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M AVmmED CLAIM UPOH THE HEADSR* 8 ATTBMTIOM 
"What i s the subject of your thesis? »»•• 
"The relationship "between history and theology*" 
"Oh*" (sotM VQCft) 
This i s an exchange familiar to anyone forking i n the area 
of the relationship between history and theology* If the M0h" 
i s uttered t>y an historian^ then i t may carry with i t overtones 
of a suspicion that history is-being meddled with* On the other 
hand* i f the "Oh" i s uttered by a theologian i t of ton oarrieo 
with i t the unspoken* largely impatient but sli g h t l y approhon* 
sive remark i "IsnH theology already complicated ©nought without 
"bringing history into i t ? " This situation presumably account© 
i n part for tho fact that from the historians* side only 
Collingwood (now out of fashion* alas) has anything of sub* 
stance to say about this relationship! and even this i s con-
fined to a few suggestive pages * From the theologians* side 
the situation i s hardly better* I t i s true that a considerable 
amount of attention has been given to the important tas& of 
forming a general Christian attitude to history* or a doctrine 
of history* However* surprisingly l i t t l e attention has been 
given to the. at least equally important investigation of the 
problem of the complex relationship between Christian theology 
and historical inajiiryr**-org we might say$ between Christian 
theology and history as the historians know i t * The two books 
to appear so far which deal with this subject e x p l i c i t l y and 
sustainedly are Richard R» iTiebuhr1 a Resurrection and Historical 
Reason (1957) and T^ A* Robert's History, and Christian Apologetic 
$$900}$ Both betray that this discussion i s at an early stage* 
On the theologians- side at least* this situation indicates 
a remarkable disinclination to bo self ^conscious about what has 
been, probably the dominant concern of theology for the past cen*» 
tury* i*e*> modern Biblical criticism* Modern Biblical criticism 
has the closest ties with the modern scientific and philo* 
v i i i 
sophio&l wafcUt v|$w# • ^©aij&iag g^-tbite ^ j ? l d .Vi«:Hii4i . Ho&go& 
jogftfeft- the following judgment j a ^\idginent which i s juat as 
ap$l£eat>lft • to t&oology a& £t £ 0 to pli£:i68#hy* HW# not Know 
tia&t lifto&& imow noihi&g outside tk© loMd: ia, spaoe. 
a»& tl^*-:«»i&'pli j^Uiiflo^ i^ cmst f£»d a &ot. £A% dog* 
watte of bo£&% but i& a opitioal study o£ t&o sots* 
o a t o i ^ * * l i ^ h ^ , , ^ ^ ^ ^ p > 8 8 ) ' ',: .: ' V . 
B&tiba*&. fit- Higbtifc# fteipg us to pXa@e this nftioi© nat ter i n 
pargfpoeMve* to -01ms?©!!- i * eom50j?i*#% fey boldly do«* 
elatfiag tJMi;.ifeU»-,ftJi#,0oat^ 03^y' efl^tefcpavife of %M 
forjaatioii .of ^  'tke'Giitmsfo tet'^toiaimW- in w£,< &&%%®mth.. mtim. 
foapgottea ^ i*@*^ 4o©@:,not fcatfi &at&Kotoipy oatagovltfn- to do&X -
isrttK): tJie-lilatd^y'Ottt^of <th£0fr i t =wfc«e$> M.'Jtfc to Itef o p t i o n 
so 110% .t&& 'Qbuvob?$& Mi^,,fo3?@od. 'fc>^  th@^ .#iigo«i^ ie0 &f'>t&& 
prooaaS to ©ftg&ge .£21, ^f««s3?iti63.^ "©f. *NMap:pr&&8£»g: ttwi- -
paet. l&.-tM&er. tfrat : l t -uilgfet. awive' o t o >'nGtt&> at tha %fc$Jfcr:, 
miid©^tanidi3jg and -ygb&Pfib- of itfwi&s&Uft^^ •• 
tl'ia©.0 .ff»ot& fthioh til© ''&poetl©r #@0@4l?ed: th#&3»: ooatta£j»slo^ *t 
f o £ U ^ 8 g pages axfc ;alt$mpt to co#&#itmto to tjj£a, 
PART I 
msitorar AIJD THEOLOGY* 
THE PROBLEM OF THB2K RILATXOHSHSP« 
"A people without hi^ tory/X® not feflawaed froia titae," 
• "Cattle biddings* T*3« l l i o t 
Chapter J 
Intro&uotion* 
1. The Problem Defined* 
The problem of history has always been with the Christian. 
Simply and obviously* t h i s situation has been dictated by the 
fact that Christianity i s founded upon an historical event* the 
Incarnation; and because i t i s coiaraissionea to fi n d i t s exis-
tence i n the world of history* 
Christians i n every period* when they have concerned them* 
selves with the relationship between f a i t h and history, have 
dealt with varying emphases with three inter*rolated but quite 
distinct problems* The frequent failure to maintain these 
distinct ions has of ten led to confusion i n the discussion of 
the Christian understanding of history* not least i n the con* 
temporary spate of boelss on this sublet* 
The f i r s t of these problems concerns <Jod*s action i n 
history § Bo m f i n d i n history the definitive revelation of 
the nature and w i l l of God* or Is this revelation supplemented 
or even threatened by a teowiedge of God derived from other 
sources* &*g* philosophy or mysticism? 
The second problem i s very closely related to the f i r s t | 
namely, the attitude which i s to be talten toward the historical 
evidence (supremely Holy Scripture) upon which Christianity i s 
£oundedf This problem i s related to but not identical with 
hermeneutiosi at least not as that discipline i s usually con-
ceived* This second problem* together with the f i r s t * i s * i n 
S 
short* the problem of revelatioh i n a very fundamental aspect* 
I t i s i n t h i s as*ea that t h i s thesis w i l l ho primarily, hut not 
exclusively* concerned* 
The t h i r d problem concerns the view which the Christian i s 
to ta&e: of the development of history (not only "holy history'O 
both, past and present* I t ia. this- area which* beginning with 
8t* Angustin#*a. concept ©f the tw o i t i e a * has deceived the most. 
self**oons©i0ua thought throu#i the centuries*. This inquiry as 
to the meaning of history i s commonly called t t e philosophy of 
histo3*y Mj a subject about which we w i l l have a great deal to 
say; later in. t his thesis*. This i s a distinctively Hebrew?-
Christian ooncerr^ one which was not genuinely raised prior to 
the Hebrew^Ohristiati development* ( I t i s interesting to note that 
those contemporaries of ours who havs been thoroughly estranged 
from Christianity claim to be t o t a l l y indifferent to the R a t i o n 
of th# meaning of hiat0.*»y#. even i n it© most secularised forms*) 
A l l philosophy of history**^ inOludlng secularised versions auoh 
as that of Hegel and M&r%. have a fundamental motivation which i s 
H0"brew*Christian i n origin} namely* the search for the meaning of 
history* ^  Although we w i l l necessarily deal with this 
$wt»3& aspect of th# Ohpi&tian. concern with history $ i t i s not 
the primary concern of this thesis* Above a l l * no attempt w i l l 
be made to present history as a rationally coherent whole* 
(1) Cf < Lowith* Karl, Meaning in Higtorsy * The University of 
Chicago •Press* Chicago> 194>9$ "Introduetion ,% 
' & • 
Another aspect of this t h i r d area of concern i s that of the 
Christian's attitude toward the culture and society which sur<* 
rounds hiraj; towards the culture and society which history has 
produced, and which i n i t s turn is having i t s own history* This 
concern i s practical In emphasis* and has the closest possible 
ties with personal and social ethics* I t can profitably be 
looked upon as the practical application of the individual 
Christian's own particular attitude toward history which he 
holds i n common with his fellow Christiana* 
Richard Niebuhr,^ i n his book Christ and Culture?^ has 
described i n a masterful fashion the various possibilities for 
the Christian i n his relation to culture. In briefest summary 
these are (together with representative theologians); Christ 
against culture (Tertullian) | the Christ of culture (Ritschlj 
gchleiermaoher) j Christ above culture (Clement of Alessandria); 
Christ and culture in.parados (Paul? Marcion)j and Christ the 
transformer of culture (I\#D* Maurice)*. The actions of every 
Christian eaepresses one or more of these possibilities, regard* 
lea© of whether he i s articulate about history or not. By and 
large the attitude the Christian takes to culture is an aspect 
of the view he takes of the relationship between Christianity 
and history as a wholes of the relationship between the action 
of God and the historical context i n which the action takes 
< 
place* 
( l ) Niebuhr, H,# Richard^ Christ and Culture« Harper Torohbooks> 
Harper and Brothers* New York, 1959# 
4 
For example! i f one conceives of history as merely the 
shell i n which God's actions take place|, then there i s l i t t l e 
"basis or motivation for talcing history and culture seriously* 
One then assumes the attitude which Ifiebuhr characterizes as 
"Christ against culture" or "Christ above culture"* I f * at the 
other extreme,* the Christian sees i n history the progressive 
unfolding of the image of God i n man) then the stage i s set 
for the, attitude which Niebuhr characterises as the "Christ of 
culture" f the characteristic- attitude of,the 19th and early 
30th centuries* 
I t i s for this reason that we say that the Christian's 
attitude to culture i s intimately related to his explicit or 
implicit view of the relationship between God's action and 
human history,* But this i s , i n turn*•. inextricably connected 
with one's attitude to the historical evidence upon which 
Christianity i s founded (the f i r s t and second problems under 
discussion);* i*e, one*s view of revelation* For example* a 
radically supernaturalistic view of v^ew -of revelation } can 
only lead consistently to an attitude toward. history which 
places Christ "against1' or "above" culturej and this i n 
turn leads to a lack of interest i n society and culture* 
So i t i s that the Christian's view of historical evidence 
(revelation) , the Christian's view of the relationship between 
secular history and God's action, 
and hi®, praotioal attitude toward eooiety and culture 
-froatol and poraonal ©thica) are a l l a&peeta of on© 
fundamental problems the problem of ChriatiaMty an& 
Matwfcfcf^ . 
How obviously»- i n regard to th0 relationship. 
b©$we©». the Chri@tian u^erstaiiding of histoid 
other aspects of the- Christian f oitb* i t i s not possible 
to atopwhere w®.have I n 1 ^ paragraph above* Profesapapv , 
^ohii iQintyr© has. eallod^ for a GhriBtian.., doctrine of histo??^. 
and of this proposed tetrin© he oayiM *»But #u#t because i t ; . 
a ^ootriaa of hijstory :| i t w i l l b© a doctrine 
which i s i» o r g ^ 
Christian f a i t h * t t ^ fll£his d,octrin© foulfl b© a natural 
1 . . . 
(1) Aft©>/making the :.ab©ve/ !thrde»fold tftytojrs^i of-, the problem 
. , of the relationship ^ M n Christianity an& history* I>.. 
• discovered the' follom^atatOTO^ on 
tlie kingdom, of deft*' I n spite of a difference of torwin-* 
• oiogy and otmte&fc* i t '«i3il'iife.<ae^  threes 
f o l d division oowtsponds to our own* 4,1?he Christian 
f a i t h i n the idjtysdott of (Jod i s a threefo l d things i t s 
f i r s t element ict confidence i n the divina sovereignty 
'whi01i.| .how^v0r hidden^:, i s .©till the r e a l i t y behind and . 
:, • l». a l l amalitie:©* A-jteaoad element lg- the conviction .-
# a t i n 3mm Ohriit the hidden Jeinadbm was not only 
revealed -in a convincing, fashion but alao began a special 
•  vaM sjew Xiiamm ataoni iaen, who had rebelled against the 
law of toir nature* Uhe t h i r d ©leaent i s the 
iiireotioia Of ' l i f e : "to' the coining of the kingdom i n power 
or to the redeiaption of the aelf<*8uffieient world**' 
' :,off/ftfifl,;in P*8*3' 
in b u r ^ , 1958* p#9*. xtalic© Mclntyre's Bdi a* 
Oliver 
9-
$a&:. losoessary .eorollary to the Christian doctrine of x 
i a a i i t ^ # ^ t o ) | This i s so because the View we tafea of manrs 
history ant his relationship, to Sod i n history -f orms, such 
a 3.aa?g© •fart of our t o t a l assessment, of man* And from 
hsre i t i s but a, short: step to the doctrines of Christ 
and - Cleft* ., 
Bo: i t i s that whatsver w: say about history must 
be aooord with t t e whole oorpus of Christian doetrinei 
. and any va l i d conclusions we re&oh about .history must b$ . 
tai&s^ aeoouat of in the remainder of that corpus* $his 
i s the batWouad; against whioh the following introductory 
'"statements should:be plaosd* ; 
y.Th@;frppose4 Treatment of the Problem*, 
fhe thro© osntral and highly interrelated contentions 
•¥... 
. • - V -
of this''%heBi$s..ar@ as follows*-' ( i t w i l l be seen that 
th&sS''.thr^ © Contentions' correspond* more or less* to' 
th$three problems which we have ^ust discussed*) 
(1) Mefntyre* John*. The Christian Doctrine of History 
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Fiiratt; ®od ©s&^ i?eveal£. hlms&tf l a hiatapr &»d thtfat&eh 
Mstoi&eallsr $oMitioa$d momH t& 
MstQy&es&ly given m&, l i istoa^alXy oo»difci©;ia©d*' 
B@0pnaa3rT asd ®lom%y E l a t e d to ota? t&ttit contentions 
pj?60.0a@ a&d tog.pweeoBr of e ^ i t t a ! ftisto^ioai inveatigB* 
t i o n liavo more pointe I n coramon than, i s genorally rooogniaed, 
$&%2.;L "bo the m%n ;tyu& o? this tlM»elta to taon&tt&to this 
OQatb&tioa thtfottgh ««a i^am$smtio» o£ th® whi0ta3P|o&3, pj?o00a&w 
^icdti. ^ AtK^fOtt- eox&aat*. <gwftgn&y oritioi^o &ad i»t©j?p3?@t 
hiatop-io&l datft}. aftd* ^ o i ^ ^ . f e y esssiaining the "yGv^^to^ 
$$QQ®m*:%® I t &^i*esent©d %n two oonteagotfapy tlsaologiana* 
3!his ^hiato^.ioa^ $voMW»n and th# %#v®:tat«3j?sr $*OQea&" w i l l 
than 'be coraparod^ I n this Gxamination tlie philoaopliical 
hi£j.toi?to9 to- ushoia ma? attention tsillt "bo dij?©ct@d aape 
c&amtmttlsta t$m* wm&®*MQ QVOG® said R*% CoUingwoodi 
and th& two qo?it^ |>05?ai?# th$o3|giaa$ will fce Eudoif B^tmann 
and Fgttl .$£3L||0h*,.' ' . 
fhlff&lys R©v@3.$vtto ( ^ o ^ hifttaxy*) i s positively 
a?®3,&t®d fa'the whoX© .of hi&toW and th® &dtt*# i n 
the &na&y®i®* hot sup^od©d ^ m . ^ ' ^ ^ ' m v ^ t f i x i ^ * 
IrapXiod i n this i s a radical affirmation of the . potfiaa-
&0nt v&SLti® of ' histoapiogik. l i f e and th© paroattetrof 
a 
histotfio&l- . l l f e^ an affirmation mvie&im. with i t t*&6iu$h*» 
'going ooaieguene^B tw- social and personal ethics a»& the 
tfutiLfe' attittt&o of the Christ ian toward. eultwe*. 
• i t • •. 
1 I t t>o h®3$ful to e^&nd bhm® tlvm® o&ata?ai OGnton* 
tlons l3©f pro<!j©^cli«g to QW Qsmimtion -of ;.th$ ahov© laon* 
tioiied philoBophioal historians aa& th^Q3?$ianai*^ 
F i i ^ t tii©a? 0o4 only Jpevaals hla$©.if i n history and thffoi^ 
histoffioallt oon&itionoa aoansii**!* 3?ey0latlon i.0 M@toioa3.ly: 
•*gl*e^ conditioned* lABm^ption of thi& 
9ta%<9ia$nt '£g that $o& &o@s raresA h&Eseifv . f l s d e l a t i o n , . 
i s ; & f i n i ^ l 3 r taet if iod to .'to -the Old and ®m ^estataents?.*and . 
s t t r a t e i ^ • tho<&po$tl<m .@&aed* (Howfr## as fd sha l l 
a l l 3t»0t0iatioa oaanot he oiroBMsOFibod within that ihieh i s 
?i?e^ ©a?do& i n th#;"©ld and lf©w IJoataioeatsy 
I t i& ;9tat^:Sa;|jj t^ia? f&rat sontontlon lids?©; that a l l rovela* 
'|&n'itakes pl®ee,l»Mat0###.. $hie i s not. tv ^0-un4©r3tQod^-a0 . 
i t of tan i $ | ' i a the ' sv^©s^i«sial s®n©e. that hiatoipy . set® th© 
••tags* 0®n$wty' Fal09ta.no) on to which revelation 
0om0 (o*6«- Jteflttft. a* ths GhJPist) * father th© SUM?© 3?adi<sal 
asadjption i s raeanty that i t i s on the paais of an hiiatoffioal 
ev©nt that the isnowie&ge and isftli of Ood i© ^vealed to us. 
• 'iTohn* Ma3feSi.. aa>a of 'thici-^^. ^  . . , • • 
(1) While a l l ths?0Q of th© historians tsfhoa we w i l l examine 
mro ps»imax?ilsr i n t o w t ^ d l a the philosophy ana method 
of historioal investigation* yet a l l thp®e 
pjpa@tS.oing hi8toj?ianQ* 
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.**.*#0desiptlon. i s not aoaathing wiiioh i s added to 
^ a t i o n ^ but i s i t s e l f ooaastitutiv^i cxt* the dyeated* 
^lutoHosl ovAtHty Wowho*o has this received $QJ?@ 
• ' fOtffciW. daq^i&idtt than l a the bp©n|&$ pmt&gm to 
§t», <3&mfa GoapM* to Wo r d to t w i i a a t e l y 
' :', :%®imm f loth .^•d^it'femohs'te 1 1 (^ Tdte &# i s 
©aid to nava b®©» "In to bogianiag with' Ood" ,» and 
• ' fo'&m b&en *to ag§n$y t > y - a ^ t l e ^ a t i o n ' ^ ^ 
to .to* fe might aljaost ®mmm. this 
• s^^tio^iiiMp $f titaa to -.©#3mi#. i i* t©ms 
and say 'f0.3? to Chtfistiani as foi? Plato* toStoraal 
i t m®m ' i & t o iaakiaagli"t>'ut that tim©. OJ? M s t e y * . 
i s ."being i n . to making*!.- in to eons© that hi*togsr 
:do*?ii^@ it©' s ignif icano© and pattern fpom to . 
©teapml diirinfc,.&j&p6m with whioh i t i s ©jtaf®d*(l) ,. , 
$ho## as?0 nutatfefr of things laid pa? irapllod in.tfcis .state* • 
m®nt tthioh could boooai© ?«apy hasajedous.'.'twjfa toy f ollowed out 
(ospMally beyond to l imits of "holy history*)., and which \?e 
H9ill avoid he.3?o.; e«8fe| to natui?© of to %fc§J?nal divin© putfposo" 
fs?oia ishiefc %istoj?y dorites i t s ,iig»ifiCQaoe,,j> axid to deseyip* 
tion of to tt3ignl£ioanco and p&ttom1* i n histojpy tfrtoh-Oevttwa 
f s?om to ^©tojmal divino^pu3^os@%; Ilbipvej? i t i s not these 
potential d i f f i c u l t i e s thioh a#o iaidsested in* but 3patoJ? to 
statementof to poaitiira Relationship between h i s t o y and to 
It#3»nalf. M®mftmv® ia#sh says of this i^iationshlp? ."jam o ? t e ; 
of ^nowi»@ l a <so**tainly tvom to h is tor ica l to to ©tOa?nalt*/ ,^^ ; 
to. Mgt$$r jshioh- i& %eing i n to ma&ing'V i s t mm l iwf t out in 
obtdlanoo to God* to ^ali&ation of tlfcie _ wiXt?*,*,*w^a .-luenoe to 
mtui^-^of to Bt0i?nal#. 
(1) Marsh*: fam* ^ e.'.B^ lftosfl:-of Haw*? and B?otoffs* 
. mm 1908* fr»14®». • m l e l n ^ 
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I n the course of The guineas of Time\ Marsh i l l u s t r a t e s 
t h i s position i n terms of the wholy h i s t o r y " of the Old 
Testament# He shows how the Jews, through t h e i r understanding 
of the h i s t o r i c a l event of the Exodus, had revealed to them the 
w i l l and nature of God* This h i s t o r i c a l l y based revelation led 
them to a new understanding of the <Eberna!j a new understanding 
of the Eternal which finds expression* among other ways* i n the 
reformulated creation stories of Qenesis 1» I n lik'e manner, and 
more obviously, the complex of events associated with Jesus of 
Nazareth reveals to us a new conception of God who i s eternally 
Father, Son and Holy S p i r i t * MThe order of knowing i s certai n l y 
from the h i s t o r i c a l to the eternal*" This means that revelation 
cannot he abstracted from i t s h i s t o r i c a l context without com-
p l e t e l y destroying the revelation* Revelation takes place i n 
and through h i s t o r i c a l phenomenaWhen the i n v a l i d separation 
of (or abstraction of) revelation from h i s t o r y ..is attempted, i t 
often takes the form of separating facts ( h i s t o r i c a l l y given) 
from meaning or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n (divinely given)* We w i l l discuss 
at length the -inadequacy of t h i s separation* and we w i l l maintain 
that f a c t and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are an indissoluble whole* ^ 
(2) 
Revelation takes place and through h i s t o r i c a l phenomena*v ' 
Our statement not only says that revelation takes place i n 
(1) P,f«, Marsh, aptffkfru PPJ 15,163, 
(3) C£* B$rth, Karl, Dogmatics i n Outline. SCM Press, London, 
1949, p# 69* Here i s a d i f f e r e n t but very f i n e expression 
of the point of view being presented here. 
h i s t o r y , but* following necessarily*, through h i s t o r i c a l l y con-* 
• • . . . . , i • • ' 
dltioned means* There i s probably no Christian theologian who j 
would not agree with t h i s statement to some extent* However 
here, as i n so much i n t h i s area* the task i s to apply t h i s . 
pr i n c i p l e consistently! to be wary of that point i n theological 
discussion where the h i s t o r i c a l l y moonditioned s l i p s unheralded 
i n t o the historically'conditioned* 
What do we mean when we say that "the h i s t o r i c a l l y waaeon-
ditloned a^ips unheralded i n t o the h i s t o r i c a l l y /conditioned"? 
The clearoBt explanation of t h i s w i l l be to give several examples* 
When we come to examine Calvin's understanding of Scripture we 
w i l l see he maintains that ( i n t h e i r o r i g i n a l form at least) the 
words of Scripture are l i t e r a l l y the words of God himself * Here 
the h i s t o r i c a l l y conditioned words of Scripture (e.g, lsaiah ?s) 
become something beyond that which i s h i s t o r i c a l l y conditioned 
and imperfect* The h i s t o r i c a l l y unconditionediihas come to 
replace the h i s t o r i c a l l y conditioned} the eternal the temporal* 
Or again, when the Pope speaks ej; cathedra on f a i t h and morals 
the h i s t o r i c a l l y conditioned and imperfect words of a man and an 
h i s t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n become i n f a l l i b l e , - i * e * free from error and 
the p a r t i a l i t y of anything which i s h i s t o r i c a l l y conditioned* 
Or yet again, when Barth discussed the V i r g i n B i r t h of the 
C h r i s t ^ recorded i n Matthew and Luke i t i s stated that not 
only are we to believe i n the religious or theological s i g n i f i -
( l ) Barth, op,* cit», Ch* 14. 
canoe of these narratives (i*e» that Christ comes to m as a 
freely~given g i f t of God, and not as a g i f t which has been 
earned or i n i t i a t e d by man)* but that we must understand these 
narratives as stating the b i o l o g i c a l condi tions under which t h i s 
b i r t h took place* One© again that which i s h i s t o r i c a l l y con-
ditioned (the concrete circumstances of Christ's b i r t h ) , and 
i n t h i s case reported i n such a v/ay as to leave the greatest 
doubts as to i t s oharaoteJ? as l i t e r a l f a c t * has become the 
l i t e r a l and unconditioned expression of God's w i l l * 
I n these three examples we have three ostensible hi s t o r id-
e a l l y conditioned events? the words of Isaiah; the words of the 
Pope| and the concrete h i s t o r i c a l circumstances of Christ's 
b i r t h * Wow we would not deny that i n each case there i s a 
greater or las expression of the Word of God* But i t i s g_uite 
another matter to say of any of the&e examples that they are 
to be accepted l i t e r a l l y as an expression of the Word of God 
e n t i r e l y free from h i s t o r i c a l conditioning and error.. I t 
makes no difference i f we go on to say that i t i s " i n f a i t h " 
that w© aocept any or a l l of these examples as l i t e r a l and 
unconditioned expressions of the Word of God* I t makes 
no difference because i t does not change t h e i r character . 
as h i s t o r i c a l events which can never legitimately be absolved 
from standing beneath the l i g h t of ordinary h i s t o r i c a l 
c r i t i c i s m * (This does not imply that only h i s t o r i c a l 
c r i t i c i s m i s to be brought to bear upon these events*) 
On what basis does anyone say they should be absolved,.and 
what purpose d>es i t serve except that of ( ^ s c ^ ^ ^ M t i r o g ) 
When the h i s t o r i c a l l y unconditioned grows up i n the place of 
the h i s t o r i c a l l y conditioned (unheralded or hot) counsel i s 
darkened* 
I t might be objected that t h i s same l i n e of c r i t i c i s m could 
be directed against the statement "Jesus of Naaareth i s the Son 
of God"* But a l i t t l e thought w i l l show that t h i s i s a very 
d i f f e r e n t sort of af f i r m a t i o n from that of our three examples. 
Let us use our example of Barth's treatment of the V i r g i n B i r t h . 
He affirms that i n f a i t h , the Christian claims that Jesus of 
Haaare.th was born of a v i r g i n * This position i s to be held i n 
spite of anything of a c r i t i c a l nature which might be said 
against the l i t e r a l acceptance of the V i r g i n B i r t h , e#g* the 
implsjisi'bllity of the b i r t h stories as a record of l i t e r a l f a c t , 
or the Xa'ek of genuine evidence that human conception ever takes 
place i n any other'way than through th$ sexual union of man. and 
woman* I n effects d o c t r i n a l b e l i e f about the V i r g i n B i r t h seals 
o f f that b i r t h against h i s t o r i c a l or s c i e n t i f i c c r i t i c i s m * 
Now l e t us tu r n to our statement "Jesus of Na&areth I s the 
Bon of God"* As Christians we af f i r m i n f a i t h that Jesus l a 
the Son of God* BJ& t f t i fraffirmation does not i n any way seal 
o f f Jesus of Nazareth against c r i t i c i s m of a h i s t o r i c a l , 
s c i e n t i f i c 4 psychological or any other nature* This affirmation 
about Jesus of Nazareth* i n contrast to our three example s» 
does not have a specific i n t e l l e c t u a l , moral or psychological 
content which may not he scrutinized, (Even less i s i t con-
cerned with his physical constituency or mode of conception*) 
Accurate, cogent discussion of his anger and of his Jewish 
nationalism i s perfectly acceptablej as i s his pr e - s c i e n t i f i e 
world-view* Nor i s the discussion of the degree to which Jesus 
conforms to various psychological types ruled out, although pn 
•psychological grounds the value of t h i s endeavour i s question** 
able* Jesus made no claims i n these matters, and i t i s presump* 
tious f o r us to make them f o r him* 
I n summary l e t us put i t t h i s way* Science and c r i t i c a l 
h i s t o r i c a l investigation are competent to ;judge the p l a u s i b i l i t y 
of a v i r g i n b i r t h , and to establish the marks of an h i s t o r i c a l l y 
conditioned and therefore imperfect narrative* (Hotice that we 
do not say that i t i s competent to establish the marks of a 
statement which i s either i n f a l l i b l e or l i t e r a l l y of divine 
o r i g i n * Jast what the former i s * i s almost inconceivablej 
the l a t t e r u t t e r l y so)» Yet Calvin and the theology of the 
Roman Catholic Church a f f i r m that they can point to specific 
divine and i n f a l l i b l e utterance5? and Barth maintains that 
he can point to a v i r g i n b i r t h * I n these areas science and 
h i s t o r i c a l investigation are sealed o f f j knowledges s p l i t * 
I n contrast^ no science i s competent or even claims to be able 
••:'tO:;.';3udg$ th© statement, "Jesus of I%aa3?©t|i i s the Son of 06A Rj. 
unless we wish 1 to say that Christian theology lp that wsoiena0 t t* 
Nevertheless t h i s statement i s not sealed off from i>tner d i s c i -
p lines! and history,* hermeneutios and philosophy e©rtainiy have 
important contributions to make, i n evaluating t h i s l a t t e r state* 
m©nt#; Her© knowledge i s not s p l i t # Xn the former statements 
(our three oataraples) th# h i s t o r i c a l l y umondltioned slip© i n to 
tak© the place of the h i s t o r i c a l l y conditioned! hut i n our l a t t e r 
statement t h i s does not take place* fte cannot ©v©n say that the 
h i s t o r i c a l l y conditioned i® transformed i n t o the h i s t o r i c a l l y 
unconditioned* Bather, th© h i s t o r i c a l l y conditioned and uncon* 
ditioned ar© tfoinedf hut i n such a way that the h i s t o r i c a l l y eon* 
ditioned never ceases to be conditioned? and as such subject to 
s c i e n t i f i c and h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m * 
John Marsh* again i n hip i n s u f f i c i e n t l y r^eogniaed book 
The Fulness. of T,img» i s especially good on the b i b l i c a l aspect 
of t h i s (g,uostion of the relationship between history and the 
Sternal*' He .states that th© Hebrew conception of history W 
inext r i c a b l y bound up with t h e i r b e l i e f that God acted in i t . 
i#e#j h i s t o r y was the means used by the 5pftvlt. Of 0od to lead 
thera to 06d« And how d$d thoy a r r i v e at t h i s concept of history? 
The Hebrews derived t h e i r concept of history from 
th© only place whonce any people can derive i t 9 from h i s t o r y * »*(1^> 
(1) Marshy SBfrS&&** 
V 
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And especially, he says,Vfrom the history of t h e i r deliverance 
from Egypt* I n other words, t h e i r access to God was through 
h i s t o r y and tha h i s t o r i c a l l y conditioned} and that t h i s h i s t o r i -
cal mode of approach to God was i t s e l f arrived at h i s t o r i c a l l y * 
But Marsh does not stop here* Later he goes on to assert 
that Jesus" "apparatus f o r experiencing events consisted sub* 
s t a n t i a l l y of the Old Testament"^ j and that passage af t e r 
passage of the Old Testament enabled him to interpret each act 
of the tragedy i n his own suffering, dying hut victorious way*"^ 
This needs to he put more e x p l i c i t l y * I t was not "voices 
from heaven" understood i n any l i t e r a l sense which enabled Jesus» 
and l a t e r at second hand his disciples, to interpret h i s l i f e . 
Rather i t was the Old Testament record of God dealing with his 
people, God's revelation of himself i n the Old Testament» which 
Jesus used with the help of the Holy S p i r i t i n order to i n t e r p r e t 
his l i f e * Here the Word of God ( i n the Old Testament) i s joined 
with the Holy S p i r i t i n the h i s t o r i c a l l i f e of Jesus of Naaareth 
i n order to bring f o r t h the Word of God i n a new and unique ways 
Jesus as the Christ* God's revelation of himself i n the past i s 
the pre-condition of, and becomesiineorporated into (however 
transformed) the revelation of God i n the person of Jesus the 
Christ* I n t h i s understanding God i s done no dishonour} he i s 
a l l i n a l l * I t i s He who has given the revelation of himself 
(1) i h i d * * p* 97* 
(S) i b i d * . p*102* 
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i n the Old Testament; i t i s He ?/ho has given to Hi© Son the 
Holy S p i r i t enabling him to use the Old Testament to Interpret 
his l i f e j and i t i a God to whom t h i s new revelation points* As 
f o r l i t e r a l "voices from heaven", i n what way do they protect 
the p u r i t y of doctrine and the honour of God? On what oasis 
does anyone maintain that God wants or needs t h l B "protection" 
and "honour"? What ig\"heavenly voice" l i t e r a l l y understood? 
And what could he less h i s t o r i c a l l y conditioned than a "voice 
from heaven"? Ambiguity on t h i s v/hole matter, even toy such 
writers as John Marsh, leads to unnecessary obscurity« Has the 
time not arrived f o r theological discussion to leave behind the 
confusion and obscurity which ambiguity on t h i s matter always 
entail s j and to come down squarely and consistently on the side 
of h i s t o r i c a l l y given and conditioned revelation? 
I n the study which forms the body of t h i s thesis we w i l l 
f urther argue at length that both h i s t o r i c a l thinking and 
revelation are o r i g i n a l a c t i v i t i e s of the human mind, i»e-*» that 
i t i s impossible to go behind them to a p r i o r a c t i v i t y giving 
r i s e to them, or to answer the question as to how or when history 
or revelation began* History presupposes h i s t o r y j revelation 
presupposes revelation* To t h i s i s added our contention heres 
revelation i s given h i s t o r i c a l l y , and i s h i s t o r i c a l l y conditioned^! 
Our f i r s t contention leads d i r e c t l y to our second* I t i s * 
the revelatory process and the process of c r i t i c a l h i s t o r i c a l 
investigation have many more points i n common than i t i s 
generally recogniaed* 
i a 
W© sh a l l discuss t h i s whole matter at length i n the follow* 
ing chapters* However w© may b r i e f l y characterise i t here i n the 
following way* History i s the observing ( d i r e c t l y and indirect-*, 
l y ) of h i s t o r i c a l events i n which they are c r i t i c a l l y evaluated, 
interpreted and organised* This process always takes place on 
the basis of previous h i s t o r i c a l knowledge;* No one aspect of 
t h i s process can be carried on i n i s o l a t i o n from the others,* . 
I t i s "objective" i f by that i t i s meant that the c r i t i c a l 
i ntelligence never relinquishes i t s function? but i t i s not 
"objective 1' i n the sense of the s t i l l popular misconception 
that the h i s t o r i a n i s engaged i n the unimaginative and uninvolved 
c o l l e c t i o n of fact s * 
Similarly the revelatory process (the process whereby we 
come to possess knowledge of God) i s the observation of h i s t o r i c 
cal events (the Bxodus, Jesus as the Christ).*, including t h e i r 
c r i t i c a l evaluation^: i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and organisation* ^  This 
takes place on the basis of previous h i s t o r i c a l l y given and con-
ditioned revelation* As i n the s t r i c t h i s t o r i c a l process, no 
one part i s carried on i n i s o l a t i o n from the whole process. 
( l ) The disciples p r i o r to Easter and Whitsunday were 
engaged i n t h i s very process i n a l l of i t s d e t a i l s , 
•1*61* an involved observation of h i s t o r i c a l events 
which they evaluated* interpreted and organised on 
the basis of previous revelation* Their conclusions, 
were consistently wrong* With Easter and Whitsunday 
the process remains the same but the conolusions are 
transformed because i t has become necessary to take 
two new events i n t o account *• the Hesarrdtetion and 
the ooraing of the Holy S p i r i t * A l l previous events 
are now refoeused* The p a r a l l e l here with h i s t o r i c a l 
inquiry i s obvious* 
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Further, the observer (direct and i n d i r e c t , at f i r s t and at 
second hand) of the historical-revelatory event i s imaginatively 
involved i n that event, although not at the expense of his 
c r i t i c a l i ntelligence* 
This i s not to obscure the differences between the two 
processes; differences which we w i l l discuss l a t e r * But i t i s 
to c a l l a t t e n t i o n to the far-reaching s i m i l a r i t y between the 
two* I t i s because t h i s s i m i l a r i t y i s usually obscured or 
ignored that the/statement of the differences i s so unsatis-
factory* 
The t h i r d and f i n a l contention which we w i l l explore i n the 
course of t h i s thesis i s : Revelation ("holy history") i s posi-
t i v e l y related to history as a whole, and the value of hi3tory 
as a whole i s not abrogated even i n l i f e everlasting* Implied in, 
t h i s i s a r a d i c a l affirmation of the permanent value of h i s t o r i - I 
c a l l i f e | an affirmation carrying with i t thoroughgoing con-
sequences f o r social and personal ethics and the whole attitude 
of the Christian toward culture* 
A concept which we w i l l i m p l i c i t l y and e x p l i c i t l y be return* 
ing to many times i n our discussion i s that of "holy history" 
(Heilageschichte)* ^ 
(1) "Holy h i s t o r y " i s frequently referred to by the German 
term: H^i&ffeschlchte*-1. The German.terms i s more; precise -
as /i•t^ .On^ ;'•:me^ ns••;;i"histoJ?y,|• i n the sense of " h i s t o r i c a l 
events* and not i n the sense of "history" as " s c i e n t i f i c 
study"* /The,;, English word "history" includes both mean-
ings*: However, since the sense of the English word 
"history" .1$; almost: always defined by the-contort i n 
which i t i s used, we w i l l confine ourselves here to the 
term "holy history'V 
SO 
What ..is,meant toy "holy h i s t o r y " i s clear enough* I t i s "the 
r e c i t a t i o n of the events that constitute the economy of salva*. 
t i o n " ^ ' ; or.t the "rehearsal of the mighty acts "by which God 
has accomplished the redemption of his creatur@Q"> ,7 . More 
simply* i t i s the record of God's dealings with man which i s 
recorded i n the Old and Hew Terstaiaents..* aiid which i s i n raajjor , 
part rehearsed annually ( p a r t l y by implication) i n the Church 
Year, 
This i s clear enough* However.* i t i s when, we cornel to con-
sider the relationship between t h i s "holy h i s t o r y " and history 
as a whole that we encounter a most d i f f i c u l t problem* 
I n f a o t , one of the major problems which we s h a l l 
have to face i s how what i s called .Heil^eachichte 
i s related • to. ordinary histo^y«*-^md whether i t 
forms'a separate continuous l i n e i n d i s t i n c t i o n 
from the l a t t e r j ' whether i t i s , on the contrary1 
interwoven with the l a t t e r j and f i n a l l y , i f i t i s so, 
how we are to describe those portions of ordinary 
' h i s t o r y v/hioh coincide with Beilsffeachiohte* (3) 
The po s i t i o n which we w i l l be maintaining i n t h i s thesis 
i s that "holy h i s t o r y " is. p o s i t i v e l y related to history as a 
whole* As '.we have affirmed before, more i s meant by t h i s than 
the f a c t t h ^ t revelation takes place i n an h i s t o r i c a l context 
("under Pontius P i l a t e " ) . Beyond t h i s i t ifemeant that "holy 
h i s t o r y " and secular h i s t o r y cannot toe separated into a d i s t i l * * 
l a t e of "holy, h i s t o r y " (or "acts of God'% "teachings of Jesus" 
etc*) leaving f o r a residue the dross which constitutes the 
(1) Mclntyrei oj>*cJ4* , p*8* ' 
(8) i b i d * y p*e* 
(3) ib,id». pp*8-9* 
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remainder of history*, They cannot he separated because not 
only'is the order of knowing from the h i s t o r i c a l to the eternal, 
but also because our•knowledge of the eternal never ceases to he 
h i s t o r i c a l * The events of the Exodus are as much a part of our 
knowledge of @od as are the Ten Commandments (themselves pro** 
foundly h i s t o r i c a l l y conditioned)* I n l i k e manner our knowledge 
of God i s not any body of k$rygma and didaohe which can he 
abstracted from the New Testaments hut i t i s that record i t s e l f 
with i t s fcarygma and didaohe* The h i s t o r i c a l record i t s e l f i s 
never superseded by a superior position* even i f i t i s one which 
has been abstracted from the h i s t o r i c a l record* 
This record i s shot through with obscurity and ambiguity,, as 
i s a l l h i s t o r y , This i s because i t i s made up of a large number 
of h i s t o r i c a l l y conditioned elements? i t i s seen."through a glass 
darkly", not " f a c t to face"* not with the "eyes of God"-* Of cou-
rse i n one very r e a l way the obscurity and ambiguity of the Bib-
l i d a l record i s f i n a l l y and decisively c l a r i f i e d by the events; of 
Easter and Pentecost* That i s our "certainty"* But f o r many 
t h i s i s not enough* B^ or many there must also be "voices from 
heaven"* With t h i s there i s usually an accompanying .de-emphasis, 
i n one degree of another, of the tension, temptation and ind&ci- | 
sion which Jesus faced (beginning with his baptism and reaching a 
climax i n Gethsemane) as he struggled to understand Crod*s w i l l foy 
his l i f e . This de-emphasis i s not only(only*) a f a l s i f i c a t i o n of ; 
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the B i b l i c a l record, but i t i s also intimately related to 'an 
a l l too common view of the l i f e of the Christian within the 
Church which i s singularly free from the awareness of the tension 
and struggle which i s necessarily a part of the h i s t o r i c a l exis-
tence of the Christian as he endeavours to understand the w i l l 
of God f o r him i n his h i s t o r i c a l , situation* No one canistand i n 
Gethsemane again? the Christ has done that once and f o r a l l * But 
the deliverance which the Christ has wrought f o r us does not 
include a deliverance from the necessity of standing i n our own 
h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n (which i s so ambiguous theologically, 
p o l i t i c a l l y and s o c i a l l y ) , taking upon ourselves the tension> 
temptation and indecision which such a position e n t a i l s , and -
seeking God's he3,p that his w i l l may be done i n our lives.* And 
indeed, i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , there may well be "voices from heaven" 
but not the kind that can be tape recorded* 
This means, concretely, to take only one of many possible 
examples, that the ef forts of such men as Rudolf Bultmann to 
understand anew God's w i l l f o r our l i v e s can be legitimately 
accepted or rejected only a f t e r the si t u a t i o n to which he speaks 
and the, answers which he gives have entered deeply into our 
hearts and minds. But what do we f i n d so often? As we read 
those men who stand i n seeming oblivion of the serious d i f f i -
c u l t i e s of contemporary theological communication, we f i n d 
cliches about Existentialism; guSLt by association with Heidfcggerj 
and six reasons why Bultmann* s theology i s not as adequate as 
Scholasticism* There i s often truth to "be found as such accusa-
tions, as these are developed, "but one senses very l i t t l e desp 
awareness of the problem to which Bultmann speaks* 
Ho> they w i l l have none of this* Th^; genuine recognition 
that our treasure i s i n earthen* historically conditioned vessels 
is not for them* nor i s the anxiety waich goes with i t . Thejf 
wi^ll foave "voices from heaven"# I f the Christ has not delivered 
them from the necessity of taking this situation upon themselves 
(he has only (!) sent the Holy Spirit to heJLp them), then they 
w i l l remedy this defect, This attempt i s made apparently on the 
basis of the convietion that the disciple must be greater than 
the master* But the master i s shown to be tr u l y master i n that 
he could tolerate the tension and ambiguity of historical eatis* 
tence and knowledge which these disciples refuse to contemplate... 
Marsh* i n the book already oited| states i n different words 
the relationship between history and the eternal whioh we have 
been pointing toward'here* 
The f i r s t thing to note i s that* though the eternal 
i s not to be identified i n any way with the world of 
time and succession Xwhi'ch would be as static or non* 
dialectical as the separation of the twoJ# i t i s related to i t very definitely and p o s i t i v e l y . , i s 
only i n and through the things of time and sense* by 
an act of f a i t h committing the whole beihg i n decision 
with the historical order i t s e l f , that he can know and 
have normative experience of the eternal«(1) 
A few pages later Marsh develops, i n a passage already quoted i n 
(1) Marsh, Qp.git*. p. 145# 
another connection,this understanding of the relationship "between 
time Q3? history and, the eternal in the following way?-* 
We might even express this relationship of time to eternity i n platonic terms and. say that for the Christian t as for Plato,, the Eternal i s never Hn the malting';| hut that time t or history* i s '"being i n the making'in the sense that history derives i t s significance and pattern from the eternal divine purpose with which i t i s endowed* (1) (2) 
• ; I t i s the phrase "time* or history* i s ^ e i n g i n the making" 
which we would especially want' to c a l l attention to. This idea 
w i l l appear frequently i n the following chapters! especially 
when v/e come to our examination of Croee* Here we would only 
emphasise that a l l we know of the eternal has "been "made" i n 
history, and i s inseparable froifi that h i story j that man as "the 
image of God" i s not only created i n history* hut that he 
developss and "becomes aware of this image only i n the course Of 
history* (The understanding* consistently applied, i s a f r u i t - * . 
f u l one for helping to comprehend the changes i n the Christ's 
actions and words between his "baptism and his death)* History 
i s the glass through which we see darkly * and nothing i n our 
experience transcends that vision* However, Paul's image here 
i s not an entirely happy one> for the vision Which we w i l l 
have "face to face" implies that the dark glass of historical 
existence i s entirely done away with, This i s not so* 
(1) ihid.t p. 14,8* 
(S) I n accepting this statement i t i s assumed that Marsh 
would he very cautious about deriving the "significance 
and pattern" of history from the divine purpose* For 
many specific historic events the divine purpose 
remains thoroughly obscure* 
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For sine© the end has i t s e l f entered into history , history can now no longer be discarded at the end: i t cannot cease and give place to something else, but must absorb history into i t s e l f * (1) 
And elsewheres 
*Phere are clues, hut certainly no *blue prints' of 
the heavenly society* We know that we shall not 
l i v e i n oblivion of history and what has taken 
place i n i t * (g) 
Perhaps even this relatively modest statement may appear 
as something of a *blue p r i n t * . I t cannot be claimed that i t i s 
devoid of the element of speculation* However our human nature 
constrains us to say something about the heavenly society, and 
certainly we can say as much as Marsh has said here. His position 
which seems to be largely identical with the one which we have 
been developing throughout this introduction, i s a clear eorrelarj 
of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. Moreover, to saj 
any less i s to reduce history to a meaningless shadow play, to re< 
duce our conception of God to something akin to that of Voltaire, 
and to invite irresponsibility toward historical possibilities. 
At least the seeds of jjust this situation ta found within a 
s t r i c t l y f u t u r i s t eschatology with i t s failure to properly eval«- ! 
uate the h i s t o r i c a l , via*, a denial of the resurrection of the 
body, a demoniaation of God, and an invitation to historical-
social irresponsibility# And f i n a l l y , as Marsh points 
(1) Marsh, fi£*cj^t> P* 169* 
(2) ,ibid». pfXGl* 
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out at length l a his booli,. any jguoh separation of history and 
eternity 'ie. foreign .to 'both. the Old and. Hew lestament®^ • 
I f the theology of the Churoh lis© ©oiaetime&. forgotten ©3? 
obseured 'this situation* the .worship of the Church and especially 
the Holy Cowiaunion has stood a® a reminder (a&iaittedly often 
ignored) that s&ored and secular are not separate* In the Ho^sr 
Comfliiimion thepBaored enters into history* infl^oneing i t and 
being influenced by I t * . Eevelstlon i s positively related to 
secular h i story $ and the value of secular history i s not abro«t 
gated even i n l i f e everlasting* 
<8* Soiae Past treatments of the Problem* 
As a further introduetion to thie study i t w i l l he helpful 
to loole at the my i n ViSiioh the Old and "lot Eestasients and 
various representative Christian write»-3have dealt with the 
problem of the relationship between the Christian (or Jewish) 
f a i t h and history* In making thi§ brie? ej&oaihation we w i l l be 
following, th© thr@e*part division of the- subject which tie outlined 
at tli® beginning of this introduetlonj ( i ) th© attitude toward 
Oo&*£ aotion i n hletoryf (0) the interpretation of seriptures 
(a) the understanding of the relationship between Christianity 
and the whole of history* and including one1 & attitude toward 
oontemporary culture and society* 
St i@ the tirat two of these three divisions which are the 
meet relevant to the oonoern of this thesisj yet* as we eh&li 
seep i t i@ this part of the probleiate which haa received the 
least attention* The varictis attitudes vhlch"-ln the -past haw 
been tateen toward the histories! evidence- upon which Christianity I 
i s "based are not satisfactory for the contemporary Christian*. 
Why are they not satisfactory? I t w i l l be one of the indirect 
aim© of this thesis to throw mm l i g h t on this situation* 
However* at this point t mo can -make the following highly sirapli** \ 
fia d statement* fhe attitudes which have been taken i n the past 
are not satisfactory because the uroblo.m .of- the c r i t i c a l use of 
historical evidence was never r&ise&^^or a l l practical purposes. . 
**~-unfclX the beginning of the 19th Century*< And i n fact, i t 
eould not be raised apart from t«o .other interrelated phenomena j 
of the past centurys c r i t i c a l , historiography and b i b l i c a l ! 
criticism* 
Aa a result of this relatively recent development wo have a 
situation i n which a unci© new area of oa&erlenee and thought 
presents i t s e l f f o r integration into the Christian f a i t h * This • 
la a eh&llange which has been ta&en up and focused f l r a t i n 
b i b l i c a l evitielSB} and then* later* i n the detfytholog&aation 
controvex'ay* • Of course* l i k e any challenge * i t has brought 
f o r t h the usual, quota of r i g i d * negative reactions* 
I n an examination of any of the standard BOI&S on the history 
of Christian doctrine we f i n d a long development of thought con-* 
eeroing the doctrine, .of God* .tlwa Christ* the (Shurch etc«| a 
development which cannot be ignored by those doing contemporary 
work i n these areas. But what does one f i n d concerning the 
mind of the early Church as regards history, historical interpret 
tation and the closely a l l i e d subject of revelation? There i s a 
discussion of the establishment of the Canon, of the tension 
between Scripture and tra d i t i o n , the use of allegory for the 
interpretation of Scripture*—-and l i t t l e else. There i s l i t t l e 
help here for the Christian searching for answers to the problems 
which have been raised by the development of c r i t i c a l history, 
b i b l i c a l criticism, the relationship between "holy" and secular 
history etc. I t i s against this background that Professor John 
Mclntyre has called for a Christian doctrine of history v ', and 
Paul T i l l i c h speaks of far-reaching restatements of traditional 
doctrines (e«g» Christology) as a result of a Christian inter** 
pretation of h i s t o r y , ^ 
With this genoral statement we turn now to see what the 
Old Testament and previous Christian writers have had to say 
upon this subject* 
The Old Testament. Our previous discussion has touched upon 
the Hebrew conception of the relationship between God and his-
tory • I t now remains to Btate their attitude on each of the 
three levels which we distinguished i n the f i r s t part of this 
introduction* 
(1) Mclntyre, prp»p,^ t.»a Ch*l* 
(2) T i l l i c h , Paul, The .Interpretation of History* p*86i. 
God's action i n history, In the Old Testament w© have 
what is' perhaps the pre-eminent expression of the conviction 
that God acts i n history, and i n this action reveals himself 
and his w i l l for his peopXe*. The entire complex of events which 
make up the Exodus form the foundation of the Old Testament * and 
echoes of this are found throughout the Hebrew Bible (and to a 
lesser extent* of courset i n the New Testament too)* The Hebrew 
conception of history was inextricably bound up with the belief 
that God acted i n i t * 
As with the historiansj so with the prophets of the 
pre~exilic period* Amos, Mioah* Hosea, Isaiah and 
Jeremiah a l l take the deliverance from Egypt as the 
point where God acted i n history to make Israel his 
people f and as the event which l a i d upon them o b l i -gations Qt loyalty and obedience which could not be 
neglected or ignored without disaster! ( l ) 
This aspect of the Hebrew attitude to history i s too obvious to 
require further emphasis* 
interpretation of Scripture* I t i s when we turn to our 
second levdlji:: the 'attitude toward historical evidence, that v/e 
encounter a radically different mental outlook* I t i s , of course 
p r e c r i t i c a l j there i s no judging and weighing of the historical 
record* (A c r i t i c a l evaluation, i n some form,,- would, have had to 
have gone on when the record was i n an oral formj but of this we 
have no record.*) But beyond this there i s seen the willingness 
to take non^historieal myths (o$g« the Babylonian creation myth) 
(1) Marsh. o^ f,Qi t«,« p*44* This seotion on the Old Testament i s heavily indebted to Marsh-s book which gives a f m i l 
discussion with Biblical references of that which i s 
presented here i n summary fashion. 
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and pastoral 03? agricultural feasts (e>g« the feast of unleav* 
ened "bread) and rework them i n order that they might become the 
vehicle and symbolic expression of the essentially historical 
drama which we fi n d i n the Old Testament*^ To our l i t e r a l i s t i c j 
post-scientific minds this i s a most perplfeeing phenomenon,* We 
can scarcely comprehend the attitude which made such a procedure 
acceptable* I t does, as Marsh points out, t e s t i f y to a remark* 
ably developed sense of the historical and i t s importance j but 
i n a form which i s alien to the contemporary Christian* Indeed* , 
our asking the auestion of the Hebrew attitude toward historical ' 
evidence i s anachronistic; they would never have been capable of 
speaking of the matter i n any such terms* However, our question 
i s a necessary anachronism as we t r y to grapple with this problem] 
I 
Judaism and history* The t h i r d level, the attitude toward seculaj 
i 
history and culture, i s hardly less anachronistic when applied 
to the Old Testament? although the answer implicit i n i t i s 
both comprehensible and much more satisfactory* We say this 
because the preponderant weight of the Old Testament i s against 
any radical division between sacred and secular* True> there i s 
the "chosen people" and there are th© gentiles, But a l l i s under 
the sovereignty of God* I f the Hebrews prosper, that ik God*s 
doing* I f they are chastised by the gentiles, that too i s ! 
G-odts doihg# Commenting on the Book of Jonah, Marsh 
( l ) Of. Marsh, stB#fisii#- f Oh* 3* 
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says of I t a intention?* 
The divine pity«**is constitutive not only of 
. salvation history but of secular history as 
well* The divine purposes of redemption are 
universal i n their scop©*. (1) ; 
Of the view which fragments l i f e ihto contemplative and active, 
s p i r i t u a l and material, sacred and seoular, church and culturej 
the Old Testament i s refreshingly free* This observation i s 
obvious enough| yet how much theological writing and, even more, 
conversation (here we are not so painstakingly orthodox) proceeds 
i n oblivion of this "obvious" observation^ 
The Hew Testaments God*® action in history*: I n the New 
Testament i t i s i n St» Paul that we have the closest approxima« 
tion to any self-conscious reflection about history* Concerning 
our f i r s t level. r God*s action i n history* Paul was at pains to 
emphasize that i n Christ God had acted i n history? that this was 
no angelic v i s i t a t i o n ^ but solidly within the stream of human 
l i f e and history* Further he says that God had prepared for 
this event i n the Jewish nation* and that i n the fulness, of. time 
he had brought his plan to completion i n the person of Jesus of 
Hasareth, 
'• Interpretation of Scripture* On our second level, the 
attitude toward historical evidence, and including the inter-* 
pre tat ion of Scripture (the Old Testament) * we do not have a 
uniform picture i n the New Testament* This i s what we would 
naturally expect due to- the diverse origins of the writings 
(1) Marsh, g&*Si£*» P*1U.. 
Included within i t * On the one hand there are instances of 
complete l i t e r a l i s m , as i n Matthew*s introduction of a second 
donkey into his account of Jesus* entry into Jerusalem i n order 
to exhibit an exact correspondence with 2©eh*ix*9*^ On the 
other hand we see; attempts to break away from literalism, as i n 
gaul^s treatment of the resurrection of the body i n I Cor* xv* 
:The prohlem of the interpretation of historical evidence 
was., for the Hew "Testament writers, the problem of the inter-
pretation of the Old Testament i n i t s relationship to Jesus 
Christ* What God,had done i n the person of Jesus of Haaareth 
was "according to the.Scriptures", i*©> i t had been planned by 
God and foretold i n the Old Testament* "Thus the Church was 
committed, by the very terms of i t s kerv^ma* to a formidable 
task of b i b l i c a l research, primarily for the purpose of clarify** 
ing i t s own understanding of the momentous events out of Which 
i t had emerged* **"^ 
C*H* Dodd, i n his book Acoordinp; to the Scripture a * 
argues that this task of Biblical research was carried on i n the 
following way* F i r s t , there was "a certain method of b i b l i c a l 
study"* This method was not, as i s often thought, to use a 
collection of isolated "proof texts"} these collections being 
a later development* Secondly, the New Testament writers used 
a large selection of Old Testament passages* especially from 
(1) Dodd, C*H:*, According to the Scriptures* ftisbet & Co. Ltd*, 
London, l^Sa/piiS1?'* 
(2) i b i d * p#14* 
Xsaiahj Jeremiah* the Psalms and certain minor prophets-*. 
"These section® were understood as wholes? and particular 
verse© or sentences were quoted from them rather as pointers 
to the whole context than as constituting testimonies i n and 
for themselves*"^ Thirdly? "The relevant scriptures were 
understood and interpreted upon i n t e l l i g i b l e and consistent 
principles as setting f o r t h 'the determinate counsel of $o&* 
which'was f u l f i l l e d i n the gospel facts, and consequently as 
f i x i n g the meaning of those facts*' 7 Bodd further says that 
the whole body of material resulting from this method provides 
the starting point and chief regulative ideas of the theology 
of Paul, the author of Hebrews and the Fourth Evangelist*^ 
The content of these "chief regulative ideas" i s , as G,K* Barrett 
points out i n an indfcpendant discussion of this same problem, 
made up of "two-primary features.: the kingdom of God, and the 
person of Josus as the Son of man"^* 
On this basis Dodd rejects the idea that the New Testament 
v/riters look upon the. Old Testament as pious fortune t e l l i n g or 
a collection of "proof texts"j although admitting, of course$ 
that there are instances of both* This does not mean that the 
Old Testament ideas were transferred intact into the New Testa* 
ment* Rather they were transferred into their new context with 
( l ) Dodd, op»cit», Ptl26» I t a l i c s Podd^s* 
(8) ibid* * pp#lg6~lS7* 
(3) £bi&*? pa27« 
. (4) Barrett, C*K«, "Yesterday, Today and For Ever", Inaugural 
lecture of.' the Professor of Divinity, pxiblished by the 
University of Durham, Durham, 1969* p»9t 
Ma certain s h i f t , nearly al?/ays an expansion-, of the original 
scope of the passage*"^ (This, of course, must be done care-
f u l l y ; and each instance must be judged on i t s own merits..) 
Thus, to take just one example:-
Christology, i t i s not too much to say, i s rooted i n 
the understanding of the passion% death and resurrec-tion of Jesus i n the l i g h t of the £oid Testament} 
ideas of Son of Man and Servant* (8) (3) 
As C#K* Barrett says, V*#the historical tradition was from the 
beginning oombined with and used i n the interests of the con-
vic t i o n 'Jesus i s L o r d l M ^ V 
That which emerges from the Hew Testament transformation of 
the Old Testament material i s something new* yet i t i s based upon 
the same understanding of history as that possessed by the Old 
Testament writers themselves* This understanding of history 
podd characterizes as follows 
History, upon.this-view, or any rate-the history of 
the people of God, i s b u i l t upon a certain pattern 
corresponding to God'*a design for man His creature* 
I t i s a pattern, not i n the sense of a pre-ordained 
sequence of inevitable events, but i n the sense of 
a kind of master-plan imposed, upon the order of 
human lis?© i n this world by the Creator Himself, 
a plan which man i s not at liberty to al t e r , but 
within which his freedom works* I t i s this pattern, 
disclosed ,"in divers parts and divers manners" i n 
the past history of Israel, that the Hew Testament 
writers conceive to have been brought into f u l l 
l i g h t i n the events of the gospel story, which 
they interpret accordingly! (s) 
(1) Dodd, ej&*, p*lSO„ 
(2) frPid., p#U9# 
(S) Here again we see the relationship between the problem 
of history and that of Chrictology t 
(4) Barrett, C*K», oja»cJ^*? P*^ » 
(5) Dodd, oj&*eit M p*128#. : 
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Thusft i n spit© of certain instances of the use of "proof 
te&ts", ana* i n spite of the lack of any c r i t i c a l attitude toward 
the h istorical "basis of the Old Testament such as we w i l l f i nd 
when we turn to Origftn, thexje i s i n the Mew Testament a creative 
and disciplined effor t to relate the Old Testament to the event 
of Jesus the Christ* 
Christianity and history* In turning to examine the Mew 
Testament attitude toward cultural or historical l i f e , we w i l l 
confine ourselves to St* Paul* We do this "because i t i s only 
8t» Paul who provides us with sufficient material to make an 
evaluation i n this area* 
In a long, very careful and more comprehensive considers^ 
ti o n of Paul's attitude to culture than we are attempting here, 
fit Richard Hiebuhr characterises Paul's position as "Christ and 
culture i n paradox"* ^  On the one hand Paul emphatically 
affirms that.(Sod has entered into history* "The new l i f e , 
moreover, was not simply a promise and a hope hut a present 
r e a l i t y , evident i n the a b i l i t y of men to c a l l upon (Sod as 
their Father and to bring f o r t h f r u i t s of the s p i r i t of Christ 
within them and their eomBiunity*"^ Therefore, since this new 
l i f e i s a present historical reality* there could be no question 
of a radical denial of the Value of cultural l i f e . On the other 
hand the revelation i n Jesus Christ had placed a l l men and a l l 
cultural a c t i v i t y on the same level* namely, that of a sinful 
humanity before the wrath of God# 
(1) Hiebuhr* e g , * C h i 6 » 
(2) i b i d * * p*X66* 
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The net result which came out of this tension was to assign 
to culture (in -its "broadest sense) a negative .function; i t s 
function was "to prevent sin from becoming as destructive as 
i t might otherwise be, rather than to-further the attainment of 
positive g o o d * A s i t i s obvious from the Pauline lit e r a t u r e , 
practices of the surrounding culture such as slavery were taken 
for granted. I t was only when, such practices were destructive 
of the individual Christian*s f a i t h and morals that they were 
vigorously opposed. Such a position conceivably would have been 
adequate for a relatively short interim between the f i r s t and 
second comings; hut over, the course of the centuries i t has 
often supplied a basis for the rationalisation of p o l i t i c a l and 
cultural conservatism, 
Paul's concern i n regard to history i t s e l f i s i n line with, 
his general position* History presented no problem to him ex-* 
cept insofar as i t had to do specifically with the coming of 
the C h r i s t * ^ Thus i t i s that Paul i n Romans 5 j i f f * has an 
extended discussion of the problem presented by the fact that 
the Hebrew people, who had been prepared through a long course 
of history to receive the Christ, had i n fact not done so. 
Concerning history as a whole he i s silent? and this stands 
i n strong contrast to the statements of great importance which 
he has to make up on so many aspects of the Christian f a i t h * 
(1) Wiebuhr, op.clt« p*169, 
(2) £f* Barrett,, pp.cit., pp« 7-9, 11,00 fe& naoaim. 
The explanation of ..this i s clotse at hand: the situation of the 
early Church was such that the problem of the relationship he** 
tween f a i t h and history was not visible* 
Orfrffeiu God* a action i n history* In Qrigen (approximately 
185**SB5 A»D«) we have a full-blown manifestation of strongly 
Hellenistic, non-historioal presuppositions being brought to bear 
upon Christian revelation; a point of view which has never ceased 
to plague the church* As we have said before, the decision ono .: 
makes i n regard to our f i r s t level (i*e* whether or not God*s 
revelation of himself talces place 4j& and throuqjh history) has 
thoroughgoing consequences which reach out into every area of 
Christian l i f e and thought* And i t i s just this matter of the 
significance of history which i s "The c r i t i c a l subject upon which 
Origen never accepted the b i b l i c a l viewpoint ••V*^ Behind this 
rejection of the significance of history i s Origen's characteris-
t i c Platonic aversion to particularity* 
Interpretation of Scripture* According to R*P,G#. Hanson* 
"Origen i s the f i r s t father of the Church whose interpretation 
of Scripture we can survey and judge f u l l y , A r i s i n g out of a 
time of comparative literacy, and one i n which Christians were 
well acquainted with the Bible, Qrigen set aside the crude employ* 
raent of proof texts "in favour of a carefully compiled commentary^ 
equipped with a suitable apparatus of l e a r n i n g * " ^ The result 
(1) Hanson:, E*P*C*, Allegory and Event. SGM Press Ltd*j» London, 
1959, p*360*' " 
(2) Hanson, p$*eit>r p«359» 
(8) For the great importance of Scripture i n Origen's whole theology see Mollahd, Bjaanr^ha Conception of the Qosoel i n the Alexandrian Theology. I Kommisjon HOB Jacob^  Bybwad, OslOir1938* pp,U5*9<3& \®& MmM* 
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of this.new approach to Scripturejas a very mixed owe, on the 
one hand he had an oracular view of the Bible* together with 
the attendant conception of inspiration and inerrancy which go 
with that view* He spiritualised the Biblical record, making 
an extensive use of allegory to this end#^ A i l of these . 
Characteristics, which are alien to our contemporary exegesis* 
he derived fr^m Philo* Commenting upon this Hanson cayas 
We can therefore reasonably claim that the particular 
parts of Origen'a interpretation of Scripture which 
are irreconcilabie with the assumptions of the 
scholars of today derive largely-(but not solely) 
from sources extraneous to traditional Christianity* 
from a Platonic attitude to history and a Philonic 
attitude to Holy Scripture* (2) 
Yet* on the other hand* Origen did abandon the use of crude 
proof texts and the acceptance at face value of much of the Bible*. 
(His Platonic leanings demanded as much)* In this endeavour 
&Llegory was again a useful instrument* Some of the results of 
this approach have a most contemporary ring* "Hot Rudolph' 
Bultmann himself could be more anxious than Origen was to e x t r i * 
cate essential Christian dogma from the belief i n the three~sto;pv 
Keyed universe* or from a l i t e r a l interpretation of esch&talogical; 
imagery* And "Origen*s agile mind conceived* or at least 
(1) Cf# Holland* pp*136»144 e,t pass*P* "To translate the bodily Gospel into a spiritual Gospel i s the purpose of Origen*© exegesis"* 
(g) Hanson* oft»p^ fo*y p*368* £g> Holland* &D*C|&.* pp*85ff* 
Molland points but that despite Origeirs indebtedness to 
Greek thought* he places a very limited value upon I t s 
achievements*' He rejects the idea that any significant 
knowledge of God can be attained through philosophy ozit 
"general revelation"* . 
(3) Hanson, op*o.,lt[»» p*366* G£* Molland* OP.*.clt.*« pp*lMff * 
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developed and elaborated, the conception of the Bible as a record 
of G-odVs gradual revelation of himself to men«*#^ ^ Concern* 
ing the story of Mam and Eve (and ©the* similar examples could 
"be cited) there l a strong evidence that Origen did not see i t as 
his t o r i c a l at a l l # ^ 
In short, Origen*e Platonic and Philonic presuppositions 
forced him to abandon a l i t e r a l acceptance of Scripture, and to 
assume a c r i t i c a l and evaluative attitude* 3?he results ware 
sometimes f r u i t f u l , but because his presuppositions were a n t i * 
h i s t o r i c a l i n nature isuoh of what he had to say was t o t a l l y 
alien to the s p i r i t of the Scriptures which he endeavoured to 
Interpret* 
Christianity and history* Mien we come to the matter of 
attitude toward culture? we do not have any ejsplicit considera* 
ti o n of this sub ace t by Origen to which we can turn* The absence 
of any such material i s i n I t s e l f significant* Beyond this nega-*, 
tiv e evidence,it.ia- easy to infer Origen's attitude to culture 
from statements he makes i n other contexts. For example^ 
Danielou offers t h i s estimate of a crucial passage i n Origen1s 
jSom^entary on ,the Song of Qon^ s* 
(1) Hansonf Oj3«c4|%> p*367. 
(3) G*L* Prestige, minimises this aspect of Grigen*s wor&» See* 
Prestige, G*L.: gathers, and Here.tiga*, SPCKf London| 1954*, p*68* Of p Moliand.^ o j ^ ^ I J * * wilMSS* 
(3) Hanson-* OJ,^cJ^*? p«869ff* 
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What i t amounts to i s , i n fact, an account of the three 
ways £bf spi r i t u a l l i f e j , thepurgative* the illumina-
tive and the unitive* We may* take special note of what 
Origen say$ about the second of these, as i t i s 
particularly interesting., The essential operation 
of the illuminative way i s the formation of a true 
estimate of things: the soul must come to realize 
the nothingness of temporal things and learn to 
understand that the spiritual world alone i s real«(l) 
The whole of Origen's mystical theology i s i n this s p i r i t | 
namely* a theology which i s "more towards intellectual contem-
plation than towards the experimental awareness of the presence 
of God and the transfiguration of the spuliby l o v e M ^ 
Ecstasy and the "vision of God" ? rather than any tbroughgoing 
concern for the "Kingdom of God% are the characteristic notes 
of Origen's theology* 
Howeverp there was one area of culture, and we might expect 
this from what we have said "before, about which Origen wa$ eon-s-
eemed* This was the intellectual and contemplative heritage 
of Hellenic culture* And although he placed only a limited 
value upon the results of this heritage f yet one of the chief 
motivations i n Origen's Biblical exposition was his desire to 
make the Bible i n t e l l i g i b l e to his contemporaries who had been 
educated i n this tradition* Whatever his excesses* he cannot 
but be admired for the competent execution of this desire* 
(1) Dani^lou. Jean^ Orircen* Sheed and Ward. London* 1955* 
p,305* The value of Dani^lou*a evaluation i s strengthened 
by i t s sympathetic appraisal of Origen's work* 
(2) ibid,» p.-SOg* 
In the chaptei1 on Origan in Fathers and Heretic^ G>L» 
Prestige> who curiously hints at "but .never e x p l i c i t l y mentions 
Origen's t o t a l l y inadequate evaluation of the importance of 
history i n Scripture.9 lias this to; say; 
I3?he Platonically- and Fhilonieally inspired! 
allegorical method "saved- the Scripturee for 
the C h u r c h l e n a b l i n i l "both Testaments to to© 
defended against the destructive criticism of 
educated Hellenists* And "by saving the Bible, 
i t gave security to the historical foundation 
of the Christian f a i t h and permanence to the 
evangelical standard of Christian values* ( l ) 
Theology does indeed make strange bedfellows? A thoroughly 
antihistorical exegesis saving the historical foundation of the 
Christian Church* And yet Prestige's point can quite plausibly 
be argued* 
Prestige elaborates upon our debt io Grlgen i n this matter f 
saying %*• 
The Church owes i t to Origen, f i r s t and foremost, 
th&tjj. whenever Christianity la true to i t s e l f , i i 
• Is^a-rational f a i t h * The v/hole educated world i s 
i n his |e|>t for the preservation of the old Hellenic 
intellectual cultare * $hioh he transformed by hi© 
genius into the beginnings of a -ohilosonhia •oerennia 
for Chrietendoiaf (£) 
This would seem to be an accurate estimate of OrigenV contribu* 
t i o n to Christian philosophy* However, i t i s also a decidedly 
one-sided estimate* Orison's transformation of the "Hellenic 
Intellectual culture" l e f t certain important aspects v i r t u a l l y 
(1) Prestige, Qp«0i:i|*» pf59* 
(0) j&£d«..* p*64*. 0£* Holland, sSBSfS^t-* EN 
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•unchanged; principally the non-historical outloolc of that culture 
and the attendant belief that "the spi r i t u a l world alone i s 
real". I t i s impossible to reconcile this with the Biblical 
point of view* I f Qrigen i s to have credit for this perennial 
philosophy of Christendom, then perhaps he should also have a 
©hare of the credit for the perennial plague of Christendom^ 
namely# the non-historical " s p i r i t u a l " bias which finds i t s 
most popular contemporary egression i n terms of "eternal truths" 1 
and "the teachings of Jesus" (outmoded i n the theologian's study 
but s t i l l regnant i n pub and pew)« 
at* Augustine,* We turn now to the 0th Century and St* 
Augustine j a name synonymous with the Christian interest i n 
history* This subtle and p r o l i f i c writer deals with history 
at a l l three of the levels which we have been discussing. 
Augustine^ ideas about God's action i n history and the rela-
tionship betv/een Christianity and history (our f i r s t and th i r d 
levels) have of course been the subject of much theological 
discussion through the centuries* However* Augustine also had 
much to say about the interpretation of Scripturej ideas which 
were creative and significant In the historical context i n which 
they arose, and which cannot be ignored even today* This aspect 
of Augustine*s work has received surprisingly l i t t l e systematic 
a t t e n t i o n * ^ 
it) C£# Cochran©, C*H«, Christianity and Classical Culture. 
Oscford University Press, Oxford, 1940* pp*4?4*478*These 
fiv e suggestive pages are the longest ©elicit discussion 
of Augustine *s treatment of Scripture available i n English* 
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•<*0dV aoHlon i n hiatary* Auguattna eo&h&elso* not only 
. that God aata i n that portion of history which &a a^aordad i n 
tha Old and JTaw ifflaments*; but also i n history, i n I t s ant&r&ty* 
"She &&l«hlah and tjwas Ood with Ilia Word and. Holy Spirit .*** 
(&a tha creator and ma&ar of. a l l s p i r i t and i l l body*.**,'* ^ 
Moreover* this aatian of God i s not a static* Qnaa*upan*a«#tima 
aotj. rather i t i a dynamic and continuing* %% i s Ood 
#-t#fi?0» #iosa are the potentialities of things yet to 
feevra«CUaedt the raalimtiost-of things eaaa only 
potential*- and the motion of development which enables 
what &a potential to become real and what ia. ra&l. to 
. create other potantiaXit^ *>*.*»:(fhia being the natura of 
tha. Christian God) i t i a beyond beliaf that aueh a Sod 
wished the idftgdons of man* their- lordships and thai? 
aervitudaa.*, to ba outalda the laws of his fmHrnm* (1) 
$n-ihia ^tiotatl«a Auguatina la pointing out aoiaething vm 
have aailad attention to aatfUav i n t h i » Intreduationi namely 
that one's uadepa&eMiag of Oted ia intio&t&fty ralatad' to tha 
vlaw ana takea. of hiatovy and i n history* One of the 
vwwvte*& aontenMona. of the ffitfly^qg dpd: i s that thai pagans1 
falsa ooneaption of ®od lad tham into a-distorted apprahanalan 
of tha aatwo af man. and of .histary.* 
Jntarpratation of gc&tpttttf** Turning to. Auguatina*® intar*' 
pratatian of aar&pt&ra wa f i n d that ha mo&ds Origan* a .. 
PXatoniaaliy itt&ivad a i i a g a r i ^ l n g ^ * . but at the aama time 
U) MM&Mh **SA#- Sranalation by a«H» Barrow., |ntra^eMcm. : 
ffetoei? and Paha? L o n d o n * I S w I P W 
J f w f SojjjSeFiani mora aasprahane&va commentary an thia ! 
p&aaaga aae Barrow* ^ BS^ QU-v PP» 3*159*4.62 aj| $$$$11* ! 
(B) itetractationes -ila£&*l* Aagustina i a alsa cautioua about. 
apaautewn aanaorning th© Second coming,* sees jpa, fiiv^ $e^ » 
s v i l i * : 0&» m* 30* 
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he i s not content with literalism* For example* the creation 
i s to be understood as taking place "in some other way" than 
within the six days defined by the c i r c u i t of the s u n * ^ 
Augustine distinguishes t for example i n the f i r s t part of The 
Sp i r i t and the Let "top.* between the l i t e r a l and figurative mean* 
ing of Scripture« 
That textf,*-*wMThe l e t t e r k i l l e t h , but the s p i r i t giveth 
l i f e ' * - * — i s naturally taken to mean that we are not to 
understand the figurative sayings of Scripture i n their 
l i t e r a l sense, which may be ir r a t i o n a l * but to look for 
their deeper significance***^) 
This passage demonstrates that Augustine* far from being a-
l i t e r a l i s t , sees the d i f f i c u l t i e s presented by Scripture on &. 
relatively superficial* verbal level* Beyond t h i s , moreover* 
he understands that there are deeper d i f f i c u l t i e s i n Interpreta* 
tion; as for example the d i f f i c u l t i e s presented i n The Spirit 
and the Letter when he discusses Paul's concepts of law. grace 
and j u s t i f i c a t i o n * ^  At other plaee© this same discernment of 
the d i f f i c u l t y i n Biblical exegesis i s seen as Augustine tries 
to reconcile the Old and New Testaments*^ 
Against this generally favourable estimate of Augustinefs 
use of Scripture, an estimate which we do not wish to retract* 
there must be placed certain exceptions and qualifications* For 
example, i n The P l r ^ t Homily, on I John Augustine comments on 
( l ) De (Sen* ad Litf t * * i i i * 86* Cited by Christian* W*A*. "The '  Creation of the World" i n A Companion to the Study of 3t» AUKUaftine* Oxford university Press, New York, 1965', p*819f 
(3) "The Library of Christian Classics", Augustinet. Later toks 
edited by J. Burnaby, 8CM Press Ltd*> London, 1955* p*198* 
(S) jbid*:*. pp*gS7ff« 
(4) Be U t i l * Cred* * i v * 18 j v i . 13 §t passim* 
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Isaiah*'0 words "He put a band upon my head as on a bridegroom*: 
and adorned me as a bride, with her ornaments*"^; saying 
baldly that here Isaiah "speaks i n Christ's person"* Or again, 
Augustine seems to regard Christ 's remark about the camel pass-* 
ing through the eye of the needle not as an example of oriental 
hyperbola, but as something which i s l i t e r a l l y possible with 
Ood*s help (although admitting i t has never taken place) * Or 
yet again* i t i s inconceivable that "The Song of Bongs" was 
ever intended to be a straightforward love song* Many other 
such instances could be cited , and yet compared with the stren«* 
gths of Augustine * s approach to Scripture they are relatively 
insignificant flaws* 
Another weakness of Augustine's interpretation of Scripture^ 
and one of a different order from that Just discussed, i s his 
imperfect conception of the nature of historical knowledge, 
Suppose someone thinks he knows the {historical! fact 
I have 3ust mentioned about Cicero* Nothing prevents 
him from learning i t * though i t cannot be a matter of 
knowledge s t r i c t l y speaking* But $f he does not know 
the diffex*ence between true toowlecige> 1*0*, rational 
knowledge, and belief i n what has been profitably 
handed down to posterity either by report or i n w r i t -
ing CUet, historical Knowledge] , he certainly errsj and there i s not error without disgrace t Our knowledge, therefore, we owe to reason% our beliefs to authority*** 
Knowledge always implies belief#**But belief does not 
.always imply knowledge* *. (.&) 
The passage goes on to explain why the acceptance of Christian 
belief upon the basis of authority i s to be commended* 
(1) Isa, 61*10, 
(S) fie U t l l * p^ ed«i x i i S6« Quoted ins "She Library of 
Christian Classics", Aujgustine; Barlier Writings, 
edited by John H*8*.Burleigh, SCM Press Ltd*, London, 
1961* p* 312. 
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Augustine' s estimate of history here i s perfectly applicable 
to that form of "history' 1 known as ohroaologyi*i--the only form 
of formal history with which Augustins could have been familiar* 
But i t i s not applicable to genuine *. c r i t i c a l history Which 
partakes f u l l y i n what he describes sis "reason". However as 
i t i s only within the last century that the Churdh has become 
selfconsciously aware of what i s involved i n this matter, i t 
would be anachronistic to take Augustine to task here* Nevel?-* 
theless,the Church's handling of the Hew Testament,, at least*, 
has fre&ueutly been marked more by the s p i r i t of c r i t i c a l * 
reasoned history than i t has by the s p i r i t of chronology*^ 
In view of the dominance of the s p i r i t of chronology i n h i s t o r i -
cal writing (l«e* history conceived more or less as a l i s t i n g of 
dates and events) v i r t u a l l y u n t i l the 19th Century| this manl* 
festation of a c r i t i c a l and reasoned attitude toward the New 
Testament i s a most interesting and important fact* and one . 
which, although outside the scope of this thesis* i s worthy of 
investigation* • = 
Turning once again to the strengths of Augustine's approach 
to 3cripture| attention should be called to his realisation that 
the principles useful for the study of literature i n general 
("general hermeneutica" as we w i l l sometimes refer to them i n 
the following chapters.) aa?e pa r t i a l l y applicable to the study 
of Scripture«^ The help to be derived from general hermeneur 
(!) For a f u l l definition of " c r i t i c a l history" and "chronology" see P&rt XI of this thesisj especially the sections on Groee and Collingwood« 
(S) D e n t i l , Gred>f iv» 101 v* 11-18. 
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J&©« TO, j o $t$$x pisjBwea«8»*w ®A t f ®^P^f 
*&0tt5f JO ^ «|> P0$0tNVUW* Olii& H ^ 0 J $ t P ©q, tt$& ®€>1!l 
0^1 fo «AT^OQ TO piq- l9tcnq4t«iQ0 ttofq,ia$0£d^ ©ptt ©tig. 
:M$ p©stt ptt© %©iti set ^®tMH $w$t&Etj©x tf*pMW98" »'P©$**e©fc$p 
©<t XXT& *6uo^^^©4to^Ht; ®sot$, trodn poij.©©*© sra©$.&£© TO 
pas *«BTO j o #q^^«wSM^trf ^ ^©ciSis^y pra j&ao$0$p 
~$«(^ G0*£t©f PXO dfQ. ^TlQ, *0Ott^gO<felf |6 t E i P 
''.. « t W ift#$#ioo WSJ TO; • 4(9f$BBfm). 0tift&TO©x. 
patpstnwtvoOB jo ©ot^4 TO t|3n©TO< ©nxo is jaotx «sq; imm 
q^tf&©ti ®$t$ mo&j ^ a^B^s t(^|pifW> 1 
q.tvoqtj ettot$$©tiD s&iqptnoe p*©$ &t sOT o$ &q% ®| ' • ttdi^tstMtscmt TO u% 4toQ%&$ti #o t*o$$^ &a&s©prf - T O . . 
«dtz$t«&p ©t£^  jo p^&&"i ptmoj o£ &|. ®#ix%&%a©S tsl 
•* • 
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•• .pap&odte pwe ©«ittg,iSt^B tt| p984$nazrs *a:o$i8odx© tit3f^ 0|dsxtO 
! f t j * ^ 0 ^ 3* •W* t&tuty- TO, jo 3&&©t -0%'««tWo^ sf«? 
^Ww P©&OA$ tm o$' UA»$ q.ott ptaQ& A* *©x<3fcn33e© «*0i& No$pi©ti©ta£&i? 
Bu%%%m ST ©tt t|0|t^ ^mi^ xif i©A©^ xQ<l oxp gftto JQ ^lod^t?^© 
TO. taotij ®st?3©dEB otp pt» ®m%&t&p® tr$ j t ^ K l t i p®e^ ©rats| smc oxpv 
•to^ teodic© tmt^et^tO &VL% tiootn ptt©d©p ^.enm ea *Qts"e^ u?®8i ^ t ^ ^ ^ t i V 
*©<jetv$dtr^O0 j o ©tiXBA O'Qq. JO ^uoitSpnp X ^ l j W **t-(WW*OH 
f #@e %<m PTP JX^TO aot[q.ne ©t?^  tTOp « t i t 
itto|^.^oixfe| ®ttf©©8 jo j&$.i:xTOeB|tH«f0G* m\% POT ^ i i x i ^ ^ ^ l t ®t?^ oa 
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be as powerful and active as before) but i t has 
to take into account as one of i t s basic principles 
something of which, i t was unaware of before, namely, 
the insight into the meaning of existence given by 
an i n i t i a l act of f a i t h ; and f a i t h means taking God 
at lii s word as the source of a l l vaiuesf(l) 
The fundamental query we hate here i s whether or not the 
i n i t i a l act of f a i t h i s made as independently of the accumulate 
data, of knowledge (scientist) and, specifically, reasonably historic 
cal knowledge ,as Augustine imagines* But be that as i t may, 
the above Quotation egresses the fundamental basis cf 
Augustine*s^.interpretation of scripture*, 
Christianity and History. I t i s when we turn to our t h i r d 
level (that concerning the relationship between Christianity 
and history, and including "philosophy of history") that we 
reach the area where 8t# Augustine put his decisive stamp upon 
Christian thoughtj an impression which continues to this day i n 
both Christian and secular versions* Motivated by practical* 
a^i-ogetic interests Augustine opposed the Greek conception of 
the eternal world, without beginning or end* i n which l i s t o r y 
traverses an ever recurring cycle of events demonstrating the 
regular , rational and dependable order of the universe* 
Augustine does this by asserting that the cyclical view of 
history i s hostile to the Christian f a i t h , which proclaims a 
radical newness which has come into the world i n the person of 
Jesus.the Christ* 
(1) Barrow, <aftf*,g4|». pp* 196^ 197« 
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F©# i f the soul* w e delivered* a© i t hevor was before^ 
Is never to return to misery, then there happens i n i t s 
e^erlenee something which news? happened before.]; and 
th i s , indeed* something of the great^s^ consequence*,, 
to •wit*- the secure entrance into eternal f e l i c i t y * (&) 
Karl IiOwith commenting upon this sayss* 
(Augustine1 si f i n a l argument against the classical 
concept of time i s * therefore* a moral ones th0 
pagan doctrine i s hopeless* for hope and f a i t h aj?e 
essentially dilated to the f u t u r t and a real future 
cannot exist i f past and future times are eojual 
phases within a cyclical recurrence without "beginning 
and end* On the basis of an everlasting revolution 
of definite cycles + we could ex&mt only a blind 
rotation of misery and happinessthat i s * of deceit** 
f u l b l i s s and real misery * but no external happiness 
---^only an endless repetition of the same but nothing 
nexfj redemptive and tinali (%) 
; 3?he peculiarly once~for*all Christian doctrines of the 
incarnation and* by implication* the i n s u r r e c t i o n ^ are the 
basis of Augustine1 s "philosophy of history 1 1 which destroyed 
the classical "philosophy of history". (On© wonders why tto 
did not also c a l l upon the doctrine of Creation to support his 
"philosophy of history"|) I t i s this "philosophy of history" 
of Augustine which i s tlbetfoaais of a l l religious and secular 
"philosophies of h i f t o i ^ ' ' charactoriged by linear and progressive 
movementi including that of Marxism*; Lowlth argues unoon* 
vineingly that this linear and progressive 
(1) .De,.0.iv^  m±f SQ# Quoted i n liowithj. Kara*- Meaning, i n 
' ^istoffy« ghe university of Chicago Press* Chicago9 1949„ p'*164* 
(8) Lowith* ofi»q^ «.y p»l63? 
(3) There i s a legitimate use of "resurrection" which refers 
to that which ta&es place repeatedly i n the l i f e of a 
Christian* But that i s beside the point i n t h i s content. 
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view of history i s not implicit i n Scripture $ but that con-
troversy i s not our concern h e r e $ ^ 
This whole matter has received a great deal of attention, 
and there i s no need for us to develop i t further* However 
there i s one aspect of Augustine's "philosophy of history" 
which has received less attention and hence does need to be 
emphasised here: especially as i t i s related to what we w i l l 
have to say-about the "philosophy of history" i n later chapters. 
This i s that Augustine wisely does not attempt to historically 
disprove the classical view of history nor historically prove 
his own view*- I f such an. attempt were made i t would of course 
have to be made upon the basis of historical evidence| but 
hist o r i c a l evidence' i s much too ambigftous to lend i t s e l f to 
any such program* Augustine's revolution i n the attitude toward 
history did not arise out of the study of history* but from 
insights and presuppositions which came from his Christian f a i t h 
We turn now from Augustine's "philosophy of history" to a 
related but distinctive problem: his attitude to culture* 
Here the voluminous works of Augustine are ambiguous, and 
different commentators can present different emphases*^ 
(1) I t i s fascinating to notice how a culture returns to a 
circular view of history when i t abandons Christianity, 
e*g*;, the internationally famous French motion picture 
3jjar Ronde of a; few years ago, Alas the classical Virtues do not return with the c i r c l e | the f i l m 
proclaims only the circular and vacuous nature of 
e#i stance* 
(3) Ldwith (opieit>» Ch*9) emphasizes the Christ "against" or 
"above" culture element i n Augustine? Cochrane (pp*oit»« 
pp*501ff.*: passim) emphasises Christ as the "transformer" 
of culture* 
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Richard H<fctbub.r judiciously points out several of the different 
between Christianity and culture* Prominent among these i n 
that i n which Christ and his Church are placed "above" or 
"against" culture* Augustine*® interest i n monasticism and 
especially hie antithesis between the heavenly and earthly 
c i t i e s point i n this direction^ as does his dualistic attitude 
toward slavery and war, i*e, these are. to be accepted not 
because they are ri g h t , but because they are part of the neces-
sary and established order of this world* v ' 
However He^uhr also points out that there i s also another 
important strain i n Augustine's thought? namely, that the Christ 
i s the means of the transformation or regeneration of culture* 
• * 
He points to Augustine's own pilgrimage from paganism to 
Christian!tyj the result of which {as we have already had 
occasion to point out) was not to discard his Classical back-
ground, but to transform.it and to put i t at the service of 
Christ and his Church*^ Niebuhr further calls attention to 
this same ideaoas i t runs'through the Confessions* and ending 
i n the ecstatic wordsi "Thou, 0 God$ sawest everything that; 
thou hadst made, and, behold i t v/as very good*** Let thy 
works praise thee that we may love thee, and l e t us love 
(1) CJ1* Pe Civ*. ..jQeltt:*. i x * 15* This i s an appalling example of 
AugustineTs h o s t i l i t y to culture* 
(S) Hiebuhr, pp«sl.ti» pp*308ff * 
strains of Augustine's thought concerning the relationship 
fefth. 
&2 
the© that they works may praise t h e e * " ^ Of other but similar 
passages Biebuhr makes the following general summarys 
To mankind with this perverted nature and cor* 
rupted culture Jesus Christ has come to heal 
and renew what sin has infected with the sick** 
ness unto death* By his l i f e and his death he 
makes plain to man the graatnasa of add'a love 
and the depth of human sins by revelation and 
instruction ha reattaches the soul to God, the 
source of i t s "being and goodness, and restores 
to i t tha right order, of love t causing i t to leva whataver i t loves i n God and not i n the 
context of selfiahness.or of idolatrous devo-* 
tio n to the creature(2) 
There are many passagea i n Augustine which partake of tha s p i r i t 
which Hiebuhr i s calling our attention to i n this quotation* 
For example i n Book v*19 Augustine maintains that tha City of 
God i s tha ideal which must transform p o l i t i c a l society at i t s 
bast* Many other such instances could be cited* 
As further support for this point of view we can cite O+II* 
Cochrane who* i n his deservedly much praised book Christianity 
and Claasloal Culture * argues that Augustine presents Chriat 
as the transformer of culture* in the context of a discussion 
of Augustine* and eapeeially of the City of God. Cochrane main-* 
tains that Christianity prescribess 
#**adhesion to God* the sourca of truth$ beauty* 
and iaodnessi tha supreme reality* as tha one 
fundamental principle for individual regeneration, 
( l ) Conff*-* x i i l * - xxvii# 43? xxxi*. 46 j x x x i i i * 43, 
(S) Hiabuhr* pt>*oi^*v m>* 81&»£14* For passagea i l l u s t r a t i n g 
.Niabuhr/a'atatamant sea • Be • piv* pe.i,« x* 24 and xl« S* 
Yat#; at TTiabuhr points out ,, such passages need to ba balancad: by auah a p p a l l i n g statements as that found i n 
i X f < M 5 # • 
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and for social reformation, the point of departure 
for a fresh experiment i n human relationships, on 
the acceptance of which rests the only real hop© 
of f u l f i l l i n g the promise of secular l i f e * (!) 
One would lps- to believe that this i s what Augustine 
wanted to say* Cochrane cites particularly the City of Pod* 
x x i i * 22-34 i n support of his posit ion* Yet when we turn to 
those chapters and read them we are not so sure* How frequently 
and easily Augustine slips over into discussing the "fresh 
experiment" which i s to begin net i n this l i f e but i n the 
l i f e to come* At no point do we find the unequivocal statement 
to match that which we have quoted from Cochrane* 
Af ter reading and fudging v/hat these various commentators 
have to say about Augustine, and above a l l after placing what 
they have to my against Augustine's own words, we are led to 
agree with Kiebuhr thats 
The possibility of the redirection of a l l of man's 
work among temporal things into an acti v i t y glorify-* 
ing God by rejoicing i n and cultivating the beauty 
i n His creation*** b? using a l l temporal goods with 
sacramental reverence as incarnations and symbols 
of eternal words-*--*this possibility rises to view i n 
Augustine's thougbt only to be dismissed*** So the 
glorious vision of the City of God turnsiinto a 
vision of two c i t i e s , composed of different i n d i v i -
duals, forever separate* Here i s a dualism mox1© 
radical than that of Pa-1 or Luther* (S) 
(1) Cochrane* o^:*c^.t.*« r-«S01* Also see the discussion following* and 5especially p*514* 
(S) iiebuhr, ob*olt*« pp*816*817 Gi»crana, F*E*, "The Develop^ 
ment of Augustine'* s Ideas on society Before the Donatist 
Controversy'1, "The Harvard Theological Heview", Vol* XLVII, 
Ho* Oct* 1984* pp.j(:865*3i6* This detailed study of 
Augustine's thought i n society between the years 586 and 
400 reaches conclusions which are i n line with those of 
Miebuhr's* 
This conclusion of St* Augustine was not the only possible 
conclusion! although perhaps i t wasJ the only possible conclusion 
for 6th Century Christian orthodoxy* (lionasticisra loomed large 
i n the l i f e of the Church of succeeding generations $ but not a 
conTers^oni0t view of culture*) For a theology i n which the 
Incarnation played such a large part, and the doctrines of 
Creation and the Resurrection of the Body hardly a smaller 
part, Augustine*s conclusion i s not even consistent* God*e 
good creation, visited by his Son i n the flesh, i s not so 
strange to Him that i t i s f i t ' only to be "used" as a stepping 
stone to a heavenly c i t y * 
John Calvin* From St* Augustine and the 6th Century we 
turn to John Calvin and the 16th Century* Our examination 
w i l l show that l i t t l e change had ta&en place i n Christian 
thought about history i n the intervening eleven hundred years* 
I f we were to examine some of the men standing betweeh Augustine 
and Calvin (e»g» Aquinas) we would even f i n d a point of view 
infe r i o r to that of Augustine* 
God's action i n history. Because Calvin's theology i s so 
thoroughly grounded i n Scripture, i t i s inevitable that his 
emphasis upon God's action i n history should be equally thorough* 
Naturally he does not use the Spth Century terminology about 
"the action of God i n history", but nevertheless the meaning 




For God, otherwise invisible (as we have already 
said) clothes himself,, so to speak, i n the image 
of the world (mundi imasdnem quodammedo in&ultL 
i n which he presents himself to our imagiiaation 
#* therefore as soon as the name of God sounds i n 
our ears or a thought of him suggests i t s e l f * l e t 
us clothe him with this most "beautiful attitfej 
finally,,, l e t the world be our schoolf i f we desire 
r i g h t l y to tow God.* (!)• 
This passage refers, specifically to Godfs creation* and 
the knowledge of God to toe received from this source p3ays a 
substantial part i n Calvin's thought.*^ But this "natural 
Knowledge" of God cannot and does not stand alone* 
For there are two distinct powers which belong to 
the Son of Gods the f i r s t * , whieh i s manifest i n 
the architecture of>• the world and the order of 
nature) and the second* by v/hich he renews and. 
restores fallen nature,* As he i s the eternal 
Word of God, by him the woa?ld was made, by his 
power a l l things continue to possess the l i f e 
which they once received^ man was endued with 
ah unique g i f t of understanding., and though by 
revolt helost the l i g h t of understanding, yet 
he s t i l l sees and understands, so that what he 
naturally possesses from the grace of the son of 
God i s not entirely destroyed* But since by his 
stupidity and perverseness he darkens the l i g h t 
which s t i l l dwells i n him, i t remains that a new 
office be undertaken by the Son of God, the office 
of Mediator, to renew by the s p i r i t of yegenera* 
tion man, who has been ruinecL* (3) 
In spit© of the efforts of some c r i t i c s to minimise the 
f i r s t of these "two distinct powers", they continue to stand 
(1) Corn,* Gejt« "AvgitoMik1** Cited by Downey, Edward A*, Jxv* ,TM Knowledge of God i n Calvin's Theology* Columbia 
University Press, lew York, 1953, p«6» 
(2) For a substantiation of this statement see Downey, 0£»ci; 
pp. 131ff« .©Jb passim* 
(3) Downey» OP*pit*, pp* 9-10. 
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as an integral pax»t of Calvin's theology* Howeves? I t i s the 
second of these two powers* i»e# that which venom and restores 
human nature through the office of the Mediator, which i s the 
more fiindam@nt©3-# "^here i s no redemxitive knowledge of God, 
whether patriarchal* prophetic or apostolic s apart from the 
mediat»aial office of C h r i s t * r t ^ Nor i s any "natural know* 
ledge" of God of any avail apart from the Christ* 
God would remain far off§ concealed from us, 
were wo not irradiated toy the brightness of 
Christ* (2) 
That i s * only i n the knowledge of tfeaua Christ which was h i s t o r i -
cally given, which has "been preserved!through history by the 
Church, and which i s historically received by the contemporary 
Christian; only i n this way are wo the reelpients of the know* 
ledge of God* 
In the f i r s t of our three main contentions (which we stated 
earlier i n t h i s Introduction) we not only maintained that our 
knowledge of God i s historically given; but also that i t i s 
hist o r i c a l l y conditioned* This l a t t e r idea i s also found in 
Calvin* Again* and as we would expect * his terminology i s not 
the 20th Century one of "historical conditioning"! rather he 
speaks i n terms of "accommodation"* "God cannot be comprehended 
by us except so f a r as he accommodates (jit^emperati,) himself to 
our standard*"^ Bowney elaborates t h i s * saying? 
(1) Downey, op.oit» p.10. see also the discussion on pp«i67ff* 
(8) i n s t i t u t e s a 5:2:1* 
(&) Qfffflfl* M&* 9*3»<i<* Cited by Downey, p&*ojjbo PP#3~4* 
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.. **.#ae!O©ismo£lati0n is e f . two 'var ie t i es* (ft) the 
vHimpgtft &snd aeotragavgr &oooi3?fiod&tio» of t b i 
i i i f i & i t e ' opa-tePltt* of-0o4 to f - ^ t e ^ f f l B ^ 
TMOIJ tntiovkw* a l l r©voMt lH# lS ia \ pT^F 
g&tt6l$ut itooosmodatSon to toman . M g m d ^ f *hl6h 
l a oonnoetod w i t h tin* mmWmm^m^m {%) 
4 i am m® vthQxi we oo&$ to &um$xw/Qtii&$&*a wu$&v* 
.sstaading of tho use of aeviptw&t &@ twed p l a s t y } * o f 
aoeomraodatiom i n a $t3?an$e and o f t en anft&MKraa way* l&hia r esu l t 
i s t o fc© e^Xataed IMw&Xp W the. f a e t t f c & t GiaWn wyote bejtoro 
t*w advent o f ttodewn BifciieaX oi&tioian#. nevertheless e&lv&n*s 
eoncept i s toftAiotittgr the mm m t i i a t whieh wo w i l l develop 
l&tea? i n teapme. of %UtovlQaX eond&t&oning'^: 
Close l r a l l i e d , w i t h to £j?&»eiple of aoooBKao&stion Is 
Calv in 1 e p r i n c i p l e o f the lin%mmlated OJP eomtta ted n&twe of 
ttie Imowle&geof (led paid of swm* 
0«3? wiad0&***Q4mfti&t* almost e n t i r e l y of two pastas 
the 3mowl©dge of ®od and o f om»s©w@# Biit air tfoege 
eta?© eoimeeted togetiboj? ma«ar t ioe* i t l a not ©aejr 
to determine $»Seh of t he #0 ptfeeedee* and gives 
feirth to tb@ otJio^ (2) 
Cementing on t n i e &®@et of Calvin*a tK@03.osy.*.' Dcftfeggr was**'" : 
Xt''Owmot? b0 too etx*engl$r w ^ t t t o ' t t a i t we ax»© 
epeaMng e l l i & t i a a l i a r when we uii*'-thft $to&se 
''imewXeise o f ted?9 ' in mmmnm to ea iv ia ' e 
theology* xtw mp&® &m in tmt an m^rav ia^ 
t i e n f o r the wnoie eosiplieated i n t e w l a t i o n 
Co* Sod and aAnj w&ien v/e have fteen deeeplbing* 
(Sod d i d not iweej^odato himself t o •aaa** 
eap&oitie$ a® a f tm&el aeoojamod&toe &' a t r op j . 
l i X S t l f M ^ ^ l J ; a 3 o a ? : : . 1 3 » l g t poiajfu on afofflt 3*18* 16e 
laitea? %IOQ.•mt&m,mQ& e i ted W To3?j?oaoo> 
ffipgaaii ^ f td , :d^a^ .« Olive* and Boyd» M i n t e g h * 1066, 
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of f l u i d to a small opening, but i n such a 
way that the instrument of accommodation 
(c3*eatio»# M0'UJ?seXveB',5 i® implicated i n what 
i s transmitted* The "loiQWledge of Sod" i s 
therefore always man*s Knowledge of God*o 
revelation (according to the principle of 
accommodation) and the very revelation of 
God always i n a radical way implies man/,a, 
self knowledge (according to the principle 
of correlation)* ( l ) 
I n the course of this thesis we v / i l l repeatedly maintain 
that man* knowledge of himself i s always arrived at historical** 
ly$ 1*©* through the examination (however unconscious) of his 
own personal history and that of other laen^ and through observ* 
ing what other men and he himself have brought fo r t h i n the 
histo r i c a l process* Thus the knowledge of God and the imowledge 
of man are both historical? and they are* as Calvin says, inter* 
related• I t follows from this that one* s doctrines of God, man 
and history are a l l interrelated* 
Interpretation of Scripture, "One of the great goals of -
Calvin* s iif@«*^ -*«on© to which he referred shortly "before his 
death i n hie farewell to the Genevan pastor#~~*-w8ia purity of 
doctrine* and this was primarily right understanding of 
Scripture* f , v ' What was Calvin* a understanding of Scripture? 
I t i s convenient| following Downey*s lead* to divide the 
discussion of this question into two parts; the inspiration of 
the writers of the Bible, and the witness of the Holy Spirit 
to the authority of the Bible, 
(1) Downey, o&*&ijio P*9*» I t a l i c s mine* 
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Concerning the f i r s t of these,Downey writes?** 
$he Biblical writers are the instruments or 
organs or amanuenses of the Holy Spirits 
fheir mouths are "the mouth of the one God"; 
their writing style i s the style of the Holy 
S p i r i t * When we turn to them we may say, 
"Bow l e t us hear God himself speaking i n his 
own words*" We owe their writings i n Scripture 
Hthe same reverence which we owe to God, because 
i t has proceeded f rom him alone and has nothing 
human mixed iiuV*« "Whoever wishes to p r o f i t i n 
the Scripture, l e t him f i r s t agree to t h i s , 
that the law and the prophets are not a doctrine 
delivered at the discretion of men, but are 
dictated by the Holy S p i r i t * " (1) {a)» 
t h i s under standing of Scripture naturally presents d i f f i c u l t 
ties i n exegesis* These d i f f i c u l t i e s are accounted for theologi* 
eally by saying that obscurities or mistakes serve the purposes 
of the Holy Sp i r i t j or the principle of accommodation is called 
Upon to explain irregularities or #iaiisions (e*g* Moses i n h i i , 
account of the ereai&oii* Genesis) omits speaking of the 
invisible angels because* i n accommodation to the ignorance of 
men, he speaks only of that which i s visible to u s ) * ^ Or againj 
mistakes may be due to the c o p y i s t s * ^ Thus* i n on© way or 
another, the position i s established that the Scriptures i n 
their original form were errorless) free from the admixture of 
human f a l l i b i l i t y . * I n this way Calvin's teaching about the 
(1) Downey, $frsj&«VPP* 9l*98.t 
(3) For a discussion of how seriously we are to take Calvin's 
remarks about the "dictation" of Scripture see Downey* 
M f S l l i f pp»99ff # His conclusion i s that Calvin's use 
of the work "dictation" i s to be taken ciuite l i t e r a l l y * 
(3) l a ^ l l B M i * iiX4si* . 
(4) CJL* Downey, M*'SU,*:* P*W*-
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"accommodatedM nature of Scripture :f which appears to be and 
indeed i s basically so. much, l i k e what we mean today by the 
•'historically conditioned" nature of Scripture* i s developed 
i n such a way as to establish a Bible which i s largely historic-
a l l y unconditioned* The f a c t that the f i n a l result of Calvin*s 
thought here i s a contradiction of the position from which he 
started does not destroy the v a l i d i t y of that starting point* 
I f Calvin i n his day had had. the benefit of the f r u i t s of 
modern Biblical criticism, then he would have been able to 
develop his teaching of the "accommodated" nature of Scripture 
i n a more satisfactory way* 
We turn now to the second and more congenial aspect of 
Calvin's understanding of Scripture? the witness of the Holy 
Spi r i t to the authority of the Bible* Calvin argues that we 
do not believe i n the Bible f i r s t of . a l l because of i t s |n%rrant 
character * Rather i t Is. that the po\ver of the Holy s p i r i t 
operating upon our hearts and minds as we read the Bible leads 
us to the conviction of i t s truth and authority and (for CalVin) 
inerrant character* 
For as God alone i s a suitable witness for his 
own Wordso also the word w i l l never gain credit 
i n the hearts of men u n t i l i t i s sealed by the 
internal'testimony of the Spirit* I t i s necessary 
that the same Spi r i t who spotee by the mouth of the 
prophets should penetrate oti* hearts i n order to 
convince us that they delivered f a i t h f u l l y the 
message whidh was divinely given*(i) 
(1) Institutes> I;7i4* Quoted by Downey, o ^ o i t ^ * p*106. 
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«,»there cannot he a doubt that the certainty of 
what he [Godl taught them was firinly engraven on 
their hearts, so that they f e l t assured and knew 
that the'things which they learned came forth 
from (k>d«>>(l) 
For escample, i t was the power of the witness of the Holy 
Spirit to th© disciples that assured them of the truth of the 
resurrection of the Christ; and i t i s the same power of that 
same Spirit wliieh convinces us of that same truth when we 
receive the Biblical account of the Christ's resurrection* 
Scripture i s the instrument which God's"Holy Spirit uses to 
bring f o r t h the Word of God i n our l i v e s * ^ 
"The Question of certainty supplies the dominant motif i n 
Calvin's doctrine of Biblical authority, as well as his doctrine \ 
of f a i t h i n general*"^ The certainty of this authority i s not j 
given primarily by the Church (an "authority") ^ , but by the 
conjoining of Word and s p i r i t * ^ And as a result of this union,j 
"Scripture bears upon the face of i t as clear evidence of 
i t s t r u t h , as white and black do of their colour, sweet and 
b i t t e r of .their t a s t e * " ^ (This quality of Scripture i s 
often referred to misleadingly as "self-authentication", by 
which i s meant that the testimony of the Holy Spirit bears 
witness to or authenticates Scripture* Self-authenticating 
U) .Institutes* IsQtfe*. 
(8) S£* Com* XI Tim* 3sl6* Quoted by Downey* op«oit*« p*106* 
(3) Downey, o&iej/t *, p»109* 
(^) ££« ynatitutes* 1;7:1* 
(5) ££» Institutes. 1:7*3 and 4 where Calvin calls Augustine 
to his support, and especially Be U t i l i t a t e credenti* 
(6) J&|&«» Xj7 sg*" 
then means 3pirit~authenticatingt) Calvin's whole doctrine of 
revelation rests oonfidently upon this correlation of Word and 
S p i r i t j a revelation which i s two-fold i n i t s content (and 
both of which we have already mentioned)•} (1) that which refers 
to God i n his general a c t i v i t y as Maker and X^rovidential 
Sustainer of heaven and earth, and (&) that which shows God 
i n his special work as the gratuitously merciful Redeemer i n 
Christ* 
Christianity and history* when we turn to Calvin's 
attitude to history we f i n d a position which i s remarkably l i k e 
Augustine's, i»e., a conversionist view of history and culture 
i s delineated and then f i n a l l y rejected* However this i s an 
evaluation with which some w i l l disagree, arising as i t does 
out of an examination of many conflicting passages i n Calvin; 
passages which can be made to.form a unified whole only through 
the exercise of considerable ingenuity* 
On the positive side of Calvin's view of history and 
culture we have many passages such as the following? "God,,#by 
ingrafting us into His Son, constitutes us anew to be lords 
of the world, that we may lawfully use as our own a l l the 
wealth with which He supplies us»"^ Included i n this wealth 
are such things as food, wine* and clothing* Theae are given 
(1) G£* Downey, M#M&*» P*I3&* 
(8) Cf» Downey, JESMIW P'*38i 
(3) Comm» on I Tim* 4:5, Quoted by Wallace, R,8.s Calvin's Doctrine of the Christian I^ife. Oliver and Boyd, 
Edinburgh,' 1959, p*13S# 
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to us not only to supply our physical needs; but, as Calvin 
i s careful to point out, also "for our enjoyment and d e l i g h t " * ^ 
Bor are God's blessings confined to material things* 
• **He (God) f i l l s , moves* and invigorates a l l 
things py the virtue of the S p i r i t , and that 
according to the peculiar nature which each 
class of beings has received by the Law of 
Creation* But i f the Lord has been pleased 
to assist us by the work and ministry of the 
ungodly i n physics, dialectics, mathematics, 
and other similar sciences, l e t us avail 
ourselves of i t , l e s t , by neglecting the g i f t s 
of Jod spontaneously offered to us, we b© 
jus t l y punished for our sloth* (8) 
Our ingrafting into Christ also has consequences for the 
Christian's relation to p o l i t i c a l l i f e . 
But as we lately_taught that that kind of 
government [civily i s distinct from the 
s p i r i t u a l and internal kingdom of Christ, 
so we ought to know that they are not adverse 
to each other * The former, i n some measure, 
begins the heavenly kingdom i n us, even now 
upon earth***(3) -
TiF* Torrance commenting upon this, says: "Calvin takes this 
overlapping of the two ages so r e a l i s t i c a l l y that he speaks 
of t h i s world ajs already i n a manner renovated b^j; Jgje coming 
of C h r i s t . " ^ And i n the same vein R.S, Wallace says; 
(1) jlnatitutes* 3slO;S, 
(S) i b i d * . S?Ssl6* 
(3) 4&&*r4»&6*8'» See TtF* Torgane©* op#01^*^*166-3.60 for' a discussion of this aspect of Calvin's thought* 
(4) Torrance, P«1S1* i t a l i c s Torrance's* S£« Wallace, 
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(Calvin reminds} us that i f this process has' . 
already "begun within us, even i n a feeble and ! 
hidden,w&y>r"~-of increasing knowledgs and con* 
templation bringing us into increasing con* i 
formlty to aodr-**then i t i s bound to go on ! 
a l l our l i f e with increasing force arid fulness, 
for i t promisea ultimately the entire restora* 
tion into the image of God not only of our own 
beings but also of the whole Creation* (!) 
A l l this, seems to give a clear and positive picture of 
Calvin*s understanding of the relationship between Christianity 1 
• ' . ' / • ' 
and history* (In this content, as usual$, we are using "history" j 
loosely to include the cultural product s of the historical process j! 
and the material world i n which that process takes place*) 
However, the understanding which we have presented so far i s 
one-sided and misleading* Against the passages quoted up to now, - s 
must be placed those much more numerous statements which speak 
of the "contempt of this world", : I t i s d i f f i c u l t to evaluate 
these statements as a body* In certain instances Calvin i s 
clearly speaking of the contempt of this world insofar as the 
world enthrals and blinds men to God*^ In other similar 
instances i t i s clearly the case that i t i s the world of Adam 
<«M apart ^ o . G**,«) M l * U *»U i n «onUm*t Mantes 
i n i t s 80th Century usuage at leasts i s not the right word to 
describe the Christian attitude to unredeemed creation* never* 
theless Calvin^s meaning i s clear#- and one would not 2 want to 
(1) Wallace^ ^ i»cj^* i p . 358* 
(S) e*g*j Institutes* 3?10s3* 
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take serious exception .to: these passages* 
There are s t i l l other passages, however, i n which a much 
more radical position i s taken; a position not so much against 
s i n f u l self-indulgence and the unredeemed creation as i t i s 
against time, space, history and the creation as a whole* 
•••the ascension of Christ means that we must 
l i f t up our minds i n f a i t h above and beyond the 
concepts of time and space which v/e have i n 
this world of bondage and sin and decay* (1) 
Elsewhere Calvin says:-
I f heaven i s our country, what can the earth 
be but a place of exile? I f departure from 
the earth i s entrance into l i f e , v/hat i s the 
world but , a sepulchre, and v/nat i s residence 
i n i t but immersion i n death? I f . to be freed 
from the body i s to gain f u l l possession -of 
freedom, what is the body but a prison? (8) 
notice why i t i s that the body is denominated a "prison"* 
Hot because i t i s not ingrafted into the new creation wrought 
by Christ, but because i t hinders us from taking " f u l l posses** 
sion of freedom" « presumably i n heaven* I t i s to be questioned 
whether adequate Hew Testament support can be found for such a 
point of v i e W f ^ To speak of the body as a prison i s i n 
(1) Torrance, pfitolft** p#108» This quotation i s Torrance's 
summary of a number of passages from Calvin* One of 
themt Institutes S$16tX4f<» reads i n parts "*••Christy by rising again, ^having laid aside th© abject and 
ignoble conditions of a mortal l i f e * * * " 
(S) Institutes. 8?9:4* 
(3) I f adequate support i s to be found i n the Hew Testament, 
then i t would have to be drawn from such passages as I I 
6or» 5:1-8* Verse 4 of this passage reads (Revised standard 
Version): "For-while we are s t i l l i n this tent, we sigh 
with anxiety| not that we would be unclothed, but that we 
would be further clothed, so that what i s mortal may be 
swallowed up by l i f e " * ISven this verse i s more positive 
i n i t s attitude to earthly l i f e than are those passages 
from Calvin which we have quoted, and which use such terms 
as "prison"| "sepulchre", "abjject'% "ignoble" etc* 
accord with Hindu thought, "but i t i s not i n accord with the 
f a i t h which teaches the resurrection of the body* Calvin does 
indeed, having taken .away the goodness of the material creation 
with one hand*, give i t hack with the other hand i n almost the 
next sentence* "We oughtnever,, indeed* to regard i t with 
hatred, except so far as i t keeps us subject to s i n j * * . " ^ 
But then he takes i t away once again i n the following sentence* 
"At a l l events we must stand so affected towards,, i t £earthly 
l i f e ] i n regard to weariness os? hatred. as# while longing for 
i t s termination, to be ready at the Lord 1 s w i l l to continue i n 
i t # # * " ^ Do w© participate i n the pa r t i a l l y redeemed and 
redeeming creation with reluetanoei? • ^  Is i t done primarilyr*--w 
or at a l l for that matter—~in the s p i r i t of duty and submission 
to G-od*s w i l l ? ! This raises the specte^of a l l of the l i f e -
denying ghosts which have plagued Protestantism, To what extent 
i s Calvin responsible for this? 
I t seems to me that the best resolution of this problem i s 
to be found by looking at T*F. Torrance*S oharacterlaation of 
CalvinVs eschatology as an "eschatology of hope".^ Christ 
has descended into the created order, and the now pa r t i a l l y 
redeemed creation i j ^ a g i f t for which we are thankful* Yet 
this has taken place not so much i n ordej? to redeem the creation 
(1) Institutes 3s9s4« 
(3) JLb^* 
(3) gf * Wallace* OP»oii»* pp* 136*137. 
(4,) Torrance,. op.oifc** Ch*4* 
(although that has taken place In part) as I t has to give us 
th§>-itope and preparation for the l i f e to come* In the following 
passage Torrance paraphrases, or quotes, various statements "by 
Calvin pertaining to this matter: 
I f God sends us troubles i n the present l i f e i t 
i s only i n order to prepare us through the 
tolerantia crucis for the glory of the heaven-
l y Kingdom/ No man has made much progress i n 
the school of Christ who does not look forward 
with joy to the day of death and resurrection*^* 
He who does meditate on the resurrection w i l l 
learn that though the glory of the new creation 
i s only as yet exhibited f u l l y i n Christ the 
Head, the condition of our present world i s 
only the obverse of the perfect r e a l i t y which 
i t already has before God* ( l ) 
Wo one would wish to take exception to these statements (except 
possibly the f i r s t one), but i t is the strong reference to the, 
future which we are calling attention to* This i s even more \; 
evident i n the following extract, i n substance, taken by R*3* 
Wallace from one of Calvin* s sermons* 
A l l the tokens of God's earthly providence j 
towards us* the ri s i n g and going«*down of the 
sun*>the fruitfulness of the earth, the changes 
of the skies, can b§ beams of l i g h t illuminating 
our heavenward path when otherwise we would have 
to walk entirely by faith' i n the midst of dark-
ness* (3) 
Wallace even ventures the opinion that for Calvin the Christianas 
meditation upon the future l i f e must be thought of as the resto* 
ration of the true order of nature * ^ 
(1) Torrance, o£*cjitL*» p#141* 
(S) Wallace, pfl*c,it»y*. 186* 
(3) ibifl»F«P»li3p*. 
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Finally, l e t us turn to the end of T*F* Torrance's chapter 
on Calvin's "eschatology of hope"# Torrance says that the Church 
lives under an eschatologieal impulse, i*e*, under "an inner 
necessity to reach fo r t h even i n i t s present condition of 
humility and servitude towards that ultimate plenitude and 
harmony i n a l l i t s members which i s to be revealed*"^ Then 
he goes on to speak of the three ways i n which C a l v i n c o n -
ceives of the a c t i v i t y of the Church under this esehatologloal 
impulse* F i r s t , there i s the gathering of the Church together 
on every side and the extension of the Gospelj secondly, the 
restoration of the l i f e * doctrine and worship of the Churchj 
and t h i r d l y , the ecumenical ac t i v i t y of the Church* This, i n 
order that at Christ's second coming we "may be one fold and 
one shepherd"* 
This i s certainly most acceptable i n i t s e l f * There i s an 
agreeable emphasis, upon the mission of the fihuroh* the ref orm* 
ation g£ thef phureh. and the reunion pj£ the Church*! But by 
themselves these a c t i v i t i e s are too much centered upon the Church 
and upon the future* What of the Church as i t looks put into the 
world seeking to heal and transform it? While admittedly the 
leavening of the world by the Church can only b© accomplished 
i f the Church i s continually being gathered together, i s that 
leavening accomplished only by the gathering together of the 
(1) Torrance, op»cit** p*165* 
Church? And while this leavening does take place i n the power 
of the f i r s t coming of Christ and looks forward to the second 
coming, yet i t s value i s not only determined by reference to 
the second coming* I t has some value i n i t s own right as the 
egression of God's w i l l for the present* 
As i s evident, the evaluation of Calvin's understanding of 
the relationship between Christianity and history (together 
with i t s products and the world i n which i t takes place) i s 
most problematical* H* Richard Hiebuhr offers an estimate of 
this aspect of Calvin's thought which may well serve as a 
summary of our own conclusions* After calling attention to 
the many positive elements i n Calvin's understanding of this 
relationship* he writess«* 
*. * a l l these tjpositive elements] lead to the 
thought that what the gospel promises and makes 
possible, as divine (not human) possibility, i s 
the transformation of mankind i n a l l i t s nature 
and culture into a kingdom of God i n which the 
laws of the kingdom have been written upon the 
inward parts* But i n this case also the eachate* 
logical hope of Christ's transformation of man* 
kind's ruined l i f e i s turned into the esehatoiogy 
of physical death* and the redemption of some men 
to a l i f e of glory separated not only by i t s 
s p i r i t but also' by itsphyslcal conditioris from 
l i f e i n the world* The esch&toiogioal hope of a 
new heaven and a new earth brought into being by 
the coming of Christ i s modified by the belief that 
Christ cannot come to this heaven and earth but 
must await the death of the old and the rising of a 
new creation* To the eternal over^againstness of 
God and man* Calvin adds the dualism of temporal 
and eternal existence,^, and the other dualism of 
an eternal heaven and an eternal h e l l * Though 
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Calvinism has "been marked-by the influence 
of the eschatoiogical hope of the transforma-
ti o n by Christ and by i t s consequent pressing 
toward..the. realisation of the promise, this 
element i n i t has always been accompanied by 
a separatist and repressive note* »*(l) 
Priedrioh Schleiermaeher» As w i l l become evident, the 
860 years between John Calvin and Friedrich Schleiermacher 
witnessed a imaeh greater change in theological thinking than 
had the proceeding 1100 years between St, Augustine and Calvin* 
Moreover, the type of theological thinking associated with 
Schleiermacher continued right down into our own century* 
Barth say3 of him: "What he said of Frederick the Great i n his 
Academy address entitled 'What goes to make a great man* applies 
also to himselfs 'lie did not found a school, but an era,' 1'^ 
So i t i s that Schleierraacher's tlfclogy helped to engender the 
climate of religious thinking out of which the problems to be 
investigated i n this thesis have arisen, 
God's action i n history* In his early book. On Religion: 
SoeecheaL to i t s Cultured Despisers (1799)/3^Schleiermacher states 
i n general but very clear terms the place of the concrete and 
histo r i c a l i n religion* 
Jf a definite religion [p*g# Christianity] 
may not begin with an original f a c t , i t 
cannot begin at a l l * There must be a 
(1) Hiebuhr, ^ c ^ , * j pp*m7*.818i 
(2) Barth, Earl, From Rousseau to R-ltaehl* SCM Press, London, 
1969, p*506* 
(5) Schleiermacher, Frledrich, On Re3,iffion: Speeches to i t s 
Quitted Desplsers* Harper Torchbooks, Harper and 
BlFoth^rsT^wYork, 1958* 
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conwon ground fox" selecting 091110 one 
religions element and placing i t at the 
centre, and this ground can only "be a fact* 
And i f a religion i s not to D© definite i t 
i s not a religion at all.* fop religion i s 
not a name to toe applied to loose» uncon- | 
nected impulses* ( l ) | 
This applies at least to a l l of the great monotheistic 
religions? i n which we see the "endlessly progressive work of 
the Sp i r i t that reveals Himself i n a l l human h i story But, 
Schleiermacher emphasises* i t must be definite: for "nothing i n a 
general and indefinite form can actually "be communicated* I t wnei 
be individual and thoroughly d e f i n i t e f or i t i s nothing* 
I n his more e x p l i c i t l y Christian and churchly work, The 
Christian Faiths Schlelermaqher applied this insight directly 
to Christianity# He states that i t i s impossible to conceive 
that Christian piety could have arisen i n any way except through 
the "historical connection with the impulse which proceeded 
from Christ Concerning Christian dogmas "there i s an 
inner experience to which they may a l l be traced: they rest 
upon a ffiyeny and apart from this they could not have arisen* 
by deduction or synthesis* from universally recognised and 
communicable p r o p o s i t i o n s * A n d this experience comes 
through "historical connection with the impulse which proceeded 
from C h r i s t " * ^ 
(3.) pa..g$W&a» .p*S34,cfv, P*80, 
(8) i b i d * . P»83/fc« (3) i b j j d * r p*165# 
(4) Schleiermaoher, Friedrioh^ The Christian ffaith» edited 
by Mackintosh and Stewart* T* and ^ «xiavk| sainbur^hy 
(5) ffhe Christian Faiths p*67* I t a l i c s Schleiermacher's* 
(6) Of* $he Christian Faith, pp,4f9fjPf 87,698: On Religion* PP. m&wtY 
As we stated earlier i n this Introduction ^©vexation i s 
nojb only hist o r i c a l l y given, but also historically conditioned, 
Schleierraacher's theology recognizes this situation % for not j 
only ie Christian piety and dogma historically connected "with j 
the impulse which proceeded froia Christ"* but i t i s also brought 
to a more perfect egression i n succeeding ages, Conoerixing 
the Apostolic age Sehieiermacher isritess 
• • • i t s thinking a© a whole cannot supply a 
norm for that of later ages* For owing to ' 
i t s naturally most unequal distribution of 
the divine Spirit«««it was very easily pos-
sible*** that expositions of religion might 
be produced which, s t r i c t l y spealsing« were 
rather Judaism or Paganism coloured by 
Christianity than Christianity i t s e l f , i«e* 
were, i f considered as Christian* i n the 
highest degree impure# ( l ) 
In a l l this we see that Schleierraacher at least intended 
to give a central and determinative place i n his theology to :j 
the action of God i n the person of JOBUS Christ, He recognised ; 
that this historical event was the only possible basis for the 
origin and continuation of the Christian f a i t h * However* when 
i 
we come to those passages which deal with his understanding of • 
the Old Testament» we f i n d a thoroughly inadequate conception 
of the place and value of the history of the Hebrew people* 
i?or examples 
(1) afee Christian Faith,' p.«S9$* 
Hence the rule may "be set up that almost 
everything; else fcother than the Messianic 
prophecies] i n the Old Testament i s * f o r 
our Christian usagef hut the husk: or wrapping of i t s prophecy* and that what-
ever i s most definitely Jewish has least 
value* (1) 
%n 'She Christian Faith (par. 138) there i s a strong 
affirmation of the limited v a l i d i t y of the Old Testament | i t s 
religious ideas are outmoded and imperfect* There i s of course 
some "basis for this position! a position which, incidentally* 
one wishes had found some place i n Calvin*s theology. Never* 
theless> the reduction of the Old Testament to a shell contain* 
ing the Messianic prophecies i s far too radical and to t a l l y 
unsatisfactory* Here the Holy Spirit at work i n the l i f e of 
the Christian "believer has fudged the Word of God i n the Old 
Testamentj has found i t wanting$ and has consequently largely 
rejected i t . To a limited extent this i s a process i n wliich 
most i f not a l l Christians engage. However, the radical 
•results of this process i n Schleiermacher1a theology 3eacbus 
to question whether* i n this situation at least, this i s the 
Holy Spirit at work or "merely man's religious consciousness"^ 
I t i s 3ust i n this area of God"s action i n history that 
Barth f i n his essay on Schleiermacher i n From, Rousseau to Ritschl 
makes his main criticism of Schleiermacher} and this not only 
i n regard to his treatment of the Old Testament t but of his 
(30 The, Christian Faith, p.69. gf * On Religion. pp.869ff* ^ 
(S) Cf* Froiq Rousseau to Ritsohl f m>. 358*565. 
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theology, as a ttfhole* Barth saya that l a Schleieriaacher's 
theolo^r experience (xj@ligiouii e^orience* f a i t h ) threatens to 
overcome, the Word of God* '^She, fforfl noj> g$ _aa,auffed here i n • 
Barth deea not say* and cannot gay on the basl® of 
Sohieiermaaher1s works* that the Word Jy| 4i®®olved by f a i t h or 
that i t has lost i t s independence* Bsajapt i n regardto the „ 
Old Teetawient (<juite an eseoeptionl) the quotation® which m 
hat© made t$m- Schleiermaeher i n the proceeding paragraphs 
indicate that t h i s dissolution or lorn of independence did not 
i n fact ta&e place*,. In Barth* s opinion* "The only thing iaihicfr 
pr^ehte i t i s Sohlei©j?Hia0h03?*3 good .will i n not allowing thing© 
to develop so f a r r * * ^ ' ' ' 
•• fhat Is the jjuetioe of thijs criticism? In regard to the 
Old 0^staffi©nt we aee* •emctly -ae Barth e>aye$ ©a$erienoe over* 
doming the Word of flod#W I t i s ©uprising that Barth doea not; 
c a l l o u r attention to t h i s * '3ftirther# may hold 
s<^ iiisi©i?maohQ3?1© theology responsibao for the religious^ eliiaate 
which prevailed and largely a t i l l prevails up u n t i l our 'o'wa ' 
tins*- then B a r t h % oritioi&ia i e well made* At least u n t i l a 
few years ago the ford of Sod ^ /as submerged i n a variety of 
(1) P*asa>- Italioe - t e t h % * 
( 8 ) ! I f m were to, start pie&ihg and choosing isolated elementa 
out o:t* th© Old Testaiaonti certainly the lesraianio prophe* 
oiefe ^hich Bchleie^iaaoher wanted to retain would not he 
our f i r s t choice*. 
phenomena which-might loosely be included under the heading of 
"religious experience"? e,g* a strange cult of Jesus emphasising 
his "teachings" and "precepts" i n which were to be discovered 
"eternal truths", feelings of brotherly love, the emphasis upon 
and cultivation of religious sentiment often degenerating into 
sentimentality (many 19th Century hymns) etc* Nov/ npne; of this 
i s found i n Schleiermaoheri but the step between this and 
Sohleiermacher i s , however perverse, not a long one. 
This i s not to say that one i s entirely contented with the 
position from which Barth criticises Schleierraacher* Barth ©ayss: 
" I t i s between these two poies \gt experience and histor^J that 
Schleiermaehe^e interpretation of Christianity takes i t s 
course***"^ Barth says th i s because he feels i t i s distihotive 
of his theology* 3ut one would have thought* i f we consider as 
Sohleiermaoher does that the action of G-od i n history i s a part 
of history* that a l l theology moves between experience and 
history* The New Testament i s clearly written within thia ten-
eion* And i f we would like, for Schleiermacher to give to the 
Word of God a more objective and independent existence than he 
does j then we would also l i k e to see i n Barth a clearer recogni-* 
tion that experience i s the medium of revelation, that revelation ; 
i s recorded experience9 and that when the historical account of | 
the experience of revelation i s truly received by a later genera-* 
tion i t becomes ( i n a new but genuine way) the medium of revela* 
t i o n once again* ' 
(1) Prom Rousseau to Ritschl. p*3Sl, 
However, with these misgivings, we wiXl give Barth the 
last word and agree with him i n this careful judgment of this 
ambiguous aspect of Schleiermacher *s theology :«* 
JM ^ according to para* 10 of the Doctrine of 
g a i t ^ . t i i t h e impulse proceeding from Christ 
imparts to Christianity colour and tone, his-
t o r i c a l breadth and the possibility of i t s 
existence* Religion i n this determined 
impulse i s real as Christian religion* But 
i t s t r u t h , i t s content* i s none the less 
nothing hut the feeling of utter dependence, 
at i t s highest level, i n i t s stamp as aware** 
ness of redemption* ( l ) 
The Interpretation of Scripture* i n Schleiermaoher we 
encounter for the f i r s t time, i n the course of this historical 
survey, an expression of an important contemporary problem; 
namely, the fact that Holy Scripture can become static, prepo-
sit i o n a l information which does not provide a channel for the 
operation of the Holy Spirit.* This problem i s a form of the 
traditional problem which we have already discussed i n terms 
of "l e t t e r and Sp i r i t " * However, the modern form of this 
prohlem i s posed i n a more radical and acute way, and con-* 
aequently deserves and has received a larger and more detailed 
treatment»^ Sehleierraacher states the problem i n these words* 
(1) From Rousseau to Bitschl. p*351» 
(2) As we w i l l see late r , this-problem of the interpretation 
of Scripture has the closest parallels with the problem of 
the interpretation of historical documents* Oiambattlsta 
Vice's statement of that historical problem (The Mew Science 
A*Bf1744) proceeded Schleieraacherj but Vice's work was not recognised u n t i l the l a t t e r part of the 19th Century* 
And when, the f i r s t bloom of Christianity 
being past and i t was appearing to rest from 
i t s works, these works, so far as they were 
contained i n the aacred scriptures, were /1\ regarded as a finished codex of religion,**** ' 
That i s to say, the Bible was regarded .as a codex—-*or 
chronicle might be a better word**—of religious facts which 
could be used rather as one uses a log table* This approach 
to the Bible i s s t i l l sufficiently with us that no one should 
have any d i f f i c u l t y i n understanding what 3chleiermacher has i n 
mind here* He has thi s to say about those who would use Holy 
Scripture i n this way:~ 
Belief.*#usually so called, which i s to 
accept what another has said or done, or 
to wish to think and feel as another has 
thought or f e l t , i s a hard and baa© service*** 
To wish to have and hold a f a i t h that i s an 
echo, proves that a man i s incapable of r e l -
igion* to demand i t of others, shows that 
there i s no understanding of religion* (S) 
Those persons who use the Bible i n this way turn i t into a 
"mausoleumj a monument that a great s p i r i t once was there, but 
is now no more*"v ' And as an implication of th i s , 
Schleierraacher further denies that Holy Scripture reveals 
dootrlnes to us* a denial which only becomes v i t a l l y necessary 
i n a rat i o n a l i s t i c age.^ 
But the Spirit once was i n Scripture, and i s there s t i l l 
(1) Oh Keliffiion* p*-869» 
(2) frbid*. pp,90^91* 
(3) $M&*t P*91, 
(*) The Christian Faith* pp*60ff• 
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for those who come to I t i n the right way* How are we to 
account for this presence of the Spirit i n Scripture? Hot by 
any idea that the contents of the Bible were "dictated" to i t s 
a u t h o r s * ^ And rejecting th i s ^ Schleiermacher further rejects 
the kind of interpretation which accompanies a "dictated" theory 
of scripture? namely, "the suggestion that i n virtue of their 
divine inspiration the sacred books demand a hermeneutlcal and 
c r i t i c a l treatment different from one guided "by the rules which 
obtain e l s e w h e r e * R a t h e r , turning his Wsk on a l l t h i s , 
Schleiermacher finds that the inspiration of Scripture resides 
i n Christ alone* 
A l l that they teach derives from Christ} , .. 
hence i n Christ Himself must be the o r i * 
ginal divine bestowal of a l l that the 
Holy Scriptures coneain****^ot, however, 
i n isolated particulars, by way of i n -
spiration, but as a single indivisible 
bestowal of knowledge out of which the 
particulars evolve organically* Thus the 
Speaking and writing of the Apostle© as 
moved by the Spirit was simply a communi-
cation drawn from the divine revelation i n 
Christ,(3) 
On this basis* Sehleiermacher continue®, the Apostles* f a i t h 
i n Jesus was not based upon the Old Testament} and especially was 
i t not based upon some special theory of inspiration of the Old 
Testament* Bather i t was the encounter with Jesus as the Christ 
which awakened their,faith} and only then did they go on to adduce 
prophetic testimonies'in confirmation of their f a i t h . " ^ "And 
(1) ffhe Christian Faith. p*598« . 
(2) Ab.ld.t p.600, Cf» p.G05. 
(S) i b i d . . p.598, 
.Jtietj as their f a i t h sprang from Christ's preaching of Himself, 
so i n the case of others f a i t h sprang from the preaching of 
Christ by the Apostles and many more*"^ The Hew Testament 
i s i n effect such preaching! and. our f a i t h , l i k e that of the 
Apostles* springs from our encounter with Christ mediated by 
the New Testament*^ Our situation i s i n no essential way 
different' from that of the Apostles* "And when Holy Scripture 
i s described as * sufficient*#*»tihat i s meant i s that through 
our use of Scripture the Holy Spirit can lead us into a l l t r u t h , 
as i t lead* the Apostles and others who enjjoyed Christ's direct 
teaching*."^ Holy Scripture i s the God-given instrument which 
the Holy Sp i r i t uses i n order that the Word of God may appear 
i n our lives* 
We have emphasised the positive elements i n this brief 
sketch of Sehleiermaeher's understanding of Scripture* And 
there are other such elements which w© might have turned out 
attention t o , e«g« the valuable although not Wholly satisfactory 
attempt to deal anew with such ideas as "miraele", "inspiration" 
and "prophecy"^$ and the insistence that non~Christian 
religions .are not entirely erroneous i n what they have to say 
about God/ 8) Howefea?* i f we are to present a balanced picture 
* ' . • • ' i 
(&) ffhe Christian ffaith»p»593« 
(8) Tfee Christian ffaith* p#898f The "Hew Testament" her© inci\id^s by implication preaching and the saerements* j The Christian, Faiths p.#384» , " ! 
(3) The Christian -.Faith.* t>«606* 
(*) Qa, Heai^ion* pp ,88*89:* \ 
(5) The Christian Fa^thi p*B2» j 
her© r we must make mention of certain largely un&atisfa^torjf • 
aapeots of Schl@iermaoher*s thought i n thin area* There i s , 
f o r example* his definition of revelation as* "Every original 
and new communication of the Universe to maj&***"^ Or again* 
his separation of the "speeches" i n the New Testament as "being 
more valuable than, the other p a t f t s * ^ and his somewhat unguarir 
&ed proposals about the status of the Canon of the New Testament, 
&nd the possibility of opening i t i n order that later material 
might be included* ^  We have already sppken of the violent 
treatment which the Old Testament receives at his hands* and 
of Earth* 3 criticism of the relationship between the Wor$ of God 
and religious experience i n this theology* In short* 
Sehleiermacher's interpretation of Scripture i s a mixture of 
valuable and permanent insights into i t s use* together with 
other ideas which are quite misleading* 
Christianity History* I f we had certain reservations; 
about Ba^th*s judgment of the relationship between Word and 
s p i r i t on Schleiermadher'^ theology? we can wholeheartedly 
endorse his further -judgment that that theology i s a "culture 
theology"* Barth writes?4 
( 1 ) On Religion* p»89* Of * The: Christian; ffaith* P*S1* 
(S) On B e ^ i o % p» 181» 
(3) -xjtffa.* pp* and The Christian ffa,i.th» 
p t 605* However* there i$ much of value i n what Schleierma0he# has to say on this matter* 
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By "birth and upbringing i n i t s innermost 
sanctuary his thetfipgy i s cultural theology-t 
i n religion i t s e l f l*whieh Is the true object 
of hie theology> i t i s the exaltation of l i f e 
i n the most comprehensive sense, the exaltation, 
unfolding, transfiguration, ennobling of the 
individual and social human l i f e which i s at 
stake* Givillaatioii as the triumph or" the 
s p i r i t over nature i s the most peculiar work 
of Christianity^ just as the qtuality of being 
a Christian i s for i t s own part the crown of 
a thoroughly civiliaed consciousness* (1) 
Schleiermacher sees religion and especially Christianity 
i n i t s relationship to the historical, cultural and social l i f e 
of men as on© of mediation between the " f i n i t e " and the I n f i n i t e * 
I n the elegant Btyle so characteristic of On, Religion he writes 
Yet this complete form of religion £ which Schleiermacher 
i s advocating} remains the highest, and i t i s only 
by i t * that* with satisfactory results* man sets 
alongside of the f i n i t e that he specially concen-
trates oh ( i * e * his vocation) t an I n f i n i t e } along-side the contracting endeavour for something 
definite and complete, expansive soaring i n the 
Whole and the inexhaustible* In this way he 
restores the balance and harmony of his nature, 
which would be lost for ever, i f , without at the 
same time having religion, he abandoned himself 
to one object, were i t the most beautiful, most 
splendid* A man's special calling i s the melody 
of his l i f e , and i t remains a simple, meagre series 
of notes unless religion, with i t s endlessly rich 
variety, accompany i t with a l l notes* and raise the 
simple song to a full-voiced, glorious harmony* (8.) 
This, Schleiermacher continues, is "really the nature of 
r e l i g i o n " H o t e th&% t h i s i s not a simple glo r i f i c a t i o n 
of culture* Culture alone .leads only to separation and 
(3.) Fyqm BQusaea.u to Hitachi* pp»8i5-31G* gf> mehuhr, 
pp* 108*103 
(2) op,M^Mm.$ P* 8 7 
u n f u l f i l l e d longing for the true source of l i f e * W Rather 
i t i s culture united with the I n f i n i t e which i s being held up 
before us here? a unity i n which the individual and distinct 
ie lost and the Universe f o u n d s A f t e r we have become 
accustomed.to the alien language i n which i t i s expressed* 
there i s a grandeur i n this conception of the relationship' 
between religion (specifically Christianity) and culture* This 
I© especially and refreshingly true when i t i s set side*by*side 
with, say, Calvin1® endless repetitions about the meanness of 
this world* At the same time* however, a moat fundamental, 
weakness i s evident i n Sehleiermacher at this point: he obscures 
the difference between God and man| Church and culture* ^ ) But 
i f he obscures this difference, he does not deny or obliterate 
i t , 
I t i s «}ust the i n t u i t i o n of the Universal 
resistance of f i n i t e things to the unity of 
the Whole* and of the way the Deity treats 
this resistance* Ghristiani'ly sees how He 
reconciles the h o s t i l i t y to Himself ,| and 
sets bounds to the ever*increasing allena** 
tion by scattering points here and there 
over the whole that are at once f i n i t e and 
i n f i n i t e # human and divine $ (4) 
In the process of history the Church mediates between the 
" f i n i t e " and the I n f i h t e i a process i n which through the 
(1) m-foeltftitiii* p.92, (fi) j y b i | * # p»138* 
(a) For a typical essample of the way i n which Sohleiermacher 
obaoures'or softens the difference see The Ohrlstian Faith 
(pi 54) where "Godlesaness** i s replaced by "Godf orgetf 
• ness"* 
(4) pn.fieM^onj.: p,34l« This point*of*view i s related to IcISilerffiaQher^s Christoiogyf a fact which becomes 
e3®iicit i n The Christian Faith (p, 64 ej, ®&M&M) * 
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a c t i v i t y of th© Church "redemption is. "being ever more completely 
realised i n time, and the Holy Spirit i s thus pervading the 
whole ever more perfectly*i:*"^) Implied i n this i s a reeoghi* 
tioft of the his t o r i c a l l y conditioned and hence limited forms; of 
the Apostolic Church^ j the need to be aware of the corruptions 
" ' ('/A "•• 
which the Church has undergonev ' j and the Resultant duty to 
(A\ doctrine offcft extend v ' and purify the/Church*v ; The Church successfully 
engaging i n this process i s the "true church" which 
Schleiermacher commends to his readers j "the church which has 
vanquished'all opposition! whose training i s complete*•« C a n d 
in. which] the religious view of l i f e i s dominant*1^6) This i s 
the divinely established body which mediates between the 
" f i n i t e " and the I n f i n i t e * 
This concludes o<pr introduction i n which we have distinguislk-
ajteed and discussed three aspects of the Christian's concern for 
history* These ares, (1) the view which i s taken about the 
place and importance of God% action i n history j (S) the under-
standing of the nature of the Bible which we take to the inter-
pretation of that book} (3) the attitude which i s taken toward 
history as a whole, and including the cultural products of 
historical development* 
(1) Thev Christian Faith* p.* 595 • 
(2) j f f l ^ T?P* 595*596* .-; 
($) 0^ Hei^^ioh.*.. .P»-' 816 et passim* 
(4>) ' ffilfliyfr 148* 
(5) . The.Christian Faith, p, 243* 
(6) Oft Relj^ioni P« 157* 
fife 
We have directed these three t u i t i o n s , toward a number of 
important and representative Christian theologians^ and we have 
found that the results of this examination have been diverse^ 
yet i n each ease f r u i t f u i * The significant response which can 
be evoked from Christianity under this kind of questioning 
stretches from the Old and New Testaments right down into our 
own times* Therefore we conclude that the problem of history 
i s tlirown at us in three*fold formj and that this problem 
as. we; have described i t i s of the essence of Christianity * 
not a modern problem superimposed upon Christiahity* 
i " 
'. I 
i:Now we stand i n our own age with this same problem on our 
.JhancL-^ * Bvjt.. now the problem has one very •&£f^ffi$^rlf&£e&Q^9* 
This Idiffe-s?enee i s that, today there exists a selfweonsciousnesf•,. 
aWirll.ii'i-&to3?^- auoh as has never .existed before* f t i s this 
aelf^cojisqlousness which makes i t imperative that we de^.l v/ith 
the problem of history afresh. This self-conspiougness ftbout 
histdry i s particularly marked i n some historian^ and theoiogianii 
Let tia. turn, to them now and see what happens* We w i l l begin 
with vfche ,18th Century and Gdambafctista Vice • 
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PART IX 
'smm HISTORIANS j 
HISTORY AMD ITS HBLDVAITOB TO TIIBOI*0(IY» 
"Think nowAl%&$Q$$ has- many ounnlng passages," 
GhsgpnMons T»S* Eliot 
Chapter J l * 
VICO'S . UMDBRSTAMDIM& 01? HISTORY 
1* Review ahd Prospect* 
In the preceding section we have surveyed various ideas 
and attitudes of the Church i n regard to the nature of history 
as a whole, the Interpretation of Scripture$ and the relation-* 
ship "between Christianity and cultures With this as a back* 
ground we turn now to consider a related set of problems which 
l i e , as we shall see* within the area which we have surveyed. | 
These problems may be generally described as those associated. j 
with the understanding of the nature of historical event and i t s 
interpretation* We wish to approach these problems by consider* I 
ing the relevant writings of three mens Giambattista Vico, a 
i 
Neapolitan who wrote i n the f i r s t half of the 18th Genturyj 
Benedetto Croce, who wrote aroimd the turn of the present centuryjj 
and f i n a l l y R*G» Collingwood, whose death occured i n 1946* 
The reason for selecting these three men w i l l become appaV-
rent as we proceed* However, i t w i l l be well i f at this point 
we give a brief explanation of our choice* The f i r s t and most 
important reason i s that each of these men spoke at length and 
•with o r i g i n a l i t y on the problem of the interpretation of histo-
r i c a l events* In this endeavor Croce acknowledges his dependtnce 
upon Vlco, considering him to be "the philosopher most closely 
(1) 
akin to myself "p and Collingwood i n turn reoogniaes his 
( l ) Croce^. ^ ^ o j ^ g r ^ p h y , Oxford University Press, London, 1987. ps*'.:,«54-76. 
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indebtedness to Croce and Vico« Bach of these ©en has received 
a wide hearing and has exerted a relatively wide influence* 
This influence i s manifested both i n those persons who have 
accepted and b u i l t upon the thinking of these men, and i n those 
who have f e l t themselves compelled to oppose them*^ 
A second and negative reason for our choice la that very, 
few men have dealt seriously with the problem of the interpreta* 
tlon of historical evidence* In contrast! many have written 
"philosophy of history", attempting to apply more-*or-*less arbi-
trary c r i t e r i a to the course of history i n order to interpret 
the past and to predict the future *. e,,g*.# Augustine, Marx* 
Spengler, Toynbee etc* However* "philosophy of history" i s 
not the central concern of this thesis* A host of others have 
retold and recast at second hand original work which has been 
done on various aspects of historical investigation* With this j 
i 
second-hand material we are naturally not concerned* But due 
to the relatively recent emergence of genuine historical studies* j 
the number of men-who have made a sustained and original con* 
tr i b u t i o n to the problem of the interpretation of historical ; 
(9) " I evidence i s very limited indeed* N / j 
( l ) For a survey of Vico*s influence see Oh* 4> of the Intro* 
duetioh to The Autobiography of Giambattista Vice, trans** 
lated by U«K$Flseh and T*G, Bergin* Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca*,Hew York* 1944* A comparable survey does 
not exist for Croce and Collingwood* 
(S) For a good summary of the historical development of the 
theory and writing of history see Collingwood, ft.G,• The 
Idea of History* Oxford University Press * 194-6* pp» 14 
f i n a l m&mn tm owe onoioe i s that mm of these* mm 
wa?ot© as a toologian* Vico considered hii3©elf to h@ a' loyal 
Roman Catholic? tout ho ©awfully ^eluded thooiogioal W©st»iga«» 
fcion tvtm hi® mltitm®* H©hi?Qw histoffsr h© ©oa®i&®r»0d to W i n .. 
a d i f t e o a t oategojpy fs»o}B •'geatiXo" h i s t o i d and no oatfOfullsr . 
OxeladQ© the fom&w tvam hi© lo^8ti&»t&oii0* Mowowify. although 
?ieo did not i^eogniso i t * .th&m 1& a strong aaouiaa? wxgveab i n • 
hia t h o u g h t * ^ Earning to CI»QCO* i t w i l l be peen that ho 
wa?itea fffom an omph&tioaXly ha#antatio yi©vi!p0in% He: probacy 
would have fce#» astounded $h&t there m-e any e l a t i o n fcotwoon 
hia investigations and tho suo;)@ot of w o l a t i o n i Qollingwood's 
vtiUgftyus position* whilo ppofcafcXy 4aglioanf n®v©3? fceeoiao® 
ex p l i c i t * i n any das© be aertai&ijr &oea not wit© a© a theo* 
Xogian# 
One might wsil as&s Ihy doea the non^theologioal oha^aotej? 
of the wos?k of t h e ^ men oosaaend tiwm i n an kncgilpy- at>ont ih&.... 
natna?© of swolation'? /She aasw i s that th@#e is, aa. illuminate 
iag similarity i n the way i n i?Moh the .seoulas? hietopian 
appspoaohefc hia* evidenee of historical ©vent* and the way i n 
which the theologian han&10& the s&iae problem v/hen dealing tfith 
revelation*, fhoa?© ia uadotfbtedly a hordes? line {01? apea) "between 
the two in<3ai;eie©> "bat to atand on thi s feo#ta> line M i l illamia-
ate the taa& froth of the historian and the theologian* 
(1) F03? the ^ohlem of the am?ooogaig©d feeulariam of Vioo*© 
thoaght aee. Cj?oee* B*.». »,,|Mteo^fe .o^.^agba^^Q^ J j o ^ 
% .Allen and Un^ni London* 1918 > Appen&ist; I I I JJ& feaiSaiyu 
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W&t& thi s :g®mmi. introduction we turn now to th©• fi**a$ of 
2* ^ . . l ^ r B ^ i e ^ ' o f aiaa'battlsta.-Vieo* • V 
a$aiabatti&ta V&oo (Jl$©8~174&) «$e&t M@ sati?© li f e , i n and • 
n©aj?''ftgp&aaj a l i f e aa3?ised t>sr personal potf^ty and t&o f a i l w $ » 
to obtain any iaipo^tant and genuin&ly tfOHmnwativ© position on 
tli© faoi&ty of tko iniiv®j?&i ty t&©x»e* In consequence tboae- yoa^a 
we?© spent$ i n addition to %M discharge of tn© x^aponaiDilities. 
of an uniinpo3?tani pj?of^eaos?sliipt irn tn$ waiting of a nniab©x» of 
ainos? wo3?l£0|-.and above a i l i n Hne @^8p^j?at;lng d£ffiox4ti^***oi* 
a good twenty yeaffe* which 3?o8nlt©d i n .fffrp Wm..a&%ppipfa^ :v©f 
tne minos? w i tings tn© mo©t important a&t-tlio Aslant WiMem. .&,f , 
.tjhft ytal^ana (171Q) and tn© ffn^@3mal,: l*aw: ( i m } f ^ ^ fir** : 
edition*of ffft© SfQy aoienoe appeared i n 1?S5$ a gseoond and 
g3?©atly revised edition axjp©as;J0d i n 1730 j with a ttalvft and 
f i n a l edition appealing i n th$ y w of Vioo f9 deatlif 1?M* 
•.^ ew...3oi^ n0§.i8 V&CQ*B flaaflmatt, ornate mKmastitlna th® o-aliaination } 
and £ull ombodiiaent of a l l of ti$o s a 1&oughtt^ Fos? tfaift 
a?oa&an w< w i l l toe GQmevm<& ®m%w&ve%y h®m with f^ @;Ne;w:.;Bel^ n]be 
(1) For the $2® ©aition of tnes© mino*? wotffess and theis? eventual embodiment i n tmr 3oiene% ae© tha' followin$8 Fiacn and :• Bo-pgi«t * >• 4©f f l i n t y i*6bwif BXatiMoa ttw Sons9 London* 1884* Gnapteps -S^ui o^oo©f P^A^OiQpn.y o r f i f f i M t M i , , ! ! ^ . ' <&iapt<Ss»0 1 * ' 0| Caaoaig*»iy A*E»» .|ip^ .and,. ftoutledae and Ksgan Fanl* London* 1960* 013*;"'!*:" ' 
(8) A l l of Vieo1© os?itios ai?® i n substantial &p»0eia©nt as to the fnol^siyoenaffaetofr of gam. Mm j3ei<mee» ages Crooe* B#? Sjfea i>^3,^ogo^|y ..of , 0 i < t ^ t t | j ^ ^ i S ^ i>^7.' aaisoniffffi« •' <Sp;*» jtegttt Fiaoh and B»ftattf: -opiffifoi pp*33ff*$ F l i n t * '•• 
$i#8t; warning to be g|#n to anyon© apptoaefeiag g^fi 
ij^ -Bie.if^ ©: i s that'.it 1B malted by a o b t a i n evu&ty*. tfihle 
4toap^t&vi*ti6- is'se&n fi3?©t i n i t s .styld,*- whieh ia highly 
jBNapetltlTd and dig*»£i0aiv@« S?he digression® consist of bringing . 
l a .mv®<*o%'*%Qm tangential matters i n support of hia argument! 
digression© ishieh to Vloo uttftt have ap^ai^d smob to thf 
point* Anoth@3? jmni'fefctatlon of this <iw&i%&$ f3?om th© point 
of view of th© SOth Century* i s th<* pesjvaaiir® 03E*3?OS* m to £a&£g 
e«gi« tot ©&J?iy men «s*e giants* that the tmlv§a?s&3, fHood ooow* 
#6d< 3.680'yeava aft©? the Creation* that Os?©e3s hiatos^y begin!' 
a f t w tho w&w&aaS. flood ete* 
$» 3?<sga*»& to th#so ohapactetistio^'- of $h& fftt* sa&anoft. two 
things need to b® said* $h© f i r s t la that Vloo** work W0t:/b0 . 
mm i n it© histo^ica^ oontG&tj* A j?©adiag of scientific wos?ks 
of the mtm period* and indeed m&n of the 19th Gentey* tfWa&a; 
a simllaa? esnadity fa?o© the point of vlow of th© 00th Cenfey 
«ea£ft&* Sebond&y* i t till beeo!»6 evident i n what follows that* 
i n apitd of fanoifttosaa and OPTO as to fact* • Vlao had a pro* 
found insight into th© problem of th© int@»p3?etatioa of hlatoj?i* 
' . i . . . t 
;A--f$»al 8e»e*93L' pw&mfo aoe^t©-!^ aade concerning.our 
at?-bfbach to ^he fflfo Solende* 'jfosFQ ©l©m©at® as?© ovidont i n Yioo'gi 
ta?$atment of history.? .'Tha fij?$t of thea© ia..a. th0os?y of imo#* 
and a inathod of reaching historical 1snow3,edg©.|. The so&ond 
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element i s his "philosophy of history", i n which he attempts, to 
set f o r t h the "ideal eternal history traversed i n time "by the 
histories of a l l nations"* Of course Vioo saw the two as a 
unified whole * They can, however, he distinguished j and even 
i f we may have to dismiss his "philosophy of history" as unten* 
able, we may s t i l l f i n d great value i n his understanding of the: 
proper use of historical evidence* 1 
S# . The Structure of The Hew Science* 
I t w i l l be helpful to outline the structure of Vico^ most 
unusual book* and to give enough of the content to enable the 
reader to have some indication of the line of argument and the 
terms i n which i t i s set forth* This w i l l serve as a useful 
background for the discussion of those sections of the book 
which are relevant to this thesis* 
Prefacing Book I there appears the "Idea of the Work"* 
This, consists of an explanation of an allegorical picture con- i 
tained i n this seotion* In this explanation, are found a l l of 
the princi|^])ideas of The. Mew Science* An allegorical mode of j 
presentation may have beeh congenial to the mind of readers i n 
the 17th Century, but even with Vioo^s explanation this section j 
is hardly comprehensible to the modern reader* When the rest of I 
The Hew Science has been read with some care, then the "Idea of 
the Work" i s seen to be ;just what i t s t i t l e says that i t i s * 
m, 
Book 1* Book X i s entitled "Establishment of Principles"^ 
and consists f i r s t of a l l of a chronological table with notes 
which ^sets I f o r t h i n outline the world of the ancient nations, 
starting from the universal flood**£hie section can only 
be described as a curiosity* I n an effort such as this VICQ^S 
errors as to fact count most heavily against him* 
The second and more important section of Book I i s headed 
"Elements", and consists of over 100 "axioms" which w i l l guide 
Vice in, ;3Ubsequent sections as he seeks to understand historical 
evidence and to describe the "ideal eternal history traversed i n 
time by the histories of a l l nations"* Examples of these "axioms 
are? "Because of the ia&0flajlte nature of the'human mind, when* 
ever i t i s lost i n ignorance, man makes himself the measure of 
a l l t h i n g s , " E v e r y nation* *,* whether Greek or barbarian* 
has had the same conceit that i t before a l l other nations i n -
vented the comforts of l i f e and that i t s remembered history goes 
back to the very beginnings of the w o r l d * " ^ j " A l l barbarian 
histories have fabulous b e g i n n i n g s . " T h e nature of thinge . 
i s nothing b u t their coming into being (nascimento) at certain 
times and i n certain fashions*"^ 
( l ) The New Science,* translated by T*G:* Bergin and M*H, Pisohf 
Cornell University Press* Ithaca.* Hew York, 1948, paragraph 
ISO* A l l references to The New Science w i l l be given i n 
terms of paragraph numbers* These numbers are uniform with 
those i n the text edited by Pausto Hieoline and appearing 
as volume 118 and part of volume 113 i n the So r i t t e r i 
d'Italia« Bari* lateraa, 1928* 
(S) par* 1SB 
(3) par* SOS 
(4) par f 147 
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... Some of those "axioms", such as the f i r s t two quoted above, 
have a "psychological" element i n them,, ite.*, they are statements 
about a constant pattern of thoughts which Vieo had observed i n 
the study of history and, undoubtedly, among his contemporaries* 
At several points he makes reference to the mental patterns of 
children i n order to support his argument* Another group of , 
"axioms", such as the t h i r d one quoted above, seem to spring 
largely from historical study* S t i l l another group, such as the 
last one quoted above, i s mainly philosophical i n character* 
These three groups are by no means exhaustive of the "axioms" 
found i n Book I f nor, i n fact, do they lend themselves to any 
s t r i c t grouping*, 
In the subsequent Books of The Hew Science Vico makes 
frequent reference to these "axioms*' i n the course of his 
argument* The "axioms" support his argument, and reciprocally 
the success of the argument gives support to the "axioms"* 
However i t should not be thought that Vico f i r s t arrived at 
these "axioms", and then proceeded to his following investiga* 
tions*: There i s no indication that he proceeded i n so straight-
forward a manner as t h i s j to a large extent "axioms" and 
investigation developed together* This procedure i s ;}ust what 
we would expect from the last of the "axioms" which we quoted* 
"The nature of things (the emphasis of Book l ] i s nothing but 
their coming into being (hasoimento) at certain times and i n 
certain fashions (the discovery of which origins as to time and 
fashion i s the goal of the subsequent Books] *" In other words» 
i n the study of origins (actual historical investigation) we 
come to know the nature (expressed i n the "axioms") of the 
events and documents which we study* In turn*this knowledge 
of their nature reflects l i g h t hack onto the actual historical 
©vents and documents studied t and to some extent upon similar 
historical events and documents,, We w i l l return to this when 
we come to examine Vico*s theory of knowledge* 
Book I I * Book I I i s entitled "Poetic Wisdom", and forms 
the main body of She Hew Science* By the term "poetic 1 1 Vico 
means Mpre«*reflective"r I t i s the original mode Of human under-
standing* 
•K thy a necessity of human nature, poetic style 
arose "before prose style? ;just as, "by the same 
necessity* the fables* or imaginative universale* 
arose before the rational or philosophical univer** 
sals which were formed through the medium of prose 
speech* ( l ) 
Vico maintains that "Doctrines must take their "beginnings 
from Lthe "beginnings] of the matters of which they treat. 
And what are these beginnings? They are f i r s t of a l l "poetio Mj 
the t o t a l production of this f i r s t stage of human consciousness 
was "poetic 0 or "pre^efleotive" i n character* Therefore we must 
not, as do "men of limited ideas";,: accept these "poetic" produce 
tions at their face value»v ' Rather they must "be interpreted 
(1) par* 4-60 * 
(2) par* 314« 
(3) par* 319, 
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and understood as "pre-freflective" and veiled forms of knowledge| 
the historian must sympathetically and imaginatively attempt to 
understand what was being expressed i n terms or gods* heroes, 
the formation of words etc* This discovery Vico considered to 
"be the "key1* to The New Sciencei i t sets his enterprise i n 
motion and pervades i t s development* He writes of i t i 
:#«;*early gentile peoples* **were poets who spoke i n poetic characters,! This discovery^ which i s 
the master key of this Science, has cost us the 
persistent research of almost a l l of our l i t e r a r y 
l i f e j, because with our ci v i l i z e d natures we cannot 
at a l l imagine and can only understand by great 
t o i l the poetic nature of these f i r s t men* (1) 
The value of this approach* as we see i t i n Book I I * varies* 
When he argues against the then popular view that primitive 
peoples possessed men of "matchless wisdom"! then we see his 
procedure bearing f r u i t and making an important contribution to 
hist o r i c a l inquiry i n his d a y * ^ On the other hand the results 
are not always so happy* For example4 when he concludes that 
men were originally of what'we would c a l l normal stature f. but 
became "giants of enormous build"* In Yioo's view the V*causes 
[of giantismj are to be traced to the savage education of their 
c h i l d r e n * 3 ^ He supports this position as usual by etymological 
analysis* In such instances as this i t i s clear that Vice's 
analysis does not grow out of the study of historical evidence 
(3.) par* 34 The limited way i n which Vioo uses the work "imagi* 
nation" can be seen i n this passage*, 
(S) pars* !19~138j 347~575 et passim* 
(3) par* 170* See also pars* 569-573 ej, passim* 
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or of the observation of human mental patterns f; but at best 
out of the study of rumour and speculation which had passed 
for history* Then with great assurance he imposes this under4* 
standing upon the historical process. This is a characteristic 
which the reader feels at work throughout Vico, and not ;just i n 
the patently fanciful and erroneous sections as that relaiing to 
giantism* 
Once again we should- remind ourselves that The New Science 
was written i n the f i r s t part of the 18th Century. Moreover 
i t i s not the v a l i d i t y or invalidity of the specific content 
of Vice's results that matter (although this was occasionally 
valid and important)..; so much as i t i s the theory of knowledge 
and method of hist o r i c a l investigation which he employed* In 
subsequent sections we w i l l show the value of these i n spite 
of imperfections and misapplications* 
The aspeotsoof "poetic" or "pre-reflective" l i f e which 
Vico examines by means of this method are comprehensive indeed* 
They include language and writing, logic, morals, economics, 
p o l i t i c s , physios, astronomy, chronology and geography. In 
each examination we see the same presupposition as to the "poe* 
t i c " origin of knowledge, the constant reference back to the 
"axioms" of Book I * the use of etymology (often completely 
implausible) to support his position, and the same mixture ( i n 
varying proportions) of insight and fantasy* In a summary of 
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Book I I he restates his theme and sets fo r t h the substance 
and conclusion of the Book. Seen i n the context of his day* 
this statement substantiates the va l i d i t y and importance of 
Vlco * s endeavour* 
We have shown that poetic wisdom Justly deserves 
two great and sovereign tributes* The one* clearly 
and constantly accorded to i t , i s that of having 
founded gentile mankind* though the conceit of the 
nations on the one hand and that of the scholars on 
the other, the former with ideas of an empty 
magnificanoe and the l a t t e r with ideas of an 
impertinent philosophical wisdom, have i n effect 
denied i t , this honour "by their very efforts to affirm 
i t * The other, concerning which a vulgar tradition 
has come down to us $ is thai the wisdom of the 
ancients made i t s wise men, by a single inspiration, 
equally great as philosophers, lawmakers, captains, 
historians* orators and poets, on which account i t 
has been so greatly sought after* But i n fact i t 
made or rather sketched them such as we have found 
them i n the fables* For i n these, as i n embryos or 
matrices, we have discovered the outlines of. a l l 
esoteric wisdom* And i t may be said that i n the • • . 
fables the nations have i n a rough way and i n the 
language of the human senses described i n the 
beginnings of this world of sciences, whioh the 
epecialiged studies of scholars have since 
c l a r i f i e d for us by reasoning and generalisation* 
£'Fom a l l this we may conclude what we set out to 
show i n this second book? that the theological 
poets were the sense and the philosophers the 
i n t e l l e c t of human wisdom* ( l ) (2) 
Book H i t Book I I I , entitled "Discovery of the True 
Homer", i s an attempt to apply the method and insight of the 
(1) par* 779» 
(S) Vioo refers to the poets of primitive times as "theological 
poets", not i n our sense but i n the sense that i t was an 
"age of gods?' and a l l of l i f e was enveloped i n the "divine" 
These poets dealt i n terms of "dense"(sensation), the 
concrete, fables etc* $his imperfect truth was latent 
c l a r i f i e d by the in t e l l e c t of the philosophers* This 
last conception i s unsatisfactory and w i l l not be dealt 
with here* 3?or an exposition and criticism of this see 
Croce, B., The Philosophy of (Hambattista Vieo. Ch* 4. 
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f i r s t two Books to the problem of the authorship of the 3;iiad 
and the Odyssey*. In the introduction to this hook Vico states 
the position against which he sets himself* 
Although our demonstration i n the preceding hook 
that poetic wisdom was the vulgar wisdom of the 
peoples of Greece* who were f i r s t theological and 
later he#$|$.poets* should carry as a neoeasary 
consequence that the wisdom of Homer was not at 
a£l different i n kind, yet, as Plato l e f t firmly 
fixed.the opinion that Homer was endowed with 
sublime esoteric v/iwdom (and a l l the other 
philosophers have followed i n his t r a i n , with 
pseudo-D Plutarch foremost, writing an entire 
book on the matter), we shall here examine 
particularly i f Homer was ever a philosopher* (1) 
Vico then proceeds to show from the internal evidence of 
the two poems (principally the savagery of the I l i a d and the 
cunning displayed i n the Odyssey) that the author(s) could not 
have been a philosopher of "sublime esoteric wisdom"* He con-
cludes that the poems are the product of nations of people 
over a period of several generations, and not that of one or 
two individual poets| that the more savage I l i a d proceeds the 
Odyssey i n time of composition! and that the ptotnC of origin 
of the two poems is different* 
The refutation of the conception of Homer as & wan of 
"sublime esoteric wisdom" was a permanent contribution to 
Homeric studies, while some of Vice's more general observations 
possess insight which i s to be found i n contemporary and s t i l l 
far from settled Homeric criticism* The relative freedom from 
(1) par* 780 
100 
fantastic speculation and the attendant degree of success of 
Vice's effort to apply his method i n this area comes from the . 
fact that h i a method was i n this case controlled by the two 
specific documents under consideration. 
Book XV> In Book I V r "The Course of nations"* we leave 
the excursus into l i t e r a r y criticism and return to the direct 
elaboration of Vico Ts view on history* I t i s here and I n the 
following Book (Book V,: "The Recurrence of Human Things i n the 
Resurgence of nations") that Vico's "philosophy of history" 
becomes most exp l i c i t * (In a less explicit and less developed 
form t h i s "philosophy of history" i s * l i k e many of Vico,,s 
themes, to be found throughout The, Hew Science») Here i t i s 
that Vico elaborates an ideal pattern which he thinks a l l 
nation*- traverse i n the course of their historical development* 
Moreover,, as we shall see, a nation may traverse this course 
more than once* 
Now i t i s the "philosophy of history" which quite right l y 
arouses the i r e of professional historians, whether i t be the 
type propounded by Vleo * Marx,/ Toynbee (erjwhoejverj (We may 
provisionally define "philosophy of history" as the creation 
of a speculative pattern to which actual historical events are 
supposed to conform*) When we come to consider Croce and 
Collingwood we shall see that they are emphatic i n their re^eo-* 
tion of the attempt to create a "philosophy of history"* 
i o i 
Bmmmpf. bofore> m mim a e r i t i e a l ©valuation, of ¥ieo*s. mm 
^h&t&mphtr of hftatery* l o t Us f i r s t deeeribe i t * ' 
The ftmd&mental problem' of any ^ hileeophy of history** i s 
to ejgpl&in or demonstrate the relation between the speculative 
pattern and til©<< hi at or leal r©eordf r£he goal £a to demonstrate 
that- they coincide* ' 'I'his i a t of course*, true of Vlco too$. 
attempt t.while not acceptable9 doaa.poeaeaa soisi^  subtlety# 
•It w i l l be fcalpftfl to have a aieteffleat of -the relationship ' 
whioh 6jd^tei/-:in ^ ; rffffir ffiilenoe,. botwsen apeottlative pattern and 
hietorieal event before; turning to the text i t s e l f * A«R* 
Capoiiiga?i' 03^ 3?es@@a it-well*. 
{jhea?© as?© i n Viool ideal and etevnal hietovy 
speculative pattiriji) and tli© eonreeof the 
nations i n time, mmtviml eeovae of event CU 
I n r e a l i t y * the©® are. not two* but one* 
the ooui»M of the nation®,in time f u l f i l l s 
withia the limit© of the 'tina*for»8 of taan 
ewlture the eternal and ideal history t while the l a t t e r i n tmm* define© the isaaanent. 
ideal i t y of a l l time pvooeaa* Thai* diatine** 
t i o n oanjmly bo formal and! diaieotioal* 'JPhe 
science • Ijffhe, ffljay. .jteieqael whiah embraces them 
Oeea ee • w ^ i T O T y a a d d l s b i n Q t i ^ .w4 
xauat be.it. eo^se<pently> philo.aopljy. and- history 
at oneej. ess* mere t r u l y ainee philoaophy and:, 
hie toy h&ve alwaye» i n veotoro tradition.*, 
atood i n dialeetieal opposition to each other* 
a. 'Sew Science* indeed*. (1) 
eeama to indicate 1 that i n fhe, .He;^ ..8oieaoe the "ideal, 
and eternal hiata^y'1 is.-not apeouiatiye at all? but. rather that. 
i t has an asi^ifciaal esdetenee within "the .eouraa of the nation© 
i n 'time** However aa we new proceed to describe thia "ideal 
(1) Qapenig*!* A«R*# P*109» 
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and eternal history" i t w i l l he seen that i t i s not found 
within empirical history so much as i t i s rather a r b i t r a r i l y 
abstx'acted from Oreoo^ -Roman history, and then imposed on history 
i n general. 
With this background l e t us now turn to Vico himself for 
a statement of the purpose of Book XV, "The Course of Nations!** 
*##we shall now, by the aid of this philosophical 
and philological illumination lot the preoeeding 
sections of The New. .8eleneel. and relying on the 
Axioms above stated concerning the ideal eternal 
history* i n this fourth book discuss the course 
the nations take, proceeding i n a l l theia* various 
and diverse customs with constant uniformity Upon 
the three; ages which the Egyptians said had elapsed 
before them i n their world, namely,, the successive 
ages of gods, heroes and men* For the nations w i l l 
be seen to develop i n conformity with this division 
by a constant and uninterrupted order of causes and 
effects present i n every nation, through three kinds 
of natures* From these natures arise three kinds of 
customs; and i n virtue of these customs three kinds 
of natural laws of nations are observed* and i n eon* 
sequence of these laws three kinds of c i v i l states or 
commomwealthso are established* «• These [groups ofj three 
special unities, with many others that derive from 
them and w i l l also be enumerated i n this book, a l l 
lead to one general u n i t f f This i s the unity of the 
religion of a provident divinity* which i s the unity 
of the s p i r i t informing and giving l i f e to this 
world of nations* (!) 
Vico i s saying here that there are three ages which a l l 
nations must pass through j and i n Book V he adds that- i f a 
nation i s destroyed by i t s decadence, then i f i t rises again 
i t w i l l once more pass through these same three stages* These 
three ages are characterised as that of the gods, of heroes and 
(1) par* 915* 
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of men; and each age has I t a appropriate customs, laws, govern* 
ment etc* This position i s qualified by saying that traces of 
one age may persist into the following age»^ In order to 
give this speculative historical pattern or. "philosophy of 
history" some substance we w i l l b r i e f l y characterise each of 
these three ages* 
The f i r s t age i s the age of the gods* In this age men are 
impelled .by necessity* they are crude i n nature, and hugla. and 
grotesque i n appearance "like the cyclopes"* The government 
was that of the family state* ^  The fathers of these families 
grew more powerful as the "impious and unchaste" peoples who 
wandered the land placed themselves under the protection of 
these fathers* I n this age the people "feel without observiagM^' 
and their wisdom i s "pre^reflective'V "poetic" and creative* 
As the name of the age indicates* there was a pervasive sense 
of a relation to the divine expressed i n terms of fables* 
The second age i s that of the heroes* i n this age men are 
impelled by u t i l i t y * - severe i n nature, "proud and magnanimous, 
lik e Achilles"* The government was that of aristocratic common-* 
wealths based upon a union of families and their adherents* In 
this age men "observe with a troubled and agitated s p i r i t 
(1) pars* 249, 1004*1006* 
(2) pars* 241~248* » 
(3) par. 218* 
(4) par*, 218* 
t04 
their language wis one of "heroicblaaonings* with which arms . 
are made, to speak" $ and law was one of foree but controlled "by 
religion* W 
The t h i r d ago i s that of men. Included i n this i s Vico's 
own age* In this age men are impelled by comfort? are benign 
i n nature) and are marked by Intelligencer^'they reflect with 
a clear mind," The moat characteristic governmentis the con-* 
s t i t u t i o n a l monarchy*^' Men recognise for laws* conscience*: 
reason and d u t y * ^ 
When the constitutional monarchy has been established i n 
the t h i r d age r then we hare once more the unity which existed i n 
the beginning i n the person of the family father, and the course 
of history i$. complete. This unity i s the term of "ideal and 
eternal history*%. and i t has been led, to this unity by a 
"provident d i v i n i t y " which i s immanent i n the historical process* 
Vico also speaks of this as "the unity of the s p i r i t informing 
and giving l i f e to this world of n a t i o n s * " ^ 
Before commenting on this "philosophy of history'* we w i l l 
go on and describe':: the very short Book % since i t i s an integral 
part of Vico * s "philosophy of history"* 
(i j t pars* 91V« 9gO# 9S3, 986* 939« 949 et. passim* 
(3) Vicp does not describe this monarchy as "constitutional"* 
; but the concept of monarchy which he has i n mind approsci* 
mates a constitutional monarchy* Of* par* 963*: 
(8) pars* 918» 921* 9S4* 927, 940, et passim. 
(4) par* 915* 
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I n Book V + "She Recurrence of Human things i n the Resur<-
genoe of NationsM»Vieo claims to see i n what we oall the Middle ;
Ages the recurrence of the "barbarism of the f i r s t centuries of 
Greece and Rome* He goes on to say that more i s known of the 
f i r s t barbarism than the second; an evaluation which was pro* 
bably correct i n the 18th Century* deeply alienated as i t was 
from the Middle Age® by the impaot of the Renaissance and the 
Enlightenment* Finally* Vice believes that the returned 
barbaric times <(the Middle Ages) are made more int e l l i g i b l e r bj^/ 
a comparison with the f i r s t barbarism of early G-reeoe and 
Rome*^ Among the similarities which Vice sees between the 
two barbarisms i s that of the 3oining of politlcal^militatfy 
power with religious &mx$tioxS^i the granting of asylum to 
the weak by the s t r o n g ^ | and the arising again of a syetem 
of. f i e f . • 
At the end of Book V Tico leaves the subject of the 
recurrence of human things and returns to the broader aspects, 
of hie ''philosophy of history % He says* wJ?oday a complete' 
humanity seems to be spread abroad through a l l nations* for a 
(1) This i s the clear implication of pars, i047ff,| and not the opposite (i*e># that the Middle Ages c l a r i f y early Greece and to©:) which Collingwood states is'the case (The ffiea of aistory > p*67)# i n An Autobiography Gollingwood warns 'W that philosophers often do not say what their commentators say they da* 
(8) pars* 1048 * 1049• 
$3) par, i,05$* 
(4) pars* 1057 « 1058} g£, pars* 860 - S6g* 
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few great monareha rule over this world of peoples*"^ Thus 
they have returned to the. unity of the family fathers, their 
development i s at an endj unless*, that is*-; they sinls into 
decadenea and 5?ui,n* He then proceeds to mention the nations 
which do not f i t V©a?y well into this "philosophy of history".. 
Thee© include Russia* Poland, England, Japan,, various free 
c i t i e s and the Indians of North Amerieai In addition Holland, 
Switzerland and the airman empire seem to form & special* no% 
conforming group*^ After this there i s a f i n a l restatement 
of his thesis of v,the ideal of the eternal laws i n accordance 
with which the af f a i r s of a l l nations proceed" and the f i f t h 
and f i n a l Boole ends* 
The inadequacies of any "philosophy of history" "become 
obvious i n Boole V* The f i r s t of these i s the tendency to see 
one*a own age as the culmination of the historical process* 
This i s | as we have mentioned,' Vico' s position. As we view 
this position i n the 80th Century i t s error i s too obvious to 
need comment* 
Another and more serious &m>v-$frt any "philosophy of history 
i s that once the philosophy of principles have been established, 
then there i s the problem of forcing the actual historical 
evidence into the prepared mould* Vico could not do i t as i s 
evident i n the f i n a l part of Boole V where he must l i s t the 
(1) par. 1089, 
(2) pars., 1088 * 1095,. 
emMrassingly long l i s t of nations which do not conform to the 
pattern* fta our om day I'oynbee has the same d i f f i c u l t y in 
getting theory and evidence to coincide* • £ The inevitable 
result therefore of any ^'philosophy of hietory' 1 ia that to one 
degree or another historical evidence i s modified i n order to 
accord with the particular theoryfc 1*0** history Is f a l s i f i e d * 
This conflict of theory and historical evidence i s also 
evident i n Book XV where Vice compares the f i r s t and second 
barbarism* i*e*» the early centuries of Greece and Rome with 
the Middle Ages* In doing this Vice undoubtedly illuminated 
certain aspects of the Middle Ages for his contemporaries* 
However* i f th i s comparison i s taken as anything more than 
suggestive, then i t •becomes misleading. For example there was 
the hi s t o r i c a l factor of the presence of Christianity i n the 
second "barbarism* 3?his factor alone would render misleading 
anything more than a suggestive parallel between the two periods* 
In justice to Vice i t should "be repeated that his "philoso* 
phy of history*' i s not inflexible i n i t s details* We have 
already mentioned that oharacteristicsoof one age may carry 
over into the next* © «fi*« heroic characteristics may appear i n 
the age of man* Moreover when evidence simply w i l l not f i t the 
(1) ££* Geyl* P»* Bebatea With-Historians* B.T* Batsford* 
London* 1955, In' a series of essays i n this boo& Oeyl 
take& Toynbee to taals for tailoring his evidence to suit 
his theories* 
theory at a l l i then j m we saw i n our review of Book V, Vieo 
admits, j i t * He also states that the 3a tor barbarisms have a 
different quality from the primitive ones, calling the later 
barbarisms "barbarisms of reflection",, i*e*.t. that elements of 
their f a l l e n c i v i l i z a t i o n are present within the returned 
barbaric t i m e s * ^ 
I t i s on the strength of Vio0*s statement as t o the 
different quality of the returning times (the new cycles) that 
some critics, see i n Vice's "philosophy of history' 1 a spiral 
movement,, i#e*# ever ascending cycles* Possibly* but there i s 
really not enough evidence to say* The, Hew Scienpte does .not 
vindicate that Vico thought i n terms of circles, spirals, lines 
etc* However* three very general comments can be made here* 
F i r s t , the concept of returning cycles shows an a f f i n i t y with 
G-reek views of time* This i s to be expected because of the 
great influence which Greeo*Roman c i v i l i s a t i o n everted upon 
Vice* Secondly and more problematically* the concept of 
returning cycles indicates i n Vico an unrecognised alienation 
from Christian thought about history? which * whatever else i t 
might be* i s never that ,of returning c y c l e s * ^ Thirdly# and 
(1) A modern '©asample^ of what Vico had i n mind here can be seen 
i n the neo*paganism of the Naai movement i n Germany* 
(However contrived i t was, i t nevertheless found many 
people responsive*) But. i t was not really "paganism", 
for i t carried within i t a defiance of many aspects of 
what we may conveniently c a l l "Western c i v i l i s a t i o n * M 
I t was a "paganism of reflection". 
(S) The coapatability of The, Hew Science with Christian 
thought w i l l be dealt with at greater length when we 
come to deal with Vioo*s concept of providence* 
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her© we are on firm grotiad.f: whatever are the merits of an 
interpretation which sees a circular or spiral course of 
history i n Vico, certainly there is no clear indication i n him 
that history i s perpetually progressive* Once the age of man 
i s achieved no further improvement i s expected. This last 
statement i s realty a l l that'is essential here* 
This concludes our survey of th© broad outlines of the 
amorphous structure of p ^ f f s ^ $c^ ence» along with some indiea* 
t i o n of i t s content and the value of this content* We have 
seen something of Vice's presuppoeitibatand methodology as 
presented i n the "axioms" of Book I , These consist largely of 
observations on human nature and ways of thinking, and the 
Observation and analysis of mythologylaws and the writings 
of Greek and Roman authors* i n Book I I ("Poetic Wisdom") this, 
methodology was applied to earliest times* VicoVs thesis here 
is that the earliest wisdom of men i s "poetic" (imaginative,: 
pre*refleetive, concrete tfabulous etc*)* In Book I I I ("The 
Discovery of the True fioraer'O this methodology and insight i s 
applied to the problem of the authorship of the ^ l i a d and 
pdys-sey,*' Finally i n Books IV and V ("The Course of Nations" 
and "The Recurrence of Human ThingsH) we see that there are 
three ageaf that of the gods, of the heroes and of men* This 
is, the ideal and eternal history traversed (and possibly re* 
traversed) by a l l nations i n the course of time* 
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This outline, then, w i l l serve as a background for a more 
detailed discussion of certain aspects of Vico* s work which are 
the particular concern of this thesis* These ares Vico*s theory 
of knowledge! his understanding of the relation of philosophy 
and history% his conception of divine providence$ and his 
methodology for dealing with historical evidence* We now turn 
to the f i r s t of these. 
3» Vico 1s Theory of Knowledge. 
a*. Man can only know that which he has made * 
Negatively, The Hew Science arose i n opposi tion to Descartes 
and the atmosphere of rationalism which Descartes* influence had 
brought about*^ This came about i n spite of the fact that 
Vico was a Cartesian u n t i l his f o r t i e t h year* Positively. The 
3^ew Science grew out of Vico *s own historical studies, i n the 
course of which he came to see that Cartesian thought gave no 
basis for history*? 
Vieo's clear break with Cartesianism came with the publica-
tion of Ancient. Wisdom of the Italians (1710), There he admits 
that the o'ogito er^o sum does establish the existence of the 
selfc r but that i t i s only the certainty of simpl^oonsciousness* 
And the related criterion which makes science possible» namely 
the clear and distinct perception, i s likewise the certainty of 
( l ) Concerning the influence of Descartes at this time see 
The Autobiography of G-iambattlsta Igloo* p,13S, 
i n 
simple consciousness* But this is not a satisfactory criterion 
f or scientific statement, foj? one may "believe very firmly an 
entirely false idea* Moreover Descartes1 criterion completely 
eliminates the possibility of history* for the data of history 
are hever clearly and di s t i n c t l y perceived* Rather what i s 
needed, says Vloo f i s a basis for determining the li m i t s of 
human knowledgej what we can and cannot know, 
I There i s another way of stating why Descartes* philosophy 
i s of l i t t l e value as far as history i s oonoerned* This i s the 
i 
fact| that Descartes starts out with a problem which does not 
arise i n the study of historyj namely the problem of scepticism* 
the problem of the relation between ideas and things. The 
historian as historian does not write about this problem* nor 
i s he. interested i n i t , nor should he be. R*G-« Oollingwood com** 
menting on this matter saysj 
History i s a kind of knowledge i n which questions 
about ideas and questions about facts are not 
distinguishablej and the whole point of Descartes1s 
philosophy consists i n distinguishing those two 
types of questions* ( l ) 
Lett us put this i n concrete terms* The historian's ideas 
about» say * the American C i v i l War are nothing else than the 
facts of that war seen* as far as i s possible,, as an organic 
whole* The interpretation or "ideas" of the historian arise 
out of this matrix of historical fact or evidence (battles* 
( l ) The Idea of History* p*66. 
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treaties*, production figures etc*), and are checked at every 
point "by this same evidence* In turn, as the historian's inter-
pretations grow out of the investigation of evidence, these 
interpretations help to illuminate and at times even correct 
the factual record* Because this i s so$ the Cartesian separation 
of fact or evidence from interpretation or "idea" i s a question 
which does not arise i n history* They go together, and the one 
i s meaningless without the other* Vico was among the f i r s t , i f 
not the f i r s t , to understand this intimate and necessary rela* 
tion of fact (evidence) and interpretation (idea) i n history* 
Therefore, a "basis for history i s not to "be found i n Descartes1 
philosophy, "but by determining what can be known historically* 
Vico finds t h i s basis, i n the Ancient Wisdom of the Italians 
i n the doctrine th^Nfehe a b i l i t y p^^a^^ understand^; any-
thing, as opposedytio ;^^)perceiving i t t i s to have made i t * 
He writest 
The rule and criterion of truth i s to have made 
i t * Hence the clear and distinct idea of the 
mind not only cannot be the criterion of other ,. 
truths, but i t cannot be the criterion of the 
mind I t s e l f i for while the mind apprehends 
i t s e l f , i t does not make i t s e l f , and because i t 
does not make i t s e l f i t i s ignorant of the form 
or mode by which i t apprehends i t s e l f * (1) 
Vico goes on.-ijo say that God knows a l l things since he i s 
their creator* (A discussion of the adequacy or usefulness 
of this analogical statement need not detain us)* The mathema-
(1) Ancient Wisdom of the Italians* as quoted by Fisch and 
Bergin in the "introduction" to The Autobiography of 
Glambattista Vioo. p,*38* 
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t i o i a n earn be said to imovi because he la dealing In terms of 
abstractions which he has himself created* lie could perceive 
at triangle * tfcw example $ without creating i t 3 but i f the t r l * 
angle l a fenown*mathematically i t i s because man has created i t 
and the individual mathematician can recreate i t # Furthermore-V 
and this, was the: conclusion i n which Vieo vke particularly 
interested, man may know history because history i s the creation 
of man* (The application of this line of thought to the f i e l d 
of history was developed after the publication of the Ancient, 
Wisdom of the I t a l i a n s ) The formula under which this theory 
of historical knowledge is usually discussed i s verum et factum 
convertuntur«^ 1 «e»« the condition of knowing anything (yerum) 
is; that the knower himself should have created i t (factum)» 
This theory of hist o r i c a l knowledge i s both highly original 
and far-reaching i n i t s iDrplleatlox^i* When we describe i t as 
highly original tMs, of course , does not mean that Vico created 
i t ex niMlo. Robert F l i n t s after escamlning the various possible 
sources of Vico*s,theory, including several minor figures of 
Vlco*e own day, writes; 
Whatever the theory may be, i t la not of a 
coramonplace characterj true or false $ i t i s 
not one,which an ordinary mind would o r i g i -
nate. I t occurred to no thinker before Vieo, 
and rests on a bold and singular conception* 
which could only have suggested I t s e l f to a 
man Who looked at philosophical problems 
altogether i n a way of his own* (3) 
(1) .Although the phrase verum et faqftmn convertuntur has the 
appearance of a philosophical Hag% this does not i n fact 
seem to be the case* I t would seem to be more,> l i k e l y that 
i t represents Vieo*s own reworking of such well*»kiiown "tags" 
as • verum pt bonuiq convertuntur (e»g«- * Sumrna Theolordea» -
lilotiji"''and one' e j Vfarum/ oonvepfoatuy X e *g« f• Summa T^eo* 
(8) F l i n t * aq*qlp*» p#-&8* 
The far*reaehing implications of this theory, warrant some 
discussion* The insight that history i s knowledge of that which 
man has mad© led Vico to see the historical process as one i n 
which men "build, up systems of languagef laws* government etc* 
Thinking hack to our discussion of the structure of The New 
Science.we can see at work there this understanding of man 
building up these systems i n the course of history* This i s 
especially evident i n Book IV with i t s analysis of the ages of 
the gods# heroes and menj an analysis which presents man as 
actually creating himself as man i n the course of history* Con-
coining this dynamic * contractive process whereby man realizes 
his possibilities,Collingwood writes* 
Here we reach for the f i r s t time a completely 
modern idea of what the subject-matter of history 
i s * There i s no antithesis between the isolated 
actions of men and the divine plan which holds 
them togetherj as there was for the Middle Agesj 
and*| on the other hand, there i s no suggestion 
that 1 primitive mah**.*foresaw what was going to come 
of tiie developments he was i n i t i a t i n g : the plan 
of history i s a wholly human plan : | but i t does not irevexiat i n the shape of ah unrealized Intona-
t i o n to i t s own gradual realization* Man is. no 
mere I demiurge* fashioning human society as Plato's 
God fashions the world on an ideal modely l i k e God 
Himself| he i s a real creator* bringing into exis-
tence both form and matter together i n the corporate 
work of his own historical* development,* The fabric 
of human society i s created by man out of nothing* 
and every detail of this fabric i s therefore a human 
faoftum* eminently knowabie to the human mind as such*(l) 
In a l l this we see that there i s an insight into the nature of 
history i n The New Science which outweighs a l l of i t s fantasies* 
(1) The idea l.Qf/^ i;s%'3i?ylt-p*65.^  
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careless etymologizing and arbitrary division of history into 
"ages". 
There i s another implication i n Vico*s theory of historical 
knowledge which, although he never formulates i t i n so many words 
is found throughout The Hew Science* I t i s this: Since history 
i s the creation of man, and since the historian i s a man* history 
therefore can "be reconstructed "by the historian as he recreates 
that history i n his own mind* We see this process at work most 
clearly i n the etymological analysis of various primitive words* 
The carelessness or lack of control with which this i s done 
does not invalidate the procedure as such* The a b i l i t y to 
reconstruct hi s t o r i c a l events i s also implied i n many of the 
"axioms", and particularly i n those which lay down how the human 
mind operates* For examples "Because of the indefinite nature 
of the human mind, wherever i t i s lost i n ignorance, wan makes 
himself the measure of a l l t h i n g s * " ^ This "axiom" i s one 
which could be used i n the analysis of an historical statement 
to show how i t s author projected his own ignorance upon a 
situation* i*e», through the process of rethinking or recreating 
the historical statement i t can be shown that i t i s in. fact a 
projection of i t s author's ignorance upon an unknown historical 
situation* In speaking of his method Vico says that i t has been 
his effort "To discover the way in which this f i r s t human think-
ing arose i n the gentile world*** , f^ 8^, i*e#i an effort to recon* 
(1) par* 120* 
(2) par* 358* 
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struct s largely i n terms of etymology*/that thinking* 
As we should expect, Vico did not work this theory out 
satisfactorily i n a l l of i t s details* When we return to i t In 
Grooe and Collingwood we w i l l see the need of greater documen* 
tary control i n historical reconstruction* Vico also under* 
estimated the part imagination, properly understood and con* 
trolled,, plays i n historical reconstruction «—* including his 
ow#* Vico r e s t r i c t s imagination to "extended or compounded 
memory'V*' Imagination i s t h i s , "put such a limited conception 
restr i c t s i t s dynamic fitnd creative possibilities* 
Another unsatisfactory aspect of Vico's thinking here i s 
that he posits "a mental language common to a l l nations"*, 
including those separated i n t i m e * ^ This would seem to: Imply 
a common human nature*: To debate this as a formal proposition 
would be an abstract, academic and insoluble endeavour* The 
conditions under which and the extent to which the historian 
may imaginatively reconstruct a specific historical event and 
share "a mental language common" with the participants i n that 
event w i l l be discussed i n our treatment of Croce and Collingwood* 
b. The Relation of Philosophy and History* 
We now turn to an ex p l i c i t consideration of an aspect of 
Vico*a theory of knowledge which has been implicit i n the fore** 
going discussion* This i s the. relatl0n of. philosophy and history 
( l ) par* 811* 
(S) par* 161* 
i n Vico' B thought* Vico and most of his commentators discuss 
this relationship largely i n terms of the verum and the certum* 
Concerning the yerum (the true) Vico sayss "Philosophy contem* 
plates reason, whence comes knowledge of the t r u e j * * t " ^ ^ When 
Vico speaks of the yerum he means the result of the philosophical 
process* Therefore i n the following discussion we W i l l i i n the 
interest of c l a r i t y * speak i n terms of "philosophy" rather than 
"the yerum"* 
When we turn to the other side of this pair of concepts i t . 
i s even more evident that we need a translation into other terms. 
oertum (the certain) i s for Vico everything that has been 
made by man. l*e* the factum* That which man knows (the certum) 
i s and can only be that which man has made (the facisumV* The 
factum i s convertible with the certum of h i s t o r y * ^ I t s 
investigation i s the province of the philologist* 
*. tphilologians tare} a l l the grammarians* 
historians, critics» who have occupied themselves 
with the study of the languages and deeds of 
peopless both their domestic affair&g such as 
customs and laws* and their external a f f a i r s , 
such as wars* peaces, alliances, travels and 
commerce* (3) 
I t i s evident from this that the realm of the philologist 
and the qertum i s very inclusive! i t includes the study of the 
(1) par* 138* 
(3) ££• CapQnigri# A,R».P OJD* pi.t.*-. pp* 148ff* This gives ah extended discussion of the relationship of certum and 
factum* 
(3) par* 139* 
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"language and deeds of peoples", a l l that man has made* The 
modern and comprehensive term for those whose subject this i s f 
I s that of "historian"| and the subject* "history"* The certum 
i s for us the products and events of history? or more simply, 
just h i s t o r y * ^ Therefore i n the following discussion we w i l l 
speak i n terms of history and the historian rather than i n terms 
of the certum and the philologist* 
With this definition of the verum and the cerium* and i t s 
redefinition as philosophy and, history, l e t us examine Vico's 
view as to the relation which should exist between them* He 
writes: 
**«the philosophers f a i l e d by half i n not giving 
certainty to their reasonings by appeal to the 
authority of the. philologiansjt and likewise .* •.• 
the fphilologiansj f a i l e d by half i n not taking 
care to give their authority the sanction of truth 
by appeal to the reasoning of philosophers* I f they 
had both done this they would hays been more useful 
to their commonwealths and they would have anticipated 
us i n conceiving this Science* (s) 
Philosophy should be informed by philology (history)* 
This summarises the f i r s t half of the above quotation* Vico 
was f i r s t led to this position by his effort to find a theore& 
fcieal basis for c i v i l law* He found among his predecessors and 
contemporaries i n this effort that they attempted to f i n d such 
(1) The term "history" always has some ambiguity* I t i s 
either? (a) a study or process of investigation! (b) 
I t i s the result of such study? (c) the events of 
history* The particular use is usually defined by the 
context* 
(2) par* 140* 
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a "basis without having any recourse to history; without the 
c r i t i c a l study of the appropriate documents and conditions of 
the earlier societies i n which systems of law arose* As a 
result.their 18th Century rationalistic viewpoint was read back 
into ancient history, e*g*s the social contract view of society» 
the assumption that ancient society possessed men of "matchless 
wisdom" who thought i n abstract and complicated terms as they 
themselves did, the assumption that the "horrible religions" of 
the ancients which had such a pervasive influence over their 
lives was cunningly contrived by priests to serve their own end 
etc* The result was a tissue of errors i n which they were the 
captives of their 18th Century point«of*viewj that point~of*view 
being road back into preoeeding c e n t u r i e s . ^ Against a l l of 
this Vieo contends that these errors could be avoided by the 
c r i t i c a l study of the laws of these former societies, l.e», by 
the study of history* I f this contention seems commonplace*, 
i t i s because i t has become so widely accepted* 
In the course of his studies Vieo came to broaden the 
context of his inquiries to include not only the history and 
development of law, but also of the t o t a l development of society* 
As we have seen* this means for Vico a l l that man has made; 
hia language^ customs$ forms of government etc* This i s the 
content of history or the certum* Here* as i n the more restricted 
study of the development of law* the same principle applies* 
(1) par* 663 et passim* 
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i t e * * any theory and pattern of development must "be controlled 
toy the c r i t i c a l study of those actual developments* "The nature 
of things i s nothing tout their coming into toeing (mscimento) 
at certain times and i n certain fashions*"^ Or again* 
"Doctrines must take their "beginning from [the toeginningil of .' 
the matters of which they t r e a t * I f this i s not don§ then 
a theory or philosophy (e*g»i, the social contract theory of 
society) w i l l toe inserted into ancient Greece or some other 
period* 
To follow this programme was the task which Vi.co set him-
self* As we have seen* he often had very limited success i n 
accomplishing this task. The reason for this was i n large part 
that the contemporary "body and technique Of historical investiga* 
tion was not adequate to this task* However there i s another 
reasoni namely the fact that he did not follow his own theory 
consistently* His most serious error i s i n Books XV and V of 
The Hew Science where he describes the ideal and eternal order 
(the ages of gods, heroes and men) through which the nations 
pass and possibly repass i n the course of time* There we saw, 
especially i n the long l i s t of nations which Vico admits do 
not f i t into his, theory* that the historical evidence did not 
conform to his philosophical theory* This toeing the case,, his 
(1) par* 147* 
(S) par* 314, 
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own theory shotald have warned him that something ms wrong} 
that he should have modified his theory$ as Croce suggests* 
into the much more general form of a movement of the nations 
from a spontaneous and prereflective stage to a reflective stage• 
Thus i t i s that Vice's most serious error 9 as compared with 
many minor errors of fact and of carelessness* resulted from 
not consistently following his "axiom" that history an& philo-
sophy must complement one another. 
We w i l l return to this whole question of the necess&y of i 
history informing philosophy when wo come to deal with Croee ,. 
and Collingwood* In particular we w i l l disouss whether areas of. 
philosophical investigation other than those mentioned here n^^d. 
to he informed by history* Our contention w i l l he that they do | 
need to he so informed* 
Philology (history) should he informed by philosophy* 
This statement summarises the second half of the quotation from 
Vico which i s under discussion here* (In discussion this second 
half of this quotation we w i l l he, rather obviously r approaching 
the same problem from a different direction*) Vico means by 
this two related hut distinguishable things* We w i l l discuss 
these i n turn* 
That history should he informed hy philosophy (the yerum) 
means f i r s t of a l l that the events or content of history which 
man has made (the eertum> i«e*> the factum) cannot he approachedss 
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purely objective f a c t j as something ?'out there''* (Even :U the 
exact science® the data are not approached i n a purely objective 
manner*) .Rather the ©vents of history must he rationally and 
c r i t i c a l l y rethought or remade insofar as possible* as did 
those persons who f i r s t thought or made those same events (battle 
treaty$ painting etc.). the events must he seen In their o r i g i -
nal context* In other words, there must he an imaginative and 
c r i t i c a l examinationof historical dataj and the moulding of 
this data by means of language or thought into a logical, and 
coherent historical picture* 
In time this understanding Of history was to "bring about 
a revolution i n the writing of history* In the opinion of 
Gollingwood, which we have already quoted the modern conception 
of history as a c r i t i c a l and constructive process emerges with j 
Vicoj and i t was this understanding of a history informed by 
philosophy which played the greatest part i n bringing about 
this revolution* 
History ceases to be Cicero *s f'storehouse of 
the countless lessons of the past," Augustine*s 
mixed career of the two c i t i e s , the medieval 
r o l l ' c a l l of saints and sinners, heroes and 
v i l l a i n s , Maehiavelli*s repertory of models 
for a wise prince's imitation, Bossuet*s 
epiphahy of a kind of celestial :. Louis XIV, 
Bayle*s register of atomic doubt-resistant 
fact,' or Bolingbrokes% ''philosophy teaching 
by examples*0 I t . i s not embarrassed by the 
failure of peoples and governments to learn 
anything from i t , since i t has nothing to 
teach but history* ( l ) 
With Vico history ceases to be these thingsj or better, the 
gradual elimination of these misunderstandings i s begun* As we 
(X) ?M AutobioMhy 1 of Qiambattiata Vica* PP* 46*47 of the "Ahtreduction" by Fiseh and Bergin. 
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shall see i n dealing with Croce and Collingwood, these men 
writing i n the SOth Century stiiX found i t necessary to oppose 
the misconception of history as chronicle, as moral tale, as 
gl o r i f i c a t i o n of party or hero eta* 
That history should he informed hy philosophy means yet a 
second thing for Vico »• I t means i n the second, place that the 
course or history of the nations i n time cannot he approached 
i n t e l l i g i b l y apart from the ideal and eternal history of those 
nations. This ideal and eternal history we have already examined : 
i n the course of our discussion. We have also already discussed 
the error i t leads to» namely, forcing empirical history Into 
the mould of an arbitrary ideal and eternal history* 
Thus there i s an ambiguity i n 'Vieo's "axiom" which calls 
for history to he informed by philosophy* On the one hand i t 
means the c r i t i c a l and constructive examination of historical 
dataj and on the other hand the approach to historical data hy 
means of an ideal and eternal history which a l l nations are 
supposed to follow* How did Vico come to hold such contradictory 
ideas about the way i n which philosophy was to inform history? 
i t was because he "believed that throu-gh the c r i t i c a l and con-
structive examination of history he had discovered an ideal and 
eternal history? and that this history could then he projected [ 
upon a l l possible history, Orjbo put i t more_ as Vicowould have, 
any c r i t i c a l and contractive examination of historical data w i l l 
i 
I 
xm ' ! 
reveal an eiapiriqal pattern which follows his ideal and eternal 
history* 
I f Vico was a good guicfe i n overeoming the misconceptions 
of history as chronicleg heroie story, moral tale etc* 3 he was 
of l i t t l e help i n overcoming another misconception* namely„ 
that of history as the "philosophy of history"* And as we 
sight expect* i t i s this last misconception of history which 
i s the most tenacious* Chronicles are no longer read except 
as eurosities and as an aid to research; hut ''philosophy of 
history'% such as that of liars or Toyribee8 continues to have 
a wide hearing* These "philosophies of history"* that 
of Vieog are i n the last analysis a failure because they 
impose an ideal pattern oh empirical fact* 'The human mind 
16 naturally impelled to talse delight i n uniformity* 
and so i t continues to be* 
4« \fico*s Understanding of Divine Providence* 
I n our discussion of the structure of The flfew Science* and 
©specially Boo&s XV and v$ we have described the ddeal and eternal 
course of history which specific nations are supposed to follow* 
In the subsequent discussion of Vleo' s theory of isnowiedgo wo 
have described the basic principles whereby we arrive at hlstor* 
(1) par* 804* 
i e a l knowledge of the nations as they develop* However there 
i s one further major elaboration of this understanding of historyj 
one to which Vico returns again and again. This elaboration has 
to do with the direction of the history of the nations i n time* 
He maintains that i t i s directed not by an inexorable "chain of 
cause and effect" as the Stoics maintain; nor by "a blind eon* 
course of atoms" (fate) as the Epicureans maintain*^) Rather 
•V. 
i t i s directed by divine providence* This providence i s immanent 
rather than transcendent* He writes: 
In a l l [the conditions of men from the bestial 
. to that of highly developed nations'! man desires 
principally his own u t i l i t y * Therefore i t i s 
only by divine providence that he oan be held 
within these orders to practice justice as a 
member of the s o c i e t y of the family* the state, 
and f i n a l l y of mankind* Unable to attain a l l 
the u t i l i t i e s he wishes, he is constrained by 
these orders to seek those whioh are his due} 
and this i s called just . That which regulates 
a l l human justice i s therefor© divine justice* 
which i s administered by divine providence to 
preserve human society* (2) 
In other words this divine providence is, unknown to man 
usually, at work i n the historical process* I t s purpose i s 
to r e c t i f y those negative actions, of men which would turn their 
nature back .into earlier and destructive channels} and thus, i t 
works for man's own larger good* I t i s because of this divine 
providence that empirical history coincides with the ideal and 
eternal history, i#e»* divine providence i s a corrective within 
(1) par* 342. 
(S) par* 341, 
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the historical process insuring i t s ideal and eternal direction 
of movement* ( I n Hegel this same process i s called the "cunning 
of reason", and other writers have other terras for i t * ) The 
s t r i c t l y immanental character of this providence i s seen i n 
the following passage*, 
Since divine providence has omnipotence as 
minister* i t developes i t s orders hy means as 
eaiy as the natural customs of men* Since i t 
has i n f i n i t e wisdom as counselor# whatever i t 
establishes i s order* Since i t has for i t s end, 
I t s own immeasurable goodness $ whatever ii& 
ordains must he direct$<i to a good always superior 
to that which men have proposed to themselves* (1) 
I t i s this immanent divine providence which The New Science 
demons/brateg.* 
Our new Science must therefore be a demonstration^ 
so to spealci of the historical fact of providence, 
for i t must be a history of the foms of orde* 
which, without human discernment or intent» and 
often against the designs Of men, providence has 
given to this: great c i t y of the human race. Fes* 
though this world has been created i n time and 
particular» the orders established therein by 
providence are universal and eternal. (3) 
On the basis of this Vioo says that The iTew Science "must 
therefore be a rational c i v i l theology of divine providence"*^ 
This- means i t w i l l be rational and not revealed^ and i t i s to 
he a c i v i l (treating of history) and not a natural theology. 
Formerly, Vico goes on, the demonstration of divine providence 
has, always proceeded from an examination of the natural order* 
(1) .gar* 348 
(8) par* 348*' 
(3) par, 342y 
"But they ought to have studied i t i n the economy of c i v i l 
things*,* 1' W This understanding of providence f i t s naturally 
into Vico' s t o t a l position which is that which man can know |s 
history (the certum) because, he has made i t (the factum)* 
This then i s an indication of Vico 1s conception of the 
nature of divine providence i n the course of history* One 
aspect of this understanding which has given Vino's commentators' 
cause f o r discussion i s whether i t , i s an immanent or transcendent 
view of providence* Because of the concerns and direction of 
this thesis we must also turn to this problem* 
The f i r s t thing that comes to mind i s * as we have already 
stated i n our introductory remarks on Vico, that Vico e ^ l i c i t i y 
excludes from The New Science any real treatment of divine or 
Hebrew history* His views on Hebrew history conformed to the 
traditional theology of his time, and this would include -a 
clearly transcendent view of providence* Whatever was the 
thought and motive behind this arbitrary separation of Hebrew 
and gentile history* i t i s of no help to tts« We cannot seriously 
entertain the view that Hebrew society and i t s early religion 
developed i n one way> and that a l l others developed i n a 
radically different way* Insofar as Vieo*s insight into the 
development of nations i s va l i d , then i t i s applicable to 
Hebrew society too* (The change from pre*-f§f.34@tive to 
relatively reflective thought forms i s writ large throughout 
(1) par* 34S* 
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the Old Testament*) Moreover* i n spite of Vice's -undoubtedly 
genuine piety ,: one cannot help but te;&| that i t i s only the 
history of tne "gentile w nations which \wS$ any genuine re a l i t y 
for him* POr these reasons we w i l l confine oua? discussion of 
Vice's understanding of providence to those views set fo r t h i n 
The New. Science concerning the "gentile" nations* 
Cro.ce maintains that Vice' s understanding of providence i s 
purely immanentalj divine providence i s another name for the 
"rationality of history"* 
History then i s the work neither of Pate nor 
of Chance but of the necessity which i s not 
determination and the liberty which i s not 
chance* And since the religious view* tha^ 
history i s the work of God* has this advantage 
and superiority over the others, that i t i n t r o -
duces a o«ti£# for history other than fate or 
chance , and therefore properly speaking not a 
cause at a l l * but a creative a c t i v i t y * a free 
and: i n t e l l i ^ n t mindj i t i s natural that out 
of gratitude to this^ higher view no less than 
by s u i t a b i l i t y of the language we should be led 
to |;ive t o the rationality of history the name 
of God who rules and governs a l l things# and to 
c a l l i t Divine Providence* ( l ) 
This position i s i n line with Croce's t o t a l philosophy i n which 
he i s often at pains to remove any idea of the transcendent 
fyofli l i f e . Moreover there is, much i n Vico which supports 
Croce's interpretation! ,e*g5,^  "***: (providence] developes i t s 
orders by means as easy as the natural customs of men*"^ Of 
coursei as Vice's position i s put by Croce*: providence is not 
(1) Ooee* B», The Philosophy Of Giaiabattiata Vico. p*3»16 
(S) par* 343* 
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the Divine immanent within the historical process! rather i t 
i s that process i t s e l f working i t s e l f out creatively and 
rationally* The historical process i s the expression of nothing 
hut i t s e l f * In a l l this Groce Is certainly right i n rejecting 
the view that divine providence operates by a r b i t r a r i l y break* 
ing into the natural order* 
Another interpretation of Vico's understanding of providence 
i s developed by A» Robert Oaponigri who asserts that "the 
Immanence of the transcendent i s the central principle of jyico' 
historicism and the whole meaning of his doctrine of providence § 
Caponigri maintains* i n support of this "immanence of trans* 
cendence0! that when Vico speaks of the immanence of providence 
he does not thereby exclude a l l transcendental reference* 
At the same time, there i s no indication i n 
Vieo^s thought of the radical immanentism of 
historicism # for he nowhere indicates that the presence which he demominated by the team 
providence i s such that i t exhausts i t s e l f i n 
the temporal process of which i t i s the prin-
ciple. Even less does he suggest that the 
temporal process i s the process of the self-* 
generation of that principle, as an immanentistio 
historicism must conclude* (2) 
However pedantically Caponigri manages to express himself, 
the fact remains that t h i s i s a quite legitimate estimate of 
Vice's thought on providence as i t i s expressed i n T^ e Hew 
Science. A reference back to any of the quotations from Vice 
(1) Caponigri» op« cit< * P«107» 
(S) i b i d . . p. 107. 
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i n this section w i l l indicate that Caponigri's position i s 
f u l l y defensible* And while admitting the ambiguity here* w# 
wish to (aline jhirselves with this interpretation* 
On the other hand i t i s arguable that Grooe and #im^lar 
c r i t i c s understand Vice better than Vico understands himself , 
and that Vico 1 & understanding of providence really does exclude 
any and a l l transcendental reference* The evidence as contained 
I n The Hew Sqienoe. i s simply not sufficient to argue this matter 
conclusively one way of the other* Hence the divergent views 
of the two very competent c r i t i c s quoted above* This situation 
indicates that, for whatever reason, Vico did not see a problem 
here*. 
The problem of the Divine acting i n history i s one which 
we w i l l return to at several points i n the following chapters* 
When we do so i t w i l l be seen that the idea of the "immanence 
of transcendence" Will commend i t s e l f to us* whether this i s 
really Vico*s view, or whether The Hew Science only leaves 
i t s e l f open to this interpretation, i s not of crucial importance* 
The important question to be decided i s whether or not this 
interpretation commends i t s e l f to us as a formulation of how 
God wor&s i n the course of history. 
Since.' we w i l l be returning to this general problem of God's 
action i n history, I want to b r i e f l y anticipate our later 
discussion* I t i s certainly the case that the Christian misses 
aline 
131 
i n Vico any convincing statement of til© importance of the divine 
r e a l i t y wlyieh stands behind the providence which manifests 
i t s e l f i n history* EMs i s th© . mm l a spite of the faot that 
Vico deals with history which has taken pls.ee i n the Christian 
©raj in'which era* from the Christian po4at~of~view* the wold 
Israel" had been changed into the "new Israel" of the Christian 
Churoh* Bene© Vice*a arbitrary and never satisfactory compart** 
aentalising of history into Hebrew ("divine") history and gentile 
("ol v i l " ) history completely breaks dewiv* But* foatfi&g recognised 
t h i s inadoqua^in Vice, i t i s nevertheless evident that m 
Hew, aoijsnee i s of great help;id- us, when wo com© to ask certain 
giiestions about history* For examplej what possible moaning 
can we attach to a s t r i c t l y transcendent view of God* a aotion 
i n history? Or* how can God possibly guide or help men apart 
from secondary causes and the event© of history? Such a posl-!-
t i o n would necessitate God breaking into the natural order when 
He wishes to manifest His w i l l * And this leads us to asks Is 
the natural order really so foreign to God? 
Conversely* the understanding of a transcendent provideno© 
immanently expressed seems eompatablo with* and even demanded by* 
suoh ©vents as th© Exodus* At th© Very least the historical 
factors of oppression i n Egypt* migration* and fighting for 
the possession of a new home were of the utmost importance i n 
determining that the revelation connected with the Bxodu© would 
take places and also i n conditioning the form and content of 
that revelation* Here we see God acting through His natural 
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order* We say ''acting through",for i t does not follow that 
because the event § of history (secondary causes) are of the 
utmost importance i n determining revelation* that transcendental 
reference i s thereby excluded* 
5* The Writing of History» 
In this survey of Vice's understanding of the theory and 
writing of history i t only remains b r i e f l y to euramari^e his 
contribution to the actual process of the writing of history. 
Everything we say here i s baaed on the foregoing discussion. 
We w i l l ignore those aspects of Vioo*s effort which we have 
had to reject. 
The f i r s t and most important contribution was to show that 
history i s more than the compiling of chronicled or even the 
c r i t i c a l study of documents* He demonstrated that i t was possible 
to reconstruct h i s t o r i c a l periods, and to give some indication 
of their development* In addition, this reconstruction of the 
characteristics of a period enabled him to argue analogically 
from one period to a later and similar period* e.g., our 
knowledge of the early centuries of Greece and Rome can be used 
analogically to arrive at Knowledge of the similar period of 
the Middle Ages* The crudity with which this programme was 
carried out does not invalidate i t s great achievement* 
The second contribution was the formulation of a set of 
principles #f historical interpretation which arose partly from 
the study of history and partly from the observation of the 
X3S 
way i n which human -thinking proceeds* • These principles or 
»'a3c|dmsi.rt -1^ .11*36 the understanding of the recurrent habit of 
attributing magnificence to antiquity) the fact that nations • 
paint, their history i n the most favourable colours* the tendency 
to attribute to the ancients greater wisdom than they actually 
possessed etc* 
A t h i r d contribution was the demonstration that the analysis 
of language,: myth*, customs* traditions etc* w i l l yield historical 
'" ( l ) 
information which i s not contained i n their explicit content*,.w 
Mob. of thisJ seems* obvious to us ^#Hty" because i t has come 
t o ^ e commonly accepted* However* $n i t s historical context i t 
,was;'potentially, revolutionary for the writing of history! a 
fact which helps to explain why i t s actual acceptance and 
application was delayed for several generations* 
6* |Summary and Epospeet* 
We have not dealt with a l l aspects of The. n&iv Science* ' 
Among the m$op ommissione are details of what might be: called 
Vicof s doctrine of man*, and also of his ''philosophy5 of history"* 
In both cases the reason for the omission i s that i t i s not-
relevant to the problem of this thesis! and that i t s content 
i s . so problematical* However we; have found i n Vico several 
important and highly interrelated contributions to the under* 
standing of history which commend themselves to us* and to which 
(1) I am indebted to R,G. Collingwood (The Idea of History. PP* 68rVl) for help i n distinguishing Vico^s1'main con-tributions here* 
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H i ' . f e e makiag reference i n the following chapters* Let us | 
concisely summarise them* 
The fir§tt ofthese i s the "axiom"? "Doctrines must, take 
their "beginnings from [the beginnings] of the matters of which 
they, treat *" In the study of the "beginning of anything we come 
to know i t s nature* "The nature of things i s nothing hut their i 
coming into being (na^dimento) at certain times and i n certain j 
fashions*" This implies that doctrines or philosophy (the verum^ | 
must not be separated from.their historical beginnings (the 
certum) * And of what can we know the beginnings? Only of 
that which man has made (the factum) and has l e f t evidence of 
having made. In this we see that history (fact* event*,, the 
cerium*, the factum) goes hand^in*hand with philosophy (inter* 
pretationi the verum^ ,* I f they are separated fact becomes mute* : 
and interpretation becomes uncontrolled* This whole theory of v 
knowledge i s based upon the conviction that i t i s possible to 
reconstruct. and imaginatively enter into these "beginninga".* 
^ second contribution of Vice was to be among the f i r s t to 
point out the inadequacies of the Cartesian epistemologyj and 
especially i n i t s use as a basis of history* This critique of \ 
Descartes grew up side«by*side with the development of Vice's 
own theory of historical knowledge* 
Vico also gave us a new conception of providence # one which 
has a strong note of immanence* We w i l l return to' the problem 
of the nature of God's action i n history i n the following 
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chaptersf and i n doing so we w i l l talee the position which i s 
i n accord with ow interpretation of Vicoj namely, of the 
Immanence of transcendence» 
Finally,,- on the basis of the above contributions, Vico made 
a cont2?ihution to the praotice of the Writing of history* 
Due to the revolutionary nature of Vico• s ideas concerning 
history* they remained for a l l practical purposes wrapped i n 
obscurity u n t i l the l a t t e r part of the 19th Century* Even now 
the study of Vico remains undeservedly esoteric, usually being 
relegated to a few pages i n specialised surveys of the writing 
of history* 3?he p r i n c i t e ) w r i t e r Who has striven to correct 
this situation i s Benedetto Croce* and as we turn now to an 
easamination of Crooe we w i l l recognize, i n a more developed 
form, many ideas which we have already encountered i n Vico* 
Me  le 
Chapter i l l 
CHOCB'S UNDERSTANDING 01? HISTORY 
The following statement of Croc©1s -understanding of history 
i s dram from thro© of his boo&s*; The f i r s t of these, entitled 
Theory and History of Hiatp#lo£raph,V (Teoria o atoria della, 
storiografja) * ^ was published i n 191.7V We w i l l be drawing 
mainly on this worK* The other two subsequent boo&s. History as 
the Story of L i b e r t y ^ and My Philosophy^» consist of the 
application of the views i n the f i r s t book to p o l i t i c s and other i 
f i e l d s f and of replies to his c r i t i c s * 
Anyone attempting to make a study of Croce*s thought i s ; 
immediately faced with the problem of his style* There i s 
throughout an arbitrary us© of words* Among those which we w i l l j 
examine are: "empirical", which is used.Un contrast, to a logical ' 
and c r i t i c a l progression of thoughts "intuition",, which turns j 
out to be synonymous with imagination} " s p i r i t % which cannot 
be discussed as sucht but which i s expressed i n concrete acts 
of thou^it concerning truth, beauty, morality and u t i l i t y * 
These and other terms to be examined are often used /before they 
are explained* They present a d i f f i c u l t y because Croce has 
b u i l t his own peculiar meanings into them* 
(1) Croce| Benedetto, Theory and History of Historiography* | 
translated by D» Ainslie* George G* Harrap and Co* London* ! 
. 1921* | 
(3) Croce, Benedetto, History as the Story of Liberty« trans-
lated by Sylvia Sprlgge, George Allen and llnwin Ltd*, 
London, 19S1* 
(3) Croce* Benedetto* My Philosophy, translated by E*F* Ca r r i t t , George Allen and Unwin, Ltd** London* 1949* 
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Another problem i s the organization of Croce's isritings* 
The greatest organisation i s to be found i n the Theory and Histftrifl 
of Historiography, although even here the reader i s l e f t to 
discover this organisation f or himself * The other t?/o bpo&s 
under discussion are collections of essays held together more by 
a common theme than "by a logical progression of thought* In 
short* Oroce,s worfc i s characterised by a repeated treatment of 
a limited number of' important themes as they appear i n different 
contents, e*gi„ the contemporaneity of history, the identity of 
history and philosophy* the relation of philology to history* 
the rejection of any notion of the transcendent from history 
and l i f e etc* 
One further matter should be mentioned before turning to 
the easposition of Groce's understanding; of history* This i s 
that his understanding of history lias a definite and self-»con* 
sciptts relation to his\total philosophy* This philosophy i s a 
very comprehensive one embracing a l l areas of our experience* 
Because of t h i s relationship X v?ant to( br^e^ly^dumbrate this 
t o t a l philosophy^--" 
Croce affirms "the absolutely sp i r i t u a l nature of r e a l i t y " * 
This r e a l i t y he subsumes under four "eternal values or categories; 
or a c t i v i t i e s of the s p i r i t " * These four ares truths beauty, 
morality or goodness and u t i l i t y * Bach of these "in i t s opera* 
tion presupposes the others / since a l l are necessary to the 
whole r and no one can claim a primacy that belongs only to the 
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whole cycle or to the s p i r i t itself«"^' Vifhat i>art does phi!-* 
pspphy have to play i n this scheme? Philosophy ''concerns i t s e l f 
with a l l these as they concern themselves with i t " * The relation 
of history to a l l of t h i s i s indicated i n the words; 
* ^ h i s t o r y i s philosophy i n the concrete*** 
history i s the only judgraent properly so 
palled, and includes i n i t s e l f philosophy, 
which i s only l i v i n g philosophy i n history 
and as history* That i s why, since 1 had 
to f i n d a name for ray edifice,*** 1 pre-
ferred [to c a l l i t ) ^absolute history 1* (S) 
Thus, i n Croce*© view history i s concerned with a l l aspects of 
experience? aspects which he categorizes as tr u t h , beauty, moralits 
and u t i l i t y * Our encounter with experience or r e a l i t y always 
comes under one of the four categories, and i t i s always a con-
crete encounter? e*g*, not with "beauty" i n general but with the 
beauty of a particular painting* Furthermore, the process by 
which we are able to make the judgment that this particular paintM 
ing Is beautiful i s an historical process, A f u l l e r explanation : 
of t h i s last st&teiaent w i l l have to wait u n t i l we have given a 
more complete exposition of Croce's thought i n this whole area* 
Let us turn to this exposition now* We w i l l start by 
stating what, i n Croce^ opinion, history i s not* The negative : 
beginning i s necessitated by the many misconceptions which every-
one but the specialist brings to this subject* The ideas present 
jjied here w i l l be further supported when we come to the positive 
U) My Philosophy ,p»18. 
exposition of Grocers thought* 
1»- History as Misconceived^ 
Before beginning this section i t w i l l "be helpful i f the terms 
which Croee uses i n his polemic against false history are b r i e f l y 
explained, Groce i s most emphatic that the "philosophy of history 
i s mot t r u l y history*- By this term he means the sclfnatizing and 
-judging of historical events i n terms of a est of values derived 
from some area other than history, i n terms of dialecticai 
materialism*^ Secondly, Groce maintains that history i s not 
"chronicle", "by which he means the l i s t i n g of events i n a ehrono~ 
logical order; nor i s i t "philology% "by which he means the re-* 
f i n i n g and editing of chronicle inscriptions and other documents 
Included here would he the description and dating of artifacts *-
thirdly0 history i s misunderstood when i t i s presented as "uni-
versal history"* By this term i s meant the various attempts to 
present the whole sweep of history* This effort i s objectionable 
for several reasons* The f i r s t and most obvious of these i s the 
fact that prehistory, "dar& ages" and the future must be f i l l e d 
i n largely or entirely by means of speculation* "Universal 
history" i s also illegitimate when i t presents history from a 
particular point of viewj the implication being that this i s the 
interpretation of "universal history", e«»g«, Hegel's vision of 
(1) See My Philosophy* pp* 64-67, for a concise and spirited 
statement on the falseness Of the Coiamunist "philosophy 
of history^* 
a l l hisiory as culminating in'the 19th Century Prussian state** ' 
Finally* history i s misunderstood v/hen i t Is conceived as "poetr-
i e s ! " or "rhetorical" history* By the former term Croce intends 
to designate those histories which are ruled by some particular 
sentiment* e«g»» patriotism* The la t t e r term, "rhetorical" 
history* refers to history ruled by the desire to teach a lesson* 
?*&**.. Communism i s bad* Let us turn no?/ to a f u l l description of 
each of these misconceived histories* . 
a* History i s not the "philosophy of history"* 
I f an int e l l i g e n t and well||ormed person i s told that a book 
i s about history* but not about any particular historical subj)eci, 
then h© assumes that i t concerns i t s e l f with what Croce calls the ; 
"philosophy of history"* This term i s an example of those terms 
which Groce uses in a rather special way* for by i t he designates 
a l l of those systems which seek to understand the whole sweep of 
history and to predict the future i n terms of a particular pattern 
That this misconception should exist i n the minds of many i s only 
i 
to be ejected when we think of the large number of schemes or 
patterns which have been offered up i n the name of history, e*g** ; 
dialecti c a l materialism* progressive evolution patterned on bio-* 
logical evolution* Toynbee's idea of challenge and response* the 
various r a c i a l i s t theories, the schemes of Hegel* Spengler and 
many others* Of a l l these.* Croce says they are misconceptions of 1 
(1) G£* My Philosophy* pp* 18CV207, where the interconnection "universal history" and "philosophy of history" i s evident* 
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hiatorys they are hot history at all? they belong to "the phen-
omenology of error"* 
How does Grooe j u s t i f y this indjfc«5ment which has so many 
serious historians and philosophers as i t s target? He does i t i n 
this Way* He maintains thaLt the "philosophers of history" have 
taken i t f o r granted that there are brute or meaningless facts 
to be discovered i n the course of history* This assumption i s 
thoir f i r s t step, and i t i s a false one* Their next step i s to 
maintain that they "must confer*>*a ^ meaning* [upon the brut© 
facts] ««* representing them as aspects of a transcendental pro-
cess, a theophany*"^ Here "transcendental process" i s used not, 
i n a narrowly theological sense, but i n a functional sense $ i^e** 
any hi s t o r i c a l process or goal which does not arise out of history 
but i s rather imposed upon history and hence '"transcends" hisfcory^ 
For exampie, a r a c i a l i s t philosophy of history might maintain; a* 
the eulture of negroid peoples i s inferior to the culture of 
western JSuropean c i v i l i s a t i o n (empirical f a c i ) i b* therefore 
negroid peoples are naturally inferior to those making up western 
European c i v i l i z a t i o n (a pattern of meaning imposed upon empirical! 
observation and not arising out of i t ) , The concepts of natural 
superiority and i n f e r i o r i t y of races do not arise out of the studj 
of history; rather they are, so to speak, located i n a transcen-
dental realm of "self-evident t r u t h s % History must then be 
( l V theory and History of Hiatoglq^qajhy,. p.*. 69, 
read i n order to support these "truths"* "The void of logical 
thought" i n this simple example of a "philosophy of history 0 i s 
readily evident* In more complex examples* this defect i s not so 
obvious; and especially i s i t not obvious when the "philosophy of 
history" i n question purports to support a position with which we 
have traditional t i e s , e*g*, li b e r t y over totalitarianism* 
Christianity over paganism, democracy over Communism ©te*^ 
Another way of expressing this la to say that, "the search 
for the transcendental end £of history] i s the "philosophy of 
h i s t o r y " ^ To posit a meaning for history i s also to posit the 
end* For example, i n Marxism the "inner meaning" of history i s 
the movement toward the classless society, and the end of history 
3,s that society* 
A confusion which i s often compounded with the above error 
i s that which talces place "when classifloatory representations 
^ ^ [ k r e ] idealised". By this i s meant that certain identifica-
tions (e«gr* that between Greece and the liberty of the individual 
or that between Rome and abstract generalisations) which have 
some basis i n empirical observation*, and which are possibly per-
missible i n the interests of classifying material, are then taken 
to say something definitive about the subject under consideration* 
For example, to associate Rome with abstract generalizations may 
have a certain schematic value and can be historically supported? 
(1) C|f * Theory and History of Historiography* pp* 68ff 
(3.) i b i d n*67. ^ 4.-5'ppV,^85» 
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but to raise t h i s convenient identification to the status of a 
statement about the ' inner meaning1' of Roman c i v i l i s a t i o n i s to 
impose a preconceived meaning on history and to create con* 
f u s i o n # ^ 
'What i s the net result of this approach to history? 
In t h is way we get a duality: on the one hand 
historical accounts constructed by way of ori** 
tioism # on the other hand interpretations which l i e beyond criticism being the result of reve-
la t i o n or of u l t e r i o r vision* of & faculty which 
cannot bj, described or. f.ind, any, relationship o£•"' 
te»t a&fr 'S&a/as&es £affl&tiAaa lass. isaaaa 
s p i r i t * (8) 
I n the l i g h t of this statement what i s the Christian to 
say about the distinction which is often made* i n various forms* 
between "history* 1 and "holy history"? This i s a problem which 
w i l l reappear at several points i n the following chapters* and 1 
which w© w i l l t r y to answer i n the concluding section of this 
thesis* W (4) 
b« History i s neither chronicle nor pliilology* 
The "philosophy of history" i s an ambitious and grandmas© 
e f f o r t , but one which i s nevertheless a misconception of history* 
( i ) Cf* History as the 3tory ) of Liberty» pp* 140*140* 
(8.) i,bid» *o* 143. I t a l i c s mine* 
(8) Crooe ma&es an interesting demonstration that deterministic i 
philosophies of history (e*g,, Marxism) always end i n trans-* 
pendency*, i b i d * m>* C8ff,«. et •passim* Since this demonstra-*•; 
ti o n i s a working out of the implications of Crooe*® under* l. 
standing of history rather than an, addition to I t * I do not 
propose to treat, i t further here* 
(4«) For a further discussion of the "philosophy of history" with 
special reference to Hegel see My Philosophy* pp*18(KS07* 
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On a much less exalted plane stands another misconception of 
history* namely that of chronicle and philology* 
What i s chronicle? Most simply stated* chronicle i s the 
chronological ordering of a number of more or less related his-
t o r i c a l facts* e*g«?,the chronological ordering of the principal 
o f f i c i a l acts of Henry^ j^jjjjfy vTJ* .Such,effort$ are marked by two 
obvious qualities! the uncritical acceptance of the documents 
out of which the chronology i s constructed* and the lack of any 
attempt to integrate the recorded events into a coherent hlsto**-
r i c a l picture* Such efforts are not without value* for "The 
moment w i l l come when they w i l l serve to reproduce past history* 
But the chronicle i s not i t s e l f history* 
Crocks own critique of chronicle gives us a further indica-
t i o n of i t s inadequacies* An example which Croce gives i s that 
of the history of Hellenic painting* In such a history what do 
we have to work with? A series of a r t i s t s ' names* some bio-
graphical anecdotes about them, the subjects of some of their 
paintings and the record of approval or disapproval which certain 
ancient authors passed upon these paintings* B'rom this material 
the most that can be acheived i s to arrange i t i n chronological 
order^--H}Q make a chronicle of i t * Ho more i s possible because 
we do not have the l i v i n g documents* i*e»* the paintings them* 
selves* We know, for example* that they painted battles? and 
thus we might write general about Apelles and the painting 
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of battles* However we can say nothing specifically and con-
cretely about the battle scenes which Apelles painted, 
iUwe can think indifferently of any onfc of 
the numerous facts that those names of the 
a r t i s t s recall* For this season their con-
tent i s indeterminate» and this indetermina-
ti o n of content i s their emptiness* (1) 
Since such histories are empty they are without truthj they rest 
entirely upon the authority of others* When Oroce says that 
ohron^iles are not true, he does not mean that they are false* 
I t i s just that they cannot say anything about the subject which 
i s not empty5 and i t i s their quality of emptiness* according to 
Croce9 which fenders them incapable of yielding truth* Hence* 
they are q.uite useless for our actual lives* 
This type of history may be characterized on one l$ / e l as 
disconnected* superficial and external* But Crooe wants a mor© 
fundamental characterisation and contrast to genuine history* 
He writesJ 
The truth i s that chronicle and history are 
not distinguishable as two forms of history, 
mutually complementary* or as one subordinate 
to the other» but as two different s p i r i t u a l 
attitudes* History i s l i v i n g chronicle* 
chronicle i s dead historyf history i s contemporary 
history, chronicle i s past historyj history 
i s principally an act of thought t chronicle an act of w i l l * Every history becomes chron-
ic l e when i t i s no longer thought, but only 
(1) theory and History of Historiography, p*17* 
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recorded i n abstract words,. which were once 
upon a time concrete and expressive • (1) (S) 
I f history i s not chronicle, neither i s i t philology} the 
l a t t e r being a refinement of the former* Concerning philology 
Oroce says with characteristic pungency | , 
The ingenuous belief cherished by the philo* 
legists that they have history locked up i n 
their l i b r a r i e s , museums and archives (some* 
thing i n the same manner as the genius of the 
Arabian llif/Jita. who was shut up i n a small * 
vase i n the form of compressed smoke) does 
not remain Inactive, and gives rise to the 
Idea of a history constructed with things, 
traditions, and documents (empty traditions 
and dead documents), and this affords an 
instance of what may be called •philological 
history* (3) 
The reaaon why philological history w i l l not work i s . that history 
cannot be composed from external things, i*e#, from objective! 
unthotight facts* 
Chronicles that have been weededj, chopped up 
into fragments, recombined, rearranged, always 
remain nevertheless chronicles*--"-that i s to 
. say, empty narratives5 and documents that have 
been restored, reproduced, described! brought 
into l i n e , remain doauments'-^that i s to say, 
silent things* (4) 
W ibjd*& p* 19* I t a l i c s Croee'a* See also pp* 85*84* 
(2) Croc© considers "the anecdote" to be a form of chronicle, 
and developss this idea on pp* 118-1S6 of History as the 
' ,. storv of Llteoptff* This i s a working out of an element of 
his thought already implicit i n the material just con** 
sidered* and therefore we w i l l not deal with i t here* 
( 3) Theory and History of Historiop:raT3hy f p»S7* I t a l i c s Croce*s» 
(4) i b i d . . p,S7» 
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Since philology i s only a refinement of chronicle* the same 
essential problems remain* Philological histories remain diseon* 
neeted* external and superficial* Their authority rests (and 
must necessarily rest i n this approach to history) upon the 
authority of "the authorities"* Since this gives no basis for 
any possible real authority, i t remains empty? i t i s neither 
true nor false* 
Does this mean that chronicle and philology are useless? 
No* says Croce« they are very necessary* They are the beginning 
and Instrument of history* but they are not history i t s e l f * 
e* History i s not "universal history"* 
We come now to a misunderstanding of history which contains 
the errors which we have already identified i n "philosophy of 
history" and I n Ghroni&ie, and i n addition has i t s own peculiar 
errors* This further misconception i s "universal history"* 
"tJniversal history" partakes of the error of "philosophy of 
history" i n that i t attempts to subsume a l l of history under some 
particular pattern* and thus to present the whole sweep of human 
history as a rationally coherent whole. This process inevitably 
involves placing an interpretation upon historical faotsj an 
interpretation deriving from the pattern or "key" Which the 
historian has assumed holds the explanation of history* This 
may be aclSived i n a variety of ways* X^ or example the historian 
may decide that history i s primarily economic or p o l i t i c a l or 
religious* Upon the basis of this decision he w i l l then choose 
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the so-called facts which are to he included i n his "universal 
history"* (And obviously* a l l ' o f the facts of history cannot he 
included,) Thus, depending upon the kind of facts which he has 
chosen* "universal history" w i l l he seen as primarily economic 
or p o l i t i c a l or religious or some other kind of history* A 
variant of this method of writing "universal history" i s to 
select and trace out some theme which i s supposed to explain 
a l l of history* e*g*? the emergence of the rational mind* 
Another error of "universal history" emerges necessarily 
from the fact that i f i t i s to he truly 'universal" i t must cover 
the t o t a l i t y of human experience* However the t o t a l i t y of human 
experience i s not available as a subject of historical study* 
This i s moat obviously true of prehistory and of the futurej 
both of which are dealt with i m p l i c i t l y i f not e x p l i c i t l y i n 
"universal histories"* (Concerning the future.* i t seems to-be 
the case that having "©plained" a l l of history i t i s impossible 
to resist the temptation to project this "explanation11 into the 
future*) However i t i s not just pre-history and the future 
which present a problem i n this respect* for i t i s to be ctues^-
Tfionod whether any one historian can enter into a l l of history 
sufficiently to say anything significant about i t * This i s 
particularly true of those periods and cultures about which 
there i s very limited documentary evidence? e*g## the early 
Middle Ages, And f i n a l l y , having claimed to "explain" a l l of 
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history, i t Is d i f f i c u l t 'for "universal history" to take any 
other position hut that of being jgi§, explanation of history* 
A l l other'interpretations are excluded* 
In a l l of these ways "universal history" shares the errors 
of the "philosophy of history ' s The i n i t i a l and implied assump** 
tlo n which give© rise to these error a-*—-and we have seen that 
t h i s assumption i s the basic error i n both "philosophy of history" 
and chronicle-—-is" that a l l of the necessary facts and events of 
history are at hand ready to be grasped and lined up like 
checkers i n the historian* s chosen pattern* On this understand* 
ing historical events are objective things to be had merely by 
reproducing certain words from a boote or manuscript of inscrip* 
t i o n j and that as such they constitute meaningful history* I t •! 
i s merely e. matter of collecting the facts* and then of supplying 
the interpretation* I t i s only on this basis that "philosophy of ; 
history"* chronicle and "universal history" are possible* History, 
according to Augustine* Hegel* Marx* tho doctrine of progress* 
Toynbeej^o^ reveals the painful inadequacy of this basis* 
Clearly then, "universal history" belongs to the "phenomenology 
of e r r o r " * ^ 
d* History i s neither "poetical" nor "rhetorleal"* 
I f the historian turns his bacfe upon the effort to write 
history on the basis of arranging so-called objective facts* 
(1) Cg,* theory and History of Historiography* pp* 55-60* 
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what i s to be the alternative? This problem receives 
•««a fallacious solution* expressed by the 
substitution of the interest of sentiment for 
the lack of interest of thought and of^esthetic 
coherence of representation for the logical 
coherence here unobtainable« The new erroneous 
form of history thus obtained i s poetical history* (1) 
In t h i s way many of the d i f f i c u l t i e s discussed are overcome* 
There i s now a cri t e r i o n of value which i s used to select the: 
historical material to be used and to ^ udge of i t s worth* There 
are many types of "poetical" history* e#g«, histories of chivalry, 
of p o l i t i c a l parties* of movements» of national heroes* of 
nations etc* 
A specific example w i l l help to demonstrate the process 
which works i n such histories* Let us take as an example the: 
account of the Amerioal Revolution which i s to be found i n most 
American history text books and even others of a more advanced 
type* Here there i s no question of dealing with a l l of the 
evidence or of looking upon the historical events as cold* 
objective fact* Rather there i s a criterion which i s used to 
select the material and to evaluate i t * Roughly this criterion 
i s that everything which demonstrates the incompetence of the 
Br i t i s h * the justice of the colonists' position and the heroism 
of their efforts marks historically valuable material* This 
kind of c r i t e r i o n i s what Croce calls "sentiment"! national 
sentiment i n this case. (iSven the well-educated American i s 
(3.) Theory and History of Historiography* p*36*f I t a l i c s Croce*a 
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shocked the f i r s t time he comes across an account of the American 
Revolution as i t i s presented i n such a wGx»k as The Cambridge 
Ifpdern History which i s not poetical history and where a differeni 
criterion Is at work*) The inadequacy of this approach i s too 
obvious to warrant further comment* 
This "poetical" approach does have the virtue that the 
historian does not look upon his material as objective fact, but 
imaginatively enters into the experience, re-enacting the events 
and i n some sense making them his own* I t does, i n the best 
instances, come alive* However there i s obviously something 
wrong i n such a process i n view of the distorted version of 
history which i t presents, This d i f f i c u l t y i s that history's 
• ^ p r i n c i p l e of determination cannot be the value 
known as the value of 'sentiment',, which i s l i f e .-„..• 
and not thought, and when this l i f e finds expres-
sion and representation, before i t has been 
dominated by thought, we have poetry, not thought** 
In order to have true history ***we must repress 
our loves, our tears, our scorn, and.seek what 
function the event has f u l f i l l e d i n social 
a c t i v i t y or c i v i l i s a t i o n * * * ( l ) 
The attempt of "poetical" history to overcome objective 
fact i s right? i t i s the attempt to do i t by using sentiment 
rather, than thought as the principle of determination which i s 
fallacious* The e f f o r t to relive history imaginatively i s right3 
but the ef f o r t to do this apart from c r i t i c a l thought i s 
f a l l a c i o u s * ^ 
(1) Theory and History of Historiography, pp* 36~37, 
(2) Cf* j,bi#;*, pp* 34-41* 
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The same essential process which we have observed i n 
"poetical" history i s to be found i n "rhetorical" history* 
This? i s history which Is narrated with a practical end* This 
end may he to introduce a historical truth into the mind, to 
arouse virtue or enthusiasm etc* Once again there Is a principle 
of valuation which controls the selection and evaluation of 
materialj hut again the principle i s the wrong onej i t i s not 
that of c r i t i c a l thought* hut rather that which w i l l promote a 
practical end* And once again there is a proper desire to l e t 
imagination play a part i n the historical construction; but i t 
i s imagination controlled not by c r i t i c a l thought, but by the 
principle of determinations What w i l l promote the practical end| J 
1 
There i s a place and value for "poetical" and "rhetorical" historji 
but i t i s not history properly so-called* v' 
Before we go on to give a positive statement of Oroee*s 
understanding of history^ l e t us summarise this f i r s t negative 
section* We have shown that history i B not the 'philosophy of 
history" i n which an "inner meaning" i s imposed upon objective 
and meaningless facts, Secondly,it i s not the stringing together 
of objective facts i n a chronicle3 not even when these facts 
have been c r i t i c a l l y edited as i n philology, Thirdly,history i s 
not "universal history", i n which facts and events purporting to 
represent the whole sweep of history are placed together, origins 
(1) Theory and History of HistorioKraphy* T>t>» 41*44« ' 
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and terminations outside of history supplied and an overall and 
exclusive meaning given or implied* Lastly the e f f o r t to. over« 
come the fallacies of these histories by way of "poetical" and/ 
or "rhetorical" history i s not successful! for while they have 
a principle of evaluation and attempt to reconstruct history 
imaginatively, they do so not on the "basis of c r i t i c a l thought, 
hut on the "basis of sentiment and the desire to promote a 
practical end* 
XX# Croce*© Understanding of History# 
a» Croc©*© understanding of history f 
As we have said "before, Croce*s method of writing about 
history i s that of a repeated treatment of a limited number of 
important themes, and including an examination of these themes 
i n various contexts* For example,, one constant theme i s that 
" a l l history i s contemporary history V This theme i s examined 
i n the context of a discussion of the documents the historian 
uses^V * n relation to the so-called "dark ages"^, i n the 
context of a discussion of the place of imagination i n the 
writing of h i s t o r y ^ :i etc* We w i l l examine this theme later 
i n t his section* 
1h© disadvantage of this approach i s that we do not have 
a sustained treatment of the nature of history* However, there 
(3-) theory an^ History of Historiography. pp* 1&?14 gjs passim* 
(3) . PP*' iB«18 .ej, jsagg^t-
(3) iMd». pp# 39, 91 e j Passim* 
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i s a compensation to be found i n Croc©*a writings to that his 
statements are carefully thought through and well articulated 
Into the structure of his whole philosophic system* This results 
i n the fact that each of his statements about the nature of 
history i m p l i c i t l y contairavirtually everything he has to say 
on the subject• We w i l l examine this remarkable thought out and 
articulated understanding of history under the following headings! 
1;« The manifestation of '•spirit" as thoughtj 3* "Spi r i t " as 
the source of value i n history} 3# A false alternative to "sp i r i t * 
as the source of value i n history} 4* Croce*s understanding of 
history i n relation to the various misconceptions of history* 
1* The manifestation of " s p i r i t " as thought* 
What i s " s p i r i t " for Groee? I t i s interesting that although 
Croee uses this term frequently, his only explicit treatment of 
i t i s an infrequent sentence or paragraph* The easiest entrance 
into t h i s matter i s a statement on ''spirit" by Hegelf upon whom 
Groee was c r i t i c a l l y d e p e n d e n t A t the beginning of the 
Introduction to the Philosophy of History Hegel says? 
For* l i k e the soul«-eonduetor Mercury* the Idea i s 
i n t r u t h * the leader of the peoples of the World} 
and S p i r i t $ the rational and necessitated w i l l of that conductorf i s and has been the director of the events of the World*s History* To become 
acquainted with s p i r i t i n this i t s offi&e Of 
guidance* i s the object of the present under*-
taking* (2) 
(1) Croce c r i t i c a l dependence upon Hegel i s to be seen i n the 
titj@ and contents of Groce-s phat i s Living and What i s 
Dead i n the Philosophy of Hegel, translated by D * Ainslie. .. 
Maelttllan and C6#* London, 1916, 
(8) Hegel. G.W»PM The, PM^osophy of ^jstom transiated by J# Bibree, Dover Publications lnc», New York, 1966* p*8v 
A £ew page© later Hegel elaborates this* saying? 
**«that Spirit whose nature la always one and 
the same, Taut which unfolds this i t s one nature 
i n the phenomena of the World*s existence* (1) 
Thus i t would seem that for Hegel Spiri t l i e s behind and motivates 
the Ideaj and that Idea guiding the events of the world i s seen 
i n the unfolding of those very events* That this i s essentially 
Crooe's understanding of '"spirit" w i l l be seen as our ©Deposition 
proceeds* 
When i t i s said that this i s "essentially" Croce's under* 
standing^ i t i s important to emphasise that the agreement between 
the two men i s not complete. For croce the expression of " s p i r i t * 
i n thought remains impersonal and i s determined by the particular 
historical events whieh the historian studies* For Hegel Spirit 
i s the w i l l of the Idea which i s wthe leader of the peoples of 
the World":* Here we have an objectified conception of Spirit 
and Idea which i s foreign to Croce* This Ideas according to 
Hegel , then proceeds to "lead" people; thus having a separate 
existence from the people and their actions* .Just how separate 
the Idea i s from the aotual historical events i s seen i n The 
Philosophy, of History where the idea twists the ©vents into 
strange shapes* e^ g.** the Orient knew and Imows that one man i& 
free;, the G-reco^ Eoman world that some men are free and the 
Germanic world that a l l men are free* This i s a "philosophy of 
history", and consistently rejected by Croce* 
(1) The Philosophy of History.»-p* 10* 
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Now l e t us look at Oroee himself i n this mattes?* In one of 
his infrequent e x p l i c i t statements about " s p i r i t " Croee says* 
"*«*the s p i r i t becomes transparent to i t s e l f 
as thought i n the consciousness of the hist** 
or!a&*»*" (1) 
Thus i t would seem that " s p i r i t " i s some underlying e n t i t y j not 
transparent (hence cloudy or dark) u n t i l i t expresses i t s e l f i n 
thought* e#g«> the " s p i r i t " of Gibbon became clear to i t s e l f 
(i*§** *° G&bbon and those who study him) as he was engaged i n 
the process of thought of writing his monumental history of the 
Eoraan empire* Croee emphasises that the thought i n which the 
underlying " s p i r i t " finds expression i s always thought about 
concrete and particular things* For example* i n History as the 
Story of Liberty* he sayss 
"But of -pspirit"3 abstractly considered as 
outside or above things r i t i s as l i t t l e possible to make a history Qience impossible 
to think about] * as*** to eat a f r u i t i n general 
vjhleh i s hot a pear| a plum* an apricot, or 
other specified f r u i t * " (S) 
I n other words* we cannot think about the " s p i r i t " as suchj but 
only about the ^ s p i r i t " aWamanifested i n specific acts of thought 
For Groee these acts # thought can always be included under one 
of four categories! beauty! truths morality and u t i l i t y j and 
investigation of these four categories formsi : the four sections 
of hi© |>h|lqsonhy of the Sp i r i t * 
(1) Theory and ffistory of, Historiography* p.36» 
(2) History as the Story of Liberty. 3?6* 
The a f f i n i t y "between this point of view and that expressed 
i n our earlier quotation from Hegel i s evident* The intention 
of Hegel expressed i n the quotation i s to examine "the events of 
the World*® History" i n order to "become acquainted with Spirit 
in*»,*its office of guidance" of the Idea* Hegel, li&o Croce, 
sees the manifestation of " s p i r i t " i n thought or Idea as one 
which i s expressed i n the concrete events of history* This view 
of r e a l i t y runs throughout Grace and Hegel* The reality of any-
thing does not consist i n i t s essence or i t s abstract generality* 
rather i t must consist i n i t s developed form which materialises 
i n the h i s t o r i c a l dialectic* In the context of a discussion. 
God* J i g e l says that i t i s , 
"***a raisunderstan4ing to suppose that Knowledge 
. . . can be content with the "per se"* the essence ,* 
but can do without the tfosfen> that the absolute 
principle* or absolute i n t u i t i o n ^ makes the 
carrying out of the former, or development of 
the l a t t e r * needless* Precisely because the * 
former i s kB necessary to the essence as the 
essence to i t , absolute r e ^ i i l i y must not be 
eoneeived of and expressed as essence alone* 
i.e*, as immediate substance, or as pure self-? 
i n t u i t i o n of the Divine, but as form also, and 
with the entire, wealth of, toe developed form,* 
Only Wen is i t grasped and expressed as really 
actual* (1) 
In Groce himself there are many places which indicate that 
he has the same attitude as to what constitutes r e a l i t y * For 
example, Croce says? "The act of thought i s the consciousness 
(1) Hegel, G*w*F*» Phenomenology of M,ind« translated by J*B^  
v M i l l i e * i n l ^ e l Selections (The Modern Students Library 
edition)$ Charles Soribner^s Sons, New York, 1989, p*l6» 
'• I t a l i c s mine* 
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of the s p i r i t that i s consciousness** #tt^' i*©*t wh&t we 
experience as consciousness i s consciousness of the "s p i r i t 1 * ! 
and this consciousness of the "spirits i s realized i n the act 
of thoughtj concrete> dialectical acts of thought being under*-, 
stood here* 
In short, Croce says that " s p i r i t " as such cannot "be thought 
abouti but only the manifestations of ''spirit" i n concrete 
thought. This being the case# i t w i l l be expedient for us to 
deal as mutch as possible with only the manifestation of "spirit"*, 
1%©*! with the act of thought* Since " s p i r i t " as such cannot be 
thought about * but only " s p i r i t " manifested as thought $ and 
since thought i s always thought about the concrete! therefore 
history must be conceived Inarms of concrete, particular acts 
of thought, e*g>, thought about Caesar's invasion of Britain i n 
64 B,C* For: 
•.•history i s thought, and* as such, thought 
of the universal, of the universal i n i t s 
concreteness, and therefore always determined 
in' a particular manner* (2) 
2i " S p i r i t " as the source of value i n history* 
I*et us now turn to another of Croce*s recurring themes* 
This may be stated? " S p i r i t " as manifested i n concrete acts of 
thought about beauty* tr u t h , morality and u t i l i t y i s value; and 
(1) Theory and History of fflstorioffraphyf p. 118* 
(a) i f t l d * , . n-»6oV 
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indeed the only valuo that i t i s possible to conceive* tt &k' 
thought alone which conveys value (moanin^fj&ness^ u s s f u i n w f 
tru t h about r e a l i t y ) * Por example* i t i s only i n tile process' 
of thinking through the preoondition$f: n ^ t i v v s ^ p W a ^ ^ ^ ^ ' 
execution^ .results'etc* of c&os&r's invasion of Britain i n 64 A«b< 
that that account comes to be meaningful to uaj i t i s only i n 
t his way th&t the account of the Invasion i s neen to b© truth" 
about r e a l i t y t i*©*^  that i t assumes value*. Th@ on£y other way 
i n which one might go about giving value to thi s or any otter 
event would be to impose some meaning on the event from the 
outside^ e*g*f to turn i t into some kind of wrhetoxical" or 
••poetical history'** the fallaciousnps® of which m have discussed 
previously* 
This process of thought of which Croc© ©peaks i s , as sh<K*ld 
be clear from our example* not about anything abstract or trangk 
soondentali rath@r i t i s always concrete thought about historical 
©vontia* CroOO Mgp»w«s* i t : 
•#*thought always thinks history * the history of 
re a l i t y , that i s one* and b&yond thought thar4 i s 
notningf for the natural object becomes a myth 
wh#n i t Is-affirmed as ob^eott; and. .shows-itself 
&n i t s true r e a l i t y as nothing else but the human 
s p i r i t i t s e l f * r # W 
This does not mean that nothing exists i n any sense outbid© 
of thought* That i s t objects do have numerical and spatial 
@3sist&no© apart ftfpm thought* tore ar@| for easamplej,, 
(1) Theory and iEs^ory of His^prio^raphy. p.133. 
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such tilings as dead and unthought documents and artifacts , and 
Grace discusses at some length their limited. exlstencCf One can j 
apeak of there being•• certain quantities of these i n specif ic ! 
places* tlov;ever* insofar as they are-not thought they are , 
in e r t , useless, and yield no knowledge. 
Once again there i s an a f f i n i t y between this position and 
that of Hegel, although' the terminology i s largely different* 
For Hegel the, seif^eonsolouaness of the inquirer after Knowledge • j 
i s composed of two partsj f i r s t , "the fact that I know" and \ 
secondly "what 1 know";* Howj, 
Xn self , consciousness these are merged i n one; 
for the Sp i r i t knows i t s e l f * I t involves an 
appreciation of i t s own nature, as also an 
energy enabling i t to realise i t s e l f ! to make 
i t s e l f actually what i t i s potentially 
UniversalHistory,, .•isi»**the process of working out the knowledge of that which i t i s poten* 
t i a l l y , ( l ) 
For Hegel "the fact that I know" (at a l l ) only comes concurrently 
with ''what X know" (and the dialectical process whereby I come 
to know "what I know")* The two are merged i n one* I come to 
know W a process of thinking which i s historical* That which 
i s real i s the rationalj or, more specifically, rational his» 
to r i c a l thought* The relation between this and Grocers content 
tion that i t i s thought which conveys value (meaningfulness,, 
usefulness^ t r u t h about rea l i t y ) should be obvious now*- Of 
(1) Hegel. a f |. The Philosophy of History* pp* 17-18. I t a l i c s Hegel's*" 
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course* as Ave have said before* Croce follows Hegel i n this 
methodology but not I n the particular way i n which Hegel works 
i t but i n terms of "the Xdea,Ji "Universal History", the f u l f i l l * 
mefct of these i n the State etc* 
So i t i s that Groce* with a selective dependence upon Bagel 
maintains that i t i s thought which conveys value* For our pur* 
poses we may Say that i t i s thou^it which conveys value i n 
ftjsftery* f h i s position w i l l be further supported as we turn now 
to consider a false alternative to t h i s position* 
3« A false alternative to " s p i r i t " as the source of value 
, '.' in.historyr 
Groee maintains again and again that we iftust hot start our 
his t o r i c a l inquiry after knowledge i n the realm of "empirical" 
or "brute" fact} i n the realm of "non-thought" f as he sometimes 
refers to i t * This way of thinking i s the error behind the ap* 
preach to history which assumes that we f i r s t collect facts and 
then search for causes "or connections between the facts? $o 
start i n this way i s to posit a dualism between matter and mind 
which i s then impossible to overcome• (Croce l i k e Vico sees 
himself engaged i n overcoming the dualism which arose with 
Descartes*) However> because much intniiry does start i n just 
t h i s way* historical inqtuiry i s degrad«$ed* Greco*s own 
words| this degradation i s brought about by 
..•••the coarseness of the mind incapable of 
perceiving the difference between pwe con* 
cepts \thought] arid empirical concepts 
[pon«*thoughtj, between judgment and class** 
i f i c a t i o n * . y ( l ) 
Here again we see Orooe using a term i n a very special way* 
••Empirical" i s used by him i n a perforative wayj i t i s contrasted 
with judgment* However, empirical inquiries as we know them are 
always permeated with thought and judgment} these qualities 
being essential to their progression* But Oroce uses "empirical" 
i n another, sensef namely as the l i s t i n g and classifying (pigeon* 
holing)' of facts; i t i s for him the second half of a mind*matter 
dualism which he i s striving to overcome* 
How what happens, asks Croce* when an inquiry i s conducted 
i n this dualistlc manner); that i s , starting with the collection 
of "empirical" or unthought events and facts? Naturally the : 
inquirer i s usually not content ftiat with the collection of 
facts* He also expecte to j u s t i f y his inquiry by demonstrating 
that these facts have some meaning or pattern, or that they have 
some bearing upon a particular problem, &.*e.», to demonstrate 
that they have some value* But where i s this value to come 
from? " S p i r i t " as manifested i n concrete acts of thought about 
specific h i s t o r i c a l facts and events cannot convey any value i n 
this situation* Why? Because the facts and events i n the 
dualistie approach under consideration are posited as "brute", 
(2.) History as fthe Story of Liberty, p.371. 
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"empirical", ^thought etc* By definition then the " s p i r i t " 
has nothing to think about; hence i t cannot convey any value 
upon them* 
Does the matter end here? Croee would undoubtedly say that 
i t should end here, but i n fact i t does not* There i s a demand 
for value* The only possibility l e f t i s for the value to be 
imported from the outside and Imposed upon the facts* These 
values which are imported into the historical scene are termed , 
by Croce as "transcendental" or "metaphysical11.». Any inquiry 
which starts from the dualistic position just described w i l l 
inevitably have recourse to "transcendental" or "metaphysical" 
values} the two go together, and together they are repeatedly 
attacked by Croee* He understands the "transcendental" and 
"metaphysical1 as being another realm from our own, and "trans*-,,., 
cendental" and "metaphysical" values as coming from this other 
realm* Since this i s their origin the only relation they can 
have to the facts and events of this world i s that of being 
Imposed upon them* This i s clearly a dualism; i t i s "non^spirit* 
ual" (always keeping our previous discussion i n mind) and as 
such deeply alien to Croce * s thought* For Croce this procedure 
i s l i t e r a l l y not conceivable* The only genuine value i s that 
which arises from the " s p i r i t " as i t thinks about concrete 
h i s t o r i c a l events* 
This concludes our statement i n outline of Croce'e under* 
Standing of history* I t remains i n the following section to see 
what l i g h t this understanding throws upon the various miscon-
ceptions of history which we discussed earlier* The effect of 
this w i l l "be to deepen the understanding which we have presented 
here i n outline* Before we proceed to this., however# i t w i l l be 
well to say a f i n a l word about the relation'between Croce and 
Hegel* We have commented on this relation i n the course of our 
exposition, and have seen that i n spite of a difference i n term* 
inology there i s an important area of agreement between the two 
metis This agreement consists i n the view that human " s p i r i t " 
finds expression i n concrete acts of dialectical thought about 
the events of history$ and that through this dialectical process ; 
that which i s potential i n the human " s p i r i t " becomes real and 
actual* The differences between the two men l i e * as lias been j 
I 
indicated before, i n the way i n which this dialectical process j 
(1) • ., . ! i s worked out* • For the purposes of our present discussion* 
the most important of these differences are,? (a) for Groce the 
dialectical process i s much more s t r i c t l y and consistently con*-
t r o l l e d by the c r i t i c a l investigation of historical fact} and 
(b) Groee *&; consistent refusal to import into history any value 
which does not arise out of the historical process i t s e l f * This ; 
results im (a) the absence i n Croce of the arbitrary and fanciful 
i 
( l ) A f u l l exposition of these differences are found i n Croee*s : 
y/hat, i s Living and what i s i n the ffhiloaoflhy of He&el« ; 
One of the moat important differences» Croce feels* i s ', 
Hegel*a confusion between the "synthesis of opposites" and 
"relation of dist|neta"> This confusion i s explored at 
length i n the book* 
constructions of history which wo f i n d i n Hegel's The Philosophy 
of History:y and (b) i n eliminating such "transcendental" and 
problematical assertions as "The State i s the Divine Idea as i t 
4* orcoe*® understanding of history i n relation to the 
various misconception of history* 
Let us pause now and see how this foregoing statement of 
Croce's understanding of history i s related to our f i r s t and 
negative section on misconceived history* This w i l l also enable 
us to i l l u s t r a t e how droce*s theory finds expression i n dealing 
with specific kinds of history* 
F i r s t * history as chronicle and philology i s rejected because 
i t i s '"empirical", i*e.#, i t i s the l i s t i n g and classification of ; 
unthought facts and events* There i s a classification following 
a pattern supplied by an uncritical chronology j but there i s no 
judgment $ Anybody who has ever sat through a series of lectures 
on a set of hist o r i c a l documents (for example the various strands 
of material which go to form the Old Testament) j has seen them 
refined, classified and possibly characterised with a few stock 
phrasesf anyone who has observed this process should know the 
difference between philolgy and history* The net result of such 
a process i s that one acquires many more*or*less valuable tech-* 
nlcal factsj but one does not have any understanding of the 
( l ) Hegel, G», The Philosophy of History* p* 39* 
exists on Earth I f 
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situation out of which they arose, the intention they were 
intended to serve* the degree to which execution matched intent 
t i o n etc* This i s philology and not history* As philology i t 
i a an indispensable constituent of history, and confusion only 
arises when philology claims (i m p l i c i t l y or ex p l i c i t l y ) to say 
a l l that can be said* When philology thus claims to be history 
a dualism i s set up,and unthought or empirical facts are posited 
apart from thought* No value i s conceivable i n this approach 
because 'where could value come from but from the facts and ©vents 
themselves? But these have been posited as unthought> "brute"y 
''empirical" etc* One cannot thinis: through or understand facts 
which have been defined as unthought* A chronological arrange** 
ment of these facts i s the only legitimate possibility here* 
There i s however anotherfwB) illegitimate possibility* 
This i s to engage i n what we nave called "philosophy of history" 
or "universal history"* Hero the attempt i s made to overcome 
the dualism between empirical fact and thoughtful judgment by 
arranging the facts according to some "transcendental" scheme# 
This scheme might be that of Joachim of Floris* three ages of the 
Father* of the Son and of the Holy Spirit? Marsha progression 
from primitive communism to the classless societyj a scheme of 
universal history showing the progress of c i v i l i s a t i o n etc* A l l 
such "transcendental history", as Croee calls i t * i s illegitimate 
because i n each case the principle of interpretation does not 
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arts© out of the : fact a |. rather $t i s imposed upon them«- The, 
schemes are a; wfcpfti* and. the fact© aa* made, to f i t - t h e partleu* ' 
lay. scheme* The divisions of the aeliewea aa?e called Wioue3^5 _ 
"age of faith"$ "primitive communism"^ ?Enii^enmei^% ; of 
progress" etc:* Anj .faet or1 ©vent $hich dees .net conform to the • 
chosea .scheme must be miaimi^edi; rejected as atypical or dealt 
with-in.some such For ©»mpl©g to .study the esmsade^ within 
an "age of tb&W^fvm&m&s GtmteB morw contusion than i t does . 
uMerstanding* In contrast to thee© i^^uMerstandings Oroee 
argues* as. we hive slen>,£or a a » a | ^ f t M i ^ • 
and judgment. of history* 
I h summary ton* h i s t o r y i s history of the s p i r i t " * ; .• 
history i s the historieal study of the " s p i r i t " as that " s p i r i t " 
,|#;ianifeg(ited I n concrete' acts; of thought*-^^ a coin* a painting, 
a document*; the record of an invasion and ;Bo,.on*. Hi e t o ^ ;arif.ea'•; 
fry uiaderatajiding just ©uoh eonerete thi?igs >m these* That i ^ to 
say 1 history arise a by thinking through the concrete historical 
events a*4 documents thempeivea$ fbj&h events aad documents aw 
«?©ltelftidnifc©#. th0'-l»2aaa.--: * % p i r i t H * This historical understanding 
constitute Wae.' value - 'Of , the • 'subject of. historical 'Inquiry' (e^g**: 
a coli* or doeu^ent) ^  4xideed# w***the natural object becomes a 
myth [ i n the sense of having no t r u t h * t u l i existence] when i t i s 
afi*lri&s^. a# 0 ^ i t is. 'affirmed apart from t f t f 
thinking % p i r i t " * This i s the basis for the ciaim that "*•« 
s p i r i t i s value, and indeed the only value that i t i s possible 
to conceive, (and} * * * h i story i s clearly always history, of values* 
The event i s a concrete act of " s p i r i t " * and the understanding .. 
of the ©vent i s aeh^ived through i t s re~enactment , ,in the thought 
( " s p i r i t " ) of the h i s t o r i a n * The value of history i s $m$ t h i s 
©vent i n conjunction with i t s $e^©naetaent"in the consciousness 
of the h i s t o r i a n * 
Because t h i s i s so* Oroce maintains r the only revelation 
" i s that which thought gives to thought "by means of c r i t i c i s m * " ^ 
Thus i t i s that "the value which rules the w r i t i n g of history 
i s the value of thought'% and nothing else* 
This concludes, our examination of Croce*s understanding of 
the nature of history* and of his associated c r i t i q u e of the 
various misunderstandings of history* This foundation «12$ help 
us now\jn) f i r s t ^ d r a w i n g attention to two cor o l l a r i e s of Croce's 
understanding of history? and t secondly» i n describing o r i e f l j r 
the steps by which th© h i s t o r i a n sets about the w r i t i n g of histor; 
b» Two Corollaries of Croce's Understanding of History* 
1* A l l h i s t o r y i s contemporary history* 
At the very beginning of the Theory and History off 
Historio^yaphy, Crooe launches i n t o a discussion of th© state* 
ments "every true history i s contemporary h i s t o r y " | v w y Com-* 
mentators often sees determined to make something d i f f i c u l t or 
even mystical out of t h i s and similar statements* Actually i t 
i s a very straightforward position* 
( i ) Histpry as the Story of Liberty« t>. 67* 
(S) Theory and History of HistoriOA-raphy* p# 1S» 
\i T i r s \ P  
Grooe asks;- What are the conditions of contemporary hldtottyt': 
They ares "that the document3 are before the hi s t o r i a n and that 
they are i n t e l l i g i b l e * ' 1 ^ Thi© means that the " s p i r i t " (l*©**. 
mind and thought) of the hi s t o r i a n acts on the documents* Thia 
act of thought consist® of two aspects* the conceptual and the 
i n t u i t i v e * The conceptual aspect ha© to do with logic and de<&* 
Auction* i*e*» h i a tory proceeds i n an orderly and reasonable way* 
The second aspect i® i n t u i t i o n * This much misusedword i s Croce'e I 
term f o r i m a g i n a t i o n * ^ 
The conceptual aspect^ does not c a l l f o r further comment-$ 
. . . ' ! 
out the i n t u i t i v e or imaginative aspect does* i t i s i i ^ g i m t i o n 
which l i n k s th© documents to l i f e * Oroce tajcos the exainple ot 
Mexican a r t which| f o r him, has no intere s t * ^  Therefor© a 
history of Mexican a r t would not be history f o r himj i t i s only I 
a chronicle# He might deal with i t conceptually$ hut &ot iaagin* 
a t i v e l y * A& a r e s u l t there i s no t r u t h i n i t f o r him? rather^ 
m f a r m he i s concerned,! i t i s a "dark h i s t o r y " or a ''dark age"*; 
However|.Crooe continues^ i f f o r some reason Mexican a r t were to 
become a l i v i n g i n t e r e s t f o r h i % then the whole s i t u a t i o n would 
"be changed* How the relevant documents and worlss of are would 
be related to his l i f e j now genuine history and t r u t h would he a 
U ) theory.:andJi; B^tpffy,$£. fffrstp^paraflhy;« p. 12 f 
(&) Croce uses both words» but M i a t u l t i o n , l i s used more 
freguentlyt 
(®) 'Ikeorv and Mgftprv of H^atoriograyhyf ppj 1S*14S This example i&- giv^n: i n these p a g e s * ' 
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p o s s i b i l i t y here* NOW? 
that problem j i t e * , .Mexican arCl i s related to 
lay being i n the same way a*- the history o f a 
"bit of business i n which I am engaged, 03? a 
love a f f a i r i n which 1 am indulging* * * I exa-
mine i t with the same anxiety and am troubled 
with thesame sense of unhappiness u n t i l I 
have succeeded i n solving i t * ( l ) 
L i f e and document are now related, and history can re s u l t * 
Obviously one cannot conceptually think oneself 3.nto such a 
r e l a t i o n with Mexican a r t , the Reformation, the American C i v i l 
War or any other h i s t o r i c a l event, Hather t h i s l i v i n g r e l a t i o n 
comes as a re s u l t of imaginatively perceiving the many subtle 
relationships between the event and one * s own experience* This 
i s what Oroce means when he maKes'suoh statements as The "source© 
£of h i s t o r y j are i n our own breasts, On the other hand the 
h i s t o r i a n cannot possibly deal with an event without having t h i s 
imagination controlled by c r i t i c a l thought* I n the unity of the 
two l i e s h i s t o r i c a l t r u t h * 
Without t h i s imaginative reconstruction or 
intefratio3a i t i s not possible to write history* 
or'to read i t * or to understand i t * But t h i s 
sort of imagination, which i s r e a l l y quite indi«* 
apendible to the h i s t o r i a n , i s tl|e imagination 
which i s _ inseparable from the h i s t o r i c a l syn-
thesis jifontaihing the c r i t i c a l and conceptual 
• elements^, the imagination i n and f o r thought,* 
the concreteness of thought, which i s never ah 
abstract concept» but always a r e l a t i o n [to 
l i f e ] and a ( c r i t i c a l ] judgment,*#(3) 




so i t . : i $ «&Q®mpn% w& e W i e i $ % . o ^ . i i f o m$ thought* 
^ ; % $ ' s i i t a n ^ |aoft£pea of h$&Mvp^^lm% i s to say* the' '&X#* 
Ifo ^ i i a ^ t i t y f . . 'G£o#®*'&, ©hoio# of th©,- t&ma wim0$i»&tio&ft tuftf 
@^oo$a|^; ^3^itio» t t i t t thiisi 'ocm^<KMdbnot a ha$)$r pat 
•the joe&gi&ig 4^9Bff ©hou$h* 
At t h i s '.poWfe: i t i « @apy to isiatsSke C * © o a f a i d e n t i c a l * I t 
i s ^ t th© th&t. £if#s» .03? thfe ;doo>p@nt#'#jto^ ameo^- past 
3.if§..$, $ t a ^ :©ut$i&© of h i f c t o ^ j «q4 th®& img&mttm saft 
thotaght ®oiae aioag to w i s iag>Oh thess® est0jme& tMsh&ftgs'* i& 03Pte 
to pj?oa&0#; h i ^ t e $ ^ / J ^ ^ a g 0 i Bathos^ i t 1Bths y t i t y Of 
4oo»»tB aiJi toilet tyhieh 
foawi j>aj?t of h i s t o i d itssolf* they .tare within th# 
syiitMBia*; they to>&'« oo i i g t i t t i ^ i i t 'g&vi of i t and 
- o^ftaMk$<s$. hy I t * : Heaq© th© mm of m history 
• '•with i t l sott^oe^ ovmifa1 of ' i t s e l f fts-snathe* fanoy • 
Fop X have often ha& h0fo3?$ T&® th© to©taa©iit0 of 
the BsittX© of a©tty$htu?g| Ehls, "battle free* a l i v i n g ifct©j?©at 
foi? w&.'p09wfi&i mmig othar things* X ^ i t o tot ^ ootahta?y 
.«oA-..?,••waraBlfwhat m at©; .to no- ©in^ lX octant Ta^ oaufas of whM*. 
h^pojioft thea^: 3?®&iiMti0& l a Oa?o$#% tanna* th© 
.3?®sttlt of i n t u i t i o n or. i i ^ g i m ^ o i H ($h£ft i n W t l ^ . j N s ^ l i ^ t l o a 
doos hot mm%&' m m in%%t®£ &mm$&y® foa? the $ti*ay of 
the 4ooiJia©wt0^  mthej? i t i s a facto* i n th@ia? uatostanaiiig fffoa 
s t a r t t o f i h i s h # ) fh#ou$fo the urn of tho tempts X 
m at)3kd to a?@oon©ta?uot th$ h a t t i e i n Of i t * ' mp®Q%&* 
(X) yheogy aM HiatQgy of m^oyio^gaphTT^ p 0 2 5 . I t a l i c a Croce'a. 
(8) i b i d . . p.S3. I t a l i c a raino, 
3 ^ 
mm of the documents enable me to enter Into th$ ambitions^., 
plan® and motives of th© leaders of both ©ideis.f other documents 
t e l l m© how the mon i n tho ranlca thought and f e l t j s t i l l otiiers 
indicate the part played by t e r r a i n * supplier and the support 
raosived from Washington and Eioamoadi and- a t l l l others m t t t a 
me to &now tho immediate: and gemote oonae^wnoes of the b a t t l e * 
How eroee'a point i s ; The meaningful h i s t o r i c a l existence of the 
Ba t t l e of Gettysburg i s nothing else than the -flnffiy of ay thougifc 
(iiaaginatiye and conceptual) and the i n t e l l i g i b l e documents? 
nothing els© than the u ^ t y of the % p i r i t " of the h i s t o r i a n 
acting upon the documents nothing else that the uftitv: of the 
"BipiP&i* of the h i s t o r i a n acting upon the docmantagy record of 
a concrete record of li£& ( h i s t o r i c a l #vent)* and making that 
l i f e -his owa«-; 
History thus ptfopejfty uadei?8to®d< i s always contompora^* j 
There i s no n$ed to make sosaething mystical or parado5?i0al out o f i 
t h i s statement* I t i s simply that Whether an event took plaoVa 
month* a year* a decade or a century ago does hot have any impor* 
tant e f f e c t upon that ©tent as history* The his t o r y of World War 
11 and of the American C i v i l f a r ore ftot essentially d i f f e r e n t ! 
both are produced through the unity of document and , % p i r i t r t j 
(thought) $ and the d i f f i o u l t i e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are the same i n 
both case®* t h i s i s true i n spitfc. of the f a c t that the lattes? is; 
usually called ttpas#* and the f ormer mi^ht w i l l be ©ailed a part j 
of contemporary hi s t o r y * "Past" i n d i s t i n c t i o n from contemporary* 
before 1* and "after'* are tetfms of the ohroniclei they are not 
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teams f o r the h i s t o r i a n , except in c i d e n t a l l y , History becomes 
contemporary or presently l i v e d when the documents are before 
the h i s t o r i a n and his 'spiriU' acts upon them* 
This means, i n terms of Croce's understanding of history 
which we have examined i n a previous section, that the historian*8 
" s p i r i t " thin&s imaginatively and conceptually about the h i s -
t o r i c a l event recorded i n the document j and through t h i s eon-* 
scions act of thought the values emerge which enable him to 
evaluate the i n d i v i d u a l documents and the event as a whole. The 
value which rules history i s the value of thought} and sp e c i f i c -
a l l y , h i s t o r i c a l thought* And t h i s h i s t o r i c a l thought emerges 
i t s e l f by means of h i s t o r i c a l thought* "Before11 and " a f t e r " 
are not important i n t h i s process, but rather whether or not 
the documents "vibrate i n the mind of the hi8torian w , ,^-one of 
Croce'a characterizations of t h i s whole process, 
The thesis that a l l history i s contemporary history i s thus 
seen to be a d i r e c t corollary of "history i s history of the 
s p i r i t " , However t h i s coro3,lary which we have been discussing 
i s more i n t e r e s t i n g than the statement from which i t i s derived* 
This i s because i t i s less abstract and more immediately applic-
able to our experience* Another way of stating t h i s corollary 
( r ) 
i s to say that history i s "knowledge of the eterna^ present"}*' 
I n terms of our e a r l i e r example, t h i s means that the Battle of 
(1) Theory and Hjatory of Historioyai3hy> p f61 I t a l i c s Croce'a 
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Gettysburg i s ;)ust as present now as i t was the day af t e r the 
'battle, or indeed the actual day of the battle«^ And because 
the past i s etern a l l y present ( p o t e n t i a l l y , and again and again 
i n a c t u a l i t y ) * "We are products of the past and we l i v e immersed 
i n the past, which encompasses us# o v ' 
We w i l l return to t h i s theme when we discuss R«@t 
Gollingwbodj f o r whom i t i s also a fundamental idea$ and then 
again i n the l a s t two parts of t h i s thesis where we w i l l explore 
i t s r e l a t i o n to the doctrine of revelation,, 
3« The i d e n t i t y of philosophy and history* 
On the basis of the t o t a l foregoing discussion we turn now 
to Crooe1 o position that there i s a r e l a t i o n of i d e n t i t y between 
philosophy and h i s t o r y . We have already dealt with the basic 
misunderstanding of history which mafees t h i s statement looJc ii&e 
sheer nonsense; namely that history i s chronicle and philology* 
i f h i s t ory were t h i s , then obviously i t would have no r e l a t i o n 
to p h i l o s o p h y * ^ 
When Groce says that philosophy and history are i d e n t i c a l 
he does not mean that l i n g u i s t i c analysis s e t h i c a l theory or 
(1) A c r i t i c might say j "A motion picture camera could have 
tafeen a newareel of the b a t t l e on the day of the b a t t l e * 
and t h i s cannot be done now*" Oroce would agree» 1 believe, 
that i n these terms the b a t t l e i s not eternally present but 
indeed past* This d e f i n i t i o n equates "present" with "matter 
i n motion1*.& A newsreel i s a form of chronicle* 
(2) History as the 3tor.v of Liberty. p443» 
(3) Theory and History of Historiography. p f 6 l . 
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some other f i e l d of philosophical inquiry i s capable of render-w-
ing luminous the I n d u s t r i a l Revolution or any other event i n 
h i s t o r y j nor i s the reverse true; nor indeed generally i s any 
specific philosophical investigation illuminating i n regard to 
any specific h i s t o r i c a l problem* Rather,, when Croee says that 
philosophy and history ax?e i d e n t i c a l , he means that both are a 
a methodologys both are means of dealing with a pa r t i c u l a r 
problem* There i s no general, universal or closed history (as 
we have already discussed) with a claim to be universally V a l i d j 
and likewise there i s no general, universal or closed philosophy 
with i t s claim to be universally v a l i d . There are only an infin-> 
i t e number 03;y»rtlcular h i s t o r i c a l and philosophical problems; 
and these are eaeh and a l l approached by a methodology which we 
should c a l l h i s t o r i c a l * 
The i d e n t i t y between history and philosophy i s evident at 
a l l essential points* I f I wish to study the philosophy of 
Descartes, what do X do? F i r s t of a l l I must have at.least one 
document, the Discourse on Method> Then, i n Crocks t e r * 
minology, my " s p i r i t " (mind, thought) deals with t h i s document* 
As the p a i n f u l experience of many college freshmen demonstrates 1 
i t i s not enoughiio deal with t h i s document conceptually* Vtfhen 
i t i s dealt with only i n thj.a way the words on the pages do not, 
seem to have any r e l a t i o n to anything* Something else i s needed, 
This need i s that the words of Descartes are seen to be dealing 
in 
wit-li a specifier and r e a l problem, i#e* j a problem which 1 can , 
see has some r e l a t i o n to my experience (Those philosophies 
which do not have such a r e l a t i o n Croce characterizes as " c i r c l i n g 
i n the void"*) 'This insight whereby document i s related t o l i f e 
comes from the f a c u l t y of thought which Croce c a l l s " i n t u i t i o n " 
or Imagination*" So i t i s that we have here, as i n h i s t o r y j docu-
ment and thought (imaginative and conceptual) leading to the 
're-enactment" of Descartes* thought, i*e*., the problems he faced 
when he set out to write the Discourse on Method, his dealing 
with them* the solution arrived at etc* Only i n t h i s way do we 
have true philosophy? and t h i s i s also true history* 
I n such an examination, how do we evaluate Descartes* 
Discourse oh Method? By importing c r i t e r i a from somewhere else 
and then seeing to what extent Descartes meets these criteria 1? 
Of course not„ Rather our evaluation comes from the thoughtfuli 
examination of the document i t s e l f . I f we say that Descartes* 
e f f o r t i s successful, we can do so only to the extent that h i s 
thought validates i t s e l f to us i n the process of our examination, 
i.*e,*» i t i s a matter of " i n t e r i o r v e r i f i c a t i o n " * N / Otherwise 
we can only say that the Discourse on Method i s v a l i d because 
Descartes, Prof * Kemp Smith or sDiae other authority says . i t l e 
so* This would be anecdote and not philosophy* 
(1) S£. Theory and •tftataifr p£ ma tocography* pf136» »*>*true '; hTatory i s that ox wliloh an i n t e r i o r vei'ifieatioa i s 
possible, and i s therefore history i d e a l l y contemporary 
and present,**«" 
in 
•%n order to demonstrate s t i l l another parallel between 
history and philosophy t Xe$ us ask the gueatioiu Is Descarte^ 
pMiosi&hy- ,*p&0ttt or '"present day'* philosophy? This Is a rather 
pointless question as can be seen by asking whether his philosop: 
t» more "past" or ior© present day" than that of Plato or Prof* 
Ins0f^::.a0. B#soax*t#$* pM&osophy is. philosophically-historioaXiy 
tmdej?^tood i t i s as contemporary ("eternally present <*} as i t 
mw'«a#ji i f i t i« not- so imderstood %h,m m type of 
chronic!®* 
^ t i l l again* does philosophy say anything that 4s univ#3?sa3|r 
%rm% Many philosophers have? thought so, t&got$& m-'MmavUm 
rmKea universally true statements he make® them as they arise . 
0xi%. of the particular p r o b e s $hieh he i s asj&mimng* Again..'... 
t h i s 0on#iitnte@ a point of identity with the methodology of 
history*..for '*to negate taniversai history does not mean to negate 
the univ©>s:aX i n h i i t o ^ y [ f o r ] history i s thoug^;' 'and>; •• 
such# thought of the m&wpm\» of the universal i n i t s oon-. 
cretenesai and therefore always determined i n a particular 
mann#%,,•^^^ 
The ahtl^tiaphya.ioal Mm of the position out of which 
t h i s idon^ification of philosophy and history arises i s evident* 
CD W^m^^^^MrM^^m^t PP.£9-60. 
day?' really hav# nothing * and Aye^ The 
to do with philosophy except to give chapter headings i n w#urvey&3 
«**the i ^ p e r i o r i t y of philosophy a© methodology fl 
over^philosophy as B i l ^ S l S i i i 0 . * ^ s shown oy th© 
capacity of the f o r ^ r t o solve th£ problems of 1 
the , l a t t e r by e r i t i s i a i n g them and pointing out 
t h e i r o r i g i n , Metaphysic, on the other hand* i s 
incapable of solving not only the problems of 
methodology| but even i t s own problems, without 
having recourse to the fantastic and a r b i t r a r y * 
Thus questions as to the Reality of the ejctei'iml 
world, of soul-substanqe, of the unknowable, of 
dualisms and antitheses, m^ Wfovth^ have 
disappeared i n gnoseological doctrines, which 
have substituted better conceptions f o r those 
which we formerly possessed concerning the logic 
of the sciences,, explaining those questions as 
eternally renascent aspects of the d i a l e c t i c or 
phenomenology of Knowledge* ( l ) 
I'hia p o s i t i o n can be substantiated at many levels of philosophioa3 
discussion, and i t s f r u i t f u l n e s s has been amply demonstrated i n 
modern philosophy* However^ i n order to prevent t h i s position 
from taking on the aura of " f i n a l t r u t h " which Croce ^ hated^sjoy 
we must ask one question of Croce here* Grooe*s greatly prised 
(and r i g h t l y soV methodology; reat;$> upon a very high valuation 
Of history* h i s t o r i c a l event, the created order etc* as a means 
cof knowing r e a l i t y * I t i s , f o r example, a methodology which i s 
a l i e n from Greco-*Roman and Bastern philosophy. The m-eatlon 
which we have to ask of Croce, then, i s : What i s the o r i g i n of 
the high valuation of history upon which t h i s position depends?; 
Some have argued that i t has i t s origins i n Christian revela-
t i o n » v B e that as i t may, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see that the 
(1) Theory and History of iilstorio^paphy* pp* 153«164*"»*\w» CA«»*i&. 
(3) Cf ^  Collinffwood* R»a*« The Idea of History* m>. 44ff. 
underlying assumptions of t h i s p o s i t i o n hay© been arrived at 
methodologicallyj and i n f a c t they have every appearance of 
feeing ( f o r want of a better term) metaphysical i n o r i g i n * Never*-
theless s, recognising the great value of Croce*a position* l e t 
us permit him to have the l a s t word i n t h i s section* He sum-
marizes his p o s i t i o n as to the relationship between philosophy 
and h i s t o r y i n the following words* 
When philosophy has been defined as I have defined 
i t as the "methodology of historiography" we must 
s t i l l not forget that methodology would be abstract 
unless i t coincided with the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of events, 
that i s * unless i t renewed i t s e l f and continually 
developed at one with the intelligence of events***, 
A philosophical problem can be resolved only when i t 
i s set and dealt with i n r e l a t i o n to the events which 
have made i t arise* and which have to be understood 
i n order to understand i t * Otherwise the philoso* 
phical problem remains abstract and gives r i s e to 
those inconclusive and interminable arguments which 
are««* always at the same stag© of development* (1) 
c* Three Factors i n the Writing of History* 
We have considered at length Croce's understanding of the 
w r i t i n g of hi s t o r y ; but there sfcill remains three factors which 
have h i t h e r t o only been implied* I t w i l l be well to make these 
e x p l i c i t , especially since they w i l l appear i n our discussion 
of Collingwopd ;and i n the l a s t and constructive part of 
t h i s thesis $ , It siiould be remembered here that Crooe speaks 
not only as a philosopher, but also as a practicing h i s t o r i a n * 
1* History begins with a problem* 
W History as the Story of,Liberty, pp* 147*148* 
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What does the h i s t o r i a n want or heed as he begins to write j 
i 
the h i s t o r y of* say, the fettle of Gettysburg? Does he want or 
need absolutely a l l of the knowledge which pertains to that events 
Groce refers to t h i s complete Jmov/ledge as the i n f i n i t y of know** 
ledge* and says of i t s 
The road of progress to the i n f i n i t e ( i n the sense ! 
jus t indicated above] i s as wide as that to h e l l * ! 
and i f i t does not lead to h e l l i t c ertainly leads 
to the madhouse* And that i n f i n i t e * which grows 
bigger the moment we f i r s t totich i t , does not a v a i l j 
usj indeed i t f i l l s us with fear* Only the poor j 
f i n i t e assists us, the determined*: the concrete, ! 
which i s grasped by thought and which lends i t s e l f 
as base f o r our experience and as point of depar-
ture f o r our action*(1) 
Even were t h i s i n f i n i t e knowledge offered to us # our only 
course would be "to goj^et jit]J« and to concentrate upon that 
p a r t i c u l a r point alone which corresponds to a problem and con-
s t i t u t e s l i v i n g * active h i s t o r y , contemporary h i s t o r y * " ^ & -
other words* not only i s t h i s i n f i n i t e knowledge not possible, 
i t i s not*eyen necessary or ;&esirable* Th© h i s t o r i a n s t a r t s 
w i th a concrete problem or problems (What brought lies i n t o 
Pennsylvania? Why did Pickett 's charge f a i l ? What enabled X*ee 
to escape back i n t o Virginia?),* and the necessary knowledge i s 
available to 're-enact' (and thus make contemporary) the b a t t l e I 
and thereby to answer the problems* "That 'remaining* history 
i 
[the r e s t of the i n f i n i t y of knowledge concerning Gettysburg* 
and not connected with any problem^ i s the eternal phantom of 
(1) Theory and History of Historiography* p*63* 
(2) ib f t d * . pp* Grace's i t a l i c s , 
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the thing i n itself„ which i s neither 1 thing* nor * i n i t s e l f * * 
but only the imaginative projection of the i n f i n i t y of our action 
and. of our knowledge-* w(^ 
History "begins with a problem presented to the historian "by 
hia JJspirit"; i t e * , through imagination and conceptual thought 
h© sees the problem as i t existed then* and yet which also exists 
now f o r him as an h i s t o r i a n * History which does not s t a r t from 
a problem i s chronicle or some other misunderstanding of history* 
The dictum "Study problems, not periods," has t h i s understanding 
behind i t * History begins with a problem f and "has at i t s heart 
a motive whioh l i n k s i t up with the seriousness of l i f e as i t i s 
lived*«."^ 
3* Cause and end* 
F i r s t c o l l e c t the facta* then connect them causally* Tliia . . 
statement represents a common misconception of how the hi s t o r i a n 
works* However,even b r i e f r e f l e c t i o n upon our discussion of 
Croce w i l l indicate that t h i s concept has no place i n his h i s * 
t o r i c a l methodology* although he agrees that "cause" may be use4 
loosely i n t h i s way* For Groce the only cause i s that which 
emerges as the h i s t o r i a n 're-enacts"in his thought the genesis* 
development and results of a particular h i s t o r i c a l event* Any 
other cause i s one which i s imposed upon the h i s t o r i c a l process 
from the outside* The f u t i l i t y of the search f o r such causes can 
(1) Theory and History pf HistorioiOTanhvfn>05> pf« History as fthe gftory of Liberty* PT>* 65> 116* 
(8) History as the Story of Liberty«r>.83* See also p t 18, Cx'« My PliiatOaoPhy, P* 198, 
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readily "be seen i n the various examples which have been put 
forward from time to time, e*g*, race, the w i l l of (Jod* the 
Renaissance s p i r i t , economic production etc* each and a l l of 
which are a source of merriment f o r the f i r s t c r i t i c who comes 
along with a d i f f e r e n t point of view* 
A f u r t h e r d i f f i c u l t y with the search f o r cause i s the obvious 
one of where one i s to stop-the process of tracing back the chain j 
of cause, The only "solution" i s to say that one i s not interest \ 
ted i n the f i r s t cause* but only i n proximate causes. But t h i s 
i s , Croce maintains, a " f i g l e a f " to cover up the f a c t that the I 
h i s t o r i a n has made an a r b i t r a r y decision to stop at a pa r t i c u l a r 
l i n k i n the supposed causal chain, Bor i s any help to be received 
here i f , instead of looking back fo r a cause, one looks forward 
to an end* Immediately the f a m i l i a r problem presents i t s e l f , 
Since the end i s something i n the f u t u r e , i t does not arise out 
of h i s t o r y , but i s imposed upon history, e,g,, as i n the case 
of the "classless society", 
Croce * s constantly repeated position i s that i f we want to 
speak, of cause and end i n hi s t o r y , then they must be those which 
emerge i n the methodological examination of specific h i s t o r i c a l 
events* I t i s here that we see Croce * a intention to present a 
r a d i c a l l y secular understanding of history i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
evident . ^  Whether t h i s understanding can only be incorporated 
(1) g£ Theory and History of Historiography,* PP* 64ff, 77, 85, 
IQOff* e t passim* 
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i n t o a r a d i c a l l y secular point of view i s another question* 
3* H i s t o r i c a l conditioning* 
The term " h i s t o r i c a l conditioning" refers to the much do* 
bated question of to the extent to which the h i s t o r i a n i s con-* 
ditioned and hence l i m i t e d by his own pa r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l 
period* Croce speaks to t h i s problem, but not as thoroughly as 
one would wish* He says, as we have seen e a r l i e r i n another con** 
t e x t , that an h i s t o r i a n may be so conditioned (by personal, social 
and other factors) that i t i s impossible f o r him to "re-enact" 
p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l problems? and hence i t i s impossible f o r 
him to make a genuine h i s t o r i c a l inquiry about those problems# 
We gave one of Croeo's examples of t h i s s i t u a t i o n i n which he 
says that i f an h i s t o r i a n had a t o t a l lack of interest and 
appreciation of Mexican a r t , t h i s f a c t would so condition the 
h i s t o r i a n as to make i t impossible f o r him to write a genuine 
history of that subject* • 
However Groce does not say whether there might be an inter** 
mediate stage between t h i s s i t u a t i o n where a subject i s closed 
or "dark" to the h i s t o r i a n t and that i n which a period i s open 
and f u l l y capable of being re-enacted'i I n other words* whether 
or not a h i s t o r i c a l problem might not be p a r t i a l l y "dark" and 
p a r t i a l l y " l i g h t " to an historian* Yet i t would be reasonable 
to suppose that the h i s t o r i a n might frequently f i n d himself i n 
just t h i s mixed s i t u a t i o n * For example, i t i s evident that 
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Gibboni i n h i s 'She Berlin® and P a l l of th© Roman ISiaplre* was 
largely "closed 0 to th© religious aspects of hi© problemj but 
not to a l l other aspects* However 3ust what Croce*s position 
would be i n t h i s matter i s not clear,* 
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AS WO h&m stated i n tii© pmoQ&im chapter* and ao w i n 
ho evident I n tho following pages* Colliagwood ia a direct 
heia? of the inteileotual heritage of Vieo and Croc©* Because 
t i l l s i s Bo, and since wo have already made an e&atoination of 
Vico and Oa?ooOj> wo w i l l f ool ourselves3uatifled i n s t a t i n g 
contain paa?t@; of Collingwood*o tpfl&erotandiag of hiotory moj?e 
concisely than we would have done 'Qtlherwiee^ However* Uhis 
does apt moan that th© following 03ca®inatioa of ^ Olilngwood 
la to he ©imply a repetition or resume of what has gone hefore* 
Certain distinctive features of Colli»gwbodfO position wilt. 
ho soon to emerge} and moreover Colliagwood poOaeeaes advan** 
tag© over Vieo and Grooe respectively* As a result of at&nd* 
lag woll within tho igOth Ceatoy* Oolilagwood does not havo 
to woa?ls within th© context of tho undeveloped state of his* 
t o r i o a l Inquiry which existed i n tho 16th Century* $ad within^: 
which Vico waa ohliged to wor&# l a respect; to Croco* 
Collingwood haes what many w i l l f ool to ho a decided advantage*'-
i n that hio ohaervationo on history are free from Croee*e 
of ton esoteric language and hia elaborate philosophical &yotom» 
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Fpa? a l l of these &m&om m may ©xpoet Oolliagwood to maK® 
hist own distinotiv© ©onttfifcution to ow disousaion* 
Tlx© ppiziolpl© of what follow© i s eolUarood*® 
"gghe.; -•Ifljapt" of .Hi0^O3»% ffcis "bools i s a posthnmoue collection 
of mptft>lish©d material witt®a \>&%mmx 1936 arid 1940* 
i&thottgh part of this iaaterial as we hav© I t was possi'bly 
hurriedly w i t t e a i notfertholess Gollingwood had thon^it 
Of i t as ©vantually going to form his "ohief woric** I t 
i® not sn^ri&ing i n Vi©w of the g©n©sip of , thi© tJooJs 
that i t i s 90ffl0#iat repetitive*: and that i t lae&e a oloj&iv 
©wr**all organisation* W© t t f i l l "begin our examination of 
GoilinSbod*© understanding of history W looking at hie. 
eritioism of virion© wid©ly held laiaooneeptione of hiatoryr 
1* History ae Misconceived* 
a* History ia not ©hron!©!©*-. 
Eh© ooiawonoat i&i ©under ©tand&ng of history^ and on© whieh 
'i 
must he ©mphaticaliy denied* 40 that history i s ehroaiol©! 
that ia# that hist03?y i * a l i f t i n g of dates* ©v®nts# 
move&ents $ie.* 'Sim. so<*e®3.3,ed "outltooa of ni&tQ#y!*.a3?® • 
not htot0i?y at "but «iofct&afion©: of .fsots 8?3?a»gsdifl . 
• 'Q&fcscOy i?ei&t©d. to tnis? 1$ t&@ K&stst&on ido& M • 
history i d the transmitting of the toattoony of nfttaeaaee 
4© thus tt£seoao6lire&jjr aistofcy aonslats to 
accepting and, piremttUgjg. t$atiraoj^* and th© 
"•• malting of hi©t0a?y consist® i n t^soffifctog* . 
tff&aalating and eois^iXittg* Such WOJ?1E i# 
useful* "but i t i s not hi&tozTi thora i» no 
: 03?iticisni$ no £&t©a^ 3?et&t£0ity no #&1&^ng 
, of past 6a$d3&eaa,e to 0 ^ * 0 owa mind* (sj. 
ColkingTOod jeof©?® to this p0eu&o*lil8t0as»y a& '%0i&$QtfB#&nd« 
paet©,, history * Xt i s tho uncritical o^oeptano© up6a 
authority of what someone else toss: §sdd i s t w * Hiotoxy, 
i s oWiouipXy impo@©i"bXe upon this iaaMg* ^ ^ 
. History i a aot ^ig^on iioiing^*. • 
(1) :VjCf ^ Coffingwood* fi#«*-f . .3;dqa of Ijjfltory* Oxford• 
i&); :|frid.*k ft'aflQfa 
(s) of. ia®a of History, pp., sa4»ag»>* mm m mmH 
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The "pigeon holing" apj>roach to history i s really a slightly 
subtler version of the "aeissors^and^pastfe!' approach* "Pigeon 
holing" consists i n grouping historical material together into 
certain periods, or arranging i t i n a particular pattern* These 
period o# patterns "may be necessary a •priori on logical grounds, 
or may be forced upon our minds by the fact of i t s frequent 
ID 
repetition, or i t may be a b i t of both*" v ' In this way a wide 
sweep of European history might be seen, to give a common example 
as; Dark Agesf Middle Ages, Renaissance and Enlightenment* The 
arbitrary and biased nature of such schemes is clearly indicated 
i n the names attached to this set of "pigeon holes"# 
0* History i s neither "universal history" nor the 
"philosophy of history"* 
Collingwood does not speafc about '^universal history" at 
l e n g t h ^ , and he does not use the term "philosophy of history" 
i n the sense i n which we have been using i t * However, his oppo-
si t i o n to both of these types of false history i s quite evident; 
he sees both of them as forms-of "pigeon holing"* As historical 
inquiry developed i n the 19th Century» Collingwood says* the 
historians became dissatisfied with the then prevalent concept . 
tion of history as being a matter of "scissors-and-paste% As 
v/as quite natural i n the 19th Century, they wished to raise 
history to a science; and the analogy of natural science v/as 
(3.) it* The, Idea of ftiBtoryi p*S64» g£* pp* 387-328, 
(8) See however Collingwood, pj3«cJLjiM pp#l03-*104>, 26b. 
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close at hand* So the historians were led, i n accord with the 
commonplace procedure of the day, to collect historical facts; 
to elaborate pattern© or theories "explaining" these facts; and 
then to extrapolate these patterns into the past and the future* 
I t proved to he not at a l l a d i f f i c u l t task for any* 
body with an active mind and a taste for hard work*; 
For there was no need to collect a l l the facts known 
to historians* Any large collection of factt^,.: i t -
was found j» revealed patterns i n plenty; and extrapo-
la t i n g such patterns into the remote past, about 
which there Was very l i t t l e information, and into 
the future, about which there was none* gave the 
* scientif ic * historian just that sense of power 
which sciasors*and-pas,tehistory denied him« ( l ) 
This ef f o r t was, Collingwood continues, "a delusion". A l l 
such histories- are marked by an arbitrary selection of h i s t o r i -
cal evidence and the claim to be the interpretation of history, 
but their fundamental error i s that they look upon history as ,< 
objective events which dan be manipulated into patterns of 
meaning* Speaking of Toynbee, whom Collingwood regards as a 
writer of the type of history under discussion here, he sayss 
lie (Toynbei) regards history as a mere spectacle, 
something consisting of facts observed and recor-
ded by the historian, phenomena presented exter-
nally to his gaae, not experiences into which he 
must enter and which he must make his own» (8) 
This i s the fundamental reason why the value of "universal 
history" and the "philosophy of history" i s "exactly n i l " . 
(1) Collingwood, opvCit*,. p*305« 
(2) .ibid, pq68» 
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-d* History i© not prophecy.or predicting tn© futur©'*; 
fh© re a c t i o n of hiptory : a© wpig#0Xi holing" injplics to 
rea c t i o n of history as .proph©oy*; 3p©ngl@r and foyafc©© hay© 
thi© (araong other things) i n 'opawon with Jeremiah? thpy :..all 
speate of **d©0lin©0wfr then they ®p©a& i n this ,*y they ar© h©ing 
propheti©! they ar© ©p©aiting of that which .ie to eomp. and of 
the ©e®d© of this futur© d©y©lopment which, are ©yen not pr©s@at* 
Prophecy i s the fudging of tha$ character of a future tiw© on 
the.1>a©i© of paet and present ©^0ri©n©@# ' 
• However* a l l such ©ndeayoure am notoriously d i f f i c u l t * 
tfh©y a©sum© that a certain, period of history ©an foecharacterised 
|%ig©pn*hol©dw) m %ad t t (or "gpod'V * "Golden Age'1*: ~m tfEn* 
;lighti©nro©nt0)l and that a futur© poriod can he characterised 
a© "good" (or *baft% as the ©aee- say h©)* Spoaising to thi© 
prohl©ia'of the hietorian ,e relation to the future* Collingwood 
laa&es %m ehscrv&tioae* Firsts 
£h© ©0*©all©d good periods aye the oh©© Into whoe© s p i r i t th© historian has penetrated* owing ©ither to the ©xietph©© o;f atjundant evidence or to hi© ofn capacity for reviving' th© ©i<p©ri©nc© th©y eh3oy©aj th© ©o*eall©d ©ad periodsiar©' either tho©e fo r HBhieh evid©nc© i s relatively scanty* or thojs© vehoae l i f e he ojinnotf for reasons.arising out of hi© om ©3cp©rience m& that, of hie ago, r©eon©truct ijftthin himself > ( l ) 
secondly Goliingv/ood observe© that? 
(1) Coilingwoedf o#«eifc».» p* S8t* 
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»,»the task of fudging the value of a certain way 
of l i f e taken i n i t s e n t i r i t y i s an impossible 
task, "because no such thing i h i t s e n t i r i t y i® 
ever a possible object of historical knowledge*^4"' 
For these reasons history i s not prophecy, nor can i t be 
(a closely related misunderstanding) produced i n order to "teach 
a lesson" or "point yjjjj^ j/a moral". This does not mean that gener«* 
alination about history i s t o t a l l y i m p o s s i b l e F o r example, 
we may make yjarv general statements such as: Persistent social 
discontent usually leads to p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y • But the 
value of such statements i n the study of history i s obviously 
-very limited, for i n a specific situation we need to know such 
things as what constitutes social discontent, the effect of any 
stabilizing factors which may be present, the form which the 
p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y i s going to take and so oh* For this 
reason the limited a b i l i t y of the historian to generalise, about 
history does not form a basis for prophecy5 nor does i t enable 
the historian to do much i n the way of using historical studies 
to "teach a lesson" to his contemporaries* 
e* History i s not the description of objective faots* 
One of Collingwood*s fundamental theses i s that there can 
be no history of objective facts, of the "out there", of the X~Xt« 
(1) Collingwood, oja*cii», p»327» C£* Popper, Karl, The ffpvftrty 
of Itistorioism* Routledge and Eegan Paul, 1957, p#151 e& 
passim* ' . 
(S) Cj£» Gardiner, Patrick, The Nature of Historical Explanation« 
Oxford University Press, London» 1958, 0h»8 ftCpas&lm*-
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"Of that which Is not experience but the mere object of experience 
there can be no history* Thus there i s and can be no history of 
nature. * » "^ 
The importance of this position i s seen when Colllngwood 
goes on to develop an implication of i t , namely, that history 
becomes impossible when historical event i s treated as natural 
event* This misconception can b© seen to be the fundamental 1 
error underlying a l l of the misunderstandings of history which 
we have just described* Collingwood writes: 
Throughout this essay i t has been necessary to engage 
i n a running f i g h t with what may be called a positive 
i s t l e conception, or rather misconception* of history* 
as the study of successive events lying i n a dead 
' past* events to be understood as the scientist under** 
stands natural events> by classifying them and estab-
lishing relations between the classes thus defined* 
This misconception i s not only an endemic error i n 
modern philosophical thought about history # i t i s also a constant p e r i l to historical thought itself# 
So far as historians yield to i t ^ they neglect their 
proper task of penetrating to the thought of the 
agents whose acts they are studying, and content them** 
selves with determining the externals of these acts,. M 
the kind of things about them which can be studied sta4 .:i t i s t i c a l l y * Statistical research i s for the historian 
a good servant but a bad master. I t profits him 
nothing to make s t a t i s t i c a l generalisations^ unless 
he can thereby detect the thought behind the facts about 
which he i s generali#ing» At the present day* his-
t o r i c a l thought i s almost everywhere disentangling 
i t s e l f from the t o i l s of the p o s i t l v l s t i c fallacy* 
and recognising that i n I t s e l f hlstox'y i s nothing 
but the re«enactment of past thought i n the histor-
ian's aiihdtf* (8) 
(1) Collingwood, pj)-»cj$,* > pt SQS* Cf» Popper * opteit«, pp. 
10*? f 143*147, 
(S) GollinCTOod, op«oit«* p»gg8« g£* pp*S92, 300* For a 
discussion of the naturalizing of history, and including 
i t s i l l effects on theology, see Niebuhr, R.R., Resurrec-
tion and Historical Reason, Charles Scribner's Sons, 
New York, 1957, Ch. IV.-
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This important position w i l l be .supported; at 3.ength when 
w@ «pn$\td f l ^ setting f'oj»tivQf OollLingwood'p view® as to the 
nature of genuine hi s t o r i c a l inquiry* 
B* Oollingwood'a tindcrstanding of History* 
I f fc&at0ry i s . neither chronicle, noa? ^ pigeoa h o l i n g ^ nor 
%nivo**©al history"* nor "philosophy of history"* nx*r 'prophecy* 
mv the description of objective faotgj th#n what i s it.f The • 
best way of answering this question i§ to build w A description 
as to howiGoliihgwoo^^s ta^erstandingf t h t historian works • 
This procedure w i l l be ©specially useful, as 0ollinCTOod fa y^ e, 
^dea,^. IliQto|»y was published posthumously4. and M it® frtfttev 
ments are' somewhat repetitive'i and lack the coherence, of his 
finished worki The material availabl© &s.#howevery quite 
adequate to build up a f u l l picture of C61iingwood*s undes?** 
standing of history* 
. Putting history to the ^ f t i o n > 
History begiha when the historian "puts history to the 
qjajestion"> i*&#..§ wh$n: he approaches his t o r i c a l evidence with a 
specific Q^jOittptt $&%$nd* !»• this;, partioular'r^apect history 
i& liJte , science* for neither the historian nor the scientist 
passively receives the data i n the hope of thereby i w n i n g 
something* Rather toy approach their data with a specific 
question i n mind*' i n both cases theory ie prior to ob^rvation* 
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The Msoi38ors~and~paste,, historian reads fhis 
sources| i n a simply receptive s p i r i t , to rind 
out what they said* . The scientific historian 
reads them with a question in his mind,; having 
taken the inffative by deciding for himself what 
ho wants to f i n d out from them«*>puta them to 
the torture, twisting a passage ostensibly about 
something quite different into an answer to the 
question he has decided to ask# (1) 
I t i s a further characteristic of this technique that 
!,3Svery step i n the argument depends on asking a question***, 
(which* together with the ensuing questions) must be asked i n 
the right order Moreover this dialogue of question and 
answer i s j 
. * fnot put "by one man to another man* i n the hope that the second man w i l l enlighten the 
f i r s t man's ignorance by answering them* They 
are put» l i k e a l l scientific questions# to th© 
scientist by .himself* (3) 
I t i s only i n this way that the historian achieves the autonomy 
essential to scientific thoughti the situation i n which state* 
ments are made not upon the authority of another, but through 
one*s own i n i t i a t i v e * judgment and decision* 
This approach to history i s set forth not by one who was 
only theoretically interested i n history, hut who was also a 
practicing historian* The faithfulness with which Collingwood 
used this approach can be s een i n his hook Roman Britain and the 
(1) Collingwood* o;p«cit«V t>p» 369~270* C£* Popper* pp»oi1;.» 
(2) Oollingwood, op*oit» f ptS78« 
(s) 'm&** p ^ * 
English Settlements * For example, at th© beginning of Chapter 
I I I he ooasidere tht^ prohXemu Why did Caesar invade Britain i n 
•66 B»G*?-This question presents i t s e l f forcefully because the 
invasion was made late i n the year and with an inadequate force* 
Moreover Caesar does not directly speak to this question* i n 
trying to elucidate an answer to t h i t i problem; Collingwood asks 
the following questions i n the course of four pages? What 
motives did Caesar have fo r invading Britain? How long had he 
been formulating his plan of invasion? (These two questions 
make portions of Caesar*s pommenta^les germane, to the problem, 
although they would not be so to one reading them passively*) 
that information can we obtain from the public reaction i n Rome 
to Caesar's campaign of 66 and 54 B*C*? vshat gains could be 
ejected from such an invasion? What l i g h t do Caesar's cam* 
paigns immediately before the invasion throw on the problem? 
What knowledge of Britain did Caesar have? What part could have 
been played by the traders who were known to pass back and fo r t h 
between Britain and the Continent*^ 
As the reader follows this dialogue of question and answer 
he sees that i t i s not an arbitrary spinning of theories* a l * 
though i t i s obvious that risks must be taken i n such a process* 
( l ) Coilingwood, R,G*» and ?aeyers, J*N*Lvt Kofflan, Britain and < 
the English settlements* gnd edition, Oxford University 
Press, OxfoM'i 1987, The f i r s t part of the book, which 
includes Chapter I I I , was written entirely by Gollingwood* 
(8) m&** PP* 32-35* 
Eather at each step the various possibilities are controlled by 
the available historical evidence* (Poeuraents i n this instance*! 
"but i n other places f u l l use i s made of the findings of arch* 
ae&ogy*) Moreover * any particular answer to a question must 
have a meaningful relation to the t o t a l situation with which the 
inquiry i s dealing* Even i n those instances when the question 
put cannot he answeredt the problem has nevertheless "been Claris 
f l e d to some extent by the fact that the question was put and 
thought through* 
This i s the process of ^ twisting a passage ostensibly 
t . . . 
about something quite different into an answer to the question 
he ||he historian) has decided to ask* " What i s the net result? 
Not a twisting of evidence into deformity # but rather, the twist*-
ing of the mute evidence'' of historical sources into a shape which 
can assume a meaningful;place i n the historical investigation* 
b* There are no uncriticiaed data i n historical investiga* 
tion* 
The foregoing statements give us an idea of how Collingwood 
conceives of the historian as he launches into his work? and 
With i t we have an example from his book ftoman Britain and the 
Bnfflish Settlements« How i t remains to qualify and deepen what. 
has been said* 
We have spoken of the data ( p r i n c i p l ^ documents and the 
objects and findings of archaeology) and the use which i s made. 
Of data* Xfowever* i n history thes?© i s no such thing as dataj at 
least not as that term i s commonly underetood* 3?his i s because 
his t o r i c a l data {©*g^ ^ a ©ertain statement by Ehucydides Co***-
Naming the 'P©ioppnn@©ian f a r ) doe© not ©onstitU"fe.a::d2l,5C©d and. 
A l l that the historian means^ ifliien^h© 'described <^r*>. 
t a i n historical'f act& as hie'data 4s that for th© 
certain .histprioai pj?o'bi©ms r e l e t i n t to that w©r& -. •whieh ifos? ' the present he prcposee:to treat a©-, .'.. 
•©'ettledj thonghg if...they are settled r i t i©.©»ly. • • • becamehistorical thinking .'has'©©ttled'them i n 
the past * and they remain settled only u n t i l he 
• or some one• ©1B©' de©ide:©;. to :r©o^©ln %©^#. ^ 1) . ,." 
Ali'4ata .and'ell'anthoritiea^are hietorieaily g£ve%> and -iaiere** 
fore-not f i n a l and oinding* ' I t i$ f o r this reason .that?. 
fhether h© jjhe h i s t o r i a ^ accepts or reseeta or modifies or reinterprets mihit his so-called author* •'. i t i e e t e l l him> i t i # he that i s .responsible for • •,, the statement which*, after duly c r i t i c i s i n g them^ 
'•"(: $n this discussion of data we begin : to see 'the diver gen©;|.:. " 
betiaben history -and .sciencei a divergence fhie&>:will become 
clearer l a t e r * fail© everything which hae been "said i n the .pre* 
ceding paragraph© could mi% "be applied to ; .scientific, procedure*: 
yet i t would not hat© the ©am© relevance and urgency i n ©uch an 
applicationf. Why i s this? i t i s "because of the, greater, prom* 
•'inence of'•the human factor in-history as over against, science* 
(1) ColUnftWood* Tha Idea of History. pvtftMfc. 
(2) • $$ffi4;i,mM4,*.: 
I t i s t h i s human factor which ".*» i s the, ultimately uncertain 
and wayward element i n social l i f e and in a l l social i n s t i t u * 
t i o n s * " ^ , and we might add, "i n a l l of human experience"» 
Another way of indicating this difference between the 
"exact sciences" and history i s to point out what has been im* 
plied i n what we have already said* namely the difference i n 
their starting points and conclusions* 
In exact sciences they (the starting points] are 
assumptions* and the traditional way of expressing 
them i s i n sentences beginning with a word of com-
mand prescribing that a certain assumption be made: 
'Let ABC be a triangle* and l e t ABwAC* In history 
there are not assumptions$> they are facts***(£) 
Historical facts or data are handled c r i t i c a l l y i n the manner 
we have already discussed* These facts may he accepted i n a 
very qualified sort of way as describing a particular and limited 
view of an historical sitxtationj hence as being true, but not the 
whole truth* An example would he a document giving Jefferson 
Davis* opinion about the cause and purpose oi' the Americal C i v i l 
War-.* Such a document would be of great historical value even 
though i t was obviously partisan and distorted* Plainly there 
i s no genuine parallel between this and the assumptions and/or 
data which form the starting point i n the "exact sciences"* 
There i s also a divergence i n these two types of discipline 
i n that the conclusions are of a different nature* In historical 
(1) Popper, op^eit*> Eul58, Popper4s i t a l i c s * 
(3) Coiitoavood opacity •00*850^861* 
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inquiry* on the one h^&&| the conelusion$ relate to people and ' 
mat*-*having- an -ewt. location' ih'^aoe- ;a&d: •tiwev then the' : -
'historian movoo .wfflfifrom worfeihiS with.- particular events i n time 
and space ho inva&iahly lapiaoa- into hopoleo&ly,f^ahai ' g e ^ r a l l * 
nation ouch a# ^ideiipreadv and persistent diaoontont within& ' 
oountryev^j^ually load to aaoial '-turiBOil**. M the otho^ hand^ 
"tibud -:oiaaM^tt^€MCM^' 'a!biWfcve& '3P<s^ ' i n .goiohoo aW,nois ilaslto^; jo-.pa** • 
tiottlar-loe&tioni i*v ©paeo .and tiiae.#;. '^ Th©. ^ ogrooo. o4 .aoionoo 
ha# 'hoon a constant.mt0M$M~the- dl^ootion'of. suW&wl»g M o » : 
law©; undoa? laws of higher generality j s t t & ' « & consequently widor 
' e* The use Of neoosaary or a r$ip*$ 
j>'' wit&thoso oharac^oriotio^. of- the uoe; of ^ sto^iO$lL data i n 
ffll3i% i t . now mtm%m to ooe what use ^|a«i- ,llji»iBlf(^^^6aB|:, ,iaa]$e!A of'enoh 
dwtai 0olii»gwpe& $008 the historian dealing with theia i n teraao 
Q$ :i*mm®mw or .a fer^Qffi, iiimginatlon'V This; has two eharae^ $tS»J; 
..= ;.. ,,^rst t . i t i s noooooary or % pyioffi*^For g^mp^e^^fp 
a ^ i 0 ^ i t i e o , t o l us that oil one day Cae$ar i&fc- ffcRoao. a nd on a 
latoa? diy; |n <j&ul§ they t o l l w$ nothing; a^out his |oiirney from 
<^r$iaer.*: 8fr*U$fr*- v*$t M**;#.tho- notions Of past ' 
and fuimsfe;**dFnot oitea? i&to functional o^lanatlon^ m 
i t ooot^$-|n the•advanced mi&wm% at..ali|- for there"'' 
'noonsidorations •.of .the ^ line^e^der' a>® aup^reeded hy con* 
sidorations .relating, poioly to structural order*" Of . 
one place to the other, Twit we interpolate this with a perfectly 
(n) 
good conscience*" This i s a necessary action of the mind of 
the historian* 
The aeoond characteristic of this a c t i v i t y i s that i t i s 
imagined* ?/e find ourselves obliged to imagine Caesar traveling 
from Home to Gaul; and without this a c t i v i t y , operating not eaiH 
piciously as fancy hut i n i t s necessary form* history would he 
impossible* This a c t i v i t y of necessary imagination i s not to 
he looked "upon as a possible necessary yet nevertheless "rislsy" 
endeavour* Hather i t often has the effect of c r i t i c i z i n g and 
even refuting documentary evidence* 
The web of imaginative construction i s something far 
more solid and powexif u l than we have hitherto rea-1-
Ai^ed***Suetonius t e l l s me that Nero at one time ^ \ 
intended to evacuate Britain* I reject his state* 
meht f not because any better authority f l a t l y eon* tradicta it» for of course none does; but because .-. 
my reconstruction of Mero^s policy based on Tacitus 
w i l l not allow me to thin*; that Suetonius i s right*** 
I f i n d myself able to incorporate what Tacitus t e l l s 
me into a coherent and continuous picture of my own* 
and cannot do this for Suetonius* (8) 
Here we see that an imagined construction formed from data ( i n 
this case that of Tacitus) can refute other data* Notice that 
i t i s not a statement of Tacitus versus a statement of Suetonius| j 
rather i t i s an imaginative historical construction based on j 
Tacitus v/hich leads to the rejection of Suetonius1 testimony* 
Thus m see that the part played by imagination i n history i s ' 
(1) Collingwood, t p«:340* 
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«I6»*S-" *aflUfeq^ a"" *toai»' -oa^ ii0ia>• x^ -Xl^ HMft^  "S&ft fMtojtag statement. 
•/ htortan*©' p$$to# of' hi© 
• ®vfo$®&%'m a s$<$i©;a$#: of 6iront#' or a. past? of*. . 
, &im^mM #toh#<li ImMmm, - certain tiswA- points' 
M fcfc#'80 points f^gaont. n^oti$h an4..th®. ths?#a48 
• gp^'f#b«t •' . . • 
mv&t- ter^fft W the '& ftFjfo*!. taiag&naMon &»& n&tfo* . 
"by *i##|^a^&t*a^' fanoyyv'tta$ #ioi$ p&ottt^ » -lb oon* • 
«; atafiftty ire*lfie4--:t)yi appeal to and • 
" . • ' ; O f $O£$n&^0Ueh' -Kith"' thO] %Sii@h • • • 1 
At aa o t t e pl&Qp i n .j&tefr tff;i;Hiftfeoffsr GO||l^wo4 app3?oa^ . 
ohi^, 'tli|v$ p3?o^&m f «»oa a aomevfet &iff©ffont: point of view* li@ 
points o^tt . thai h$ai®s?3ria Jii^9aww1i4Tat3L-jii--' .***** i t i s i n * 
t$x>m&: tw&'Wmt" ($&m m Mm^.M the my in $alch 
we M <la$a $t to t>t tapwrtwfc In h$$toa?lca3. investigation*) 
f t ; f$%&&miwi*hi& o t e ^ o t e i i i t i o , o^ M»tos?y-.ittot; t&i-'!djttQvi^ 
®m iss&iMt' hl& ; -^sjon^&tlo»i. to anyona who ia-afcX^' and 'iilllwg' ; 
'to foifcow.|i*W 
; ^ | ) ' : Coi;ting»o%^ 
.. ..sfct$M& on l&a&lnalslvi. M0to3?l«il ^ n^timotlon*.' • tche •.. .. piotW: uutf} 1>o,. Mtm m& &®m&* 2* i i a , .hi^to^jr 
• i&u&tv '0aa*#M&ft£1i. with i t $ $ i f f .^onologioaa.l#*: iopoifcaph* . |oa||# a n & ' i n ^ ^ 
-$&cMto a$an4& .In a; p©<m3,te -^JaMon. to J i l t ^£&tta#fr': Of 
i&es* the tWk ate -olwUwwi the th&a?& wi3.1 "be 
4&®oti@a©& i n tte/icBnpd^t^ly f0&«iwtag^ • 
(0) G#jf Oo^lagwo^ pp*. $6l*®0&* Of* the $W,ois$n$* , 
of .^ttl^ng- 'ifiwnagi'»-if t>y tno m& of wnioh won of itoteiroj? p&s?t|r eah i?o i33?ou^ (it to m& itet aotually iiaipponod^  th©n t 
w hoisr on© oan &otibt the ofeleote^ty of histoa?3r,tt • I n m i . '^h^ 'O^cjotivity >of' Miatoj?^*: Philosoyhy^ • Vq3«« XXXZXXf- i»«-l8&f pilQ©.* Quoted t>sr RatoogMa g.A^  * Hjlstftfty and G^istian,A»olbaatldt*. S*P«C.«K*,#. liondont 11060^ . $«1A6# Botn CoiUingwooa, ana Papsaoipo aaataao of cowae that 
ono oono63?nQd has accepted the pposuppositiona of hlsto*!* oal thinte4ng« 
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However there are different kinds of inference* Here we 
come again to a distinction between the "exact" and historical 
sciences* I n the former inference i s deductive* . The clearest 
example of this i s i n mathematics where there 
i s a kind of logical compulsion whereby a person 
who makes certain assumptions i s forced„ simply 
by so doing* to make others***he cannot make the 
i n i t i a l assumption***go on thinking*** [and] arrive at a 
conclusion different from that which i s seientifical-
•ly correct* (1) 
History# on the other hand* i s characterised by the induc-
ffive, us© of inference* I n this method of inference we put cer-
ta i n observations together j and seeing that they form a pattern, 
the pattern i s extrapolated* There i s nothing i n the pattern 
which logically necessitates this extrapolation; i t i s permissive 
i n character, rather than obligatory* For example, Gaesar i s 
known to be i n Rome upon a certain date* and also to have been 
with his army i n Gaul a short time later* This, taken i n con-
junction with knowledge about roads, methods of travel and other 
matters leads the historian, to inductively infer that Gaesar 
passed through southern Gaul* But this inference i s permias|ory 
and not o b l i g a t o r y * ^ 
i t might well be objected here that such inductive inference 
i s v i r t u a l l y obligatory* Gollingwood agrees that this i s soj 
but points out that the, distinction between the two types of 
(1) Collingwood* -^»$Ul*# P*S@4* 
(®) i b i d * « p*.$B4« 
SOS 
inference i s a real onej and secondly, suggests that the v i r t u a l 
compulsion of inductive inference proceeds from unquestioned and | 
unrecognised assumptions about "certain religious beliefs about 
nature and it® creator God* M^ 
tlnfortunately Collingwood does not develop this statement* j 
and he could hardly have done 90 within the context of She idea | 
' " l 
of History since such an endeavour would have carried him into 
the f i e l d of theology* There i s only one other point i n Tjtjgi \ 
Idea of History where Oollingwood gives us any indication of 
what he had i n mind i n making this statement. He writes* 
To fancy that religion lives either below or above - | 
the l i m i t s of reflective thought i s f a t a l l y to mis- ; conceive either the nature of religion or the nature ' ! of reflective thought* I t would be nearer the truth • to say that 1 i n religion the l i f e of reflection i s eon* centrated i n i t s intensest form, and that the special j problemsof theoretical and practical l i f e a l l tafce ; their special forms by segregation out of the body of religious consciousness, and retain their v i t a l i t y only so fa# as they preserve their connection with i t ! and with each other i n i t * (0) 
Oollingwood does not develop his idea beyond the stage which we i 
find i n this b r i e f statement* I t w i l l be one of the principle 
aims of Part iv of this thesis to discuss this relationship 
between :&od and that area of reflective thouight known as history*; 
(1) Collingwood, o^p^|»A p# 865• 
(2) Gellingwood* fffrpi$,*A p#51^ ,« Gollingwood*© discussion of 
the influence of Christianity upoii the writing of history 
(pp. 46ff*) might be considered to be an elaboration of 
this statement* I f , 9 0 , ; i t i s purely implicit* ( I t i s well to remind ourselves here that The Idea of History i s 
a posthumous collection of unpublished material*) 
and i n that; discussion we hope to throw some l i g h t on 
Collihgwood* a very interesting statement. 
d« History as "r0**enactedB experience..* 
In the t o t a l foregoing exposition of Collingwood's thought 
we have moved i n a series of steps to the c r i t i c a l thesis of his 
conception of history# This i s : history i s relived experience; 
i t i s the < nr&»<^«tin&!ktn by the historian* s thought i n the 
present of the hi s t o r i c a l event which he i s studying* This 
l^e**enactiaent,!deals with both the outward (Caesar invaded Britain \ 
i n 54 BG,) axid the inward (Why did Caesar invade Britain i n 84 
BO?) aspects of the event "being studied* (This distinction j 
between "inward*' and "outward" i s made by Gollingwood only for 
purposes of analysis* f or he i s f u l l y aware that i t i s impossible j 
to discuss one i n isolation from the other*} ^  ; 
Let us review thogateps up to t h i s point* First we dis* | 
cussed history as i t i.i••ffluently misconceived! misconceptions j 
which elimimte 4*iy possibility of history being understood as 
Mre»ena0ted1, experience* Then we discussed the method by which 
the historian works$ &*©•*» putting history to the &ueotionj the 
status of data i n h i s t o r i c a l investigation} the use of necessary 
w -ft ffttiogflt, imagination and inductive inference* In each sue* 
i i 
. , . « - , • i 
cessive step the place of imagination properly understood has I 
i »•... 1 assumed a more prominent part* « | 
(1) Gollingwood, ofr*ei$»» pp* 88£*30S e£ passim* 
. New the question which has been bef ore us a l l along, at 
least i m p l i c i t l y * i s : How i s the historian to toiow; how i s he 
to understand the past? I t i s obvious that he cannot be an eye-
witness* Further i t has been shown that we cannot rely Upon 
eyewitnesses or other authorities* Gollingwood's solution to 
the problem of how the historian lenows historical event i s as 
followss 
iiif #the historian must r©<*enact the past i n his own &ind*»*h@ must (Jor essample i n considering a passage of an ancient philoaopher] see what the philosophical problem was* of which his author i s here stating his solution* He must thinte that problem out for himself, see what possible solutions of i t might be offered* and see why this particular philosopher chose that solution instead of another* This means re-thin&ing f o r himself the thought of his author* and nothing short of that w i l l mafce him the historian of that author 1 @ philosophy* (|) 
Let there be ho misunderstanding* says Collingwood* that we are 
apeaking here about the "re-enactment" of past emotion* The 
* 
attempt to "re-enact" or relive past emotion i s a dubious and 
historical useless procedure* Taking anger as an example • 
Coilingwood says: 
** *the actual past anger of which X am thin&ing |s past and gone; that does not reappear, the stream of immediate es^erience has carried i t away fo r ,ev@r#.*.f. (S) 
The power, which might recall this stream of immediate eajperience 
which included anger la the power of memory; but of memory and 
(1) collingwood* op»oit. * pp* S8S»285« 
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M-m- M&1mp$.m%. 0tudy o^ v**jj|tpQl©:on*:0 img©^ **: or ^Goethe^t ieej*. 
iJj@8%.. A study o£ such, ©ub^ot^, 0tf©% 0upp90.in^ tlx© necessary' 
@Vidm*e> &cist©%'; ^ B .p^c^&ogical .01?: pefoMana^tical^ .. 
and-not histoj&o&i^ \ Mi® ®M;-;ix0&Wi>y to recapture j 
past Motion- applied Jo ,the\ empjioja&l; aspects-of past acta -of _ _ 
thcu^hit^ ••>*W^'OMW o*»- the bit*v ; 
t@£nesj*';0$ ^  , ! 
8el&in^o&^& und^^ 
haad®$, and i n ^ mrneMm %h&mmoup^i, - £& ouj? . 0 1 % raid.: by'' interpre t&fcloia • o£ ijha^ ; 
the: ^ h|u§^fe^lail : wli^ : i'th^i#$j 
In os$&?'tK&i i t might -n0t he 
too miichj i t i o necesaas^ to s 
'lion to his u^^Wanding'^f history as '%®>0j^ c7C©d^ -:@3 
iMm $$fe i t th$t we cain^t :ani sieed w # • 
/&he eiaoiioiis' a^teM^vfe upon a past act of thought? but w$ mm*-
not and ne©& 'not' Isnow 'O'.th^ j? .'thought© which may have been i n tb.0 
mind- 0- the man who's® tho^iitia «& mm •s^e^in^.:;^ t^»enact%" 
Speaking- of Suolid <a#. an ^©j^ mpie^  Gellingwopd :say#i. / 
• ••- ^ ^..#a®o/siftg his proof,..of theC^#t$] theorem. ft© (jHiclidi may Jwwft fchou^it * this theorem enabled we; to- p&&m that- the ..angle., i n a semi^cirele .is a 
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angle*, and a hundred other things which i t i s Just as impossible for us to know«>*but to say that because the theorem, as an aot of thought* exists only i n i t s oontext we cannot know i t except i n the contest i n which he actually thought i t * i s to restrict the being of thought to i t s own immediaoy,, to reduce i t to a case of merely immediate experience* and so to deny i t as thought* (1) ' 
The past act of thought can never be know gin i t s "immediacy"* 
i»e*» with the emotions and associated ideas present i n the mind 
of f i n thip case, Euclid* But i t can be known i n i t s "mediaey1** 
i t O i * i n the "re-enacting" of Euclid's process of argument*^ 
Putting his position i n a slightly different way, Collingwood 
Say©!' 
I t has been said that anything torn from i t s con* 
text i s thereby mutilated and f a l s i f i e d j and that 
i n consequence* to know any one thing* we must 
know its context, which implies knowing the whole 
universe* (3) 
We have seen that Croce refers to this desire to know"the whole 
universe" as "the pursuit of a mad i n f i n i t y " * 
The historian cannot "re^enaot" past emotion, nor can he 
know the t o t a l context of thoughts i n which the thought being 
investigated was originally formulated* In addition to these 
p a r t i a l limitations upon history as' "re^enaQtment", there are 
circumstances i n which no "re~enuoi^flent,, i s possible* This 
happens when the historian 
(1) Collingwood pp^tfim-. pp# 898*299* 
(S) i b i d * * pp*3QO-30&* 
(3) i b j ^ * , p* S98* 
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»«.#flnds- certain historioal matters u n i n t e l l i -
gible,**,*, [and thereby discovers] a limitation 
of his own mind; he; has discovered that there are certain ways i n which he i s not, or no longer* or 
not yet, able to think* Certain historians* some* 
times whole generations of historians* f i n d i n 
certain periods of history nothing i n t e l l i g i b l e * 
and c a l l them dark agesj but such phrases t e l l 
us nothing about those ages themselves, though 
they t e l l us a great deal about the persons who 
use them, namely that they are unable to re-think 
the thoughts whieh were fundamental to their 
l i f e * (1) 
Two of the most common places i n which we fin d this d e f i -
ciency i n contemporary writing lope mediaeval history and the 
accounts of primitive societies* i n the former we are often, 
for example, expected to share the author*s moral indignation -
that the ISth Century was not motivated by a democratic egal-
i t a r i a n ! sm* I n the l a t t e r , primitive religion and magic are 
discussed from a point of view which indicates that the author 
has no conception of the aspects of existence with which such 
primitive practices attempted to deal* The sometimes "superior" 
tone of the anthropologist i n such writings makes the reader . 
wohder who i s "superior" to whom* In both of these instances 
there i s an obvious indication that the authors have chosen to 
deal with a subject about which, i n certain fundamental aspects, 
they are not able to think* Unfortunately they have not "dis-
covered" a li m i t a t i o n of their mindj they have simply indicated 
i t * ' 
(1) Collingood, 0£*£j&», pp* S18-819* C£* pp* 304-SG8, 387, 
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However), for the historian who i s able to "re*enact" or 
rethink, the past* the situation i s entirely different* Instead 
of the dead shell of, say f mediaeval history from an unimagina-
tive 20th Century point of view, we have various aspects of 
mediaeval l i f e arid thought "re-*enaeted" i n the mind of the his-
torian and ( i t i s to be hoped) of the reader* I n this way* " i n 
so far as'there i s any knowledge", we have knowledge of these 
aspects of mediaeval l i f e and thought* In t h i s way the past, 
insofal as i t i s known historically,, survives i n the present* 
I t ' i s t " 
Because the historical past, unlike the natural past* 
i s a l i v i n g past, kept alive by the act of historical 
thinking i t s e l f , the historical change from one way of 
thinking to another i s not the death of the f i r s t * but 
i t s survival integrated i n a new context involving the 
development and criticism of i t s own ideas* (1) 
Thus* both past events and past modes of thought survive i n the 
present* 
This i s a brief statement of Oollingwood*s concept of "re* 
enactment"! a concept which i s central to his whole idea of 
history* "Re-enactment" consists i n the c r i t i c a l rethinking of 
a self-conscious aet(@) of thought expressed i n the historical 
evidence which i s under study* I t presupposes the a b i l i t y of 
the historian to enter into the thought which he i s studying 
(iVe*! that i t i s not "dark" to him); and i t i s done i n the f u l l 
(1) Oollingwood, oj>*cJ^** p* 226* 
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r^Jognition that the emotioml oontoxfc and associated ideas of 
the evOnt being »rerfenacte€^  cannot be recovered* This whole 
understanding i s elaborated and dftepjMgiag.as Collingwood proceeds 
to consider possible objections to his understanding of "re-
enactment**:* 
Objection to history as ^ e^enaotment*1 
The f i r s t objection to this theory which Collingwood con* 
• * • 
aiders i s that of the person who maintains that i t i s impossible 
for the historian to rethink the thought of another person* 
Such an objector "maintains that although, the object of two 
person* s acts of thought may be the same,* the aots themselves 
are d i f f e r e n t * 1 1 ^ That i s to say.* i n ©very cognitive experience 
there i s an act and an objectj and two different acts may have 
the same object* For example* 
i f I read Euclid and fin d there the statement that 
t h ^ angles at the baas of an isosceles triangle are 
©qua^i and i f I understand what i s meant and reoog-
nia© that i t i s true, the truth which X reoogniae, or t h t proposition which X. assert, i s the same truth 
which Euclid reoognisjed, the same proposition which 
he asserted*-. But my act of. asserting i t i s not the 
same act as h i t j that i s suf f ioiently proved by 
either of the two facts that they are done by dif<* 
ferentpersons and are' done at different times* (&) 
Therefore, according to t h i s objection* the historian's "re* 
enaotment" of the process of thinking whereby liSuolid was able 
to maintain that the angles at the base of»an isosceles •Mangle 
(1) gollingwood,• . S^i$$lk*t 
(2) jb,idv. p*884* Xtalics mine* 
<3H 
are'-equal i s not a revival of Euclid's act; rather i t i s the 
performance of another act of the same kind* 
Collingv/ood then goes on to give a thorough and technical 
philosophical criticism of the object under consideration here/3*^ 
the conclusion of which points out that this objection rests 
upon an impossible and aelf«*defeating claim to know: (1) not 
only the object of another's thought (e«g«, the proposition of 
Euclid which we have taken as an example), but also the act by 
which i t i s known; (2) to know the same object and act of 
thought i n the h i s t o r i a n s mind; (3) and f i n a l l y to know that 
they are different* The objector's position rests on a claim to 
knowledge far greater than that which i t seeks to deny*^ More-
over, Collingwood continues, the claim implicit i n this object 
tor*s position i s that thought i s mere object; and this position 
results i n an impossible solipsism* Against t h i s , Collingwood 
says: 
Thought can never be mere object* To know someone 
else's a c t i v i t y of thinking i s possible only on the 
assumption that the same activity can be re-enacted 
i n one*a own mind#*»To reject this conclusion means 
denying that we have any right to speak of acts of 
thought at a l l , except such as take place i n our own 
minds, and embracing the doctrine that my mind i s 
the only one that exists* (3) 
(1) Collingwood, oj2*£|tVf pp* 28S<*288* 
(2) ££• i b i d * p*088* 
(3) ibid«« p*288 . . . . . . . 
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Collingwood*s f i n a l comment on this i s very characteristics 
"Against anyone who accepts that form of solipsism I shall not 
stay to argue* " ^ 
Collingwood then turns to a second and more plausible objec-
tion to his understanding of history as "re-enactment"* This 
objection is? 
M#we must be able not only to re-enact another's 
thought but also to know that the thought we are 
re*enaoting i s his* But so far as we re-enact i t , 
i t becomes our own; i t i s merely as our own that 
we perform i t and are aware of i t i n the perform* 
anee? i t has become subjective, but for that very 
reason i t has ceased to be objective? become pre-
sent, and therefore ceased to be past* (2) 
There are two points i n this objection, says Collingwood* The 
f i r s t i s that i t i s not enough simply to "re-enact" another's 
thought, for the historian must Know that he i s doing so* That 
i s to say, his t o r i c a l thinking i s a function of self-conscious** 
ness.» Xn th i s Collingwood would agree* 
The second point i n this objection, and the one which 
Collingwood does not accept, can be expressed by saying that 
"although we can re-enact i n our own minds another's act of 
thought, we can never know that we are re-enacting i t * " ^ But* 
Collingwood continue®, 
*:**this i s an explic i t self-contradfction* The 
objector confesses to a knowledge that something 
happens and at the same time denies that such 
knowledge i s possible* He might try to remove 
(1) Collingwood, t P*288* 
(S) P.*889* 
(S) & & & * t BP» 289-290* 
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the paradox by saying *X did not mean that i t does not happeni X Only meant that* for a i l X Ufcno 
did| we could not know that i t wasrhftftpe^iliig*t' Md he might cite f, as a parallel caseg tho impossibility Of knowing that any two persons experienGe indistinguishably similareolour* ' sensations on looking at the same blade of •  grassy (X) • 
However,* this parallel of the blade of grass i s not exact* The 
objector i s not saying that i f we did actually achieve the *'r©fe 
enactment" of an historical events then some other circumstance 
would prevent us from knowing of our success* Batherj< he i s say* 
ing that i f we did succeed i n this "re-enactmentthen the ves?y 
fact of i t s happening would make us unable to know that i t was 
happening^ I n the "re-enactment" the ©vent has ceased to b© 
pastandob jeotiv#and has becomeprosont an4 sub jeetlvei 
This raises theoiieotion a s t o whether or* not i t isM^ae 
thaljf an act of thought by bocoming present &hd subjeotive ceasf'S 
to bo objebtive and i n a genuine relationship with the past); aS> 
for example |; -'when 1 "re-enaot" one- of Euclid's demonstrations* 
Collingwood*s reply i s that the two are not exclusive j the 
subjective and objective aspects of thought must necessarily 
remain together* He writes; ; 
The act of thinking,, then* ,is not only subjective but objeotiv© as well*/ I t i s not on3^ r a thinking 
rsubjeojtavoO -it is somsthing fch&tvtjian' toe thought about Lob jectivel * But* beoause***it i s njaver m^@iy objeotiv^e^ i t r©^^ i n a peculiar'wayj|"a %ay' only appropriate to 
(1) collingwood, oio.cit, a p*89Q* 
i t s e l f * I t cannot "be set before the thinking mind 
as a ready-made object, discovered as something 
independent of that mind and studied as i t i s i n 
i t s e l f , i n that independence* I t can never be 
studied -'objectively*, i n the sense i n which 
^objectively* excludes ^subjectively** I t has to 
be studied as i t actutiliy exists, that i s to say, 
as an act. And because this act i s subjectivity 
(thought not mere subjectivity) or experience, i t 
can be studied only i n i t s own subjective being, 
that i s , by the thinker whose act i v i t y or experience 
i t is,.*Thus the act of thought i n becoming sub-
jective does not cease to be objective***(!) 
Having answered this objection in. the way i n which we have 
b r i e f l y i n d i c a t e d ^ , Collingwood goes on to point out that i t 
rests on the assumption that subjectivity can only be the "con-
sciousness £of] a flow of immediate s t a t e s " * ^ , i*e», the sub-
j e c t i v i t y of feeling or immediate experience* But, as we have 
already stated, Collii^gwood maintains that such "feelings" are 
not a possible subject of historical inquiry, moat he does 
argue f o r , at least i n historical thinking, i s an appropriate 
subjectivity of the act of thought (l,e#, that which we find i n 
"re-enactment") j a subjectivity which i s at every point under 
the control of the c r i t i c a l use of historical evidence* 
tf General considerations* 
How that we have an outline of Collingwood* s understanding 
of history, together with,a consideration of some possible obj-
ections to i t , i t i s appropriate at this point to turn to 
several more general considerations* 
(1) Collingwood, op»Q,lfi*» p*S98* 
(2) We have present here a, brief summary of the main points i n 
Coiliagwood's argumentj an argument which extends from 
pp* 809*508* 
(3) Collingwood, off>olt«» p*294* 
fiv&if of a l l , i t w i l l be helpful to he very clear on the 
questions Of what can there he historical knowledge? The 
answerj implied i n the foregoing discussion, i s that there can 
he historical knowledge only of that which can he ^re-enacted" 
i n the historian?s mind* Thus* while historical knowledge i s 
knowledge of experience, w© cannot have historical knowledge of 
everything we experience* This is so "because there are certain 
areas of experience i n which that which we experience i s not 
the product of self-conscious thought, and MGf everything other 
than thought $ there can he no h i s t o r y * 8 ^ 
This definition of that which constitutes a legitimate 
subject of hi s t o r i c a l study has "been the cause of offence to a 
number of w r i t e r s ^ 4 and therefore Collingwood^ position i n 
this matter merits some further examination* To begin, what i s 
excluded from his t o r i c a l investigation i f we follow Oollingwood^ 
definition? The answer i s : That which cannot be thought about 
i n the process of Hre*enactment"t And what cannot be thought 
about i n this process? Tlf.:answer i s that we cannot think about 
that which i s not i t s e l f the product of self-conscious thought* 
' Practically* this means that there can be no legitimate hiato* 
r i c a l investigation of the three following areas. F i r s t , there 
can be no history of feelings, emotions, sensations etc* which 
(1) Collingwood, o j ^ * ^ i * j P«304». 
(3) e#gv, Roberts* T*A*, History and phristian Apologetic* B«P«G*K. , London, 1900,; p i l C -
are carried away by the flow of consciousness,; Thus there can 
"be no history oryJlarshal Montgomery's temper,; However* sine© I 
am unaware of any such history evej? *be$.ng attempted, Gollingwood's 
point here ifs possibly somewhat academic * 
Secondly, there can "be BO historical investigation of those 
areas or periods of history which cannot fee "re-enacted11 i n the 
mind of the historian* Thus$ for example, there ax*© certain 
periods of the early Middle Ages of which there dwcauch limited 
historical remains that the M3?e«©nactiaent" of the ©eif^ eoneeious 
thought which toolc place at that time i s impossible. But this 
i e not the only poaaible cause of the historian being unable to 
"re-enact u certain historical events* I t may also be caused by 
the historian being ao alienated from the events under investiga* 
t i o n that they remain "closed" or "dark" to him» Thus i t i s that 
the chai*act©rig;ation of. "darlc age" applied to certain periods iri.. j 
history t e l l s us v i r t u a l l y nothing about those periods * but I t 
does t e l l us a great deal about those who mafce this character* 
iaation* Such eh&raeteriss&tions are interesting "autobiograph* j 
i c a l M statements* 
The t h i r d area which i s not the subject of legitimate his* 
to r i o a l investigation* and the one which arouses the most pre* 
teat| i s that of nature* I t i® i n this t h i r d area that 
Collingwood*© contention that there can be no historical investi-i 
gation of the purely objective i s particularly relevant* There 
i s no history of that which i s simply "out there*'*^ '^ hus* 
for example* there can be no history of e v o l u t i o n * ^ i & l that 
we can do with the Subject of evolution i s to reconstruct f to 
some extent at least* a process which took place$ formulate 
theories as to what took placej and perhaps extrapolate the 
results of this investigation into those places i n the apace** 
time continuum for which there i s no relevant data* To invest 
such historical terms as "re-enactmenttt| "purpose"* "meaning", 
"intention 4* etc# into this process i s neither good history nor 
good science* I f , nevertheless, one wishes ^ i s o ^ e f i n e history 
as to include this sort of investigation! then, by def $aifyioai* 
i t i s historyi However, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see that anything 
but a state of confusion has "been achieved* ^ 
When Goilingv/ood writes about the relationship between 
history and nature t or history and science> there i s a polemical 
note present? and this accounts at least i n part for the even 
(1) g£* Melntyre, $g&$£&*9 P*14J &erdyaev$ o)),-«.cit*-f p*30* 
(8) But there i s nothing, i n Collingwood*s position which 
precludes a history abqut, what men have thoufffit concern* 
ing ©volution* 
(3) 3?he following passage from Herbert Butterfield lo suggestive 
when placed alongside of Collingwood's insistence upon the 
separation of nature and history* "The ®od who brought < 
his people out of the land of Egypt, out of the house Of 
bondage* was to be eelebrated-pre-eminently as the God of 
History* I t seems to have been when the Children of Israel 
Japaed into idolatry^ -^^ gav© themselves over to the worship 
of Baal, for example--^that they turned rather to the Goi : of Hature^ g l o r i f y the forces of the physical universe and 
the f e r t i l i t y of the earth*" (Christianity and Histqrff* 
Pt9 #) Collingwocd*s and Butterf i e l d ' s ideas i n this matter would make an interesting point of departure for an essay 
on $oynbee*s use, of auasi^biological oonsepts i n h i story f and his syncretic) approach to religion* 
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more polemical # and sometimes pointless, replies which his 
c r i t i c s raake when discussing this aspect of Collingwoodfs worfc* 
One cause of CJollingwood^ polemic here was i n a l l probability 
that he saw himself embattled against the misleading practice of 
introducing fjuasMjioiogioal concepts into historical inquiry* 
e*g*9 as i n Toynbee* But the result of this situation has been 
a great deal of not very illuminating criticism of 'She Idea of 
$&afioffv> For example * f »A# Boberts presents the following Mpewer« 
f u l c r i t i c i s m " (sic) of Goliiagwood* "Moreover, there are surely 
occasions when the historian must ta&e account of natural changes 
in the environment which have profoundly influenced human socle* 
t i e s or states, and these natural changes cannot possibly b© 
explained i n terms of ^human motives or i n t e n t i o n s * B u t this 
powerful criticism 1' completely misses the point* There i s ^ 
nothing i n Collingwood which would preelxid© a history of how 
people and societies were influenced by weather* or how they 
thought about that ©iib^ ect, I t i s just that there cannot be a 
^History of Weather" or a "History of Wind i n Prance i n the 18th 
Century °# $hat i s the province of meteorology * 
I f these three areas* t h e % comprise that which Opllingwood 
maintains i s outside of historical inquiry* what i s to be i n * 
eluded? The answer to this i s , guite simply* Everything else*1' 
Although Collingwood does not mention him by name* he could very 
well have said with Vico that history i s (with the exceptions 
(1) Roberts, op:»eit«» p*13» 
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we have noted) the study of that which man has made* Tiiat whioh 
man makes Is an egression of his self-conscious thoughtj and 
since i t i s such i t presents to the historian "the - possibil ity .of 
"re-enacting" that self-conscious thoi^ht* Included within this 
irouid•-'bo| specifically, written documents of an endless variety* 
all,worksof arte 9 the i n f i n i t e variety of u t i l i t a r i a n objects 
trtth vshloh the archaeologist leiargely concerned etc* And these 
are the tliiiaga with which the historian® do i n fact work> 
So» Gollingwood maintains,, historical knowledge i s possible 
of that which can be "re^enaoted" i n the histo^ian^s iaiad* 
of everything itfhieh i s an expression of self-conscious thought* 
But now the further question arises? -What does the historian 
bring to this Mi^*©naotment0# We have already answered this 
ojuestion to some extent by sayliig that he must be able to Mr©# 
enact" the event being investigated, i#e-«* the event or period 
under investigation must not be one whieh i s "dark" to hiiaj iiot 
one whose framework of belief and thought la so foreign as to 
be "unthinkable** I f i t i s* then the historian should not make 
that particular investigation* 
However, we need to give a more comprehensive anwer to the 
question of what i t i s that the historian brings to the evidence 
which i s the subject of his investigation* To do this * i t w i l l 
be helpful to look back for a moment* 
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In oW lnve»tagatlo»- of Groee we aiscuased this same matter 
in*terma of " s p i r i t " * " S p i r i t " * Croc<^  ipay%^ i s manifostod or 
i© active i n • specific acts of historical thought about concrete. 
events objects, e f g t t a treatise, .& painting* the record of 
a b a t t l e a a vase etc* Xt is this a c t i v i t y of " s p i r i t " which i s , 
brought to bear upon historical events* and which enables us to 
discern the value (i#e* t beauty^ t r u t h s usefulneaa) of these 
eventa% Without this a c t i v i t y of " s p i r i t " manifested i n thought 
the ©vents of history would remain mute, unrelated and unenlighV 
ening* Implied i n Grocers position i s a concern for specific 
historical ©vents, the necessity of being historical investi* 1 
gation with a problem* the use of controlled imagination etc* 
I t i s thia whole complex attitude which the historian must bring 
to historical incuiry* andt borrowing a term from Budolf 
Bultmann* we w i l l refer to this attitude as the historian*s 
"pre-understanding*** i t Should be evident from our examination 
of Vico that much the same "pre^undoratanding*' i s also at worfe: 
i n that writer1® historical inquiries©! and this is true i n spite 
Of the fact that i n Vice i t was often implicit and uncritical * 
In Collingwood we also f i n d that the historian must bring 
a "pre-understanding" to his study$ and moreover* we f i n d that 
i t i s very similar to that which is manifested i n Groce and 
(i m p l i c i t l y ) i n "Vic©* However, Collingwood avoids Oroee% pro** 
blematic term " s p i r i t * ^ and instead Gollingwood develop© what 
gg, are calling the historian's "pre-understanding" i n his own 
2B1 
Witfk Colliagwood •writes* • 
;1^hwhole perceptible tvorad^/tho^f;isipoten$$.aX^ 
m&<inyv&m&$%® evidence to.'the historian*;'It 
'becomes actual • evidence An' so- far as Jhe :-oaa use - At* 
And ho pghnot use i t unless he comes, to: I t with the 
• r$iht-3s$M' of •historical :k^iowled^^.0the^se^ i t 
is; isereiyypereeived fact*, historically dum>» (1) 
fhat which i f . needed, i f there i s to be history i»#..'Aft Co^llngwoodl 
terminology;^: i s a "criterion of historical truth**! and thAs, 
c r i t e r i o n i s "the idea of history Ate©lf^ jj|.\H©\iw|tte9? 
But neither the raw material of historical knowledge* 
1 , ; ;-the: d e t a i l ; , e f ^ • 
• " cepfc$on*;>nor the;%arious.#ndow«e»ts that serif® him.. | 
• • \ ^ a i d s % ) I n t e r s . < '-.| 
. historiasi;his.criterion of hist©rie^ l'.;.t#ttth#\ Bmt ; 
.ah' imaginary picture, of -the' past^/Xt • A& a •• chance ; 
• product o^ p^yclibl^ ' . . 
every man.possesses as of the furniture of-^ hi'-s.' 
• m l n % and'disfco^ ' 
\ he becomes:oonselous of ,t what it,isi:.tQ;:ha^-,a..ml3^iSv C^)-, • 
fhere As one ^ obvio^s criticism:.to "be, made; of =th:As. passagejrbut\ 
before .doing, that we need,to develop Ata;3Ane of, thoia^t. W^ffl&j 
Angs V9her0:.'does thAs, idea of Matery^. A..ethAe •. '^re^us^r* 
Xt.vouj^ biH^i^pMetioaX.to argue that* since the 
historical-p^cese Is a process "of51 thouprt;|: there : • 
must be thought already present f as i t s presupposl* tibn^. at 'the'he:gAhMng of i t * to -that an: account': • 
of what thou^ai is , o r i g i m l l y and i n i t s e l f 0 must • be & h o n ^ i s t o r i t a account* Histery 'does' not pre* 
suppose min&t i t "is.: the l i f e " of mind itself;* which 
As-not'jAInd except <w far a.s i t both liv&s In-histo** r i ^ a i process aM'isaows> i t s e l f m so • living*, (s) 
(1) Ooiu&gw^ 
standing^ ^come fr d m f H i s . answei?. i s as $ollow&i 
(s) 
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of whatever else i s done with them* have been and must continue 
to be hi s t o r i c a l l y received* Without a valid understanding of 
history and his t o r i c a l investigation!, our understanding of 
these events w i l l not he " c r i t i c a l l y j u s t i f i e d and securely 
"based"* We w i l l return to this i n parts 111 and IV of this 
thesis* 
Chapter V 
tm mm OF yxco t CROCS AM COI&IOTOOD. 
We have now concluded our exposition of the understanding 
of history found i n Vieo, Croce and Gollingwood* Among these 
three men there i s a unity of thought about historyi a unity 
which i s not confined to isolated points of agreement,, but which 
pervades the thin&ing of each* As v/e have seen, Croee was i n * 
fluenced by Vlco, and eollingwood was influenced by both? yet 
each man has written about history i n his own distinctive way* 
In spite of the distinctiveness of each, and i n spite of the 
great differences of style, the unity remains* In parts I I I and 
IV of this thesis we w i l l examine t h i s understanding of history 
i n i t s relation to the many aspects of the christian doctrine of 
revelation. In order to f a c i l i t a t e this examination i t w i l l be 
helpful to make ex p l i c i t this unity of thought, I also wish to 
c a l l attention to a few ideas which are more«*or*less peculiar 
to each of these men (especially Croc©)* and which w i l l play a 
part i n our subsequent examination of revelation* 
Q-pposition to false history* We have shown that a l l three 
men are consistently and vehemently (the word i s not too strong) 
opposed to a variety of false histories which have surrounded 
and s t i l l continue to surround us, e#g*> the history which has 
as i t s presupposition that the "ancients were men of matchless 
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wisdom" (Vico)j chronicle and philology (Groee and Collingwood)? 
"pigeon-holing" (Gollingwood) etc. The fact that a l l three men 
were practising historians contributed to their thought i n this 
area*' 
Opposit ion to the "philo sophy of h i story " i , Vico, Croce 
and Gollingwood1s opposition to the "philosophy of history" i s 
an aspect of their opposition to false historyf a subject which 
we have just discussed* However, due to the prominent place of 
the "philosophy of history" i n the following chapters,, w© wi$h 
to single i t out for special attention,at this point* 
We have defined "philosophy of history" i n a special way, 
and for that reason have enclosed the term i n ouotation mar&s* 
The term may he used simply i n the very general sense of cri** 
t i o a l thought about history* However* following a rather wide* 
spread practice, w© are using this term i n the sens© of the 
attempt to discover and Impose a "meaning" upon the whole sweep 
of empirical historical events. The goal of this effor t i s ! i d 
present a rationally coherent account of a l l historical events. 
Among the examples of this practice which we have cited, together 
with some indication of their f a i l i n g s , are those of Augustine, 
Marx and Toynbee. The fundamental f a i l i n g of this practice i s 
that i t proceeds on the basis of a Cartesian dualism which as~-.-? 
sumes that the facts may be arranged, and then the interpretation 
of the facts may be sought out and applied to the facts* 
2m 
How do the three historians Whom we have studied stand i n 
regard to the "philosophy of history"* Vico was i n fact oppos* 
ing a "philosophy of history'* when he attacked the practice # 
widespread i n his day, of writing ancient history upon- the 
basis of the assumption that the ancients were "men of matchless 
Wisdom"f However* he was inconsistent i n this matter, for he ' 
himself produced a $biXosophy of history" which he eharaeterigied 
as an "ideal eternal history traversed i n time by the histories 
of a l l nations". As for Croee and Collingwoodt their opposition 
to the "philosophy of history" is so clear and emphatic that we 
need only mention i t here.* 
Onnosltipfi to Garteaiafe dual^sma In a l l three men the. 
criticism of false history i s tied up with the recognition that 
such histories are based on a s t r i c t Cartesia% subjeet^objeot 
epistemologyij and that such an epistemology i s inadequate for 
the study of history % Vico was among the pioneers i n this 
criticism, and i n this he i s followed by Croce and Collingwood*. 
Any submission to a throughgoing dualism between subject (his-
torian) and object (historical event) i s radically foreign to 
a l l three* 
Imagination and "re-enactment". The converse of this' 
Cartesian position i s found i n the understanding which sees the 
necessity of imaginatively but c r i t i c a l l y entering into the 
original event, and thus "re-creating" that event i n oneVs mind]1 
©*g..#* the recovery of "poetic times" (Vico); " a l l history i s 
contemporary history" (Oroce); history as "re-enactment" 
(Collingwood) « 
The unity of Vico, Oroce and Collingwood as to the necessity 
of imaginatively entering into the origin of events clearly lm*» 
plies that among a l l three there i s agreement that "the nature 
of things i s nothing but their coming into being at certain times 
and i n certain fashions*" (Vico) The only d i f f i c u l t y here i s 
that Vice's starfc "nothing but" is not e x p l i c i t l y contained i n 
Groee and Collingwood* However, there i s substantial agreement 
among a l l three, i n this matter* 
I f this process of "recovery" or "re-enactment" i s to tales 
place, then the historian must not stand passively before his-
t o r i c a l documents as does the chronicler* Rather he come s to 
his study with what we have chosen to term a "pre-understanding"* 
This carries with i t a respect for historical event, the nec-
essity of questioning* such events, the use of c r i t i c a l imagine 
ation etc* We have seen this clearly implicit i n Vice's etymo* 
logiaing (however imperfect), and then ex p l i c i t l y developed i n 
Croce and Collingwood* 
The unity of philosophy and history* I f this imaginative* 
c r i t i c a l recreation i s to take placej then history and philosophy 
must go hand-in-hand*t They are mutually complementary* History 
cannot proceed without the exercise of systematic and c r i t i c a l 
conceptual reasoning* This reasoning (philosophy) must be 
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The, unity of fact and interpretation* Closely al l i e d to 
the unity of philosophy and history (as well as to much els© of 
what we have said) i s the insight that fact and interpretation 
occur together* ^ a t o r i c ^ l . fact has no genuine existence, when 
by "fact" i s meant bare, objective, uninterpreted occurence* 
I t s genuine historical existence consists i n i t s being apprehend-
ed and integrated into an historical«*experientlal framework of 
meaning* Conversely, interpretation must always have reference 
to some historical fact or event* I t i s Croce who gives the 
most sustained and exp l i c i t development of this* 
Up to this point we have summarised various aspects of the 
understanding of history upon which "Vico, Croce and Collingwood 
are cloarly i n agreement* I t i s indeed a large area of agree** 
ment, and one which has i t s basis i n their view that the task ^ 
of the historian i s that of the c r i t i c a l "re-enactment" of his-
t o r i c a l event* we now turn to three matters which w i l l play an 
important part i n the following chapters* but upon which agree* 
ment between our three authors i s either not expli c i t or absent* 
Man can only know that which he hasf made* The phrase i s 
Vice's of course* TO what extent i s the same idea found i n 
Croce and Collingwood? neither discusses the matter i n these 
terms* However, Croce's writings imply the acceptance of Vice's 
statement* First of a l l there is the emphatic rejection of any-
thing which i s transcendental or outside of history, !+«-«.* 
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outside of that which i s made by man i n history* Related to 
this i s his belief that the only source of value i s to be found 
i n the historical forms which " s p i r i t " has developed i n the 
course of history* These forms are, of course, the creations 
of man; e»gf# paintings, philosophic documents, governeHts etc* 
I f this i s the "only" source of value, then a l l else (the un-
made) i s without value § I t would be safe to say that for Croce 
that which i s without value (the unmade) i s unknowable* Mete> 
physical speculation which i s unrelated to hietorical-experienie 
•fatal forms i s described by Croce as a "circling i n the void"* 
Collingwood also follows Vico and Croce i n this matter* 
although he expresses i t i n different and less elegant terml## 
idbiogy* As w© have seen,, Collingwood's inquiry after knowledge 
l i e s i n the "re-enactment" and interpretation of historic events* 
ite«, that which has been made by man* 
Knowing yourself means knowing what you can doj 
and since nobody knows what he can do u n t i l he 
t r i e s | the only clue to what man can do i s what 
man has done* The value of history, then$ i s 
that I t teaches us what man has done and thus 
what man'is*:^y. 
Thus there seems to,be, in.spite of different formulations, an 
essential agreement between Vice, Croce and Collingwood on the 
idea that "man can only know that which he has made". 
No nronheoy,*. An a c t i v i t y traditionally associated with 
history i s prophecy* Vico dissociates himself from the Old 
(1) The Idea of History. p» 10. 
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Testament and a l l else that might traditionally com© under the 
heading oi\ prophecy* Nevertheless, he does engage i n prophecy 
i n hie account of the ''ideal and eternal h i s t o r y % . He was able 
to do this because be Relieved he had discovered the "end" of 
history M**0 age; of iaan")» and thus had. a basis for mateing 
prophecies about the future.* 
However we have seen that Croee and Collingwood emphatically 
reject prophecy as an historical a c t i v i t y $ and i n our examinatien: 
we have supported them against Vico i n this matter * One cannot 
prophej^^^as an historian because to prophe^i^)neane to fcnow 
the future or the "end" of history* But obviously the future or ; 
"end" of hiatory***^t least as commonly understoo^-**^ is : impos** 
ted from outside of history,. e*g*f the classless society, the 
Kingdom of God, progress v* / etc* 
Providence.. Finally we coiae to providence* Vieo stands 
v i r t u a l l y alone among our three authors i n dealing with this* 
We have examined at ©owe length Vice's views on providence* 
and especially that interpretation which we have characterized 
as the "immanence of transcendence % For Croce providence i s 
only "the ra t i o n a l i t y of history'^; and Collingwood i s mute* 
I 
This concludes our comparison of the understanding of 
( l ) Progress i s an "end" which i s distributed a l l along 
the historical'line i ' hut which i s always i n the process 
of an even greater realiaationf 
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history found i n Vico, Groce and Gollingwood* We turn now to an. 
examination of the understanding or apiatemology of history found 
respectively i n Bultmann and T i l l i e h f We w i l l also include i n 
this examination other aspects of their work which i s "based upon 
their respective epistemologies of history, This investigation 
w i l l be informed throughout by the results of the examination 
which we have aust concluded* 
PARI X{l 
f£W0 TISJOLOQXMJSs 
•PHBOIOdY AM) TO SBOTAKGIS 3?0 HISTORY 
Chapter VI 
1* The Problem of Historical Event and Historical Inquiry 
Raised by the Ke&lity of Faith* 
In an essay -written i n 1931 Hudolf Bultraann calls atten-
t i o n to a pervasive characteristic of contemporary l i f e ; namely, 
the fact that "supramundane r e a l i t y has been called i n question" 
I t i s t h i s , according to Bultmann, which constitutes the "crisis 
i n belief"* 
How, although this situation i s so v/idely recognised as to 
have become a truism, yet the effort to deal with i t vigorously 
and creatively has not been an outstanding characteristic of 
contemporary theology* I n the case of Bultraann, however, i t i s 
the recognition of this "crisis i n belief* which has been the 
motivating force behind his theological work* 
Bultmann sees the crux of this problem as being the re* 
discovery of an understanding of the proper function of history 
i n the r e a l i t y of f a i t h as that i s ©jcperionced within the Church 
Within the Church* Bultmann says# the basis and possibility of 
f a i t h i s the revelation of Jesus as the Christ* But this reve-
l a t i o n must not be conceived of as an empirical or historically 
verifiable event which has beien established ones and for a l l , 
(1) Bultmann, Rudolf, ffssavs Philosophical and Theological, The Maclillan Co*, !tew YorK, X965,yp,lff• 
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and upon which we may now lean as the oMept of our f a i t h * I t 
^ h i s t o r i c a l l y verifiable "beyond a l l reasonable doubt that 
Jesus of Wa«areth lived and died} but the statement i s not 
hist o r i c a l l y verifiable which says that Jesus of Nasareth i s the 
Christ through whom God has acted for me and a l l men* fhi s 
l a t t e r statement i s not historically verifiable because the his* 
t o r i o a l events (Jesus of Na&areth lived and died) are given a 
transcendent reference (Jesus i s the Christ through whom God 
has acted)* After our study of Vice* Croce and Collingwood i t 
should be clear that the assigning of transcendent reference to 
historical ©vents i s emphatically not the ac t i v i t y of the his** 
torian* In Bultmaan*s own words5 
In the Christian message [which includes the 
transcendent ref ereneejl , however, there i s 
absolutely no question of man*s being given an 
historical account of a section of the past, 
which he mi$it put to the test, or c r i t i c a l l y 
confirm or reject* He i s told , on the contrary, 
that i n what happened then, whatever the circum-
stances, God has acted, and that through this 
action of his the Word of divine judgment and 
forgiveness which now confronts him i s authen* 
tieated; this action of God*s i s to be interpreted as 
the actual establishment of this•'••Worflr—as the 
proclamation,of this ford i t s e l f . Ho science of 
history can Verify this assertion**-«©ither to con-
firm or to reject i t j for i t Is beyond the sphere 
of h i s t o r i c a l observation to say that i n this 
Word and i t s proclamation God has acted* (1) 
I f f a i t h i s not response to historically ascertainable 
1 
(1) Bultmann, g&icj^p*18« 
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©vents which have been established once ana for a l l as the 
object of our f a i t h , then Just what i s the nature of our faith? 
Sttltmann describes i t i n this way, The "basis and possibility of 
f a i t h i s the revelation of Jesus as the Christ» Faith i n this 
revelation i s e:ssactly a decision for and obedience to i t s truthf 
and a decision for and obedience to i t s truth i s f a i t h * This 
decision to obedience i s wrought by God; not "by his working 
ttobActively" apart from f a i t h ; not by giving us historically 
ascertainable events upon which we can lean* but by his working 
exactly i n the f a i t h decision* 
This decision* ^ becomes a possibility only through 
the fact that God appears to man as He who i s reveal -
led i n Jesus* Since this i s so, the decision seeing 
to be determinedj but i t i s not* Admittedly, i t i s 
wrought by God, but not as i f the working of God 
took place before f a i t h or, so to speak behind i t j t 
rather, God*s ^ ^ k i n g taices place exactly i n i t 
[the,faith decision]* ($) 
Another way; of: ,stating this i s to say that one does not 
have teowledg© of as the Christ apart from f a i t h j apart 
from making; i & f a i t h , a decision to b© obedient to i t s truth* 
Rather i t i s that t^ie Jenowledge that Jesus i s the Christ coses 
only vdth faith? comes only with the decision to be obedient to 
i t s truth* Moreover th i s f a i t h or decision or knowledge does 
not take place once and f o r a l l * I t cannot be pb^ectiviaed* 
I t must be renewed (relived, "re-enacted") again and again* 
•* f ,v ' 
(1) Bultmanni" &udolf* fheolo^y of. the New Testament. 3L1. 
Charles Scribner's Jons, itfew York, 1956, pp* 76*77* 
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But f a i t h la not a onc^fOP**&IX rationally 
acquired and henceforth possessed conviction* 
but i s the overcoming of the world which must 
be done over and over agfeln* (1) 
^ e n a man comes to a deoislo% 
The question i s whether his new decisions are 
' determined by his former decisions* I f ho i s 
to be really free i n his decisions then he must 
^v- also fee fffes from his former decisions* i n other 
word®;, from himself as lie 1? is become i n his p&st* (8) 
fh% d i f f i c u l t y with the Jewish position (against which Paul • 
argues so strongly) f and with much Christian practice, for that 
matter f i s dust that i t does not free man from his past* 
***Jewish pi$iy$ the obedieheo under the laWf 
•. i n r e a l i t y $, m& of escaping from the genuine o a l l - -
of (Jod|i f??om decision* She pious Jew doe© not Unow 
that man ha& continually to become the one he i s to 
be 3 he thinks*'"'**©!' course,*. impiicitly^Hihat he i s 
already the one he i s to become* Fox* he ha& antici** 
pated a i l decisions by his resolution "tb-obey the 
torn- 2iie commandments of lav? take from him th# 
e^^i'Hl^«ftcM»-.• 3^_^qputiiwaM3. W the situation h® me©ts* (3 ) 
0?o put tM© pGii|»i0;n i n terms $t w analysis i n S'art v th&t 
i n ,which one has f a i t h i s not repeatedly grasped anew (recreated* 
"re-enacted") i n new situations\ rather i t i s reduced to ^chroa* 
i o i e ^ becomes a "thing believed tn% i s refined by philology 
(e^cogesis) p and becomes a static norm of belief and action* 
Bultmann contrasts this with the position of the christian who 
i s trem th® past and becomes open to the, future* 
(I) ®m($owr. .off, the fflwf. ffestam^at* 3Xy t>*V9i 
($) .  ffl.s^torry: fend ohatolo&y« Edinburgh bniter$ity Press9 V\£l. 
(3) ' . 
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To ©aeiat; m Christian..apaag.io Wvs i n . f ^ e t o i 
&. t$mQm into which the ^ l ^ u ^ ^ g b t , ^ . 
, ' .• • $h# 4itfine ..grace ttfi&eh appeared in- 0&i?is% $?he 
- " jjuslified by . # i t h i s set f3?e& from his pa$t| 
• from his;sin* tPm himself* 4nd he free, 
- for a .m&l: historical l i f e to fr©e •dMisien©* 
This i@. made clear "by the* fact that the demands 
of $od. are summed np i n the commandment of lo v t * 
• ;. i . t h a t r i # | : ' a ' commandment Which does- noi^ consist • 4si'f orwii^ted etateme3E^a*ifi(l) •' 
In tea^ ©-of'• ow .analyst that,, that i n 
whiehter-'Miieve' is. recreated or %$*©naoi>edw in'our present 
• h i s t o r i c a l situations £he significance, of our belief i n t h i s 
pa^iouiar situation becomes- manifest Stt-. this process, of. t fre* 
W3k%tmm deepens-- this, j>oaition by stating that i n his deei* 
sions : mln i s , fundamentally' 'choosing' %im©elt, as the man he i s ' to 
&bej history of the human person ©omes into, 
. i n the encounters which man e^eri^noesi,. 
• with other- people or with w n t & f and i n to.- difcl* :%.,: 
• siohs:he. ta&#s i n them*, . In tea© decisions- man be** 
. , m^mm>Mm^S-#**^jwf.o»e-tho\x^. ^  « ai»i la- • 
always on<a which atanda before him and aoguires i t a 
.,, -^hfra<|ter: a» forfei t e d or as real by his decisions* . 
What a mam chooses, i n his decisions iabasically not 
t h i s or tha$* but i s himpelf a© the man he i s to be 
' and intend© to be, or as one who has forfeited his 
. real. l i $ e * (&) : 
Mt. tius put this, i n the concrete terms of' a serious, disagreement. 
with my ohildf, % can decide , to deal with this disagreement by 
forcing him to do my w i l l * This i s a decision to remain enslaved 
lfci&*y- pp#-! 
4. 
to ray sinful nature* to ray past; and including possib^a long-
standing and unsatisfactory relationship to ay child* Or, 
snowing myself loved by C*od,; I can decide to l e t that love guide 
my relationship to my child* This i s to free myself from my 
past and to open tho way to a new relationship with my child, 
myself, and &od#; In either decision I am deciding the kind of 
person I am to become* This i s simply an example of what i s 
trad i t i o n a l l y lenown as the i r o i t ^ t i d Ohristi* This i s to be a 
"new being i n Christ"* Or, i n Bultmann's terminology, i t i s 
Msalvation«*occurrence " * 
In the "word", then, (which I receive and permit 
to guicfeme i n my concrete decisions] the salva** 
tion**oeeurrenee i s preDent* For the proclaimed 
word i s neither an enlightening ^ Weltanschauung 
flowing out i n general truths, nor a merely his-
t o r i c a l account which, lilce a reporter's story, 
reminds a public of important but by**gone facto* 
Rather, i t i s keryfyia^ »*'-herald1 s aervice«-*^ in 
the l i t e r a l sehsej^--a,uthorisied, plenipotenVpro-* 
clamation, edict from a sovereign** *Bo i t I s , by 
nature, personal address whioh accosts each xndi* 
vidua!* throwing the person himself into question 
by rendering his self ^understanding problematic, 
and demanding a decision of him* ( I ) 
And t h i s "salvation occurrence i s the eschatologloal occurrence 
which puts to end the old aeon* , r^ We need not commit our-
selves to the radical, realized eschatology of Bultmann i n order 
to agree that this i s "eachatological occurrence", i*e», that i n 
such an occurrence Christ, so to speak, comes again*~~*is present* 
This i s a foretaste of the "last things"* 
(1) heolpfty of the Hew Testament. I , p • 307 * 
(S) |bjy|* f p*3Q6* I t a l i c s Bultmann's* 
The concrete and some time a prosaic nature of the situations 
or events i n which the "salvation-occurrencew or "eschatological 
occurrence" takes place should not obscure from us that this ^ g. 
taking place and that i t s nature i s as we have described* We 
are not so much called upon to have f a i t h i n (make a decision of 
obedience to) Jesus the Christ i n abstraction,, as i n the concrete 
events and encounters of l i f e , e*g#, i n my relation to my child* 
Insofar as my relationship to my child i s guided by Christian 
love, i t i s i n the last analysis solely because of my f a i t h i n 
Jesus as the Christ* This f a i t h arises as we have described, 
i*e«, by my making that revelation a l i v i n g eaqperience within 
myself * Eevelation meets f a i t h and the Word of God appears i n 
my l i f e * The past revives i n the present and guides that present* 
This then i s an indication of the problem of the proper 
function of historical event and historical inquiry i n the e»* 
perienoe of f a i t h as that takes place within the Church*^ 
F i r s t j and negatively$ Bultmann states that historical inquiry 
cannot provide us with historically ascertainable facts upon 
which we can lean as the basis and object of f a i t h * I t i s 
possible, at least theoretically, for the historian to affirm 
statements or facts of the order "Jesus of Nazareth l i v S ) i n 
(1) I n the interests of greater c l a r i t y we are making the 
distinction between problems about historical event* 
and problems about historical inquiry* more explicit 
than Bultmann does* ; 
m>2 
Palestine"} "but the Christian f a i t h does not have i t s basis i n 
statements of this order* Here i t i s very important to notice 
that this i s a statement abeat the place of historical inquiry 
i n the Christian f a i t h j and therefore i t cannot he oonstrued as 
severing that f a i t h from the historical events out of which i t 
takes i t s rise* That this i s i n fact the ease i s supported by 
the second, and positive, affirmation which Buitmann's makes; 
namely, "that ,1$ what happened then, whatever the circumstances, j 
God has a c t e d " * ^ This i s a statement about the place of his* j 
! 
t o r i c a l event i n the Christian f a i t h * Thirdly, and again pos* ' j 
itively,w© have called attention to the suggestive parallel j 
which exists ( i m p l i c i t l y ) i n Bultmann between the way i n which 
his t o r i c a l inquiry apprehends historical ©vents, and the fay; |n j 
which the theologian apprehends "esohatological event", l t e * f : V''V-;:j 
i n both ease© i t i s through a process of "re-enactment"• Here, j 
we are again calling attention to the pla® of historical inquiry •  
within the r e a l i t y of. f a i t h * One of the recurring concerns of j 
the remainder of this theais w i l l be to discuss the ways i n | 
which historical inquiry (historical "re-enactment") and th©0<-
logical inquiry (theological 're-enactment") aaa similar, and the ; 
ways i n which they are distinctive* 
.p^i3.o.a:ot)hiQ.a.l.3&$JB^&&<$&* p. 13. I t a l i c s mine. 
BuXtma&nfB primnry aue&tidn* ths&*- i s i Wwat i s the p^B3?. 
function of h i s t o r i c a l ey§nt and historioal inquiry 1& the cpe* 
p^ riene® of f a i t h a& that take©place within the OhurGh? A 
second and subsidiary Question i s that of the status and function' 
of the mythological language i n which the Church has. formulated j 
i t s experience: of f a i t h | and* above a l l * i n that f emulation j 
whi^h make© up the Old and Xfew Testaments* The desire to find, 
a sati^aetory answer to this question i s a secondary but mrw¥ j 
theirs® impo3?tan$ laoti^ation of Bu^ imgrnn'* s theological v/or^ « He 
w r i t e s 
jjph®:.$i®w: Testament account of the event of redemption 
&s,,^Ma$a& foy the laiiguags of mythologyand the \ 
origin.'of t h ^ ^ r i o u s themeg oan b@ easiiSf traced i n 
• %M- contemporary mythology -of Jewish :A$o.0al.y#tl® '.and 
' redemption myths of. (jno&tieiiHt*. • To: this' extent: 
m 
wh 
refore botind to a«3s whether^ ,• 
%l^n^€#ri>.reaoh the Gospel todays m aspect-our con* 
'v^ts, to :a^ @0pt saot--o3w the Gospel TOasagei but • 
al i o .'the mytMcal ;view of the world i n which v ; i t 1ft 
if 
In. oth^r .wo;rd$^ . a secondary .motivation of. Bui.lma;nn'*:s theo|<-
ogy i # an umwlllingness to add to the slcandmlon proper to the 
' ^ er^^m^ the, additional. s&andaloft of a mythical worXd^view* • Of 
• (t)''::'Mm^r,m&M^* Edited bar H*w* Bar$sehr a»B*c*E»f. Loadoni 1907$ 'jfoS* I t a l i c s Bultmann*s* 
those c r i t i c s who fool that they have dealt with this problem 
by a fac i l e identification of Bultiaann with Existentialism or 
Liberalism> there i s hardlsr any need to speak* However, even i n 
.a careful and relatively sympathetic study such as L* Malevez*s 
ggjh$. Christian Message and Myth. one does not feel that the author 
it..; • • 
has ever struggled inwardly (faced as a question for his own ex-
istence*) with the problem of the communication of the Gospel i n 
the contemporary world* I t i s d i f f i c u l t to share the optimism 
of those who seem to believe that a reworking of Thomism or 
Calvinism* or another series of Biblical studies w i l l answer the 
problem* A l l this would seem to be very obvious} yet i n this 
controversy the awareness of i t seems to be largely verbal* 
A misconceived controversy* We have stated that Bultraann* S 
primary eoncern was with the problem of the proper function of 
history (including questions both of historical event and his* 
toricjsi,:;innuiry) i n the experience of f a i t h ; and we have indiea* 
ted* among other things, that this function cannot be that of 
giving to us hi s t o r i c a l l y verifiable events which we can then 
lean upon as the object of our f a i t h * I n short, and as we w i l l 
argue at length* a s t r i c t subject-object thought pattern i s not 
appropriate to f a i t h as i t i s escperienoed i n the Church* We 
have also stated that the demythologization controversy i s only 
a secondary and derivative concern* This i s true i n spite of 
the fact that the discussion concerning Bultmann has been con* 
84& 
ducted very largely i n terms of the merits and demerits of 
demythologissation* Bultmann relates the two In the following 
'w$y» 
I f the challenge of demythologizing was f i r s t 
raised by the conflict between the mythological 
cosmology of the Bible and the modern scientific 
world view, i t at once became evident that the 
restatement of mythology i s a requirement of f a i t h 
i t s e l f i For f a i t h needs to be emancipated from i t s 
association with a world view expressed i n objec-
tive terras, whether i t be a mythical or a solera* 
t i f l c one* That conflict i s a proof that f a i t h 
has not yet discovered the proper terms i n which 
to express i t s e l f , i t has not realised that i t can-
not be logically proven, i t has not clearly Hinder* 
stood that i t s basis and i t s objeet are identical, 
i t has not clearly apprehended the transeendent&l 
and hidden character of the divine a c t i v i t y * and, 
by i t s f a i l u r e to perceive i t s own "Nevertheless" 
i t has t r i e d to project aod and his acts into the 
sphere of objective re a l i t y * Starting as i t does 
with the modern world view, and ohali^nging th© i 
Biblical mythology and the traditional jj^oolama'* 
ti o n of the Church, this new kind of criticism i s 
performing for f a i t h the supreme service of re-
calling i t to a radical consideration of i t s own 
nature,*; - I t i s just this c a l l that our demytho* i 
l o l i ^ a t i o n sej&fcs to follow* (1) 
On^rreaspn why Bultmann*© important contention as to the 
unsuitability of s t r i c t subject*object thinking for theological 
discourse has not received more attention, i s that i t s importance: 
i s not as readier grasped as the question of the Validity of 
Hew Testament mythological language* Another reason i s that 
this aspect of Bultmann*a e f f o r t often remains Implicit rather 
than becoming e ^ l i e i t . * . Friedrich O-ogarten has rendered a 
(1) Bartsch, gp> cit.*:» p#310* 
service to t h i s whole controversy by making f u l l y explicit t h i s 
aspect of Bultaann,0 work* Gogarten writes: 
So long as one conducts one*© thinking naively 
and unsuspectingly within the sub3ect**objeot 
framework* f a i l i n g .to notice that i n doing this 
one i s relying on [ft* 1 0 Gartestian] philosoph* 
ouiaenon whioh| i n spite of i t s three hundred 
years of general acceptance, w i l l certainly he 
sought for i n Vain i n the Hew ftestamentf even 
i n the passages which speak of the redemptive 
event having been seen and touehedj and, f a i l * 
ing for the same reason to notice at a l l that 
this talk about selfbunderstanding* and with i t 
the attemi>t to achieve an existential interpret 
tation, # are directed towards the overcoming of this subjeot^objjeet t h i ^ i n g * so long too f i l l 1 
this t o t a l incomprehension las to what Bultmann 
i s trying to do] continue to assert i t s e l f ^ , * ( l ) 
Goj?garten goes on to put this i n different and more general terms) 
What Bultma&nfs opponents have failed to grasp i s 
that the existential philosophy i s concerned with 
the attempt to achieve a new understanding of the x 
essential nature of history and that consequently : 
i t i s towards an under standing of the historical 
character of the Uew Testament revelation i n accor- i 
:^ :^ (toee---w41^ ,.tJMl« essential nature of history that 
iiultmadcm11 & * 
The limitations of the Cartesian sub4ect-«object frame of 
reference are widely recognised* and i n the f i e l d of theology 
these limitations are certainly evident* ^ The demythologi* ; 
nation controversy w i l l certainly continue i n i t s present inoon* • 
elusive confusion so long as we do not deal with the s u i t a b i l i t y ! 
(1) Gogarten* Friedrich t Bemytholo^igat^on and, •History,, SCM, I XiOndon* 1966* m®$* \ 
(3) For a recent discussion of this i n relation to theology 
see Brown n James* 8ub;ieet and Object i n Modern flheoloffy* 
SOM, London* %95$i ' 
of the su.bjeeti»objeet frame of reference for theological think* 
ing* Therefore i n dealing with Bultmann our focus w i l l he upon 
this aspect of his thought* rather than upon the closely related 
but different and more particular problem of demythologiaation* 
A further indication that this w i l l be the most f r u i t f u l 
way to proceed was given to us i n our examination of vleo, Croce 
and Gollingwood* There we saw repeatedly the inappropriateness 
of aubject«*abject thinking for historical inquiry* Vico* one 
of the earliest c r i t i c s of the Cartesian epistemologyi saw that 
the cr i t e r i o n of "clear and distinct ideas'" l e f t s ao room for 
historical in^uir^y*^^ In Croc© and Collingwood there i s the 
recurring theme .that history i s not constituted i n the collect** • 
ing, ; "pigeonholing?* or arranging into "philosophies of history" 
of objective facts which have a significant (i*e«* historical) 
existence apart from the historian* Rather, as we discussed at 
length, the facts and events of history must be "re->enaete&" 
or recreated i n the imagination of the historian! the historian 
must, so to speak, participate i n the history which he writesj 
i # e i | he does not stand apart from his historical evidence as 
a subject to an object* H^re we see an £n^eation of the rele* 
Vance of Vico, Croce and Collingwood to the work of Bultmannj 
a relevance which i t w i l l bo the task of this chapter to explore 
at length* 
(1) 
B e e flttprat pp* l l l f f . 
I n the interests of forestalling criticism l e t i t be said 
that they© i s no reason why this spapathotio approach to 
Bultinann need ©omiait u© bafc Mehan& to SKistentialieua•• of any 
variety (i*e*# to the ^ l a t e i i t i a l thinking of some partieular " 
philosophical system) nor even to an existential thinking (the, 
.ex^stenti^ll, thinking which belongs to existence as auoh) which 
implies that other types of thinJsing are.totally excluded* 
(Wingrehj coaMaenting upon this distinction!, characterises 
SS^g^SXkSA. ^  theoretical # and efflfttentiiei;! ats ethical and 
r e l i g i o u s * ) ^ Hath®?? this approach i s taken i n the hope that 
i t might throw l i g h t upon the nature of historical thinlcingi 
and especially the place of historical thinking i n theology* 
She fundamental motive behind this attempt i s the desire to com-* 
municate -the' kerypsna i n the contemporary world* Here we sa.v " i n 
the contemporary world" and not "tp, the contemporary world 0 jf 
for i t i s not the case that we stand apart from that world* 
"Contemporary world'* and"cohteraporary man" always mean, f i r s t of 
a l l * "myyw6&^u-9&t..^f&££*4_ 
8» Vbd Problem of Hermeneutios* 
The problem of hermeneutioa i s the problem of "how to 
understand historical documents delivered by tra d i t i o n " * ^ 
(1) Win^rehi Guetav* ffheoloA'y i n Conflict. Oliver and Boydt SdinMrgh,. 19S8> p*<?l* 
2m ... 
Kvery interpretation of historical documents i s based upon 
certain herraeneutic presuppositions* One way of describing 
Bultmann*© t o t a l programme would be to state the question which 
runs throughout his work; mat hermeneutie presuppositions' are 
to be used to guide the interpretation of those historical doeu« 
fflonts included i n the Old and Mew Testaments? Obviously for 
Bultmann these presuppositions w i l l not be those appropriate to 
the Cartesian subject*object approach to historical documents, 
l»e# » the approach which w© discussed i n the previous section 
under headings such as "chronicle", "philology" and "universal 
history"* I n this s t r i c t subject-object approach, historical 
event has i t s f u l l r e a l i t y as an object apart from the historian 
(the subject); and within such a framework the historian may then 
proceed to refine his perception of this objective event, as i n 
philology} to classify i t * as i n chronicle or "pigeon holing"j 
or to impose a subjective meaning upon i t , as i n the "philosophy 
of history" and i n schemes of universal history* %t Bultmann 
rejects this answer to the problem o3 hermeneutics, what does he 
put i n i t s placet 
a* Is Biblical hermeneutics a special hermeneutiea? 
Turning to Bultmann, now, we should notice how f i r s t of a l l 
. he maintains that Biblical hermeneutics i s not a special hermen-* 
eutios# 
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**#biblical hermeneuties does not ©eels to represent 
i t s e l f as an independent and self*contained science» 
but has as I t s presupposition hermeneutics i n general *<*«(&) 
Bibli c a l herraeneuties la not a special and esoteric form of 
hist o r i c a l knowledge | "but rather forme a part of hermeneuties 
i n general* There i s not a dichotomy i n the world i n which the 
Bible i s understood i n on© way, and a l l other historical documents 
i n another and t o t a l l y different way* This moans that insofar 
as the understanding of history found i n Vieo, Croc© and 
Collihgwood i s v a l i d , i t s v a l i d i t y extends to the documents of 
the Old and Hew Testaments* I n the following investigation we 
Will f i n d that we wish to go beyond this identification of Bi ^ * ; 
Heal and general hermeneuticej or hotter, we w i l l want to make 
e x p l i c i t c e r t a i n qualifications of this view which are only im# 
p l i o i t i n Bultaann* However, w© w i l l not want to subtract from 
or contradict this understanding* But t before we can do t h i s , 
i t w i l l be necessary to give some detailed explanation of 
Bultmann'e hermeneuties* 
b* Historical knowledge arises out of the original situation 
Bultraann says, f i r s t of a l l , that the interpretation of 
historical evidence i s possible only through the knowledge and 
acceptance of the age i n which these events f i r s t took place, ' 
and of the persons who f i r s t discovered and experienced them, 
(1) Von Hoffman, J. Chr# Iw, Bibliaohe Hermeneutic* 1880, p#l f f • 
Quoted by Bultmann i n assays Philosophical and Theological* ! 
p«841* 
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He excesses this negatively i n distinguishing himself from 
Harnaek and the l i b e r a l school* 
For the liberals the great truths of religion and 
ethics are timeless and eternal, though i t i s only 
within human history that they are realised, and 
only i n concrete his t o r i c a l processes that.they are 
given clear expression* But the apprehension and 
acceptance of these principles doea not depend on 
the knowledge and acceptance of the age i n which 
they f i r s t took shape, or of the historical persons 
who f i r s t discovered them# We are a l l capable of 
verifying them i n our own e?$perience at whatever 
period we happen to l i v e * History H*or the Liberals) 
©ay be of academic interest, but never of paramount 
importance for religion* ( 1 ; 
Bultmann gives a positive egression of his own position 
i n such passages ae the following i n which he says i n effect 
that the origins of anything explains much of i t s character or 
nature* Speaking of Hew Testament interpretation, he writes: 
We must make visible whole f i e l d p£ conditions 
aaaft ppsaiblliftiea i n which independent and s i g n i f i -
cant theoldgical phenomena arise and out of which 
the theological and,ecclesiastical forms of the 
early Church gradually grow* (S) 
Commenting on this aspect of Bultmann*s work, Gustav Wingren 
writes* 
& t become3 clear that we can understand the various types (types of piety, preaching, organ* ization etc*) only i n the l i g h t of history* They have a l l originated i n definite historical situa-tions, which easplain much of their structure* (3) 
(31) Kervffma and Myth. p*13* 
(S) e^w Testament Theolomf I . p#64. I t a l i c s BuitmannV* 
(®) Theo^offv i n Conflict* pp* 164-165* 
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This of cows© brings to mind Vieo's understanding that the 
truth or v a l i d i t y (veruiit) of anything anist he informed by &riow<* 
ledge of i t s historical origins (o©rtum)a and that conversely 
the original historical event (eertunO must be informed by a 
o r i t i o a l , rational examination of that event (the verum)* Or to 
put i t differently* event and interpretation must proceed sid©«* 
by^sidej a matter to which we turn now* 
c* "Pre*taider standing" and questioning* 
ihen the historian or theologian approaches the eventf 
person* doctrine etc* i n i t s original situation, he does not do 
so passivelyt Rather, on the basis of some "pre»*understandinsM 
the historian directs a question to that which he wishes to 
understand more f u l l y j he i s 
**«guided by a certain Interest, a certain putting . 
- of • $feefr jtffleffMon;i what i s ay interest i n i n t e l f t r i i i n g the doouiftents? Which ojaestlon directs me to approach 
t|ie text? I t i s evident that the questioning arises 
from a particular interest i n the matter referred to, 
and therefore that a particular understanding of the 
matter i s presupposed* X l i k e to/call this a fire** 
This Mpre*understandingw i s understood f i r s t of a l l and most 
obviously as the emphasis which the historian wishes to make, 
e»g«, p o l i t i c a l , eeonomic, Protestant and so on* Such specific 
emphases are false only when looiced upon as ©schausting the mean* 
(3.) History and Eaehatoloffv« - n. Uf}* I t a l i c s Bultmann's* 
ing of any e v e n t * ^ However thi8,£re*under8tanding»is more 
radical than "being merely the selection of an emphasis or view-
point* 
Already i n choosing a viewpoint there i s at work 
what % may c a l l the existential encounter with 
history*- History gains meaning only when the 
historian stands within history and takes part 
i n histdry*' As 11*0-1 Gpllingwood says j the object 
of historical knowledge i s 'not a mere object, 
something outside the mind which knows i t s i t i s 
an a c t i v i t y of thought, which can be known atQfr 
i n so far as the knowing mind re**enacts i t and 
knows i t s e l f as so doing* «;*,($). 
This means that the historian not only chooses a viewpoint 
but that he also enters into a relationship with or encounters 
the event which he i s studying*' Implied i n t h i s i i s the fact 
that he does not encounter the event passively, but that he 
mu$t be receptive to the eventj and this i n turn implies that 
he must have some Mpre-understanding" of i t * Then, on the basis 
of this Mpre-understandingfi he, to use Gollingwood1 s phrase, 
"puts history to the question"* Of course as a result of this 
questioning he must be prepared to revise hie wpre-understanding? 
even very radically i f necessary* However, without this "pre* 
understandingout of which a question or questions are forntf 
ulated about the event being investigated, the process of his* 
t p r i o a l investigation cannot even start* "Without such a prior 
undeystandina and the questions i n i t i a t e d by i t , the texts are 
(1) Gf * History an<^  Bschatology, 13*118* 
(&) . IbicLa * P*119> ' 
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mute*1*^ ) I t - isi. this same essential process which takes place 
i n those scie n t i f i c experiments i n whioh|, on the basis of a pre* 
understanding, a number of controlled factors are brought to-* 
gatherj and then the question i s asked of the experiments W11S 
A| B| 0, or some other result ensue* la any area of c r i t i c a l 
investigation the subject of study must be "put to the Question1' 
I t follows from this that the knowledge of Sod which i s 
received through the interpretation of (or encounter with) 
Biblical texts (or is* any other way) i s never received passively 
or I n a vacua»| but that i t i s received as a result of question* 
ing based upon a t'pre*understandingtt.% Bultmann writes} 
i f *$2$L PQPPP®§9W^$ Stfi yftoor&a . about events •• ac|iQft of jOrp;^ ^^ <^Qiat»t>o@OQ a t>rior u^erstandin^ 
,. whaOiay i n my case be termed the action of God* l e i ue^ s ^ 
natural events*. And i f •this'le countered by saying t h a t ^ n e i t o r ean man know who God i s before his ':/"•;;,ifesi>a1$0% horf.consequently* what £6df$ action m%-,be>,..then we have • to replyr that • ^aan- may. y^ r^ :.-ijfe^ .b§ , , 
•-.•Xt fj&v [manTWl • existence"• were: not motivatld^whethe^ •:' consciously or ^ na^are,al by the inquiry about &o& i n the sense of .tto rAu^tini"an *tu iios, f ^ i s t ^ ad Te« : 
Id he M e t &od as God i n any manif . Weii neither would he MoW 0od as (k>d; i n any mahifes* 
tation of him* i n human existence an exiateh;y.el3r knofiedge about &od i s alive i n the form of the fnguiry 
about *h^ppi»ess% Salvation*, the meauing of the 
world and history} and i n the inquiry into the real 
nature of each person*s particular 'being*'.* (3) 
this, "prevunderstanding*' which we bring to the interpreta<* 
t i o n of the Hew Testament does not derive only from our inquiry 
(1) P,® Wa, Philoaophio^l and $heoloftieal* p.SG3. i t a l i c s 
••.Bultm%m?a« • Cf « ler^mrn^ • a,nd.' Myffih; PP» 191*19$* 
( s) Bsaays;- ffhilq.ao;phie.ai: ajQd.^heologiea,^.* p*Bfft* i t a l i c s 
Bultmann's. 
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as to "the moaning of the world and of history"* I t also arises 
out- of the knowledge of God which comes to us out of our eacoun-* 
ter, with the events recorded i n the Old Testament* ^  Bultmann 
does not express himself e x p l i c i t l y as to the part ishich the 
Old Testament plays i n forming the "pre~under standing" with which 
we, and especially the earliest Church, approach the event of 
the Christ* At the very least Bultmann would have to say that . 
the Old Testament' i s part of the general inquiry as to "the 
meaning of the world and of history"* But regardless of what 
Bultmann would say* the events of the Old Testament have...a very 
special place i n that general Inquiry* and the following passage 
(the exact reference of which i s obscure) does, or should have* 
particular reference to the Old Testament* 
• # . 
Wor do 1 deny that we can* know the true nature ;©f 
eschatalogioal^eicietenceonly throii^h God*ai reve* 
l&tien of hiisself i n Christ, Our previous isnow* 
ledge of i t was but ignorance and error^ hut i t 
was •OTftffff negative* otherwise the revelation 
could not convey any . real. Imowledge* That reve>* 
lat i o n would not be a l i f ^ shattering event* but 
merely the imparting of information on the subject*(2) 
I n terms of the Old Testament we may say that the revelation 
of Ocd which came out of the experience of the Exodus was per-
meated by "ignorance and error" $ but wo cannot ©ay that that 
revelation was "purely negative"* #or example, we cannot say 
that the;?jf understanding of God as being ifoeir &od and as being 
(1) This i s traditionally expressed by, i n one way or another, 
subsuming the Old Testament revelation under the revelation 
i n Christ* 
(&) e^»r^ m^a. and, % t f o . P*107* I t a l i c s mine* 
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& providing God* was a "purely negative" understanding* Further* 
Bultmann would say that this under standing was part of the "pre** 
understanding"| however imperfect, which enabled the Jews to 
receive the Christ as a " l i f ©^ shattering e v e n t W i t h o u t this 
"pre^understanding" the revelation would have remained mute for 
there would have been no basis upon which to receive i t * 
One might counter this position by saying that God could 
have prepared the hearts of people to receive the Christ under 
any circumstances This i s only a "pious1" and highly abstract 
theory which i s completely divoroed from" the historieal events 
of •Ist Century Palestine* I t i s not a question of vaia* God 
could, do (that Is completely abstract), but what he did do* 
What he did . do was to give to the Jewish people a "pre^uh^r**, 
standing'V^^h enabled certain persons among them to receive 
the Christ as a rtiife«shattoring. event"* To say this i n no way j 
impairs the sovereignty of God; i t merely says that historically 
God chose to act i n this way* 
I f a Mpre<*understanding" was necessary to receive the Christ 
then i t would follow that some "pre«understanding,^ must always 
have been present when revelation was received* When then was 
the absolute beginning of revelation? This i s a question which 
i t i s impossible to answer* We can only say here* perhaps mytho-
logic a l l y , that God has always been with man&indj i n a way which! 
was marlced by ignorance and error, but which was not purely 
negative* This i s not a "pious" theory promoted baeis upon the 
88* 
past; rather i t would seem to indicate something of the his-* 
topically grounded dynamics of revelation* 
We have here a close paraiileX with the section i n our chap* 
ter on CoXlingwood where we discussed the questions What doee 
the historian bring to his d a t a ? ^ We said there that he brings 
hi s t o r i c a l Isnowiedg© and technique to the dat&j and without t h i s 
the data i s mute* unrelated and unenlighteaing fact* Howevert 
to the extent that the historian can bring historical thinking 
to bear upon hie data, to that extent i t can be incorporated 
into a comprehensible historical picture* This previous his**: 
t o r i c a l understanding and technique may be permeated with ignor-
ance and error* and hence i t must always hold i t s e l f open to ; 
correction i n the process of the historical investigation* But 
this previous understanding and tochniojae i s not purely negative* 
I t may be incorporated into the results of the investigation i n 
a modified and oorfected formj or, at the very least* i t i s not 
purely negative i n the sense that without i t the process of 
histo r i c a l thinking cannot begin* The a b i l i t y to do this might 
well be termed a fi^^tt n d e r i ^ i ^ i n g n t . . i * * * * - ^0 wpre*understand-
ing" of the nature and necessity of historical thinking, together 
with the f r u i t s of that thinking i n the.pasi* And where does 
this Mpre^understanding" come from? 
;;lfee/supra* pp.220ff., 
I t i s not a chance product of psychological causes; 
i t i s an idea which every man possesses as part of 
the furniture of his mind, and discovers himself 
to possess i n so far as he becomes cbnscious of 
what i t i s to have a mind*(l) 
The temperature of Golllngwood's statement i s much cooler than 
Bultmann* s ^ , but this i s very close .to what the l a t t e r means 
by "existential 1 1* For Collingwood historical thinking with i t s 
imaginative recreation of the events of history i s "existential"$; 
i t i s part of "the furniture of his mind"j and man discovers him* 
self to possess i t i n so far as he becomes conscious of what i t 
i s to have a mind* 
Vtfhen did the a b i l i t y to think historically originate? 0r 7 
to put i t differently; When did the "pre-understanding" neces^* 
aary f o r h i s t o r i c a l thinking originate? As we discussed earlier, 
i t i s impossible to answer this question; dnst as i t i s impossi-
ble to answer the parallel question i n Bultmanns When did the 
Mpre*unde#standing" necessary for the reception of the revelation 
of (Jod originate? As i n Bultmann revelation must grow out of 
revelation, so i n Collingwoods 
^ h i s t o r i c a l knowledge can only grow out of historical Jsnowledge; i n other words, that his- ' to r i c a l thinking i s an original and fundamental ac t i v i t y of the human mind***(3) 
(1) Collin«wood» The Idea of History. n»&bB» 
(8) For Bultmann*s evaluation of Collingwood (and Croce) i n 
this matter see; iftatpry and Sschatc^o^y* pp* 136, 143*14?. 
(5) Collingwood, oj2,*gi&*., p*£47» 
And elsewhere* 
History does not presuppose mind} JLt i s the l i f e 
of, mind i t s e l f * which i s not mind except so far 
as i t both lives i n historical process and knows 
i t s e l f as so l i v i n g * (1) 
AB long as man has "been man* he has "been historical man., (The 
extent to v/hieh this must be a process i n which mind s.e,lf* 
epnsoiouslv, "knows i t s e l f as l i v i n g " i s not of crucial importan-
ce*) Similarly i n Bultmann, as long as man has been man he has 
"been aware who God is * * * ! * * the inquiry after him*" i t i s this 
"not purely negative" inquiry * together with i t s results > which 
i s the "prewunderstanding" which enables the event of the Christ^ 
to be received as a "life-*shattering event"* 
However, this parallel between theological "pre^understand** 
ing" i n Bultmann and historical "pre~understanding" i n 
Collingwood must be ojualified* The d i f f i c u l t y l&es* as we saifii. j 
earlier i n our examination of Gollingwood*;, i n the ambiguity of 
Collingwood* s statement that "historical Jmowledge i s an original \ 
and fundamental a c t i v i t y of the human mind"* I f this i s meant 
to apply only to those who have been a part of Western c i v i l i a a * 
t i o n during the Christian era* then we would agree with 
Goliingwoodc At one point* but only at one point, Collihgwood 
says that this i s his meaning*^ I f * on the other hand, the 
statement i s meant to apply to a l l ment including those of 
(1) Collingwood* QpiOit* * T>»827» 
(3) , i b i d . * p*l5* 
1 
Greco-Roman c i v i l i s a t i o n and of contemporary Eastern civilination,! 
then i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how the statement can be substantia** \ 
ted. Faced With this ambiguity we w i l l assume that Gollingwood*s i 
position i s the former of these two pos s i b i l i t i e s , and having I 
made thi s assumption, we w i l l agroe with him* 
• * , • . 
This brings us to another related d i f f i c u l t y i n the parallel : 
which we are haying between "pre-i-understanding*1 i n Collingwood 
and Bultmann* This l i e s i n the fact that the theological "pre* 
understanding'* described i n Bultmann i s meant to apply to a l l 
men at a l l timesj but that the historical "pre*understandingw 
described i n Gollingwood applies only to those who participate 
i n Western c i v i l i s a t i o n * In Part IV of this thesis we w i l l argue 
that the h i s t o r i c a l "pre*understanding" of which Collingwood 
speaks i s a derivative of. the theological "pre~understanding" 
tra d i t i o n * however, having admitted these d i f f i c u l t i e s , i t s t i l l 
remains true that there i s a significant parallel between the 
parfc played by "pre^understanding" i n theological and i n his-
t o r i c a l inquiry* And of course, i f historical inquiry i s i n 
fact derived from iiebrew^Christian theological inquiry, then 
this parallel should not come aa a surprise to us* 
In concluding this section on "Pr@*understanding" and 
questioning, i t w i l l be helpful to broaden i t s applicability* , 
When Bultmann takes this posi tion he has i n mind primarily the 
interpretation of the' New Testament* At other places-he states 
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that ihi& approach play© i t s part i u the u^er^tandia^ of any 
historicaivd^mm^ 
elicit, modlf ioations, to those who partioip^tt'ia .the original ". 
historical/eveat.*:" For Ming^M| ;.th#; earliest Church' came to ' 
fo r m u l a t e : . : . t l t $ ; ^ i t Miult• o f ' ' p i ^ i c i p ^ i n t ' iE' t&a f,con^ 
ditions and po s s i b i l i t i e s " of the'historical of their. ' 
own day$ their experience of the Christ* and the Interpretation 
of that experience^ proceeded ,side*byrsid©« ; TM& e^erlehc^ _ 
i t s interpretation, which later was recorded in' th# Hew Testament, 
was i n f orsacd throughout by the ifiaowledge and acceptance of the • 
age i n which the eventstools p l a c e d t h e l^wled^e^an^ ' ' : 
acceptance of' th#; -pre: itippos'ltions; and' thought forms of their"' 
own Sage.*. In. other words, the, way i n which we today experience 
and- interpret.. the event of the''Christ as"t% :is .receded';-ih the. 
Hew Testament:• &#. net-'^Bsen^feia^a^'different 'f$m tiW-way' in. whieKl 
: • ' ' \ • • . . . . . . \ . • . ,t 
\ • 
the • earliest' Church e^eritnecd^and^ iht.e»p:3?ete.d:' that ' same ©v#nt« • 
Both the^ccntwor^y theologian (or:,.:simp3^ £ believe): and th#' 
original''participant,'(e^g^£§tej?} -ataftft in' e ^ e ^ i a l l v - t h e 
same situations; f o r both" must engage i n essentially the mm j 
process of questioning ba#©4 upon an historically delivered and, | 
conditioned '^r^*mhd^rs4jan^in^"i. I n both aa.®es i t i s this < a$t$*&t; 
directed .process which enables, the; ka^gia to b© received- m a . . I 
"life^shattering ev&nt"* This similarity is# i n fact* implied. ! 
at many placed i n Bultmann*s wor&i and this i s $mt tttialf we , 
would expect front a ' hermeneutlc which Strives to 
taa&e visible (to under stands to "re«*en&ct") 
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the. whole f i e l d of • con&itiona and p^sei^iyMea which mad© up 
.th# :origiml revelatory, situation*.'.: ... 
d»: The. relation of .Biblical and general h^^eneutioja • 
.reoen^Sdered*. . 
. We have examiiiied\Bultsjia3m*s. understanding, of. Bi&lic&l .and . 
general'liermeneutieai and we have noted, him consistent, rejeotloji 
W. the- Oart^aian dualism, between, eve&i and, int©.3?p?©.tati©n|, or 
•knowledge .and. f a i t h * With, this bao35gro;tind i t ; now. remains to 
staHMwoinft Bultmann*g distinction betwea Biblical aiidgeneral' 
herraeneuticBji:, ' - " 
; Bultmaim wj?itees '; ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ; 
..feinto;.o&.3^^ tmim : w i i l ' agree -with,this 
Howew^ formulation of the, problem will* not stand' without. 
< j u a l i f i e a t i o ^ ' in;faet,^. B u l t m ^ if-.&t<V 
«re enough to s@yv,-ex$# this*.'. For 0$&tJ$le*;wfe have called attea* 
iien/.at, several- piUutato toBultm&fsa*®' refusal,- to l e t the Mftgfflaa-
be dopondent upon hi s t o r i c a l l y aaoei^tainable oventa wliioli exist 
apart from faith*- How i t i s to just. such tventa existing apaaft, 
f^ em. f a i t h .that g^ne^al'herm^nwi.^.a i s -perfeotly. .applicable '.©aft.-',: 
o^ite^sufficient*. But Bt&tmam w i l l ;not;l#t the foer^gma,: be dgpnd 
dent upon th i s approach .to femowlQage^. i * e * t ! l t . \ i s not.aijfficieat 
i n .-itself for the study of'the Old and Hew Testaments* Tkia %m 
(1) ISfrsaft-a: ghiloaophie^l and.. .Thop^&iea^ p%86$.» Italics. 
Blultmann*'e»/" -
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how tm %$Qm®&®$ &® not oiu?@fts& to mnm &l@ ©ag&lolt 
whin ho Is toai&g ®<3lf**0.QttQ$io'ag ofrout the p$s»%loia of h^#n®utio©( 
&»e ti&iosj. a?or ttoia gootto to bo %M% mtttmm. Is. praooqoled with 
a widow cgnA aioh n«a&S&& p&l©sie whio/h sot© f w t h tint mm® $©&&t«; 
of pijalte&ty betTOixi SltoUoai and floaoraX tef»a@«iti«s@t. d*g«*. 
that footh pttooootit 0& the: basis of a ^^tmdirsitsiidiiig^f both 
gogago $a a pvogoaa of qoneatlottiiiSi in "both there & unity of 
®V#&t latotyvetatioa ami ao oo* (H?hia not Uto oaJy 
InatBite^ Afc whloii tht p^Qdoe^Moa with a polsia&o l©a&® Buitiaam :: 
to mtim o&atoiatt&ta $ub$eat to &iei»t^&©t&ti0&f) 'Let M w r t 
f a ^ ^ t o t i w ma& %® m&® to the; ®%&$mm% that Bibiioal &&& 
g029ei3?al h©*ffitottt&<*8 &s?o &ot aiib^ot to dtf$&mt oon&itiw* 
fh®&wi W tfctft Biblical an& atmo&sft horaes^tto &*$:;th$ 
oasi® ^ taoftn at Wisest that "both h&stotie®& i&$iivjtea* S?h&& 
tioe* mat s$«ftf d£ ftCQP&Bf that, th© goffoxta are th© 
aieiioutio pj^inoipi&is ®a» t>o U80& in « h a a®- to y&el& teuaofe* . 
owt ttoaar «Nm al®o bp; to- proauo® m$o& l i l i t ey* poiitio&l 
his toid a ftis-togy ol1 ajathetiog ©t®* A g&&$L£ @v@tt 03? eowtaa 
of $mm&®%®m** tht s^o&tia$. kfpass itaeft? to a of t » t * : 
ngntgr &m%®M>%m. isto&t to *acSfiiwpoio04*tf, th i hi&toflan of 
m%&$$om.$ &M, tho t h i o i ^ f e * 2*x $ooh twatnoai tt» eano h©## ' : 
aonoutle gvi&oipXoa QJ?G adapted for a clifforont uoej oaoh "bo-* 
tioffiga fetlai only when' i t oMis® to ^sh^|-tfoe mwx$M0 ®i ww/ 
pa#tA6u3&r 
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event* Fox* examples the results of Biblical hermeneutice cannot 
claim to e&hauftt til© meaning of the historical event of the , 
Bxodup* To Mate such a claim* against the psychologist and 
anthropologist ©ay j i s aimpXy awganoa* 
Another way of ©grossing thia ia to say that each diaoipV 
pline has modified the principles of herioeneutioa i n a way 
appropriate to that particular discipline* i n very 8ifliple terms* 
the anthropologist * the historian of religion© and the theologian 
who were respectively studying the Exodus would each aefc a diff<* ; 
erent series of questions of that .event*-. Yet* as we have die-* ' 
cussed* each must engage i n the questioning process* each muai 
permit event and interpretation to control one another* and eaeh 
must derive his results from that ©vent* Bach inquiry would ho 
an historical inquiry proceeding upon the earn© principle© of 
i 
hermeneutica* Yet when m have siaid this about the theologian* | 
and w© do not intend to retract any of i t , we have not said• ®m$y4 
hence modifications* to the principle© of general hermeneutiea 
Which are appropriate to the theologian using Biblical hermen* 
euties? 
H$re w© have a large and d i f f i c u l t question* but i t would 
certainly include the following two modifications* The f i r s t of 
those m would state i n the following way* There ia a "pre* 
understanding51 of God which* however permeated with "ignorance 
and error" # i a not "purely negative'*, This "pre«underatandingM 
hat must be aaid t h i What are the distinctive additions* and 
sea 
both gives x*4s@ to and finds ©apresaion i n th© oaplioit. in&uiry 
as to "th© meaning ©f th© world and history! »;$bo real 
nature of ©aoh person's particular being*w$ an in&airy whioh has 
always found historioal ©agression and which eaa 1?© historically 
studied? $h© nature of thie inquiry may be further indicated by 
stating that I t spoaiss mythologioally Of the ^©ginning" and the 
**endw of the hiatorioal proo©$B# and of th© place of th© i n d i -
vidual who finds himself between this 'beginning" and ''end*** 
©till another way of characterising this inquiry ia to use Paul* 
0!illieh f s terminology and &ay that i n this inquiry W eaEDlieitaff^ 
aaie. queatio&i* whieh are of "ultimate concern " for un* ^ ) 
How this procesfi of ©oming to th© study of historical ©vents 
with a »pa?Q«iind©3?0tandingtt of God* of uei m this ttpre*understan$ 
i n g M aa a basis for aalsihg question© of those ©vents which ep&-
felicity deal with ''th© meaning of th© world and history! an&»#« 
th© real nature of eaeh person'a particular b^ing^-^Hvhfe pxttv 
600* i d distinctive; to Biblical hermen ^ i e a * ^ In oontraist' to 
th|@f we have diaouaafcf^ 
standing 1 1 which enable© th© historian of any aub^iet to recreate 
th© ©vents being studied* and thu© to apprehend them historieailyi 
5?his apprehension reveals to th© historian Jaiowledge about loan* 
his capabilities and nature* However* i t does not reveal m answer: 
(1) s«®#*3^* A3j£B&£< 
(S) I n Part IV vsr© w i l l dieousa how th© ordinary historian 
i m p l i c i t l y deala with those questiona* 
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fttK. to :wth© mmpm of the wotfLd -ai^ l&fctb.^ ^^##*^^i?©ai ••• 
^'tn^e :of .aaoh p@a?9on% p$i3?ti^ it3l3a^ ?••bei^ g^;^ , :• In ms&k mm® - i t i s 
oWJicn**. that no aueh Isnowkfi&ga :$a sought- foy-ov'-'attfeiiiti&f '•'*ig*:#.-$i 
in&n|yi.©:& afcout ^ .Q©ifio l^$tos?to3, events ? a ^ o l i i t o o t w ^ th§ • " 
in^X&sh.-f*utol syatam ©to*;. Hoiw*^. othot f i e l d s of'• 4n<p|s?3r£. • 
WtaJa-'. $®hoo&® of peyoho3.og$r# sr4e3*ct ®uoh • m- 0m% ' in&ight ; 
%n%Q-%M tmtWB 0t wm th&t •i%B,$m®%&%&Qm!m aye swtirafc© •'•' 
t§iapt$d to gouty anew®*?** as to the go&& and mining -of b&etevy*- > 
attempts* and this i s o f a d m i t t e d * do not ®&lm out of 
t^^^^ti^tito'.diaoipxim® * B something #hioh l a integral to . •  • • 
thsaaf wthea? th@3r &#o. imposed i&on the disoip&in^fiif ••flSift ^ ©amgi 
i n imssh attempts is. -not 0©i!t#o34ea t>y. th$ jtotjjy*-'- 1?h© fi?60^n$;: • 
peaotiee of -pluming .sttfth &tt®jipts. i n aonclnding oh©pt@^ tosti*- " 
•fi®& to . this appindod and ^sttflnaid sh^&ot<3#r • • 
: f hi#: tan is th& fi3?jat tttodlf lo&tiott o^  •g®ne:ffa3L fo03?m#n®iati©& 
upon oorap3?ohonsiv& p#ot>l©a of the meaning of h i g t o ^ and" 
-th®. amttyet.. of ©aoh pes^on*® ps$$£croB.aff feoing* Hotmvej?* 
•wh#n.»& #|iy thia-w® r*#t not f o f g l t 'that in..BifcXioa;L hoxnaonentic© 
m.:$& -^MmX-h^mmmv^im there- is. the sa*a8 fmetion&i 3?olo 
-t^sr l'p^ i ^ a^0tanding , ,i th© asaa® questioning of hi^torioai; 
#vont| tho mm A&seaaftgy unity of event and int§s?pi»©tationi and 
tiie same ciQiaancl tlaat. the results of the investigation arise out 
of th<$. ©ven%;&nd *JH* not impowd upon. i i # . 
to 1» f onnd :&n ,B|fc*Lio&X hepmenf-ati^i.: • mufiiftf i t s -explicit 
Ing with th© .BI&ilioBX do#iaffl©nt$ i n to l i g l i t throw 
The second modification of general herjjieneutics which we 
rauet s a i l attention to i s -.that i n Biblical hermeneutica certain 
hi s t o r i c a l event® have a transcendent reference* For examplet 
i n the events of the .Basodus there i s discovered the operation of 
a (Jod who Ju&gee* guides and provides for Hia people* This God 
i s seen nowhere, .else but i n these events and i n hie people*s 
reception of these events* yet this immanence (lorn not exclude 
the transcendent r©fer^no@* In the Escodue two factors are at 
wor&i firBt> the^pro^tmdorstandingw or search of the Hebrews 
for Gods secondly* the events, of the Sxodua which enabled the 
Hebrews to oee i n these events (and nowhere else) He. who ' , ; ' 
their $od* &&% us repeat that the ttpre>understandingM (i*e»j» -.. 
the search for and *%ot ptirely negative" understanding of (Jod) 
which i s at worls here cam© i t s e l f from a former revelation of Go* 
and that i t i s impossible to speak meaningfully about the begin-
ning of thi® "pre~understanding% 
How i n thie second characteristic peculiar to Biblical 
hermeneutioe? i*ei*|, the transcendent reference of historical 
events studied i n Biblical herraeneutice, we have a characteristic 
which decidedly sets i t apart from general hermeneutics* But* 
once again th i s i s not an absolute, distinction between Biblical 
and other forms of historical inquiry» For example$ a study of • 
Xmpreseionistio and poat-Isapresaionistic painting (certainly j 
not overtly religious) would raalce reference to certain factor® \ 
which f i n d e^resaion i n the paintinge* and yet which transcend 
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those paintings* Theae factors transcend color, volume and 
formj and yet they are found nowhere else, "but i n that color, 
volume and form. However, this similarity i s only analogical} 
for the aesthetic qualities which transcend color, volume and 
form do not transcend this world, In such a study a considera-
tion of Van Qogh1© "Sunflowers" would give us a.perception of 
those flowers and of their beauty which cannot simply be reduced 
to color, volum.® and form, i , e * f i t transcends those factors. 
Yet that beauty, has no existence apart from this world* Or to 
put i t i n other words, that beauty which transcends the painting 
has been entirely created by the a r t i s t ; but the re a l i t y which 
Biblical hermeneutics discerns transcending the events of the ;: 
Bxodus were perceived and formulated by man, but certainly noi 
created by man* This radical transcendental reference of those 
events which are the subject of Biblical hermeneutics, as con-* 
trasted with the limited and analogical ••transcendental reference 
of other types of hermeneutics> forms a distinctive characteris<-
t i c of Biblical hermeneutics* 
Bultmann recognises this special characteristic of Biblical 
hermeneutics when he protests that the kerygma cannot be supper^ 
ted by histo r i c a l l y ascertainable events which exist apart from 
f a i t h * How this i s another way of saying that the general her-
meneutics appropriate to historical events, and by which they , 
are hist o r i c a l l y perceivedare not adequate for the events of 
teeryfana* Why?. Because they, i n contrast to Biblical her-? 
meneutics, are not adequate to deal with the radical transeen-
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dental reference which i s a part of Biblical events* I t i s 
this transcendental reference which, through the operation ;of 
the Holy S p i r i t , must he appropriated i n f a i t h and decision, ; 
Once again this i s not without analogies i n general hermeneutics; 
hut i t i s vain to maintain that the kind of f a i t h and decision 
which the historian of art or polities brings to his subject i s 
to be equated with that which the theologian brings to the 
fcerygma* Thus Bultiaann has rendered Biblical hermeneutios a 
service i n emphasising what i s often denied, obscured or ignored* 
namely* that there are many similarities between general and 
Biblical hermeneutics* However, as we have shown, we must be 
more ex p l i c i t than Bultmann about the differences between these 
two hermeneutics* 
5* The eternal contemporaneity of the Word of Gpd* . 
Having examined Bultmann*s understanding of Biblical her* 
aeneutica, l e t us now turn and' see how this affects his under-' 
standing of the Icea^ /ama* i t s roeeption by man, and i t s expression 
i n the l i f e of the Church* This w i l l be a f u l l e r and more par* 
• • • * 
tioUlar exploration of those herineneutical principles which we 
have already discussed« 
In our foregoing discussion, and, especially i n our examina* 
tio n of the role of rtpre«*understandingV i n Bultmann, i t has been 
clearly implied that the Word of. God i s t r u l y received only when 
the Word i s recreated or relived by the hearer. In the following 
passage Buitraana e x p l i c i t l y states that this i s hi© understanding 
of how a l l historical knowledge is received* 
Interpretation lacks understanding i f i t Investigates 
the text i n accordance with dogmatic propositions con** 
sidered as th© result of scientific research! and i f 
i n consequence i t takes th© text i n ojaeatlon as the 
"source" of a particular stage i n th© history of 
philoaophyp and thus sees this history as an event 
which l i e s i n the past, instead of revl t a l i sins; i t 
Bultmann then goes on to develop this i n a passage reminiscent 
of our earlier discussion of Vico, Oollingwood and especially 
Croc©* 
Heal understanding would* thereforebe paying heed 
M q u e s t i o n t>oae& t ^ Q^yfe which J O S a i 
>vorg» and t h e ^ f u l f i l l m e n t ^ of one's own Individuality 
wemld consist i n the richer and deeper opening up of 
one*s own possi1?ilities-*--in being called forth out 
of one*s self (that i s , out of one*s Incomplete* inert 
self which i s always f a l l i n g into th© danger of per-
sistent devotion to the status quo) by the work*{2) 
The interpreter enters into a l i v i n g relationship with the ©vent 
recorded or proclaimed* and i n so doing there takes place a 
realization of one*s own possibilities. Hot© that this i s not 
a guasi^biological concept of the unfolding of innate human 
potentialities? rather i t takes place only when the event (oj^r* 
side and independent of the hearer) i s "re-enacted" by the 
historian* How does this apply to the reception of the Word of 
(3*) I|*ft&ES^  ^  Theological. p»S46«Italics mine. 
(2) ibid»« p*351» I t a l i c s Bultmann*s* 
<^ od? Conaf^ni^ 
t& not f a i t h simplythe hearing of Scripture as the 
Word of God? That i s indeed so, hut only when 
Scriptureis understood neither as a compendium of 
dootrines nor as document enshrining the beliefs 
of other people* yet inspiring enough to evoke rel«* 
iglous experiehce in; us*. I t i s so only when Scrip* 
ture i s heard as a word addressed personally to 
ourselves, as kerygma~*-*-i*.e:«when thei ejcperienee 
consists i n encounter and response to the address* 
That Seriptu#0 i s the Word of God i s something 
which happens only i n the here and now of encounter t 
i t i s not a fact susceptible to objective proof* (1) 
Thei'experience of receiving the Word of God consists i n encounter 
and response (obedience)* One cannot encounter a doctrine* fact* 
chronicle or anything ©la© from the realm of subject and object* 
I and It?* as long as i t remains i n that realm* Uor can one 
respond i n obedience to such things* 1 can only encounter and 
respond i n obedience to. that which i s l i v i n g for me her© and now*1 
• i ! • • •"'Y.',-X-.'.;ii»:}: • . 
Certainly this i s w r i t large throughout the Old and Hew Testa^nt| 
The Word of God i s eternally contemporary* 
But i f i t i s true that the proclamatiQli of the salva* 
tion*oceurrence i s not a preparatory tpub^ect*oh3eo^l 
instruction which' precedes the actual demand for f a i t h * 
but i s i n i t s e l f * the c a l l for f a i t h or the challenge 
to give up one*a previous selfsunderstanding or the 
cry* "Be reconciled to Godi'1**—if that i s so* then that 
means that ther s^ivation^occurrenoe i,a nowhere present 
tiroittii<fin£-ffo'fflt'pt preachinftt A merely "reminiscent" historical account referring to what happened i n the 
past cannot make the salvation-ooeurrenoevisible*** i 
The salvation**Cccurrence i s eachat©logical occurrence 
just i n t h i s f a c t , that i t does not become a fact of 
(1) ^ m M J l i t ^ ^ 
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the past "but constantly takes place anew i n the 
present* ( l ) (£) 
And eXsewhert he writes$ 
Thus the cross and passion are ever-present - » «.• 
r e a l i t i e s * How l i t t l e they are confined to the 
' events of the f i r s t Good Friday i s attply iia®s.#» • • 
trated by 'fene words which a disciple of s%* Pan! 
puts into- his Eiaster% souths,- ^ mm 1 rejoice; i n 
ay sufferings f or your saise* and f i l l up on m 
' ' 'part'that which i s lacking of the a f f l i c t i o n s of , 
Ghtfi&t i n m fl$sk foi? his hody1© whieh £» 
th# Chu•s?eh•', (Gel* i * &&).* -
i n i t s #ed@s&ptiv$ aspect, the cress of C h r i s t - • 
i s no tm$® mythical event s hut a permanent his* 
t o r i e a l fact. originating i n the pa&t histOffie:s& 
event which is. the erucifiasion of Jesus* (3)' 
, The Bible i s the record of the a c t i v i t y of the Word of God* 
both «$> Son and as Holy Spirit» i n the hearts and li v e s of God*® 
people* But i t i s not i t s e l f the f o r i of God* The ted of God 
cannot become fossilised i n a book* not even the Bible* The 
Word of God oan only appear i n the hearts and lives of B&» 
people* The Bible i s the principal (but not only) and tr a d i t i o n * 
$y,y accepted (estnonised) insta^utaent whereby the ford of Go& 
appears i n His people * "And causing this, to happen i s exmetlf 
what constitutes the a c t i v i t y ,pf the s p i r i t * 1 * 
••^ ,.j.the Hiveiation brou$%t by «r$sus i s neither a 
sum'of doctrines .nor a. terminated occurrence 'but 
BUltmann,«i ' . 
(8) wPrea©Mn^,> here and throughout BuXtmann,often seems:to 
imply an undue emphasis on what takes place from the pulpit 
on Sunday 'morning* although he would deny that "preaching" 
i s ex#lttsiveiy t h i s activity;* For our purposes "preaching* 
also includes worship, the sacraments and the t o t a l l i f e 
of the church* 
(3) Kervmaa and lavth,*. p*®?* 
that i t i s what i t i s only lay; constantly occurring 
anew* And causing this to happen i s exactly what 
constitutes the a c t i v i t y of the Spirit* As a matter 
of fact* Jesus brought no "doctrine" capable of being 
summarised i n propositions; his word, we have seen* i s 
he himself* But what he i s * what his coming and his 
going meaft* what i t means to be encountered by him**-*-
namelys the M s i f t l n s t " (krlsls) of the world which i s 
th© judgement of i t - * — t i l l this one must know with 
every greater c l a r i t y * and must acheiv© this know* 
ledge anew i n ©very How* The s p i r i t ' s "testimony" 
which "calls to mind" Jesus' words consist i n the 
fact that Jesus* word i s constantly being understood 
anew while i t remains the same-—-indeed* i t remains 
the same because of th© very fact that i t i s con* 
stantly new* This i s the way i n which the Spirit 
" g l o r i f i e s " Jesus (John 16sl4)* (!) 
This then i s how Bultmann conceives the Word of God as being 
received! The Word of God i s proclaimed, the hearer relives or 
"re-enacts" the event being proclaimed* and his response to i t 
i s a decision of f a i t h (obedience)* 33ach of these three steps 
(of which th© last two cannot he separated i n actual ©scperience) 
take place through th© operation of the Holy Spirit* 
This i s an expropriate plaoe to mention a major criticism • 
leveled against Bultmann's by his most careful and dust c r i t i c s * 
e#g#* Father L* Malevess and dustaf Wingren* This criticism has 
to do with the status which Bultmann gives to the historical 
©vents upon which the ^yygaft i s founded* Their contention i s 
that the historical r e a l i t y of these events i s not adequately 
affirmed i n Bultmamaj or that i t Is not affirmed i n the right 
way* 
CO Theology of the .Maw Testament . I I > p*39. 
tfriless the gospel spea&s--of something that has 
happened,*it i s not possible to retain the gospel1a 
sentence of ^ ustifioation which ma&es the forgiveness 
of ©ins a gph; rather than something whioh the hoaxes? 
accomplishes by his own decisions* When the concrete 
events i s lost* the conception of a g i f t i n the word 
i s also l o s t * {%) 
First l e t i t be said that a general subjective interpieeta* 
t i o n of Eultmahn*s theology w i l l not stand* This should he evi* 
dent from our foregoing discussion* The fact that such an inter * 
pretation i s not legitimate i s argued "by Father Malevea (who eer* 
tainl y does not come to Suitmann with pre-established sympathies 
for M i ) i n fffte ^ h r i s t i a ^ uopasipto and |&yth«^ i t would he 
superfluous to repeat that argument here* 
However; beyondthis general sub^eotive interpretation which 
i s not t e n ^ t b l e # there remains the question of the status of 
B i b l i c a l events* !i?hat i s to say* the events are affirmed, but 
are they iaffirmed i n the right way? ialevea writes s 
Thue $he historic Christ 'remains* i n BultmanU^a 
view?| the piaee off ;and the decisive moment f o r * on*encounter with God* (3) 
There are passages throughout Bultmann which say 3ust this* But 
this i s not sufficient to establish that Bultmann*s understanding 
of the historiciGhrist i s adequate* Malevea feels that i n 
(1) Wingrxni Quataf # Theology i n Conflict. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh 19681 p4139.t 
(8) Maieveat The Christian Message and Myth* SCM Press $I.ondon..|; 1 9 6 ^ , * ^ 
(3) flbid* > p#UV. (4) e-i,gt| Kerygtma and Myth* p*S07« 
Bultmann1s thought Christ i s "we do not know whyy the human 
organ of the Word of Godj that i s all? hi® Person lacks mystery» 
and has no peculiar relation to the God who sends him**;"^ 
Much could "be said of this criticism% I t i s certainly an 
arguable point of view, for these matters are not developed I n 
Bultmann* On the other hand i t i s more d i f f i c u l t to see dust 
what Malevea wants* For Bultmann,; Jesus the Christ i s he who 
/brings to us the Word of God* i n this i s implied the greatest 
possible mystery* although admittedly i t i s not dwelt upon> 
His peculiar relationship to God i s that i t i s Christ alone who 
brings to us the Word of God* This certainly i s |hj, essential 
characteristic of hi4 "peculiar relation to the God who sendee 
hia" f although oncei agaiit this i s not dwelt upon* The question 
wnich remains i n one'*s mind i s whether or not what jyjaievea wants 
i s a development of this mystery and peculiar relationship i n 
terms of prophecy* miracle and subdect^object discussions of the 
relation of the three persons i n the Godhead* A discussion of 
these matters* at least i n the traditional forms* i s largely 
cut off to Bultmann by his very presuppositions• Therefore one's 
estimate of Buitmaun w i l l vary aoeording to the value which one 
places upon the traditional formulations of these matters* 
S t i l l taking Maleveg and Winga^n as representative of the 
best criticism of Bultm&nn* they both bring their criticism to 
(1) ialeveg* £&4£l$»* P*117* 
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a head i n their remarks about Bultraanh's treatment of the 
Resurrection* Maleves- complains that i n Bultmann Christ's 
"Resurrection or his survival are not important for our salva* 
t i o n # " ^ ;Uhls i s probably Eultmahn's rn^st vulnerable point. 
A great deal wore work w i l l have to be done on his understanding 
Of the R^surrection f and his work supplemented i n this area. 
Yet i t i s to Bultmann*s credit that he has opened up discussion 
about the Resurrection i n a radical way* I f we a r e i ^ C y e a l j ^ 
turn our backs oh any notion of a resusitated corpse -r and i f 
w© are to do dustiee to the strange and varied accounts of the 
Resurrection to be found i n the Hew Testament! i f we are to do 
t h i s * then certainly something more has to be said than i s being 
Said i n most contemporary theology* Certainly devotional lan* 
guage and subject-object formulations do not offer the only 
alternatives here* Bultmann may be pointing the way to an alte r * 
nativej although few, least of a l l Bultmann himself* would be 
inclined to look upon this e f f o r t as a " f i n a l answer"*, 
4»* Historical knowledge as the only access to the knowledge 
of &od#. 
W© turn now to an examination of some implications of what 
we have said about Bultman»% interpretation of the nature of 
hi s t o r i c a l event* Bultmazfcn asks: tot i s the purpose of his* 
t o r l c a l study? His answer follows naturally out of what we 
have already said about him*. I t iss 
(1) isaleves* o&*oJ&** p*117 Cf # Wingrin* oj£*M£#t pO.39* cf • a l s o Niehuhr, R.R., Resurrection and H i s t o r i c a l Reason, pp. 60ff. 877 
***the ultimate purpose i n the study of history i s 
to. realisse consciously the possibilities i t affords 
for the understanding of human existence* (!) 
Applied to Scripture this means that i n the study of 
Scripture 2 learn of posslhilities for human existencej but* 
more, X also "hear things [possibilities] about m£ ojn, existence 
which v i t a l l y concern i a e " ^ j things of eternal eonaeg.uenee* 
That i s to say, the study of Scripture opens to me possibilities 
which are similar | yet different, from those which open to me, 
say, i n the study of the l i f e of Goethe* This similarity and 
difference i s the same similarity and difference we discovered 
i n our discussion of the similarities and differences i n general 
and B i b l i c a l hermeneutios* l«e*» only the Biblical events have 
a transcendent reference which open to me "possibilities" of 
eternal conseguenee* Yet* i n spite of these differences, i t i s 
s t i l l true that al^, human "possibilities" are opened to me only* 
through the appropriately conducted s tudy of historical event * 
i*e#, a l l isnowledge depends upon experience* 
*.**all knowledge depends on experience* Wov i f experience changes i n the course of time, then knowledge i s a daughter of time* That means that knowledge of tr u t h has historical character f i t depends on the situation i n time* (3) 
(1) Emm*MAM&fa*, P» *9%* 
(£) ihid*» p-*, 192* I t a l i c s mine. 
(3) history and Eaeha, toloay T p, 9, This statement arises i n oonitlinotion with a discussion of Bacon and Locke, but i t 
i s an integral p&rt of BUltmann1 s thinking* 
Another way of expressing this I s to say that a l l knowledge i s 
arrived at by the hlstorioal methodj and the historical method 
concerns i t s e i f with the events which make up the l i f e of men* 
with "the actual l i v i n g of me% which i s true h^tory"*- 3*^ And 
i t i s through this historical method that we are enabled to take 
possession of and to make our own the possibilities which men 
have achieved i n the past* as well as realising new human pes* 
s i b i l i t i e s appropriate to our own situation i n time* Man i s 
f\ "being on the way% 
This applies not only to individual men* but also to human 
greu$s£ and $mong human groups i t applies especially to the 
phuroh with i t s continuous and BOlfMsonsoious historical exist&V 
eneer TheChurch also realises i t s existence (realiaes: that i t 
-|3a&'an o&istenoe ..oozing out of the 'past^ and reaM^s/ne^f orias 
\ f o r - I t s existence i n the pro sent) as i t nr©•*enaets,l the Christ 
•:'^vent' i&^m&®:~(^Mi&$ historical circumstances* The Church 
too; i s "being on t he wa y1' * ^ 
So i t i s that man realises who he i s i n the course of his 
individual history* This involves appropriating to himself the 
experiences (the already realised historical possibilities) Of 
mankind by means of the historical process of recreating those 
possibilities i n the present* Among these historical posaibili* 
ties are thosk^ recorded i n Scripture which t e l l of God's dealing/ 
with man. 7 
&) ^m^Losssr. of the Hew Testament^ P»30B. 
These too may bo appropriated by "r©*©nacting" them i n the ! 
present* (The way i n which this i s done i s a s we have dig* | 
•scribed| both similar to and different from the way i n which ? ! 
general historical possibilities are appropriated*) For the I 
Christian the context i n which this takes place i s the Churoh| 
a hi s t o r i c a l l y founded and developing body * indwelt by th© | 
Holy S p i r i t * and i t s e l f a part of God*s dealing with man* 
Prom this i t follows that the only access we have to God 
i s h i s t o r i c a l * i*©* * through what God has done and continues to i 
do i n history* This includes what God has done i n n o n ^ i b l i c a l ' 
history i n order to lead man into a search for* and a "not 
purely negative'" understanding of. Himself? i t includes the 
©vents of Scripture which are proclaimed to men todays and i t 
includes the ttre«*enaotmentM of these events (by means of preach*; i 
ing* by means of the sacraments) within the Spirit^indwelt 
Churoh* I t i s on the basis of this understanding that 
Bultmann can say that "we cannot say. what God i s l i k e i n himself* 
but only what he does to u s * " ^ For us God i s what he doesi 
supremely what he does i n Christ* 
I f t h is i s understood we can then understand the v a l i d i t y 
Of Bultmann*s position when he says? " I am interpreting theo?u> 
logical affirmations as assertions about human l i f e # H ^ This 
i s not to be perversely understood as meaning that transcendent 
(1) &mmjaN6J83^. • 
(s) p « . - -
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reference i s thereby excludedj but rather as God working i n and 
through human l i f e * . .POP how else Can we make affirmations about 
God*; A l l we know of God**-^ 03p? : I f i t i s preferred f a l l that God 
has made Imam of Himseif*--Hs what has been humanly (historiea<i-
i l y ) perceived and huma&Ly (historically) formulated* we know 
God by what he does to us and for us In history* and supremely 
i n Jesus Christ* What other possibility exists? 
I f theolo&ieal af f inflations are assertions about human 
l i f e , then i t i s consistent f o r Bultmann to say that "The only 
true interpretation of esohatoiogy i s on© which makes i t a real 
experience of human l i f e * " ^ "3?hi© "real experience of human 
l i f e * ' includes f i r s t of a l l the historical event of Jesus m 
the Christ* I t also includes every instance i n which i n the 
context of an individual's historical existence the event of the 
Christ i s recreated i n f a i t h and brought up into the present* 
$ais too i s a "real experience of human l i f e " * 
Bultmann would seemingly exclude any future and f i n a l 
esehatologlcal event* $o this we would only add that such an 
©vent i s thought of as being potentially a { ,real experience of 
human l i f e w | a fact which i s t e s t i f i e d to i n that i t i s conceived 
of i n terms of the perfection and completion of the historically 
delivered and his t o r i c a l l y re&lissed experience of the new l i f e 
i n cifest* .whiott'we now possess,. But be that as i t mayf 
Bultmann?& eschatolpgy has made the following important contri* 
butions to eontemporai»y ehristian theology* First t i t has 
CO ^©ry^ an^ liythy p, 106# 
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and that God*s preparation for this event can be seen i n history, 
Thus the affirmation reveals to the "believer aspects of h i s t o r i * 
cal events which were not at the time evident, ©*g»i the giving 
of the Law a© being a preparation for the Christ* 
But beyond this „ w© say i n this affirmation of the pre-* 
existence of the Christ that before the creation of the world 
the Christ existed with the Father* How when we say this we are 
saying something "logically strange"**~wthological ? i f you w i l l . 
I t s real significance or content i s historical} for when we j 
extend the existence of the Christ into preservation we are - j 
really decribing a quality or aspect of the existence of the 
Christ i n the historical process* In short* everything we say 
i n this area i s s t r i c t l y a projection from the historical basis* 
6* - Historian and theologians similarity and difference* 
The above section concludes pur exposition of Bultmann's 
work insofar as i t deals with the place of history i n the study 
of theology* Before going on to see to what extent Bultaann 
delivers a valid corrective to the Christian attitude toward 
history* l e t us f i r s t see what are the similarities and d i f f s r * 
ences between his position and that of Vico, Croee and Colling* 
wood* ' Such a comparison has been implicit i n muoh of what we 
have already said$ and we have raade brief specific comparisons 
i n passing* However i t w i l l be helpful to summarize i n an ex** j 
p l i o l t and comprehensive way the similarities and differences 
between these writers before proceeding* 
BUltmann himself gives an estimate of hie work i n relation. 
to Croee and Collingwood*: 
Colllngwood as well as Oroce i s aware of the , . 
h i s t o r i c i t y of the human being* and*li&e Crooe* 
he avoids the conseQuenee of r@lativ3.sm and 
nihilism* Fop every now* every moment* i n i t s 
. historical relatedness of course * has within 
i t s e l f a f u l l meaning*. $he past from which 
every present springs i s not a determining past* 
out a past offering to the present the problems 
which demand solution or development * In Joaowing 
his situation the individual knows himself * There** 
for© the present i s meaningi'ul for the individual• 
Of course, to aafe for meaning i n history i s not 
allowable- i f one i s asking for meaning i n the sense 
of goal* The. meaning of history ie immanent i n 
history, because history i s the history of mind* 
And therefore i t may be said* as we said of Groce, 
that for Gollingwood every present moment i s an 
eeehatologleal moment* and that history and eseha~ 
tology are identified* (!) 
inhere i s nothing i n this statement from which we would wish to 
demur# I t applies i n large part to Vico also* 3?he phrase "his-
tory and esehatology are identified" i s * of courses Bultosuin's 
own* However i t does not do violence to the sense of Oroce i s 
and Colllngwood*s thought i n this area* In neither i s there any 
looking forward to a meaning or fulfillment which i s to taJtee 
place i n the future* The meaning of history i s embodied i n the 
concrete h i s t o r i c a l event as that i s created or recreated* One 
could say that they have a secularized form of realized eseih&to* 
logy* But i t i s secularisedj i t i s based on general hermeneu-
tie e j i t does not and cannot recognize the Biblical hermeneuticsj 
i t does not and cannot reoo&niae the Biblical hermeneutics which 
(1) ffisftory;.., and Ksohatology* pp» 135*186« I t a l i c s Bultmann^&t 
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are proper to, BaXtnana'a procedure* i^e,, as we have discussed* 
the hermeneutiee which recognizee the transcendent reference of 
eternal significance which certain Biblical events have* 
There are other points of similarity with Vice and Croce 
and Cpllingwood* Because of the extended discussion which we 
have given to them* i t w i l l suffice to make a "brief summary of 
each* 
F i r s t * there i s the conviction that the meaning of events 
cannot "be known on a s t r i c t subject<*ob;}eoi basis $ but only by 
the historian or theologian entering into the event and discover* 
ing i t s ttetemal contemporaneity% There are neither objective 
h i s t o r i c a l events with a meaning apart frota the historian which 
can be "pigeon holed" to produce history; nor are there h i s t o r i c 
cally ascertainable miracles which can be used to bolster tip our 
f a i t h * 
Secondly} there i s the belief that knowledge can only be 
attained hi s t o r i c a l l y * I n the ease of the historian this Is at-
tained by the us® of general hermeneutios; and i n the case of the 
theologian through the us© of Biblical hermeneutics* 
Thirdly * there i s the understanding that man comes to dis- • 
cover his possibilities through the encounter with historical 
event* This sim i l a r i t y , although present between Bultmann and 
a l l three of the historians studied * i s most marked between 
Bultmann and Croce» 
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Lastly, and this i s the main burden of the discussion at 
the beginning of this sectioni there i s the conviction that the 
meaning of events i s to be found i n the events and not i n the 
future i ...if.e,t.f.. the meaning of history i s realised nowj or.*any 
"transcendent" meaning i n history i s immanent i n historical 
events* 
As to the difference between Bultmaxm and the historians, 
there i s only one $ but that difference i s a very important one* 
The historian i n his use of general hermeneutics has no place j 
for any transcendent reference of eternal significance« This j 
i s a peculiarity of Biblical hermeneutics« 
Concerning these matters i n which there i s agreement be^ v | 
tween Bultmanh and Vice* Croce and Collingwood the Christian 
should have no qause to object* However? as to the meaning of ' 
history being found i n the present as opposed to the future, 
we would only want to malee this qualifying statement t This does \ 
not necessarily exclude a " f i n a l consumption" of meaning i n the 
f u t u r e * T o make this qualification does not alter the v a l i d i t y 
of anything that Bultmann has said i n this matterj 3ust» as we 
stated e a r l i e r i to broaden his conception of preaching does not 
detract from anythiijg he has said about that a c t i v i t y • There j 
i s , i n both cases* at the most, a task of stating what has been j 
l e f t unsaidi but not of retracting anything that has been said* 
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6* Bultm&nn*© Corrective to the Chx&stiah Attitude to History* 
fhe immanence of trmascendence* 
I n this.t and i n the concluding section of this chapter, on 
Bultmann* we want to c a l l attention to the way i n which 
Bultmann1© work can c l a r i f y christian thought about history and 
th® place of history i n theology* This w i l l be largely a devel* 
opment of ideas which have been implied or stated i n the fore* 
going discussion* 
that we. Mm said so far indicates that Bultmann has demoted 
much thought to the nature of history and i t s place i n theology* 
His treatment of i t i s both self*eonscsious and subtle* Yet there 
are many passages i n Bultmann whiehj, taken i n isolation* woitld 
seem to indicate that he had no interest i n history* These 
passages have been a persistent source of misunderstanding for 
contemporary theology*^ For example? 
I t would be wrong at this point to j?aise again 
the problem of how this preaching tpf the Cross 
of Christ] arose historically, though thaft could 
vindicate i t s fcffiath> That would be to t i e our 
sCOT lW?*3Ss n&%& of God to the results of his* 
torieal research* (S) 
! 
On the face of i t t h i s passage seems to indicate an indifference 
to whether or not the Crucifixion over took place or not* A 
( l ) For a recent example of this see; Robert a*. T#A*# Bftatery 
gad, Christian Apolo&etift* g*P»0»K«.» tondon* 196Q,p\t.o. 
(0) e^iry.^ ma:,:and, -Mfcjftu p«4&» I t a l i c s mine* • 
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c r i t i c who wished to do so could us© this and similar statements 
to demonstrate that Bultmann i s not interested l a the historical- j 
l y based keyy^ aaa*- but only i n "timeless truths* existentially 
apprehended* This interpretation i s Qf%m placed upon such 
passages* And yet this i s the same man whose great concern for 
the proper interpretation of history we have already discussed* 
However* a second reading and a l i t t l e thought i s sufficient 
to reconcile this seaming contradiction* I t i s of course not the 
case that Bultmann i s indifferent to history* a l l m have said 
up to now* .his. The ffhfroloffiir of Ifhe Hew l^estament*. and indeed his 
very programme of demythologiaation* a l l indicate that this i s 
not the case* The explanation l i e s i n the phrase which we have 
emphasised above: %»i:«s though that could vindicate i t s truth* 1? 
The historian can* theoretically at least, vindicate the^ t r u i ^ ©f: 
the statement that Jesus of Ba«areth was crucified at a certain \ 
place at a certain $im©> and for a particular reason* But the 1 
H r u t h w of the crucifixion f o r the Christian includes more 
than just that event* I t also includes a transcendent reference>! 
i,e»j i n the Crucifixion of Jesus the Christ God acted for me 
and f o r a l l mankind. How* as w© have seen, i t i s just t h i s 
matter of transcendent reference which has no place, at least 
e x p l i c i t l y , i n the work of the historian as he proceeds aeoord* 
lag to the principles of general hermeneutics, Therefor© i t i s 
impossible that the historian could ever vindicate the truth 
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£or f a l s i t y ) of the Christian understanding of the Cx'ueifixion*:> 
So | i t i s not that Bnitaann i s disinterested i n the aistorical 
basis of the feex^ffltai. on the contrary| Ms interest i n this basis 
had led him to see the true status of the historical basis* I t 
3Ust happened that that status i s not what i t has of ten been ! 
thought to be* 
When this same understanding of the place of history i n j 
theology i s applied to miracles the consequences of this point i 
of view become clearer and less acceptable to those committed to I 
the traditional ^ formulation of this aspect of the Christian f a i t h * 
Bultmami writees 
Mythological thought regards the divine a c t i v i t y ! 
whether i& nature or i n history> as an interference 
With the course of nature^ h i s t ^ y * or the l i f e of i 
th#so u l i a tearing of i t asunafep^ra miracle* i n ] 
fact* £huil -IX objectifies the divine ac t i v i t y and 
projects i t on to the plane of worldly happenings* \ 
A ii-^ acle**«Ht#e#^ . an act of Qod«*«-*is not visible or j 
ascertainabie liJse worldly events* «*but something 
accomplished the® i n such a way that the clvsed i 
• weft of history as i t presents i t s e l f to objective ! 
observation i s l e f t undisturbed* $o every othes» 
eye than the eye of f a i t h the action of God i s 
hidden* Only the "natural" happening i s generally 
Visible and ascertainable^. In i t i s accomplished 
the hidden act of &od.t ( l ) ! 
I t w i l l be seen that t h i s understanding of miracle i s the same 
as that of the Crucifixion which we have already discussed j 
4ust as the transcendent reference of the Crucifixion cannot be 
his t o r i c a l l y v e r i f i e d ! so too i s the transcendent reference of 
the miracles h i s t o r i c a l l y unverifiable* 
(1) ^|y&ma and Evth» p* 19?*. I t a l i c s Bultwann's* Of * pp> 808 * 
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What i s involved here? I t i s not fundamentally a case of 
mythological vs.*. demythologi zed thinkingj much less are the 
battle lines to he drawn somewhere i n the d i f f i c u l t realm of the 
interpretation of miracle* Many c r i t i c s have pointed out that 
Bultmann has his own mythology; that he has "re^mythologiaed" 
^he kQry«ma« Bultmann concedes that this may be soj only main** 
iaining that hie has succeeded i n removing myth "i n the tradition-
a l sense**.*, the kind of mythology which has become antiquated 
with the decay of the mythical world v i e w * ' 1 ^ ^ But this 
focus of attention should not be the primary one I n this con* 
troversy* ! 
fhe primary focus should bet and Bultmann wishes i t . t o be, 
;Upon the interpretati'on of history which w© use i n our study of 
the Bible* As we had occasion to mention i n our discussion of 
the motivation of Bultmann*s work, he challenges the v a l i d i t y 
of a s t r i c t sub^ect*ob3ect framework f o r h i s t o r i c a l tMnkingj i f 
you w i l l , he challenges the sub#ot*ob;Ject mythology* I n simpler 
termsj he denies that there are historically ascertainable 
events (e*&.| miracles) which exist .a^ar| ffrom faith; and yet 
which can be used to support that fait&« I t i s i n this sense 
that "we cannot t i e bur f a i t h i n the word of God to the results 
of h i s t o r i c a l research* * Bultmann points out that the mytholo* 
(X) Jip^^ ^MMfP-^* 
(2) This i s not to be taken as implying that we consider 
Bultmann* s treatment of myth as adequate 4 However, i t s 
deficiencies (primarily the lack of depth of understand-
in^) do not invalidate that which he does have to say* 
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gical language i t s e l f should warn us that the events aye not to 
b© understood* i n their f ^ Q m s n t Q i imppapt# i n teams of a subject* 
object world view*: H© comments on t h i s i 
Rather» the f a c t that, th© Hew ^ stapont de0Qri0©0 
the figure and. work of Christ i n mythological terms 
i s enough to show that i f they are the act of r0&~ 
demotion they must not 00 understood \sim|ii2 i n 
theias context of world history* $1*0 paradox is-
Mat t h i s , that 0 human figure t Jesus of Nasareth (see esp* John 6« and th0 destiny of that 
f i a t a w ^ ^ i i t e * a hujnan being and his fa t o , with a 
reco®alsiabi© place i n w o r l d h i s t o i d , and therefore 
easposed to the objective observation of th© hie-* 
torian and i n t e l l i g i b l e within their context i n 
world hi8toa?y**^-a3?0 not thus apprehended and undo*?* 
stood as what they really are* namely* as the act 
of God* a0 ©sohatological ©vent* ( l ) 
ttho way i n which Bult»0»n would have us relate our knowledge of 
an event and our f a i t h (belief) i n that event i s indicated i n 
the following discussion of f a i t h as understood i n St* John^e 
aospel* 
But believing i n the f u l l sons© and fenowing arc not 
two di f f e r e n t a c t a 0?? stagot^-Hihis i e quite clear 
from th© fact that the order can be reversed 00 i n Vjbhnl 17s8 and also i n 16*3C> and . i Jn* 4>tl6% M4hd 
wo have com© to Jsnow and to believe th© love which 
God hits- for ua*V • 
Faith and imowled^ ©* we concludet cannot be distiniuished as two stages. In th© Christian 
• • ;• the*?© arc not two classes' of peopleg as there wereamong the Gnostic©# who distinguished 
between ^ j e t i ^ s * * (men of f a i t h ) and "gnostics11 
(men of Mowlod^e)* Paith i s not the acceptance 
of a dogma upon which there follows a disclosure 
of items, of esoteric knowledge or a mystic vision* 
Ko * f a i t h i s ©verythimg;* Knowledge cannot cut 
loose from f a i t h and eoar on out beyond i t ; f a i t h , 
however, also contains &n0wi©dg©*"*^ £aith i t s e l f 
knows*./ Since for John a l l imowing oan only be a 
loiowing^in*f0ith| f a i t h comes to i t s e l f t , so to say.f: i n knowing* Knowing i s a structural aspect of 
believing* (3) 
(1) Keryffla and Mytfrt p*S08» I t a l i c s Bultmann's* 
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This .is clearly not cast i n the subject-object terms of a his* 
t # i # a l i y t e r i f i a h l e event which comes f i r s t t and which we then 
aa stifb^oct give our assent to i n f a i t h * Rather i t i s that Jmow*. 
Ie4ge; of an'event $Qd;;ana f a i t h i n that same event, 
arise together* 
. j j ^ t j ^ y ^ ^ l ^ ^ t A ^ arise- together,! . |he immanence of 
transcendence > The problem we have been discussing i s that of 
the relation of Smowledge (of an event) and f a i t h ( i n an event)* 
m have maintained that they Cannot be distinguished as two 
stages* Another way of stating i t i s to say that the problem i s 
that of the relation between the action of God (supremely the 
Christ event) i n i t s aspect, on the one hand, H empirical his* 
t o r i c a l occnr^noei and* on the other hand, of the Ghutfeh*© 
apprehension of t ^ e events- as, savlna flyents^ This theological 
problem i s s t r i c t l y parallel (but not identical) w i % t h e his* 
toriOAl problem which we foliowod i n Viooi Croce and eollingwoodi 
namely* the relation of #vent and interpretation* 
Thronghout MP% I I of th i s thesis we saw that history i s 
impossible on the basis of the Cartesian dualism between "objee* 
M m mmV1 ("brute fact") and historical interpretation* This 
approach i s suitable f o r ehronielej a form of '•non^hlstory^ 
which of ten finds i t s , ,non*theologioal r tparallel i n the form of 
historical resume's of doctrine, i*e*# both are compendiums which 
base their authority upon the authority of the authorities* 
This same dualism i s suitable as a basis for the important 
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inquiries of philology! another form of "nonwhistory" which 
fin4e i t s "non~theoiogieai" parallel i n some (hut certainly not 
a l l ) B i b l i c a l word studies» This same dualism i s also the basis 
for the "philosophy of history" i n which external interpretations 
are placed upon historical events. $his finds i t s most obvious 
"non**theologicalM parallel i n Fundamentalism where a patently 
post*Bationalistic point of view i s imposed upon the Piblical 
events* Xt also finds a subtler (but not essentially diff^**ent) 
parallel i n a l l theology which imposes a sub^eet-db^eet world** 
View upon Biblical events*^ neither genuine history nor geh# 
nine theology is, possible upon the basis of a s t r i c t subject* 
object. d^liism* Rather # history and theology are both only 
possllhle wher* the subject (historian # theologian) participates W 
(recreates* "re-enacte") the object of his study (Caesar's ihva-» 
sion of Britian* the Christ event)* f i t t i n g that event into an 
organised whole of ea^erience both past and contemporary* OJhis 
organised realm of experience i n the case of Caesar's invasion 
i s (as we discussed earlier) maiae up of the historian* s h i s t o r i * ; 
cal experience of geographical, p o l i t i c a l , military and other 
matters* The organised realm of experience i n the case of the 
Ohtfist event i s made up of the theologian's historical experience^ 
of God's dealing With his people i n both the past and i n the ' 
presentj dealings which also have a place and explanation i n 
secular terms* 
(1) For a f u l l e r statement of these Mnon*theological° parallels 
of "non-history" see Part fffc^nfra,* 
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I n our study of- Vic©*? Groee and Coliingwood we saw that 
the unity of event and interpretation i s an aspect of the unity 
of history (the £ji|ujg) and philosophy (the v3erum)*.. ffhla under* 
standing* which we f i r s t took up i n our study of .Vice* and which 
we examined i n our treatment of Ciroce and Collingwood, made, i t 
clear that "both history and philosophy w f a i l by half" i n not 
availing themselves of the other* i n this unity philosophy was . 
conceived if l e t us repeat* as a eritioal**historical method and 
not as: a metaphysie* History roust be approached with the help, 
of philosophyi philosophy must not separate i t s e l f from history 
(i#e*f what man has don©)*, 
The; 'parallel, to this i n theology i s that the studjr of ,. 
Biblical event- (easegesia) must be informed by philosophy^ii^^.,, 
by a critioal*»historical method* This necessary unity of exe* 
$3Bis and philosophy (i*e*># a eritieal#»historicai method) i s to 
be seen i n any essampl© of escege&is.*..even i n those which empha-* 
t i c a l l y disavow any such unity, Otg*.*3^damentali$m» Now> 
since the c r i t i c a l ^ h i s t o r i c a l discipline which i s brought to 
bear on the study of Biblical event i s called Biblical theology* 
or ^ust theology* we can rephrase this and say? Exegesis must 
be informed by theology* And as i n history* the opposite must 
also be said*.' theology (the verum) must be informed and checked 
by e3ce$esis (the study of the certumV* Both " f a i l by half" i n 
not availing themselves of the other* This i s the presupposition 
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of a l l competent* exegesis and theology* In this we see a 
furth®*' way i n which Bib l i c a l hermeneutics are a part of general 
hermeneuties* 
The way i n which this nnderstanding (whe^Joiowledge and 
f a i t h f or event and interpret&tioni arisei together) differs 
from that of, both traditional mythology and scientific thought 
i s as,follows* 
In f a i t h the closed weft; presentedproduced by 
ob jective observation i s transoendei^ though not 
as i n mythological thought* Fdr mythology Imagines 
•': it:to !bJe'torn asunder.^ whereas faith'transcends i t 
as a whole, w^en i t Ip^aissof the a c t i v i t y of God* 
In the last resort i t i s already transcended when I 
speak, of myself * 1 myself * my^reai self, am no 
mo*»e visi b l e or ascertainable than- an act of God* 
When worldly happenings, are viewed as a closed 
serleS| as not only scientific understanding but 
. even #?rkaday l i f e . ' requires t theriesis: certain^, no. room f or any act of God* But this i s just the 
' paradox of faith? i t understands an ascertainable. 
•event t I n i t a content i n nature • and-' history/ as the^^. 
act of God* Faith cannot dispense with i t s -. "never* % l-
Commenting; On this Goga^ten says: ^ 
I t i s not d i f f i c u l t to see that [the] pla©in$ of 
th# Word i n thecentral position a^ regards the 
revelation does not i n any way e^SA^e the deed 
of God* but we must look mo*© closely i f we are 
to reoogni»e that the relation of the ford aM the 
deed i n the revelation^ i s not such that the deed 
odBie& flr^t'.and i s followed as. a -kind:of directive 
or oommentairy by the Word* Nor, of course*, i s the 
opposite the oases f i r s t t h ^ ;wbrd/an4 the^:'the 
' deed* On the contrary.; what i s peculiar to the 
way i n which the divine revelation cofc&& to us i s 
that the deed takes pl&ce» through the ford, and i n 
" the Word* ( s ) 
(1) \ K e r y ^ .and;. Mytftf pp* 198*199.. 
(g) Gogarten* QfeiCffi*.. p* 8S» 
>.,• ^a a^Q©^ienfse. anja, ^ aane&oe p3?e:aeLffirad» This understating 
p5?0s©s?V0s both the transcendence and immanence of God* The 
transcendence la pyosowd i n that I t i s God himself who* through 
th# .operation of the: Holy ^ i J e i t * spes&s to m and acts- for me•' , 
both $ g the original revelatory even* (then}£ and i n the word 
which i n wy contemporary easperienoe I encounter i n f a i t h (now). 
But^ '.iM* J**wi. dl£C£u&&ed' before* H&en" and. "now*'..* before" and- • 
^ a f t e ^ M i are terms applicable to chronicle rather than to history^ 
I t |s not that the terms, "then'* and %ew M have no meaning) they 
do: 0t';,-.course:» i t i s jjust that., these^'teriai are: .not of g$m% 
significance 'tax hiatery*; The "then11 becomes Mnowtt when i t i s . 
his t o r i c a l l y perceived.* This: was one of the recurring oontlii^ ::. 
tion# of Cur stu^y of Vieo*: Orocep;and Oolllngwood* Similarly 
the , wthen w of the .^ar^^sa; becomes 'foow* I n the proclamation of 
the Wor;d|; . 1$ this w&y' a l l Christiana are*, iiice Paulf/Inborn 
out of 4ue time'* ( I cor* i£i&)<* p® t^heasi'* of tfte Kesurteetlen -
is, .seen i n f a i t h to be a.part of ay e^eriende "now** In this. • 
we see that the process by which the W d i s proclaimed and 
received has significant similarities, with the. historical process, 
Ooncerning the traditional view of a transcendent God break* 
ing the cause and effect structure of the world* and to.whicii 
the view, we maintaining i s opposed*;.. w# must mtet 8uppoi&ng 
i t were: poseibie^ .in what way does;.an historically ascertainable • 
.and objective.- revaiatiofc. r e a l i t y brewing the chain of cause 
and effect insure or heighten the transcendence of God? surely 
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i t t®@t&£$®r tovte^ jjg 
oa& t>$ laittiW^dV 3?3ii0:..po.iat of tto* ai-ao- ieatitfia* to tii$ 
#o^@pt .£* m m m : ' i# - « « m i i » 3 ^ - Ai*ia to 
ttgrt n<$t/0*&3f' i s .tto#. t^sqen&e&ct of iod .m&fetaiaed if t 
Buktmaosa*© w i d e s t Q t wslai&o&i t>%t also ®od% iawnnaaa**1 
rUh© |«»pn0no@'.iif 004 ia m i n i a t e d fcotk in the #v&g£nal maveiaft* 
•£$s?gr ^Watf wiiioli. $.0' imd&a?0tood to. M m - ev<i»t • la . and tiircmgh 
&ifeldh ®o& a@tsj and also.itt snsr p*$a$n$ situation In ^ i e ^ t o o u ^ b t 
tfo$ op0a?ation of the Holy $&?$t* * tfwsftuate* tod thaWQ3?C.! 
Of God .C3c3*&ptw.i# ps?0a<Mi^# ^ e#«&ta,* f ^ | . d t ^ % ) p3e>Q.®|i4iB0&" 
t&eougli tk§ 0h^©% "bpth to o^igiiiax e i t i m t t o &6w I 
sacottato?? th© trswac^ 3ad©nqi 0f. Qod &a i t I M a ^^i8ioit4&'';i$» ; 
. iosgH»tsQO0«- Ood*B taii&miQdMk* i s i i p w w t j . ^ aoU &oXdg:~£t#7 ' ':' i 
' p$Q$m. p&aoe ^ i t J ^ . ; i $ rt^t^i- to the $tb6$# "'-itl£^ ia. 
th&ft nw"6h&$ &o& fe&ft .p2?ov£d0d. £03? Hia tiotiUU fo® ^tnpeftiSwM 1 
thft pas?ad*m of a tsttngQttitfte&t parent and .&tf&wMn M&teyt ' 
#^ql«, ,off. ,1%, .fifty. 
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7* Bt& twangs Corrective to the Christ to Attitude to History* 
. ;\r'•.••';1^ T^Ot«lll^ g of Weto^r*. 
A prohlesi which ha® always "been asked i n Christian theology 
i s : VHhat i s the meaning of history? In oonteaip^rary theological 
S i t i n g thi© problem i s sometimes avoided "because i t i s con-
sciously or uneonsoiousay 3?egafded as hopeless| 03? i t i s answered 
rather mierit&eally fry a conservative rewor&ing of such categor* 
ies as that of Providence* Bithea? of these solution® leave mu%h 
to he desired* 
Buitraam states the origin of this problem* 
t*ithe ^ 
whie&i heii^ved' i t fenew the end of history* #his 
occurred i n the Jewish*^^ of 
l»ati*,Waa '^ .i»SWtoi»;- 'WRA- -. dfioa^ Mwtow* • .^ Sf63to^e*a^ "4^ j*:" $ho . 
•••••• -ar^eis^di& n^/raise" t*te question of iaeaning i n 
history and ancient philosopher© had not developed 
a philosophy of h i s t o r y A philosophy of history 
grew up for the f i r s t time i n christian thiiflsingj 
f o r Ctoistians "believed they IOVDW the end of the 
• world in& of history.*. (1) 
But nowf eontinttes Bultmanni the situation has changed? for "the 
question ef meaning i n history has hecome meaningless* 
fhat t h i s estimate of the situation i s correct ie ahtjndantiy 
clear from our oscaiaihation of Vioo> Crooe and Coliiijgwood* In 
that termination- we saw the f u t i l i t y of trying to predict the 
%nd of history 1 1** or to descry pattern^ i n history of any hut 
(1) 1^^orx..^4, %s<foM^%q^»- P» ISO. 
(2} J & l f o p» -i'80* 
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%h® most M^tmmi sort* • $he??# i s m oontjm&ie^iom h&twe©& t h i n ' 
Tri&w.s&d of th© Christian that Ghi&st.is'.th© &3$hgi 
M -Onega of hlstojp^foi? to saar tot Christ i s the o&phk and \ 
o»@@a of history i s VX&W to point to a, giuti&ty of 'histosr and 
th@ of h&stw* Jt i s not a hasis f oi» giving a specific , 
d&sotfiption of tafe.'iMLtteva o#: sowss. of siapiffisaX histojp&eak 
^©hts#. nor f03? giving a timstatoiis of Hsto^loaiL dsiraiopraoats, 
no# "t03? •giving the i n t e n t of hlstojpy 03? the @»4 of M0tos^f 
: . | f this: ia-ths ^ittiatien^ aa?e we than .^dtieM; to aws*. 
tiOisiit 03?nihiXisM 'j»JP**' Ho.| f®f .' 
«tfo8>#& stiXH. ##i«sias th© auction of tho leaning of sihgls histotfieaX phoaomona and single historioaV • •• •spoohs$ To• ttpecus moi?0 t h w ' apsjaalns ths 
0i©©tibii of ths importance of Si&gis histQ3?t&a2, iv^nts, and. dotds of past fo#' oiar j)jp*a*iw .^ a; . Passat whioh i s ohas?g@d with ffsaponsiMaiit^ "fos? ©\J£ 
••• £II$U#$#. (3.) 
tehis .is ©isctir^ tLsr ooasistsat with di&ottssion i n Pai?t f | :of ;;:,^:. 
. this, thesis*.We saw the "laaiwsaa, histoid'* ;&ad. th#. ^ hi|os#h3r. ' 
-of •histo^r* 1 a*® invalids and., wo- art f0a?^|a ^ 3?i6us ways the" • 
th^wi that ths •sows of valua i n Mstos^ i s to h© fdtind i n 
the histo^io foi'Jfts (sp#oifie,#v6»ti) whioh s p i r i t has dsfeiops^'. . 
in. the •60$M^<Q$ histoid*'; Does this Ncte&$ ths%'that itm .tftu&ifc'.' 
.. e$ndsnt -is ©xo^ udsd^  f a?om' h i s t o ^ and tM% tam&*$>$$i ws oaa' Oi&y 
dml with the £|iai$©d and ssei&atf lassaiag inhs:j?Snt.'ini speoiflfc. . 
hiftlKHPie svsats? • Ho* fh© only tmnsotndeaos e&okudsd i s a"fals© 
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transcendence which impose s pattern on history, which pre* 
determines the meaning of specif£0 ©vent®, and which gives the 
content of the future, and the end of history* 
th^a i s 1jh9 tran^eendenlJ (the divine) to fee found? 
I t i s to fee tound i n §od* a immanence i n history, God* e trans* 
cendence i s immanent* I t i s discovered i n the search for and 
the %l?e*understandihg,' of <Qo3 fey man* I t i s discovered and • 
only discovered i n what God does for us i n history* and supremely 
i n what he does for us i n Jesus Christ* Our theological asser* 
tio&s afeout the Christ are a0sex»tionQ afeout history5 they are 
assertions afeout the immanence of the transcendence i n history* 
"But th i s i s ;just the paradox of faiths i t understands an ascer* 
tainafele event i n i t s context i n nature and history as the- act 
of Ood* , f^ 
The isuaanenoe of Godrs transcendence runs throughout 
Bultmann*The Church i s the eschatoXogioal comiaunityj -the 
transcendent community i n an historical embodiment# Worship 
*ia the appropriate [historical] form for representing the es** 
ohatelogical transcendence of the Church***1'^ Proclamation 
i a the h i s t o r i c a l l y grounded (i%e# f immanent) form i n which God*s 
transcendence i s set f o r t h and realised* The "^demand perceived 
\in specif ie historic situations) fey conscience has i t s f ounda** 
ti o n i n a sphere transcendent to man***"^ To affirm that es# 
(1) fteyvpaaa, and filvtiu p<, 199* . 
(2) ^ 0 1 0 ^ ^ , ; ^ ; . ^ ; Testament,I. p* 153« Of, p. 310• 
(3) ifeid,>. p i 218g 
SOO 
chatoXogieal events are ;m&lim& in the present i s to aff irm 
that the transcendent l a immanent i n history and i n the l i v i n g 
of man* " 
The meaning of history can only "be known when the end of 
history i s Imown* Croee and Collingwood say that the only "end** 
03? meaning i n history which can he affirmed i s that of specif ie 
historic"'events* Bultmann would agree, hut he would add that. 
certain h i s t o r i c a l events (most clearly$ the incarnation and 
the proclamation of the Incarnation;) have a transcendent 
reference j and i n these events* seen together with the trans* 
oendent reference to which they pointy the "end" has appeared , 
i n history* This f,ehdtJ i s not one which can he discussed i n 
terms of "before and after"* "then and now"j nor i s i t loOated 
i n some elusive "future"* 
Bather th i s transcendent "eiid" i s immanent within these 
specific historic events: fthe "end'1 has been and, presently, 
realized.* Because' t h i s i s so w© may affirm the- meaning of these 
events*, and of a l l of the manifold events which i n one way or 
another and to one degree or another participate i n the Inoarna* 
t i o n i and we may do t h i s * without imposing a false transcendence 
Upon history* 
• But now, we can. says |hj> • meaning |n h^s^pry; -.1,10,8, 
. "ftlwa/^ Ift the, .p^se^;*; aid mm the present i s 
ooneeived: as y thl^ichai*oloilOal -present by Ghris* 
t i a n f a i t h the meaning i n history i s realiaedi ( l ) 
. ( i ) ffi^j^,,^nd ^^hftto^qfe. p* 156* 'italics Bultmann*:s*. 
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Ohapter v x i i 
1* The Problem of History Raised toy the Reality of Faith* 
A l l of the men whom we have eatamined have "been concerned 
with a common problem* namelys What i s the relationship "between, 
on the oh© handf the empirical study of historical events and 
the value which emerges from this study$ and, on the other hand* 
the values which * although they do not arise directly otifc of 
empirical historical study^ many people have claimed to he able 
to discern ^ h i s t o r i c a l events? These men have pointed to this 
problem i n various ways* i n Vioo i t i s expressed i n terms of a 
rational and c i v i l history on the one hand, and the discernment 
Of the operation of divine providence on the other* Croce pro-
tests vigorously and at length that there i s only one aspect to 
experience^ and that i s the historical* Any idea that historical 
events have a transcendental reference i s emphatically rejected; 
although i t i s not easy to see that his own ideas of human liberty 
and of the " s p i r i t H realizing i t s potentialities i n the histori*-
cal process escape his own rejection* Collingwood i s almost 
entirely concerned with the problem of how we; arrive at h i s t o r i * 
cal knowledge, and this/ i n v o l v e s v ^ rejection of any "philosophy 
of history" which seeks to impose an external meaning on the 
hist o r i c a l process* However, although he only treats i t very 
b r i e f l y , we have seen that he i s aware of the important rel*ti.«v» 
ship which exists "between religious and historical thought* 
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With Bultmann we turned to a consideration of this problem 
which i s e x p l i c i t l y Christian and theological* I n Bultmann our 
problem i s refocu#ed for us, and i n many ways focused more, sharp* 
l y * He asksa What i s the nature* on the one hand* of that 036* 
perience which can appropriately be described i n non**mythologioal 
language, and to which general hermeneutics are applicablej and* 
on the other hand* that experience which has traditionally been 
described i n mythological language, and to uMch Biblical hermeaa^  
neutics are applicable? Moreover, what i s the relationship 
between these two kinds of experience? 
Now j we come to the work of Paul f i i l i c h ; and here we w i l l 
discover an important similarity with a l l of the men ViSiom we 
have; already studied* But we w i l l f i n d much more* We w i l l f i n d 
an understanding and acceptance of human e^erience which i s 
more comprehensive than that of any of the other men we have . 
studied* In addition we w i l l discover an expression of the 
belief that the t o t a l i t y of human experience i s * i n spite of a l l 
of i t s ambiguityt a radically unified whole* Also included i n 
our examination i s T i l l i c h * s b r i l l i a n t and provocative answer 
to the problem of the "philosophy of history"} a problem which 
has raised i t s e l f i n every chapter* This bold and exciting 
programme i s carried through by T i l l i c h i n a s p i r i t which i s 
thfi&ughly c r i t i c a l and throughly dialejctoal* a fact which i s 
reflected i n the following passages setting forth the problem 
of history raised by the r e a l i t y of the-Christian f a i t h f i*o». 
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the problem of the rsAationship between the straightforward 
study of empirical historical events end the significance which 
(^is t i a n s disoern i n oertain of these same events*^ 
History*##oreates d i f f i c u l t i e s * For the religious 
view there i s i n history a super~temporal element* 
which oannot he reduced to historical terms*** (S) 
But at the same time the "super-toaporal elementM 
«i*must not he placed alongside of secular history 
as something which has a separate history* (Q) 
I f the second Half of this dilemma i s chosen, then we have 
"•••the rationalised, orthodox theory that a sacred history of 
miraculous sort parallels secular history-"-~-a theory which breaks 
up the unity of historical k n o w l e d g e * I f , on the other hand, 
we chose the tf.-irs.fi half of the dilemma, then we hav& %««tbft 
rational, l i b e r a l theory that sacred history i s nothing hut a 
part of general history**-^ theory which leaves the self*atafe« 
fteient finitude of the historical untouched and uribrolsen* M^^ 
Speaking of the characteristics of this l a t t e r theory|/i*e^i 
the rational, l i b e r a l t h e o r y , ^ i l l i e h writes* 
There i s the possibility of so directing one*s 
mind to single meanings, that the act of f a i t h * 
although i m p l i c i t l y concurring, i s excluded from 
on©*s consciousness* That i s the profane, 
(1) Our statement of T i l l i c h 1 e understanding of history i s haflpJ-
^leapped by the fact that the section of the Systematic 
Theo^o^y which deal® with history has not yet been published^ 
(8) T i l l i c h f t a u l * Th.e„ Be^iKious Situation,* Meridian Books* : Hew Yo3?]£, X986, p*S06* ' . 
(S) jib&U p#806« 
(e) | b j ^ , pigo6* . • N 
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unbelieving* worldly attitude***direeted toward 
the Single leaning and i t s fulfillment i n the 
system of meanings [ i n t h f j woyid* ( l ) 
This attitude leads to desperation because history understood 
i n t h i s way i s devoid of moaning* 
However, i f we choose the other half of the dilemma our 
situation i s no hotter* Discussing this OJiliich sayin 
fit i j possible, while excluding the single forsis of meaning and their rolationships |o*g*, coji^loto or relative indifference to problems of exegesis or historical researehj* to direct oneself to the absolute moaning* This i s th$ J p l y r believingi religious attitude*** [inwhich) the single meaning i s only a medium, a symbol, a Vessel of the absolute meaning* (s) 
To choose this horn of the dilemma also loads to desperationj i 
the desperation of th© holy attitude which i s "emptiness of f o i ^ 
Many so*ca;tlea " s p i r i t u a l " interpretations of Scripture are \ 
appallingly raar&ed "by this "emptiness of form'** as are, to a . j 
lesser extent* many typological studies of Scripture* More 
specif i e a l l y , i n such' interpretations the emphasis i s largely, ,.; 
or entirely devotional , dogmatic and possibly semantic; hut 
there i s a suppression of problems connected with the h i s t o r i c a l ^ 
conditioned fox»ms of New Testament eKperience, thought and e** j 
pression, e«g,9 those connected with the Ascension* 'fhis a t t i t u d 
i s not only empty of form* i t i s also destructive of reason* 
Discussing this attitude i n relation to myth and cult EtIXish j 
writest 
(1) T i l i i c h . -Paulp-. '£he, Interpretation of History* Charles 
seribner'a sons, »ww;' *OSK, 1956, p#SS4 ~ sss. 
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*i*myta. and cult-aife [in-ihis-approach]- special 
realms of reason along with the others*** (and) 
I f they are considered to he special rational • ! 
functions I n addition to the otnera* they are ! 
i n n e v e r ending and insoluble conflict, with I 
the other functions* They are swallowed by them, ' 
placed into the category of irrat i o n a l feeling| j 
or maintained as strange bodies* heteronomous ! 
and destxniotive, within the structure of reason*(l) . i 
A further implication of this attitude which sees a second, j 
kind of history| a "holy history", alongside of general history j 
i s that* 
I f such an interpretation were true$,jthe eianW . 
fe station of the ground of being \hodj would 
destroy the structure of being; -God .would be 
s p l i t Within himself» as religious dualism has 
assorted-!** disclosing a "structure of 
sferuction% (S) 
The problem of history posed by the r e a l i t y of the Christian 
f a i t h i s that i t can be and usually i s interpreted as presenting 
the dilemma of choosing between an attitude of ,self*suffioiehfc ' 
' • i 
i 
finitude devoid of meaning, or of choosing to flee from the I 
... I 
ambiguity of hist o r i c a l existence into destructive supernatural* 
iism which sees i t s e l f as a realm of knowledge alongside of and \ 
i n conflict with a l l other knowledge* ; 
Si The Problemof Hermeneutics* 
iiairing indicated T i l l i c h * s understanding of the problem of 
history raised W the r e a l i t y of the Christian f a i t h , let. w 
(1) T i l l i o h * Faul^ gys.temfffcie Theology* 1* The University Of 
•Chicago Press, Chicago, 1961, p«81« 
now t&m. to Ms • he£$ene&"kie- p#theipl&s;* <• ri?he . tejestv %e3?ffleneutiostt 
i s lae^e vOh&j^etetfistioYof--^^taBastfieK--.-iajaiji^Tili'lo^fe!1 • However we w i l l 
use the t e ^ - i n this: oaapte^ i n the interests of consistency 
with ' oii#: e a i & i ^ points • 
to the oeat#al;tas& of ooth h i s t o p i a i r a ^ lately 
p o t a t i o n of doeu^nts;*' Under-this iheliasive t03?m 1,he3TOnj>iatics^ 
w e ^ ^ toyinolide the following, five- aspects, of $ i l l i o h % the^f-
&ogyr .a*. ,<P^e^lde3?stan4i^^|;,^• and i t s eioseiy associated ideas 
of the Method of eoiwlatien'* and the 'Nosological <a%$<s%®% 
o* !ffill3.dh% ijMo^standihg of the place of Suh3eet and oh#e#t 
' i n theologioal 4a<£uia*y 5 e*. h i s distinott'On hetween paNslimin^# 
and ultlEiate eonOe#&| df his ideas about the ^ ©ro^ clfc:,^ ..l4i8«.. 
t o r i o a l events which we have,, been jpefe#tfi»$ to as "^e^enaot^sitt^l 
and f i n a l l y ©* his understanding of the tfSlatioasMp hetwsen 
knowledge and hist o r i c a l event* An emmin&tion of these five 
aa?eaa w i l l give us what as?e i n effect ^ i l l i o h ^ s hermenetitioal 
principles; although he does not e ^ l i e i t l y yefetf to them as 
Suoh* i n ioolsing at these aa?eas \n w i l l entei* into a suhstan* 
t i a l portion of $ i l l i c h f s theology; and the fact that this talsss 
plaee i n what i s only an e;M|nation of his hemenoutio pj?in* 
. oiples •testifies: hoth to the, ii8po^ a'..;iee. of those- p^ino||>les*, 
and. to ^ i l l i e h ' s reGognition of thai£ is^03?tance* ( i t i&> of 
oo^rse* not oua? pwpose to attempt the f osmidaole tae& of giving 
even a s?esual of the whole theoiogieal system ©f which this 
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examination covers only a part*) This section w i l l be a rela-
t i v e l y general approach to Tillioh/s hermeneutieal principles* 
and much of what we w i l l have to say w i l l he seen to he&ppli»6* 
cable to the historian*0 use of his documents* Then, on the 
basis of this examination! we w i l l go on i n the succeeding 
section to examine the hermeneutical principle© which T i l l i c h 
uaei^his approach to such distinctively religious phenomena as 
ecstasy and miracle* \ 
a* nxjre^und©rstandiastt* • ' ! 
Spea&ing of his t o r i c a l events i n general, T i l l i c h says that ! 
"the new i s not entirely new} i t remains related to the old* by j 
i 
which i t has been produced***as tfc& product to the producer* j 
This i s the basis for historical t r a d i t i o n * T h i s statement 1 
i s meant to describe only one aspect of historical tradition*; ! 
namely, that the new must of necessity be prepared for and ariset; s 
out of that which has gone before* And, since historical t r a i l * j 
t i o n includes both historical events and the interpretation of 
those events, this also means that the interrelation, of new 
historical events must of necessity be prepared for and arise ! 
out of the experience of (or interpretation of) previous his* j 
t o r i c a l events* In terms of our previous discussions of this j 
matter t h i s means that we come to our encounter with historical 
i 
events with a Mpre>*understandingw which has grown up out of 
previous historical experience* 
( l ) T i l l i o h , Paul* The interpretation of History. p*S53, 
site 
This point of view* which T i l l i e h expressed i n 1989* finds 
a more recent expression i n his .^y^tema^io ffhfeolQfgy whore i t i s 
ex p l i c i t l y applied to our understanding of Scripture* In speaks 
in® of the sources of theology he admits that the Bible i s "the 
basic source"* but he rejects "the assertion of neo«orthodox 
biblicism that the Bible i s the only, source"* He goes on to 
t e l l us why he makes this reaction* 
The b i b l i c a l message cannot be undoretood and could not have been received had there been no preparation f o r i t i n human religion and culture* And the b i b l i o a l message would not have become a message for anyone, including the theologian him-self, without 'the ©xperieneing participation of thei Church and . ©very Christian* ( l ) 
This is. obviously the same understanding which we have spoken of 
earlier i n terms of "pre*understaiidiagw* The past e^eriehce of 
mankind which makes up this ttpre*undorstandingu i s not sjlmplv 
the sum t o t a l of what has happened* The past also includes a 
potentiality, which w© have termed "pre*understandin$% to shape. 
ensuing historical development* and i t i s i n this ensuing devel* 
opment that the potentialities of the past become actixalities* 
For example, one of the potential a b i l i t i e s developed i n the . 
history of the Rebr©w\ people wa© that of being able to receive 
th© Christ* And when that potentiality was actualized i n th© 
©vent of Jesu© of Nazareth* then that event i n turn modified 
and became a part of our ©valuation of the past history of 
the Hebrew people* (3) 
(1) T i l l i c h , Paul, 3ystemaftic Theology* I# pp* 34*3§, 
(S) Cfv ibid;**, n* 876* 
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M i l l i o n develop*® ,thia point of view, maintaining that tho. 
" f i n a l revelation" of Jesus as the Christ cannot he understood 
as an isolated event* " I t presupposed a revelatory.hi storywhich 
was a preparation for i t and i n which i t was received* | t could 
not have occurred without having been expected.,, aiid i t could not 
hav^ been expected i f i t had not be©& preceded hy other revela* 
tlon® which had become d i s t o r t e d * ' 1 ^ this previous revelation 
had become distorted} but* i n Bultmann*s words, *not purely 
negative"* 
I f I on the contrary* this process had not taken place, then 
we must assume a revelation which i s a. "strange" holly| one which 
had no relation whatsoever to human existence,, and wh&o/h was 
received i n spite of there being no categories i n which to 
receive i t * Revelation*, i n t h i s view, becomes God * a answer 
ojaestions which were/are never asiced* This viow of r o t e l a t i o % 
T i l l i c h r i g h t l y maintains! dehumanizes man and doraonizes God* 
I f a reply i s made to this position to the effect that '^with 
@od s&l things are possible1'* then/is d i f f i c u l t t o • imow.wl^t:;^ 
say to this * What does %&1 things are possible*1 mean i n this 
phrase? How ©is© can God act than ^through men according to 
their nature and reoeptivoness"? 
T i l l i c h maintains that i t i s possjibke to discern the devoid 
opment of the "pre«*undea?atandingM necessary for the reception of 
(1) T i l l i c h . Paul* Systematic Theology>I* t>* 157* 
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revelation* This preparation i s i n three stages: coaiservatioi| 
criticism and anticipation* The f i r s t stage i s present when 
a priestly system i s present to preserve th© sacred objjeot giveiv, 
i n an.'earlier revelation* e*g*# tlie Mosaic laWf The function of 
the I r i e s t i s to enable succeeding generations to enter into the 
revelatory situation which i s related to that i n which the rove* 
la t i o n was originally received, and thus to enable succeeding 
generation® to malce that revelation their "own'S Only on this 
basis of priestly conservation i s the second stage possiblej 
namely| the c r i t i c a l attack on the sacramental confusion between 
the medium and content of revelation* 
•Phis second and c r i t i c a l stage talses three forms? t h i i 
i 
• i 
mystical, the rational and th© prophetic* The most signif icant 
of these i s the l a t t e r * The prophetic stage i s not to be..eon* 
• . • ' i 
fined to the Old Testamentt for i t i s operative throughout the 
history of the Churohv The distinguishing characteristic of 
the prophetic stage* i n contrast to the mystical* i s the concrete 
foundation of i t s attach upon a given sacramental system* ^ r o * ; 
• " • i f ' 
phetism trie-s to shape r e a l i t y i n the power of the divine foria***,; 
I t promisee f u l f i l l m e n t i n the future (however transcendent the 
future may be understood to b@)# and i t does not point to an 
eternity which Is equuXly near to every moment of time t as 
mysticism does*tt ^ 
( l ) T i l i i c h , Paul* Systematic TfteolOffgf | # p« 148. 
Thi© anticipation ©^^^  ^  
stag© i n th© preparation f o r f i n a l r©y©lation* I t comes into 
heihg during the ©ours© of the prophetic struggle with a dis* 
torted s^oramontaliami a struggle marked by a dynamic process 
of acceptance i rejection and transformation of th© distorted 
©aoramentalisjR* This pro©©©© continues today without and within 
th© Church by individual© who are ©till i n a preparatory ©tag© 
and have not yet reoeiired th© f i n a l revelation of Jesus a© th© 
Christ*. 
The, .^thoj' of, Co^elation* $hi© understanding of th© place 
of preparation and Hpr©*md©r©tandin^,, i n the reception of 
revelation doe© not ©imply form part ©f the oontent of th© 
resulting structure) of that work, and T i l l i o h refer© to this 
method as,th© "method of correlation"* 
..[. In using the method of oorreiatiotti systemati© 
theoXogy proceeds i n the following ways i t makes 
an an^ l^ rsi© of th© human situation out of which 
th© existential question© arisei and i t demon* 
strate© that the symbol© used i n the Christian 
message are the answers to these question©* ( l ) 
I n other word©, man1© "pr©*und©ratanding" ©nahles him toformu* 
late Question© to which ©uooeeding and f i n a l revelation i© the 
answerj and on© of the task© of Tillioh*s theology i s to cor* 
relate the©> question© and i t s answer• 
(1) T i l l i 0 h f : Paul, fyvatematlo Theology^ t t p. 6g# 
There are several points which should to© made about this 
s»ethod* '$&Sft&.'o£ a l l , as to a l l of Tillieh's theological system* 
i t i s recognised that this method is operative within what he 
refers to as the wtheological circle"* The concept of the thep* 
logical circle assents that i t is impossitole to arrive at the 
contents of any theological system toy inductive OJP <|eduetive 
moans* Ratherf the content is decided toy "individual ©xperienoe# 
traditional valuation andpersonalcommitmentThe philosopher 
of religion works within the same circle; tout for the Christian 
theologian the circle is even na^royer* for he has added the 
criterion of the Christian message^^ifeaus as the Christ* Thus 
the content of any theological system is present from the toegin* 
ningj the use of reason within the theological circle toeing to 
elucidate what is already present, rather than proving or i n * 
dnctively or deductively arriving at the content*^ Now* since 
the method of correlation i s within the theological circle * the 
analysis of the human situation out of which the existential 
questions arise (and to which the knowledge of revelation i s 
the answer) is not just any ^analysis? rather i t is the analysis 
made from within the theological circle* ( I t would toe poasitole 
to make many other analyses of the human situation, e«g« * one 
which does not pose any questions at ally) or, to put this i n 
another ways I t la not ;}ust any analysis, tout one which is made 
upon the toasis of the "pre^understandiug'1 given i n previous 
revelation* 
( l ) Of T i l l l c h t Paul, ftystem&tie Theology. I , pp^ , 8*11.4 
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Ehe ^ oeond point which needs to he made about the method o£ 
c o l l a t i o n i s that i t is a tool* on© which must validate i t s e l f 
through the 3?©sults which can h© obtained in using i t * A flbiyft 
and vsspy important point i s that the answes?© giv^n to the Q M S * 
tions possd hjr this KQthod do not thejasclvss dojpiv© tvom th@ 
analysis* Batfttw th© answ@3p& 
4k««a*e "spokon" |& husian existence: f^ osa "beyond i t . Otherwise thejr would "not be <aaat0to'V.*»But< the relation i s more involved than this * since i t i s eo^elation« $hes?e is, a isutual dependence between question and answer* In inspect to content the Christian answers ax»e dependent on the revolatox^ events i n tshieh they a$peavt i n voapeet to torn they aw dependent on the stamctui?® of the ajue^tions which they a m w « (1) 
$his last statement nay seem to infringe upon the goveJN* 
©ignity o£ God* But this is not actually 00* St i s t£ue that 
ttOod i n hi© abysmal natweW is i n no way dfpsn&ent upon to* 
[but] God i n hid self^manifestation to laan i s dependent on the 
way mm peeeives hi® aanifestatien* 
fhi# brings us to the jflowth and last comment we want to 
sja&e upon th© aethod of c o l l a t i o n * Althou$* the method o£ 
correlation is a tool* nevertheless i t i s not an "indifferent 
n&t w i n which reality i s caught* Rather* i * * * a l l cognitive 
stitboda* i t M i s eoia&tbiag about' reality i t s e l f . In theology 
the esei&tential <|U0Stion which receives divine answers reveals 
{%) Sillieh.j Paul*, SystQrmtie ghoolof^ti X* p.* 64* Ita l i c s imiiieh's. 
(2) tn a footnote t i l l i c h equates this with Calvin*© w l n his essence*" 
(S) f i l l i c h * Paul* ^stoa^^c ghealoav, X, p» QU 
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that the situation or event out of which the question apises Is 
not s e l f - s u t f i c i e n t v ^ 
Because this is ao# the m@thpd of c<)r3P03,atioBt has alw&ye 
"been used i n varying degree^ of self ^consciousness* T i l l i c h 
cites* :as.an example | the beginning of Calvin*s Institutesi 
"The toowledg® of ourselves la not only an incitement to $@e& 
after 't0odt but likewise a 0Onsi4@3?^ l© sisaistanc© towards find** 
ing hi*a*H. lor ia this to be confined to Christian theology. 
Revelation answers questions which have been asked and always w i l l betalked becausethey are "we .our* SSlvesV1- Man is the question he a'slss, about himself % before aw ^uestioh has been formulated* i t therefore* not surprising that the basie questions . : ;w0a5»0 .forraulated very early in the history of mankind* "Ivery analysis of the aiythologieal material shows t h ^ ^ 
appear i n early childhood* ##(&) 
The Jmowledge of Godf th©m is not received as a "strange 
object'** I t i s received on the basis of a "not purely negative" 
"pre^nnderatanding'1* This "pre^understanding" incorporates ele> 
mente of previous reveiation* together with an analysis of th% 
existential situation of the one who receives the revelation* 
e*s# , the Hebrew© * auesttoning about and anticipation of the 
Messiah* Or, more concisely^ revelation proceeds on the basis 
of revelation* To aslc about the " f i r s t w human seif-questioning 
and the " f i r s t " revelation is an impossible question* £ust as 
(1) Of* T i l l i e h # ^aui f ^rste|aaif^c .T^^pj^» I * p» 60# 
(S) Jbj&*#. P* 6g* 
m saw i n ous? o&riies? discussion that tho possibility of bistori* 
oal inquiry presupposes previous historieal 02cperi©nc©t so tho 
reeoiving of revelation presuppose© a previous reception of 
revelation*. I t i s this previoujt revelation $*ieh i s the souroe 
of religious l^#*\md0r$todisigwi or, to egress'it i n Tillieh*® 
terminology* i t i s the souree of tho gtuestions to whioh the con-
tent of subsequent revelation la correlated as answer» Because 
this is so, some use of the method of correlation i s necesaary 
in theology* 
%M. Subject and Ob^oet* 
With this presentation of 1i?ilXieh,6 view as to the part 
played by l'pa?0*u^ d02?staudi35a,| both i n religion (the reeeiving, ., 
of r e l a t i o n ) and theological inquiry (thought about revela* 
tion)$ 'm are i n a position to go oh and ®mmim his approaoh ; 
to a problem whieh is a central concern of our thesis! namely* 
the proper relation of subject and object i n histopioai and th^o* 
logioal ihouiry* Ho states the problem i n this myn : ' " ^ 
i&iowing i s a form of union*. In every act. of tenowiolgo the fenower and that which is fcnom are united* the gap betia/eon sublet and object i s overcome * 5?hO subject gasps'* the obdeot* adapts i t to Itself f-and* .-at the same time* adispts i t s e l f to th© object* ( i ) 
fhis i s it point of view which has boon emphasised in a l l 
of the men whom we have boon stiJdying* . I t i s a nooossary eon* 
(1) Eilliehj. ftxllf -p^toa|atio: .$heo3,o^ y. I * p* 94* 
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dition of liistorical laiowl©dg0, TilXich, however , goes on, as ; • 
the others have; not, to stress that there i s another aspect to 
But tije union of. knowledge is a peouliar onei i t i s a union through separrition* Detaehment is the eon* ...ditien'Of cognitive union*/. In order to know* one .. ^mu#t*%>okw at a thing* aadj: in'" order .to-look at a •••'thing*- one must he' "at a dlstano&'V ^ p i t i v e die*; -ianee i s the presupposition of cognitive union* • •. $00t^ hi!©.sophers. have seen "both «-**Sh*<. . unity .of distance and union is the ontoiogieal pro» • • toiler'knowledge..^ destroyed! toutthere i s also estrangement * The par* ticular oto^eot is strange as such* tout i t contains essential structures with vMch the cognitivo sublet i s essentiaiiy united and 'which i t can rememtoer when looking at things* (1) 
I M q W I ^ MfflB-fa}^ mmm* ln N a t i o n to this 
characteristic of knowledge T i l l i c h distinguishes toetween onto* 
logical and technical reason* The former 
***is predominant i n the classical tradition from Paawaenidea to Hegel** * i t ta a thinking which is at the same time l i f e and doy in the "atosolute truth" . (Hegei).|-. etc,i. Classical reason is &ogos* wnethej? i t i s uaderstood In a more intuitive or In a more c r i t i c a l way* I t s cognitive nature i s one element i n addition to othersj i t i s cognitive and aesthetic, theoretical and practical! detached and passionate t•selective • and .oto^ectivef' The denial'of reason in' the classical sense i s antihuman toeoause i t i s anti-divine* (g) • 
This unified and comprehensive type of reason has always 
toeen accompanied toy, and i s now replaced toy what T i l l i c h charac 
teri»e^ as "technical'* reason* Here only the cognitive side of 
(1) , T i l l i c h | ffaul* ,^ s1«ema,tlc, :jfflttpjLpffifc I, pp* 94 #98* 
(3) • p.f *?8« 
the former concept of reaeon remainet and this only insofar as 
i t deals with the discovery••of means for 03340* 
treason i n the toohnical sense determines the moans while accepting the ends from "somewhere elseV**4$he^ conseqnenoe :is that the ends are provided by -nonratioiml forces* .either by positive;' traditions or by arbitrary decisions serving the w i l l to pokier*, Critioal reason has ceased, to eacoroise i t s controlling function over norms and ends* At the same time the nonoognitive aides;of reason hive been consigned to tho irrelevance of j^icBPe '€i!^3oai!i4v,4-tiy'*:.««#MjtiAkoap' atructures| Gestalt .. processes*, valnes§ nor meanings can he grasped without ohtologio&l reason* (1) . . , 
Philosophy of history'* i n general and Marxism in particular 
are examples of the use of "technical" reason* 
f f c p ^ ^ Mother expression 
of this same polarity i s given i n the terms ,'reeeivingw and 
Controlling'' lsnowledge# ,fGQntrolling*V]tenowiedge is the out-
standing example of ,%echnloal,, reason* 5fhis Isind of Jsnowled$© 
transforms the object into a completely conditioned and cal* 
oulable w t h i n g % depriving i t of any subjective quality* In 
any act of Isiiowledge there i s a certain logical ob3eqtifioatio»* 
$his is implied i n the auotation at the beginning of this sec-
tion describing the sub^eet^ob^oct polarity of Jsnowledge. ifow* 
ever i n "Oontrolling" knowledge the objeetif ication is not only 
logioalf hut also ontelogioalAand ethical » ^ In 1 ,receiving M 
ioaowledge* i n contrast 4 
(1) Silliehj, Paul, .aystemtic,.fheo^M. J* p.75, 
(£) See. :|Mj^^e^ta^t ffffa* Hisbet and Co*> Ltd.*.* London* 1981* pp.*. '106ff*t f or an investigation of the relation "between '*cbntrolling r t knowledge and the inability of the contempGr* ary world to Respond to sacraments and sacramental things* 
;:3ie •. 
#*«08* could say fm^taph©3?ioaIL3^] that as weloolc at things so things lools. at us with the expectation of being received and the offer of enriching us i n cognitive union* (1) 
And more prosaically* 
neither actually or potentially is^ precei/ing isnow* ledge HJ Seteriained hy the, iseans-ends relationship • Eeceivlig J&sowledge' takes the object into i t s e l f , into union with the &ubdeet# This Includes the emotional element*, from which controlling icnowledg© tries to detach i t s e l f as much as possihle* Brno* tion i s the vehicle for receiving cognition* But the vehicle i s far from ;^Mag. the content i t s e l f ©motional* The content is iaiional, something to be ve3?i^ ied» to be loo&ed at with, c r i t i c a l e&ution# Nevertheless* nothing can be received eognitively Without eiaotiont (2) 
T i l l i c h mates this f i n a l characterisation of "receiving" Isnow* 
ledge i n a Way which is reminiscent of Croeet Gollingwood, an#» 
although the terminology is very dlfferent^-Hrico* 
The unity of union and detachment i s precisely, described bythe term '•understanding."* I t s l i t e r a l meaning, to stand under the place where the ob ject of imowledge stands*, implies intimate participationiiiftJnderstanding another person or a historic figure $, the life: of an .animal or a • igious tesct, involves an amalgamation of controlling and receiving knowledge * of union and detaehment > of participation and analysis* (§) 
Exactly how would Til l i e h apply this understanding to the 
study of history? We do not imow f u l l y , since the part of his 
(1) Tillich,,Paul., ..^tematifr Theologyf I * p.... 97* 
(3) ^M*» P* 98, 
^tomatie; . j ^ o ^ i y dealing with, history has not yet appeared*-Wj 
However* -in an essay written i n 19S9 m are given a good indi-
cation of what his answer w i l l he* He writes s. f *any.*4* sepa* .: 
ration of the objective existence of history and a subjective 
judgment about i t * , i s thoroughly to be repudiated*"^ to 
understanding of history which Uillich is repudiating her© is 
the same" at that which we. have seen repudiated .in various way® 
%n Part' tt# i*e>* history as elective fact- or chronicle to 
which a meaning derived from some external source is subsequently 
applied* He gives his own suggestive btit slightly .obscure, 
justification for this statement* 
History cannot be" ascertained objectively* for meaning and direction of time cannot be ascertained .. objectively.*.* *v*Singie tendemies of direction and fulfillments of meaning are manifeot, fm decision, 
hmmv$$4*4about history and non^historjr' generally^ cannot be made-by analytical efforts' (alone]* 
We are demanding a decision against the sens®*-defying retraction of time into «$aee? a decision f o r meaning against tlio ultimate raoaninglo asnc 33 of r e a l i t y , "low i s such a decision possible?.,, only a concrete* m©anlng«*giving principle can carry the deoisiont (&) 
The Concrete, raeaning*giving*r principle i s supremely the 
(1) In the "Prefaeew to volume I I S i llich t e l l s us that i n order to avoid further delays i n i t s publication* he **eame to an agreement with the publisher that the third part of the system| Existence and the . Christ should appear as the wsaeond volume.* and that the fourth and f i f t h parts* ••Lift and the s p i r i t " and "History and the Kingdom of ao&f% should follow**—% hope i n the not too distant future*" 
. (p.#viif) , .... 
(8) • f i l l i c h i S»aul$ ffhe Interpretation of History a p»84&« 
(8) IM^S* circular interpretation of history using o,uasi**biological categories is an example of a "sense* defying, retraction of time into a?$od*V , 
3g0 
receiving of. Jeaua -.as the Christj. a matter which m -will deal- •' 
with later In this chapter* however at this point w© want to 
observe that i t i s a Qonorote, event^^ which can-give meaning • 
to history! an event or events which are both objectively and 
subjectively received* In this way and not i n the objective 
collection and analysis of facts ; r nor through the use of "spa* 
t i a l * (&#©*>• timma or non-historical) concepts are we enabled 
to understand.history* i n this we see both similarities and 
dissimilarities with the views of Vieo, Groce and Collingwood* 
The very important similarity i s the agreement that history can 
only be understood through conorete ©vent received i n the way 
T i l l i c h indicates* The dissimilarity lie© i n the importance 
which Tillieh attaches to one particular ©vents Jesus as the 
Christ* (we w i l l evaluate this when we come to discuss the fact 
that In Tillich's thought the question of history resolves 
i t s e l f into the Christologieal Question, and the dhristblogical j 
question into the question of history)* :'v ] 
This same point of view* ©pressed aoa© thirty years ago,: 
finds a more recent, and incidentally clearer * -expression ? In 
the following passagO from Tillich'o ffffstemefolo. Theology* 
The oojpLtojtt of the discussion at this point i n the boo& is that 
of revelation* but 1$ i s equally applicable to the understanding 
•of h i s % * ;•' • ;. * 
(!) i n the' immediately preceding quotation T i l l l c h speaks Of a %oncreto principle rV By this awkward phrasing' Is meant a concrete event which becomes a moans or principle of inter-pretatioiw ' 
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Hevelation always /is a suMeoilve and. mo>#e.ctiV€ ©vent i n st r i c t inte^ aopond©neo» Boaoons Is grasped.... toy vtae-maiiifestatto ©f the mystery* this i s the suto* -: jjeetiveside of the event* southing odours, though, •which the mystery, of s^Vel&tiOn .#asps; someone 3, tftftft • is the OD Motive side* /These %m:. sides oannot .toO" 0eparat^d*:iiEeve2.ation i s not. m£k without the • &ee*$p- • • -v'lng side* and i t . i s not real without the giving e!.d$4l)(.S) 
With this summary •.of the of : . suto4eot ' and oto^eet i n ' 
Tiliioh^s _ thoughtt we go on to. oonsider two distia&tive ways 
in which. this approach to knowledge i s used* 
o» ."lie^enaotm^fttf,#:: . . . . . 
..We .hive examined Tillioh^s .vl^t-of the preparation which 
must ta&e/- plaee^toef ore revelation t?an 1>e receivodf• ;a view which- .< 
can accurately and hvi®$Xf m- .m$$$m& %<> as * ^ r e t ^ ^ * ^ i ^ w * 
$e hav#- also looked at understanding of the relation ; ;of^si%*. 
ijeet and oto^eet .in general* and in theological inquiry i n par*7.0. 
••^ioular:* These- two .matters are of a pieoey According .to = . • 
(1) T i l l i e h * Paulf §y,s^^, ^ ^m: $» p* 1U:* ' . . 
-(&). Of* ftfflrty^ »t X?0#. Mf't »i the end of 
. th& otoiatoiogicai discussion which, makesrnp the second volume of his W0m^jLW^ymj ^mieh writers, follows;. *H&a i i 'not only /determined toy essential good* noes and toy existential eat^atigsjMti'ito'iB'alm deter* . mined.-"by the amtoigalties' of. l i f e , and history*. .Without an analysis of these characteristics of his Doing, 
not an 'isolltea' event which happened "once up«a a time/'1! he i s .the power of the Mm Being preparing his decisive manifestation i«J Jesus as the Christ i n a l l preceding history and actualizing himself as the Christ i n a l l ' sutoseauent' history* tt italics mine.*; 
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$ i l l i c h f s ti3ad03?stai^ a»g of the relation of subject and obdeet 
the object of inquiry io not tk'^tmo^-.^A^9^'-^ eubi}e©t* 
1*0;the inquirer* ..According to th©/ajiiad©h*s- view of'.the : " 
place of "pr^underatanding", and the related "method of ©orrel^ 
tion'V the theologian eaters into the- problem or situation before 
him. in: order to rJeeiffe the answer to i t , $n this way the theo* 
logian* or dtaply the Christian* enters into the power of the 
answer ©iron by Clod to man* Thus the answer received through 
revelation i s not a Estrange body" to the theoafgian* 
Implied i n a l l of this i s the variously namod oohoept which i 
. . .. \ . • i w© have encountered f recently • in Part xx and, also' i n our exam* 
in&tion of Mtmannf i*e*|f 'wr#^nactm@ntwf recreation* reliving. 
etc* By thee© terms ia meant the process whereby the historiah^ 
theologian Or. other inquirer eaters into ("re*enactsw* reore:at@i)>; 
the object of his study i n order to understand (stand under) i t . 
l|Ee**enactmentH i s obviously impossible i f sub ject and object are 
not mutually involved* and i f there i@ not some "pre^understand* 
ing'* on the part of the inquirer of the conte&t of meanings of 
which the obdeot of study is a part* 
fhi.s similarity between the approach,to historical and.,'' 
theological knowledge, howevery should not obscure a fundamental 
dif f er^nooi'.. ($bis dif torence- w i l l become clearer later i n this 
chapter* but i t i s necessary to say a few words about i t at this 
point*) fhe historian attempting to understand Gaesar'a invasion! 
of' Brit&ln "re-enacts1* that invasion i n hie own thinl&ng*,. His 
conclusions are the results of th©' ^ p^wiiM^stanaing'1 he "brings 
to the investigation* of his .analysis;:of .the relevant material^ 
of deductive and inductive reasoning about the event and so on*. 
Uow when the theologian approaehesf for 0^sampief the 
% i s t l e to the Romans i n order that i t might become the Word 
of #od for him^)*; the process i s both'similar and'different* • 
| t i s similar i n that here too the theologian brings his ''pre* • * i understanding1'| here too he enter© into a process of *re~enaet* | 
mentw i n order to understand PaaXj and here too analytic! de*-
ductive and inductive thinking play a part* But the approprias 
tion of Paul*© conclusions do not flow in a strai^rfeforvjard I 
manner out of this proctss* As for Paul* so fotf the theologian* j 
the conclusions are spoken "from beyond" to the situation* More 
specifically * the ''re-enactment" of Paul's situation opens the, 
theologian to the possibility of receiving Jesus the Gbrist as 
the answer. $he process of f,pre^understandingn and analysis 
determines the form i n which the answer is received (Hebrew and 
©reels thought forms and not f&oist)* but i t does not determine 
the content of the answer* This is obviously i n contrast to 
the investigation of G&0aar% invasion of Britain* 
- .f^edo^ flflft £'afak. Having made this distinction* we now . 
turn to mafte explicit some of the iwlication© of this process, 
(1) f l l i i c h refers to this as "secondary revelation1* i n eon*. 
trast to the original "primary revelation'*% See infra*, fp- 3^-
.Tillieh speaks of two levels i n historical investigation! "both 
of which .wo «#e familiar with* The f i r s t i s the philological 
study of documents of a l l kinds through a study of script^'vorb-' 
forms.*, tho comparison of texts and. so on* ' Here the results' of'' 
h i i t o t i e a l Sn&uir^ have a high. dogro.# of assuranao>:'and can '. 
often he demonstrated to anyone able and willing to examine 
tho rolivant ©videnoo* 
The second'level is-a "seloetivt and interpretative 1 1 one* 
1 ' 
i « . ., Tho selective and interpretative side*-however*, without which no historiography over has been'written* is. based • on participation • in terms: of understanding- an&..e^lanaw tioiu ilithout a union of tho nature of tho historian with that of his object, no • significant history, i s , possible. But tliia union the same period- and tho, , same historical figure have received many'different . '. historically signif leant interpretations, on' tho" basis, .. • ,-. ©f the same" vorifiod,material,*-- Verification in'this .•  aspect meanii to illuminate, to mal^'uiidorotandabloii .' 
• 0m'& mmfc^v*l and. eon&ioient picture.-. ThO'hig*^---.• •torla-h*s taiaai i s to "make alive '* what has ^ aasOdvawaj*#H''' The test, of his. cognitive su^ cess-i-. of tho truth of ',. p.ioturor i s mother or not he is able to do: this*, Thi&Xx tost is."not final*- and; ove*?y-.historical wor& is a risfe..--• But i t i s a test* ossporiontial^. though not an ©s&». perimontali verif ieation.#v (1) " 
Tho period(o) which i s not open to this process i s a "dark ago-1**.. 
and no genuine history i s possihlo of such a po^iodj o,g., in 
the case of the historian who malsos tho Bnlightcnment an absolute 
©tan<3pointf presents a chronicle of the Middle Ages and declares 
I t to be a *'dar& age".-
- (1) TiiliOh^. Paul*. ByatemaMo ThoolQ^. I * pp.*. 1O0*1O4« Italios'Tillich'O:*-' 
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Qnly that reality can bo grasped with which the seeker is connected. through history and fate, This does not remove the -obligation to ma&e an effort for a l l reality* partly because each is • connected with a l l * and partly because no on® and no time imows a flriori whither the way of knowledge i s leading* Yet individuals and eras must sometimes Ssnow when to halt instinctively and when to prose forward i s f u t i l e * I t is. nec- , essary to realise this i n order to meet the arro* ganoe of the illusionary absolute standpoint i n • thlhliihg*«#(i) 
This passage bring© us to an element i n human Knowledge 
which i s operative when we reach tho "selective and interpretive'* 
level of inquiry| and this element i© that of freedom and fate* 
In genuine history "the understanding of the past becomes a 
liv i n g , creative deed« recreating the past**""*«n acliOivement of 
great historians , n '$ and i n this achievement freedom and fate 
play a part* -
By "fate" i s meant the "fateful connection" or involvement N 
of the historian with the event which he is studying* This con* 
nection is impcQ>per when i t is ta&en to mean unoo&lled sub*x 
^eotivenessj for t h i s Ma always "arbitrariness and servitude,-.- v 
separating us from the truth*" On the other hand the "fateful 
connection" i s essential when i t is properly understood as mean* 
ing the denial of the absolute object* of the estrangement of 
subject and ob;jeet$ when i t i s understood as meaning the involve-
ment of the historian with the object of his study* This means 
(1) Ti l l i o h * Paul* The Interpretation of History,, ppv 1S0*151# 
(S) ibid>« p* W?« 
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that the attitude of Knowledge is to "foe characterised by intimacy; 
and neaifoess to l i f e * "The community between the lowing and 
the fenown must be caressed i n every scientific worls*"^ ; Shis 
i s what Ti l i i e h ©alls a "community of fate"* 
knowing i s a form of union* In every act of ? knowledge the isnower and that which i s known are united^ the gap between the subject and object Is overcome# (8) 
In the context of a discussion of the writing of history* 
Til l i e h elaborates this point of view# 
When sp i r i t understands spirit i t interprets at the same time* The object receives a mean-ing which i s born out of the interaction of that which understands with that which i s under** stood* Thus historical understanding comes to be a function of l i f e through whioh the past receives meaning from the present and the pre* -}'•• sent from the past* The spirit i s not a thing which can be studied by spirit without under-. .. going a^ternationj spirit yields it s e l f . s & o r i * fices i t s e l f and becomes creative i n i t s contact With s p i r i t * (3) 
I f "fate;" i s one half of this element i n Jsnowle&ge* "free-
dom" i s the other half* T i l l i c h means by "freedom"* "freedom to 
decide • ' ' 
,411 knowledge> even the most exact,, the most 
subject to methodical technique * containa fun- > daraeatal interpretations rooted neither i n formal evidence* nor in material probability* ? but i n original viev/s^ i n basic decisions* (4) :J 
(1) T i l l i c h , Paul* The I^erpretatio^ off History* p*143* • 
(8) y^s.tema.^ ic Theology* 19 p *94* 
( s) ffift .^el^ious actuation. v*&U 
W ^he Internretation of ffpttcry,*. 73*143* 
This is 4ust the situation i n history too*. 
When tho 'Collection of • material^ and;- ©von ingenious.. •• judgment concerning tho facts stop/* historical under* . standing' has manifestly tho. clmractor Of-'conoroto " decisions*.- (1) 
^ioo f s decision that events are a part, of an "ideal and . . 
eternal, history w i s of this naturl.*. So too'-is Groce*s belief 
that Spirit rtianifests and doveiopes i t s e l f i n the course of his» 
tory* eeliingwood*© belief- that the mind of the historian can 
enter into and recreate the essential- thinking and action of 
the participants in the event being studied 1® stillanother 
• example of the. role of decision in the; writing of history* "y.-,. 
These three positions* which we have cited as examples* do not : 
come directly out of the formal evidence % a-fact which isveris?-
fied by the e^isteno^ of various historians and philosophers- «b& 
are c r i t i c a l of the respective positions taten by ?ieO| c?rboe 
and Golllngwood* These critics have made a different decision . '  
on the basis of the same formal evidence. But the freedom to 
decide has been exercised i n every case* • 
puiimry:* As. a result, of tho presence of freedom "and fat© i n 
knowledge* we are enabled to say that historical knowledge can 
only be arrived at by bringing the historical method which we 
have described as' "re-enactment" to bear upon events* We; are ; 
(X) . Tillioh*. Faul^- S^he;. Internreta^lon .of tiiatory;* p#XM» 
SS8 
ue&ng;-:1in .deytse: of the; 0Q^octloxis.0j? .i^oivesnent of ..th& 
hif3t0S»ia» (i*$*:* ifa;.M*tQ#iffibtQ fat©);, ^ t h the, dvsoft (i*&**. th© 
fat© of t ^ o v e a t ) ^ 4^fr..ea»ta&» p&ae^  9&ty t to i^ . : ' i he ; ac£>- • 
imowXe&g^ me&t.'of tho teoi&ive iiapoieta&c© of historical &v<mtt an& 
the s?og:mtio:a:"of. tho w e ^ t i a to tttitaft^'t&ft historian* '. 
®mm a i tmtioa •pmmiM 'ln ^©ga^ o* io freedom*. £s?eadora to 
deeid<rs BeeisiOB ia©a»a dAoiofton (isvfej^s»®tatip&) afcout $o&®s?©t© 
$9e&t&r aM ean be 210 g s^olae dediaion afcout ovaat© -ftfwa-; 
which a&e standa &pa3?fc| 'ffvoodpia a&& f«t$$. fe&eng toga&ro?*-
. That which w© hay© p^eviou^ dis©u&©@& the t©sm of . 
^^motiiieat*^., m& ttj&oh m-. M$h to ejmtiuue to' 3?0f@*» to taii&w 
that tewtt* $i34ieh hai deaotfited is*,;t©pas .of Mf 3^ ©&©mrt asid tt£at0"i 
In fcoth e&soa tfbat .£* '^i^^aa|d;i0'''that th© t^aniii^\34::.int03^* . >• 
pj?®tat&0& of $ir©iit$, 'is • depej^at upon" Ringing th$' pppcose • of 
genuine historical • inquiry' to beaj? tipoa those oventij a prdQoaa 
Miioh have deaerih<3d &&'detail a© 4t",appd«p» in . @aeh.tof the-
fiva. aeii wfioia « hav© studied* anA'vhio&y vdth ignvp i^Biiigiy.' 
l i t t l o variation:*, has a® it® "basis the mSmt&an of tho Oartasian 
aufoijoot^ol^aot dua.34a® and th© r^oognitioxi of th® n^oas^itsr of 
•ihat Mv® to aa '<*^ e*^ $^^ or0taftdix^ g,** Oth@3? w$®$»: 
®tan&iage of th@ eorraot a&pfoaoh to % hietori«sai av$»tawould 
l0a&; to ®pmP ?®Mt®$; topft tha un&^atanding praaant^d ;haa?a-.is 
a oonaafcuensa of th© daoiaioa that genuine 3&owl@dga of .hiatori* 
Oal events •%$> a*#tyed at through tha jaathod of historical iaqjiisy 
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vMeliVw& Jaavo presented ;fceps* thiol* to oor^eet ia i t se l f a .. = •• I 
iijattotf of dooiaion m&. ©xpGriositial v©3?$fieaiio&#; ' • • > • ! 
d* • Knowledge and &ieto*?ioal event* > • • •. 
•$illiofc a&inw.-tto* necessity ot ftie^oaNLOpl event f<a?' • ... .] 
imowleciTC -and he imilds 'thle |>o©iiloa. t lwoti^ tiie .unique use ; ! 
of "two.wfeA&r liogoa. «md K a i ^ o i * ^ kegos ie associated tiitb «• j 
pure form* eter&allaws* tii© hietorieaily unconditioned ©to* 
X&lgofl pGtom to t&e. .••'Wtgjit llsaeM os? W i ^ i l i o d t l iao**^ , As 
an ex&raple of this lattes? 'tesm» 'IiQI^l .^phllo.eQ^Ily,' i s a mM£®m>-
tation of the Hairoe of < ^ » n ; ia@aXisia* !2h0 K&lroS' ie ofneev j 
teseitsr j^ qpressod tbpougb Materieal. events, ean t>e. 1md@3p0.tood ! 
6?j3iy t>y <veeveatlng 3^stor$oal .^nt*fc.. |t . i s 'to-fee con t ras ted* . I 
Mth .qhrofloa. tfoleh • i s "oiapty ^ka©1** . . . 
w&at would T?e the nature of Imowled&'e which is..arrived.at 
ap&rt fros* '^ Q:^ t^s*90}- apart frosi participation i n ©3? **r^ *enae^ * ; 
iaen^'';of M»tojp4eai''wfimJ^'- order to arrive at lm6\&ed$e.i» 
this wasr i t must*be assumed that the iaiui??03? ima a very unueAa&l*.: 
indeed §n aliaesfc ineoi^rehensikle t • position i n wMoh he aatytygfte-j 
u l y empties himself ' i n order to'-simply .< accept thatrWhteh he. -
perceives*1 Any idea of •• wtoaV • have referred to ,aa .^ pre^ undea?* 
(3*) We w i l l '&ttaa$t- to follow f i i l i oh*0 (not entirely eonsis*-
tout) practice of placing feaiffos and 10$os i n i ta l ics t&hes*-
the emphasis i s upon their Creels origin and usage* hnt of 
teMng the t©3?ia0 out of i ta l ics when the ompjjaiii^ ^ is upon 
his own special' use of then* as 't«jaas' i n contemporary theo«* 
logioal discussion* 
(S) Gt» ^ i l l i o l i * . 3?ault f he Eoligtiotia Situatlofl* p w 1#* 
ataa<a$!iig"-.ffliijat* of oowa©* t»0 elimto$©d| fo# ; is l>&s®<3. 
upon pax«ticipation ,in. foznnoT Ji$etQp.4eai',^ v.^ iil}B. 03? .Kfeaoa,*,. ,** 
nii^ ht W said*' that this ^ppj?oaoli to imow^clge is mad© poa i^t&e 
i$i©n t&at. wMoh i s pewiv©a mtotoft th©> incises? to "reeoUOot" 
%te3?ns& os^atMities?* Uixiick Qiiama.t©s?ife@.;.Qwfe/attlt«^©# . 
m beingtno@o to irt4<$h t&e/s?© 10*,,fij»st t a wpp^selon of oa? 
^aae t^iostaia".' toward. the- .Mstosfi^l. ®i?ai»t or 'K&i5?08.$. (m&» mtio&a^rl 
i n v/hiok %®\m mpb&®&® npm ot MoB $tfte*d.pu*e torn,dp \ 
tl^r-X^ip?* .i'^l^at; ls:.^''ftttitttjSte of p&p©.. t£o©3?y$ asq^tieiaffi. 
toward'' the Kal*oef. 3poa toward, tho. Lo$>*| t&©r©on roste tti©.. •.. - | 
£Q§0ib&;y.t5f of ,ro©s?&ing tli© w$J&.&#; ^ system of a^esmsS"ioftali^  j 
; -ViUiob. goes on to dlBeosre v&otoa? .t^is,:^0©oticiaia .tovm^d,..: : | 
to^Kairos i s a, real attitude* or'^1^ff^i*. .4e^w^ an abstract 
tien* His conclusion £e tii&t i t appeal'-M,a gojmibili t jr only 
to thoss agos -tibete ie"a statlo Werprotation of^natij^' j 
and in n&ieh wtft$ intwiiitf© mind is assumed to haw an absolute j 
portion fcexrond t|si#*** ; <Bg&a$l0ft of thi^i-aityatioa woxiM. "bo j 
a^ oels eivi^imtiom^ th§ Mid&l© Ago© m&tn t&oii* et@3?na;t, fosrae of , I 
v&9&&%l&nt and* Miaod©j?n natwal soim'ae© ,^iioii ba© diasolTod 
[tim#] in$o a dimension of spaoo (t»o fowth di^noion)*** ! 
•".•••-.{Hie #t©^siijatiY0 influone® of to "belief in"thfc poseifci&itjr 
of aSGOtieiom toward the Kais?os oame to an $»& with tlx© fcrea&domi 
of th© .gtdvaal fosna© of the Middle A@os*.., #@pl&o®d,W 
(1) ^ l i o i u Pat% ffh^ ISO* " 
the reaiiagttion of the distorted character of hvmm eacisfceneet 
and the imposaiMllty of the absolute position for the euo^eet 
i n whioh he Va&a hfrld upon, the o^ewial forms* With this WW 
understanding eoraos to neoessitv of reeognising the element of 
historiosX fate i n the ofc^ot of study and i n the subject* i#e»f 
evei$thing i s historically conditioned* At the same time the 
necessity &nd freedom of decision la reeognised* 1*0*$ there can 
be no straightforward laying held of the. eternal forma* "but 
rather a process of decision and interpretation of the meaning 
of the distorted truth whieh finds egression i n historical 
events* "Fate and freedom reach into the met of 2snowledge -:sn^ ^ 
make i t an historioal deeds t h V M r o s determines the k o g o e ^ ^ - i 
„ *:there. can be no asceticism t o w d the demand of • •. 
the Kairosf no avoidance ©f the decision* Xdealism 
and supernaturalis®.* inner*isorldly and super^worldlsr 
. establishment of m/'absolute, jw&t&oft of the subject* 
are flights, fro© decision* AseeiPtieism is a f l i g h t 
from the decisions «bi6h eontintially have to "be made 
in this distorted exiBtenoe. (S) 
In this my Si i i ioh maintains that the Logos (the idea* 
understanding) can only be grasped i n terms of historical event* 
m>mvWt this i s not to toe ta&en as meaning that the I*og;o8 has 
some sort of theoretical existence apart from i t s fate or actual** 
iSGtion i n history* She idea and i t s historical fate belong to-» 
gethesr* 
(1) n i l i e h * Paul* ^ ^ ^ r ^ t a t i p n , of, .History, pass* 
(8) ibid* p«i30» 
Sssenee and fat© are not strange to each otherr that 
i s the conclusion of, this, argument*. Fate belongs io 
essential being* *,*EeeogniJsing reality is recognising, 
reali ty as i t stands i n the historical fate* not he* 
yond i t t t ^ho, participation of the things [the Kairfciy 
i n the idea [the Logos] corresponds $ua& as seriously 
to the participation of the idea i n the things* (1) 
Mother m& of stressing 1>his i s to say that the idea is 
not complete i n i tself* She idea can only become motif est in 
event*-and the manifestation i s i t s r e a l i ^ t i o n ^ ^ i t e reality* 
She contrast of eesence and appearance is removed* 
I n yhe IMi&ieue. ..Situation* where the point of, view mfoieh 
we have been discussing receives a concrete application to con* 
temporary sooial l i f e * th^oneept of the realisation of 4dea 
i n historioal event i s expressed in terms throughly reminiscent 
of Vioo# collihgwood and especially Croce^ 
#isthe' spiri tual never appears to us save i n 
individual forms* as the history of creative 
individual events*** (3) 
She history of sp i r i t i s the history of the 
spiri tual creations* not, insofar as theye&ist 
0U*»fc# not as chroniclej but insofar as they ai*e 
me#ftirigful* I t s purpose is to understand the 
relations of meaning which connect spiritual 
movements***Henoe the history of sp i r i t [or 
simply hislory] is closely related to the con* 
structive# systematic sciences of spir i t or 
mind Ie#$*> empirical methodology]* Indeed the 
constructive ef for t often proceeds by. means of 
historical understanding of classic figures of 
th# past [i*e«* throu^x the study of history] 
"*-**ea indication of the extent to which insight 
into the nature of sp i r i t and i t s originalg 
(1) 'SillichK Paul* She Interpretation of ffistorv* p*164« 
(S) Cf». | b i ^ : f p.*jcfor'- . 
(§) Sill ieh* Paul* She Eeli^ious Situation* D*66* 
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answer two questionss v iha^ i f t the relationship 
of theology to the special sciences • fofft.^ 
and tsfoat i»• i t s rel&tionehip to phiioQopi^ty'iSj':' ," . 
We may reformulate these questions. in -Apoprt/jgltili the particular 
inte3?ests. of . this thesis* la sueh;m ref o b l a t i o n those two V 
questibas heooaes (X) what i s tho relationship "between that 
part of theology lsnom as Bihiioal hermeneutica and the special 
science imonsi as history? (0) What i s the relationship heteen 
theology f and oapecially Blhlical hermeneuties» and philosophy? 
In asking this pair Of questions m w i l l also he wondering^ in 
view of on* previous diseussion of the my i n ^ i c h philosophy ; 
i s to a considerable extent dependent upon the'historical iaethOd< 
to wh&t extent these two questions'' are; a -single 'qnostienv': Here " 
we isaay anticipate our discussion for a moment and say that* on 
the basis of what \ve have already said about $illieh*s; hermeneu-
tics> we would not espect him' to"answer these'' t i e :tuestion8 in ' 
such a--Uttjp as to dr©# a radical distinction fcet«f@on theology and 
other 'for&e of imo l^edge;*; 
Dealing with the f i f s t of these tivo questionsi f i i i i e h 
finds the oharaoteristio difference hetvjeen theological inquirer 
(including' Biblical he^sieneutios) and historical inquiry "in that 
only the stib^eet matter of the former is of '•ultimate concern* 
tO. liS*.'; • • ' 
(1) m i l c h , Paul, ftya^^t^..^^ n . ie . 
WWafttffi Cjanejgn $h&t yfibjfafa O p i n e s 
am Ml£$ &g $0M$m* Only, flbgae _ statements 
a i f t i t i M p l mSkWSk Wm l a 
JB& far as i t can taegble a of being or . ^ f i B S t o * U ) 
"i^eing" i n i t s us® here does not designate, existence i n space 
and t i m e o u t "the stame the meaning and the aim of e&is* 
ten^eeMf^s^ ; cttbr forme of toowledge such as historical insights 
whioh are not & '•matter of being or no toeing for us" are Chirac** 
terised as being ''preliminary concerns0* Negatively, the rela«* 
tion of '*preliminaryM to Ultimate" concerns oan be one of in* 
differenoei e^ gwn the indifferenee of the lew Testament theolo®* 
ian to the historian or psyeholo^ist* fh i s results i n a frag* 
;.;^ntetry view of the \$or!d* or* again negatively*the "preliminary 
concern'* oan be elevated.' to: .an. 'Ultimate eoneern'-'i :e*g#*. «£ i n 
, the Various religious nationalisms* Shis is idolatry* But ; 
there i s a thiiSd and positive relation of "preliminary" to Multi-» 
mate" concerns; this tafees place when ^ the\; former beoomes.^ ehioles:; 
to reveal to us. some aspect of the fatter* taking hi8^iaii:,;'':-.;;..-j 
i n s i s t s as an example of "preliminary eoneernswt Si l l ieh sayss 
* • •historical insights* # *ean become ob ject© of 
theology | not from the point of view of their 
cognitive form$ but from the point of View of 
their power of revealing some aspects of that 
vMoh concerns us ultimately i n and through their 
cognitive form* (3) 
(1) Sil l ieh* Paul* Systematic. SheoloKyaX« p*14. i ta l ics S i l l i ch ' s 
{B) 0£» i b i ^ p*14* . 
(a) ibiji*> P*13« 
836 
Vtom tha dataila of tha '.Bstodua i n the Old featamant, and tha 
oir thatorioa In tlx© lias? faatajaant as?© not. of i&titnata aonaer»i 
Uhathar or not tha Had Saa dividaa* or s^ihathar or not M of 
Ha^arath isaa "bora of a v i rg in , do©$ not datermine our bkng 
not^aing* And ainaa thia. i s 'the situation* thaology haa naithas? 
tha naad nor tha. ria&t to pra;}udica historiaal inveatig&tioa 1$ 
thaaa araa**^ fio:ii?aver» thaaa two proi?laiaatiaai incidents hava> 
in and throu$i thair oognitiva form* tha powar of ravealing to us 
aoaa aapaat of that «b&4h Qona^ rns ua /ultimatalyi aa do alao many 
othar, .totter a.ttaatad avanta^. a^gf* #Nma* fc^ «Tohn tha 
Baptist*,-
IMa gives us an indication of tfillieaV aonoaption of tha 
relationship "between thaology (including Bialieal hawnautics) . 
and tha^ape.oial aoiana© called hiatory* But thara atiil^»#iaa^ip^ 
' , ^1^^^Wv^?'-•?••,•i''^?V^.:''''',"' 
tha second half of tha diatinetion whlah f i i l i a h .haa dra^pp^fe^ 
twaan thaology and othar^oraa of fcaowiadga? naiaaiy* tha 
diatination oatijrean thaology and philosophy* Slha d i f f i c u l t y 
hara ia#. as tillioh @ay&> and aa waa avidant in, our ascamina*-•-• • 
t ion of Oroaa and oolli&gwood* th© taot that thara ia no 
ganarally aooaptad definit ion of philosophy* Hotsavar* Sfillieh 
auggasta that philosophy is n$t#fc. 6o,ffli1f|ya:aa^ro;j^ oh to .raajity.'' 
i & yjty&fa m U E - i l . £Hfib..&& oftftaet***^ Inquiring into tfca 
(1) Cf« .Tiliiah>- fauiy syatamatic %ha61o|xy'f: %»• ?)«18« 
* j *• ' 
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AO, *ef oqju&s v 0 t t 9 | 9 J0 ts0$px&* ®T ,W»ML. ;*0&*&" * * W * (ft) 
• ' • » ^ f * ; ( l ; * « f f t f ( g ) 
;dQtt0»c0^,sp' 'Ott^ - .^^ii :ft®Q.dp0^,$is %mm$m®x'p$ W®W®Q&®^#QQ aw 
j. 8t3. ^cton*. ©antW . OQ. pstaoop 8$ g a m x$0$$9XW0 *XB0-IX<lOT0tj. 
Pto,&tj o$ flfctotOTfo ^.nQmwa "$ped0ti&Mi$ 
.4$$0.0©00tr j o 0$d,0©tf00©tHw ®s©tj^  40oxO0t® u% . *0$«: 
*#an$tm.-t%0©^ €in©. *$trgt$.. . 'MWO.^i!^ **$:*O . .I 
'', ;' j o ; .0«^oiy:$0 mx% •, dgjfdfteety.0$d00&0®. pa© m%m%Q%,@&: 0©en 
L"' JX0s$$ ;0$$i wsj':' p i ^ s o x W p ^ ' . ^ o t o f t | $ . . # w t ^ f $ 0 W 
' V^co^e^ 0t$ jo ^^:.0t$.%cm of $$-*;a^ 0&OR. 
vU£jMMk0M 4oj 'Vao?$*etib i@o|0oto t^so • ' ptOA^ tseo ^dosotM# ®& 
&ftm ''v®¥ttt& f4iidoeofft|d jo .tto^ptijop jo 0080J0P tqg 
#0 i t $ w $ ^ 0noi«03np$tiTOB' 0e$«40d00 -$x w t i 
• *^tttJW $ t «t 4t$o0©t$tjd I I 0 | A jo grated .0ft{$ w&$& (ii*:04©' ©soismd 
' *$ti0pto0^  %o#00#j *0ta|Sj.i» *Mt3@ t|0|tX$£ *0W-00W«ttati* niwtt 
«/&i0$©|t| jo &w<a m% M).: ;*$%tx00<* #0 mx®®& 'Mm® y$pL ^ ^ w t o m 
i'mm%&nd%® o0ot|$.'oitff'^tW'&tit iw$m i#m#' ®% MitPH '$0 "sawiw 
< ' . . • , i. i ' i 
i&l en 09. $ipno<K|Et «pttt©a, &o«M;p.jsq|.|^ii& et$ e$ s$a>ouoo pue 
*0!je e t^taft tswwa <*TTO tit ^e^e^, ptse e«m{|.ms ®©t?t$#p 
' weeo-tit @&tsea;eOTp :is <e$ « H M $ ;.:*12iSrtv t W t^seeeM yot® r 
.. • e«0t$tp®<a:$ e$t *t|0^ mt|£) n| peeeeads*©;; B% Wft' sis • (eo^ et . 
etseoeq, ot|^ &^ ;0oBb5• 'e^^^©^am .^ tye$ft 
4fe£l9K': ei; iste^^fw ".«cpti • en^ eenoo: tiett$t . mom WPX • = *mm 
.mmj*^%%QtQ>®m etris *8tit@& 50 e&n^ erw&e et|$ ;$eAoee$p e$ <j@p#o • 
Ut PW© 0$ ®tm% a*^©tno^^pao«t e| m@m e#0£e&et& pit© 
«| Sfttp&to*; tioBtif et$.;' puts' efotp.' ; B J%tt#©£'.£0. IBBHSf' e^ q./U&e^ eet, 
i£$t$w#Pt tra-et mm* 'iStww* $® etotp, e^ e^ oot tfei^eoittsd 
' ©tis ; •*e@04Kvoe ttt 0o«e«xe#OT e ef item e^ptno<SKevetj 
$ne$tioo o^ 1 ^ne |^^ ^oo, ptie psetseAtoAttfc ^ o*^n*|f$^ ti^ ; et 
' t*et8©toei& ©i*$; ao& fee^ otw e^•• e$t;V®®' ^ tttoq; iwww>*'JtytAWot 
. petio^ ep 3:0 etso st $t aetidoeettttd «o& *epMt$$s ©At^ ttt 
' «®o# 5:0 - « m ^ & t v ' $ W ere&etir* fPW ;*||ptod © e ^ . ^ : ^ e e ^ i 
• <^t^e^t«^'txot^owf{|.etP &#©er t$|tTO W$i^ o<ptt ' 
' " ' '•• vr ' #0$ $ttt©<t ^ 0 SWf|tW ,^<wi ' 
©tiaep iS^otoet?i^ -.'fiwuit- «t J^toq jo ©an^ on^ B^ w®. ; ^ | i ' » t w p 
* . . . . . . . . . . . • : .' . . : 
' • nt £m eq& uf sett eotteae^TP ©U* .*«setiw eft^oij seop 
to••thir araativa •&N/itti&,'&! l i f a aiid . thaaty^tura of :$®&*$% to < 
t h^ id iv ina i ^ i r i t # ; W \ : . 
fima taafca'i© a divarganoa ijet^aa.pi^iosopijy and th^olo^yi 
Hovibv^r**^^ 4a vas?y <&aractariati© .of ' . f l l l iah^-fci i la $a\ 
not tha .laat .word* fha divergence t>#'$waa» philosophy and thaas.^  
logy , i s "Dalanced b /^"an Q^ually strong convepgoneo. He maiiitains 
that tha philoaophai? 
. - ##.#&*. a theologian i n the degree to which' his exiaten-
v •. ! ' t ia l : altuatioiv'and'hia uitizsate ••aonaam ishapa-hia • -;; j' j tliiloeophical vlaion* ' Ho is & theologian i n the degree o ihUHx hia in tu i t i&v of •  tha: universal logos -i&f: " '' 
. atruatee of r a a l w aa'a #ia&a ia f o r ^ d w ^ a pa 
- tkauw "3^ {jda- \$iioh- appear©.'to him; on 'hia^pairti©^ 
and, reveals to him tha meaning of tha whole. Ana ho i s 
: a'thaologian i a the da^aa to• ifeiah -: tha 'Bariianlar. $0^0$• 
4*-'* mattafc of aativa a o s a ^ t « t ' # - t h i a &' apaeial. aoJa*'-" 
: mui&ty# :'$tom?®, i s h&#dl$ a Mator iaa l^ : ^ T O f ^ W jpKjfci* 
, 30aophar doaa.not ahow thaaa mite® of a tha#io$ian^ 
; • But tha philosophar daa -^^ ot^  int&nd' to -itm a* th^di^giaifw-v 
. Ha ,iasata .to aarva tht univereai ifep;os. Ha triaa-.to ,tui?a-
: ram^?"f r ^ 'hia 'a&iatantial 1 actuation* "including his;uibf*'-' " 
tiamta • oonaarn* .tot&rd a plaaa atsova 0i> particular 
v ;piaaaa*,;'toviiard pura^rMlityV !3?ha aonfiia^ : aa t ia^" to : v . 
intantion ofoaaoiaing tmivarsal and tha daatiny of ra*-
' ' '•' ' si^inin^'p^rtiouia3l? iSbatiaii^ 
I t la it* fcur&aa and its. graatn^aa* ($). 
: *0haaa/than.are,tha functional o h ^ ^ tha.thao**;. 
logian which raost, i f xm% a l l P significant philoaoxihepa glares . 
•a^iata^tial, invoiyattant and ultimate aoncar&$, t h a i s f ortanoa- .. 
of.tha.aonarata patftiaular fo r uadaratandiiig rfality,as.a.wholaj 
(1), ^* ; -^ i i l i oh < l . 'n>m$ 3v:atamatie; $ h a d ^ > i „ • w*&W&* 
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jo %n<> mox% ®j®£xm® jo §.«so@ s$t$, ©A|B o% &&%l<& ®m 
ptro ^qaosotFid ©PT*Wt$to|® atxisofjtuBp te0%m^ 
ttq.$& toop ^bso t l t f a p*k M&%o®i5> ( A ) *J®oto©ti* seof o© 
''wet (0) -. fcttowMwrtB • i«o$$©T04tjo. ©tig. - v[%"p& J0®mtp%s. ' ' 
(0) *i^O0OtW WO^ J tJtoipm$$@$P * es^^'pt0©O©tt ©at*? 
( t ) jo . t t tW <f) *tte©^o m% jo e^oeto oq. 
' 8,©$$$|©ee0&u: ©TO *0%et2&o#2t,jo mx»M4 t9$09<& s . . 
0$ V* .«i«tdi* 0$ f&Mttii?- g,0tt Q:@0p ptl® f 09[Be t»AO **0J «3E0^ tlUl 
iaefjoja© ©til #£e@p est £mt$ ts$ tssiao^st^ 04 Atdfts ri&ti 
.ittMFj: "pera lt|0@f j @ia^ o©q. OT#A soSO'i ©t|$ ycm w& *^ t teo« 
©til viftWi 4»TA$$OS£<P p©ico^©p j© 'og&^yB t». mn Ma0V^o^tPi^ 
6% i S t ^ o&t^ ^ft^. &mv* ®$ %% *ti^$Boto©ti '^ mq, tno*tj'it©t|do0oi 
etji^ q.® ^ ea$^ ®«|3ioo«i *$£0$«j|ti ym J&&omtpL& .#0' ©i^ ©pa©d©p«!t© t^i| 
^ttBtiopitt o^ j, pe|tdd% eei ost® ptftO^ ^©^00 1*? «t©t{<Soeo 
| jto ^t£8d$Bf< ®m w » $M^e$8t 04 e^dta©^© ©tp ©tio^e ^etiteBf 
| -: 8|t?i&' .•*!tW03fdft;'-p%«JEO^ . o$ uptswooo pott -fejLwt:. G*A' tioftpi . 
$o &ottS|tfOdtat 0% IJS^STO : txotptom ^*o pootl^ iip*i$ .qe$ft 
|. *^dw^'',^w ^^•^St^o|t'^^ oe s©t£&&9 tt£i0of0.®t$J©^ 
| **Jt$?$ :Btipttm m;S©ATS ;WTt&£ 9||8p|8%SH0 
j Otis *t4t3|%o©tiQ, ©tft £o 3t«£o& t*t $fott&x© 00 put?fi.$^$iodiat 
ob *t W ' 'twoated o t^wit^ T*1 *«ot©TA. t®®t**o$® |q ;-
I . ©totjia'iatft pa^ 8©txo^00nt> twio^b^tto. .#80^ o$ xtoi3oa$<3fe n^wst 
>i*o^©it| 'mp&p uy J^ aweffOi qi0pttt ate, @«& s© *^puooos 
l^imm^B 08dt$, #o dBpo't&oti^  .mo .o$^p!®: A^taMt «st*l 'go ;p%%mm m% 
p 4 sfflitj; put? ooeb^ tit s$#0Ae o$ p&paooo© onwe t$t$ 
*bktt30 *wm go ©m%wx tBTO?&** stxot^dmfisia t^ot^ofo^o 
titwo© jo B%mci m% uodn fepeeoo^d A*t&P ^ou iSapnPM^  e|tmt^o$ 
. *StH 'WBfc : ^ xo^  itiot^onb tteot^oto^tto otpj. ptOA© o^is toop trnt^o^t^t 
, m% *TJ^tSotoot^ -pm ^©i|dosotttid ©tiq. esr&t ;Hs«ti ^ucetBoto^ 
putj- ^otidosottt^ ^00, 0^ t i © t ^ s t ^ m% o^ftm a s m 4©xi^  %m% 
en s.®oe t i o t t t ^ • SP>1Wi. # o t w ^ o ^ t n i o ^.o^. ot^ o^ iut«<a^& - i \ \ 
t£&$tttSi Q% Stttfootaoo w t S o t 0 W ^©A$$0ir&$efp ©t^ . jo gsroe 
• J0'0$ gfttCt' 01$ tS0 *&0Jjr *©0|^0i*0K#0t£ WttCl I f P^ tW0W'.«W*$0Cl : 
t $ f s $00000*8* « T © I qP¥T¥¥&v*tKft tjx'*;0$af0&" jo. jeqi'ntt 't/.$$.$0t, 
• «#$£o o&$ ©IB *'9oo'in0 afcOtO'® $<>« ©1 ts©f$0tt|$0$p;0$t$ *i^fat»«|. 
jo ©toaoj 'adqfto 0$ 0$0$aatd#&lk 0001$ -®m $E$nt«sf tW^otooti^ 0$ 
©$mt£&0a&Q!t* 08|ai0tips 0iiw>u&&3&$ ©t$: t3t#0a$0ci: &m&&®$g%'p •& 01 
• ; 0ia;0T$ 0 t W $*&t$: vmti'-Qsmt ®ft tiofBcmostp ststpeooad ©t$ tsj • •. 
•BOIWtl^Wil X^TOIt ^0 ^©TQO d^: 0t|i£' 
••''••..•r.'!. ; ' ':.'; •c*4 t^$0ts^  
» 0 | filijroi^p &T©t$ jo ps& *eeoTt#TO0¥P 00***$' ^ i^-jb^0^ot? 
«*dm^l0i$:;0&OT 0$ ®fM 000$ .tX0@T^woO\'ff^, tps.v *w#0?$ •'• 
"pa®.0«o©air4£0$0ftj ^ i ^ W j ^ t o | ^ .i0l:o<j. ^0t» $ott 
• op m *mii®Qt®mii @t$ 0$ ^^^mtp^ vws movmQg&iv &%% 
'^t*e$00&Kt0 vc&WMsi m^m'^%^%oi(i,^% put? awxlQbotpid. 0*$ $ m$ 
' 9Qf^0S « | :*'TO$$OT00t$ ©t$ p«8 t*0$#0$0.p(I 0 % 0$ p*¥t$ffif' 04 00 
.pttt00 0^ 00 0t| $0tp. :%0t$00O!j> $0$80tO0t$ 0t$ ptre «*0tgXo00tft# * Q 
' '/4t3«p 0$. ^0%''t|0i^ a 0O^0;|i|0^0MmiO 0t$ JO 0^0d©/0t| tX0t|ia :pt^ 
. | i» | ) i0 t0W mm »0**5 tw|ao40|it m% ti&$tim$%®t® 0$ paeti #ct '0sx® 
;OTIO0 0$B0. 0t| $i3t#& %is$S#00s$ 0t|4 pa0 ^o^dosoxi^ TO tSQ0i4®O 
•: 0W$0t*1$0t& 0**$"'J0 :0S^0d0 ^0|tt1^tl@^-:$Bt$'^0t $$ 0$ ; ' 
a i Revelation^ ciyataryi and tha o&tologioal question* 
What ia ravaalad i n ravalation$ Gill ian replica* 
A ravelation i s a special a»d extraordinary J&aai* 
foetation which raaovea tha va i l from something 
wliicli i s hidden i n a speoiai and extraordinary miy» 
fhia.hlddanaaaa i f of tan called Bi^@tw%»#«A 
gaauiaa layataryi hov/aW| i a assparianoad i n an 
attitude vhi'ob contradicts tha attituda of ordinary 
• oogniticaji' fha ayaa ara ,lcloaed*' tt&a ©aaaing of 
"zsgratary'tl Dacauaa tha ganuina iayatary tranaaanda 
tha act of saain$| of oonfro&ti&g exacts whoaa 
atructura© and ralatio&a p%mmx% thaaaalvaa to a 
a\#>iJ©ct for hia toat^adga* ( l ) 
*j?hua Whan vie oagia to afoaJs of . our toowledga of ravalation'Tsa 
ara praaaatad with certain difficulties# On® haeic reason for ' 
this ia that our language haa been fonaad. to a eoaaidaraala 
a&tant toy tha atriot aub^act^ob^aat attituda to?/ard a^parianct| 
an attituda which ia mora ar laaa appropriate to many aspects 
of a3£pari©naat a*&** thoaa i»ith ishich technology ia conoaraad* 
$tte resulting d i f f i c u l t y ia ona * i c h w have traquaat#;isat.in. 
our diaousaion ©f hiatory? and one which ia intensified ia -
thaolw* 
In apit® of this, however9 aooertions about tha knowledge 
of ravalatiOii can and. ntauvt ha iaada« Tim f i r at thing thich naada 
to foe aaid ia 'tthatetfe* i s essentially layatarious cannot loaa 
i t s tayatariouaaaaa ©van whan i t ia ravaaiad**,^s^ Thia does not 
|1) . SJiliiohi £aul* .^yata^atio ffhaoloffy* X '^p>10$« 
(8) ffiidfcf. t»lQ9» 
Q4A 
• a ^ l t T O *QTt*:G,**?f§f (8) 
t i t ; 
TO- 8uts?«8d&etf 56 ssootj© TO, o^'®TO $P$® 9£$tyB%&tx mSi 
' ^yttocpmea. ym Mp^mnoB ©t ©#TO> 
$TO. 40153: t^ttt&iao TO 0!j,* •«j^ Oti ^Tdqrttoto 
I'seiEtyg pirn TBtttodoSj $t®®%1 i&tfpxb df-roftee*-adept 
%% ©aop son \'*0&p$tpo0$ oitfrp i&Qq.8i&s TO 
%% &q%$® M&%q£® TO $0 tsEfAousi mow 8ttm$aice 
txTOt& ttotq.«^ ©o^ |ui3Bi TO ctf etiofjcoq.eiaa i5tt^0©©o©ct ^TOTP*®® 
, • . . . . • . » - • « 
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>©4Ktynj otjq. yarn $ssd[ oqvjo oSpetmomj ©t$. 40 ^ ^Btipt©^^ 
•pm &8upii tteppni $no<i# 0%©tmot#r o$ottt.b&0 gq,p& postij 
I . 
I tio ^ ij^^^Bj^fati**©^, mi% jo t w j w > W © *3ttf<Ml 
: tja$n/a B?$MSEI pa© 0t«*P^a J T © W w e s a t o i^ |©<i jo ptira 
i; fyf S©A$©O©<X ot#& ts|tj tsaeoitiao dW¥Vtft j o 01 $t tStEtocpsois £©ti& 
i «*t*o© 0^ <x©ao<s oti^ st3ti $t ©roooq. ymr PSw&tt&m twonfcttoo ^trpq, 
,to$,S$ii TO v&vm n% uowcoAoa t i | $©$jftiteta feeuooeci, apt© 
ptm iiBdte^ eiDB © T O ®% ©PT® © A W ® O S ptm puoo©0 * S T I & E © ^ 
©t<IT®«oa jo $n|bd$a94e w®, 6i0*sj • pestoofC *@Ctt©q 
«@Q^o Mom j o pat» S?tt|©d tmo fttH j o «4tfpB?T W 
t®0?^ Ot^ t^tO OtJ* 310© UBO «B© y2t«0 *4^ti|0^80tX J O 
• TW*tJ0tys<W' fcftj £0 0@<xnao ti t ®| - itaiAoqtffq &®&Q@mn 
. $t?t$ *$tt©p® © T O 04 * fit ®«fc0*$ fextent ^ o tW- tife 
;i5tt;^e90Q©ii &$tiboy • t ^ > | i e ^ | t i %p£0m. u% '*Mtytipt- £° *WWt 
' 110 0fl©000£&' jEttOtyBftl $Bt$ «: $tu> 
• ' .-" '''%9$tfflxbfa dn s ^ i a . t|j)|tp . ^ j ^ ' JO' :$AIB& 
•'" §©woo^ €t'ix^  on 'nm M©tat^ » * 0At00ti0© 
*0#<$: 8 $ t $ W t>0At©>&*"'&t Wtf& ;'^0ip^ $0 ti^'it^A©^''©^ .*ixraiMt 
•4ECKX ©T$. 0$ J^TO^ftAASE OU' S-i '**©*|' *mQ%pt3$ . ^ ^ W O O 
p«t3 ip0|) £0 0tS«It'.'TO t*T <JO «XO Wft^'' SMtyWl-;j3P0. $#i3# 
.••J8B» 0$ ©q. pf&0&©ttfij, it?|©®0^M; ^ O'jfittA dtiq^tmy- *p0Af0s>0<ai ®T 
n a t i o n * th#sr WOJPO not assumed by the historian* h i s * 
tQj?iO«& in<|a43?3r wouM &0 moa?@ ft© poasiljlo than tbttoStoear w & d 
M tithout 'it© moa?0 dissect ta&ing up of th© ontoiogieal a u c t i o n * 
t3l-:' • i s o l a t i o n and ,m$$itting grotjptMf.' 
|| • the- p^uppogs&tion of m e n t i o n i a ^ f i r s t * the arising of •• 
the oatoiogieaS gtoai&nt and* aooonaayi previous ffovolation* 
Wiwifi-twd' together (and i n thoo&ogy* as i n h i s t o r i c a l gmpiivy* 
thoilp/s^ai&tion i 0 an a r t i f i c i a l ' s i t m t l o n ) go to aais© up the 
;Mp^©^dor#1iasidi^' tflhieh ftffiag to wol&tions that whion 
must ho pa?e»m*ppO0od i f j^iroiation i a to bo t&oelvedf that 
nahioh i s yftwiied and leoeoivod i$ Knowledge* ahout th® ea?eatoj? 
Of thfc l a ^ a t o ^ of froing^ a laattos? of ultimate eonootfn ©lace i i 
dot©3?aiinos om om tsoing ov nonTaeing* 
S?h@ no&t guostion to tie ta&en up i&s I n what situation <san 
thQj?e M a s?#tmlation Of t h i s flgretsyyf T i l l i 0 h * s answos?>is that-
th© ayfttdxy 4a psyoaiod fos? someon© 03? eoiae gi?oup i n a eon<k^ii$ 
situati o n of oonoojpn*. I t must t>o a oone^ote h i s t o r i c a l ©itm^ • 
tions foj?'the i?08son§ w haw already ©plained i t ©annot ; 
tafe© |>l&ee «toe*& £h®#@ i a an attitude of "aacotieisia to th© 
Ifetooait* U&m&irQ® i t must h© a situation of concofcn* foi? only 
out of fcueh a situat i o n t ? i l l tlier© as»lao the question and th# 
openness into which tho jpovolation iaay ont©3? as anawoj? and f u l * ' : 
f i l l E s a n t * . tfilMoh: ©lato03?at©s this., saying $ • 
' »@tdood m&qm 
®q% wwtj %#Q&® j o pOAioouop eq. $ontsi30 £mt% W. '©tm'vpTA 
^TP^^^no eaea f^M pwa essoin ©td®®e© ^£0,s *dtio«jB 
OTjij. siOoXj ^ aedB 0000467*8 iXBtftOXS^d a PS ©A«rc£ q,ou ptuOO 
pus *dno«x9 m% jo Mq.onpoJtflM B s*p TWPWP1*! W ©e«xnoo JQ (X) 
*,i©T$tt©d§ *uoq.qiTO **S*0 Kt&xoowoo O^MOUOO j o izot^ood t» tno«xj 
lityTdfli iEt^ EBOto oua po^ -TO ®<t ptnoo stK?F<xo$0$t{ *£0t&0 Jto&m • *Mo%®m. 
OSTBJ J0 «o|^ o©p©a «T iSt^ TiotAq.o 3.eous **B*B ^^^mo^mvd m 
':p^ s'tdtd^ otW9qp ©q. iStlp®^ troo eewT* *V »poom$txtTtO0 pUB-eooAd-
9Q0tk u% %UQ'g>tA^ e% wdovoo 5:0 uo^^m^is oq.oaotioo eipga. Jt£cnp94&90 
•^ ©tpn^ s Stzipeq, $0x4.00:0* x^ofao^ftj *Bino'ftd0a> 01& opt$ e<i©q.uo 
eQ/vtb^&otfb t®ot$oto$tio tw,% j o ®m$ WTttV&k'&Vl Strfxmwosi 
4 0 j (post^oo^tm #OA©&ot?) uaeotioo Itsot^^opieTio© a©ptm mot 
*qoo:d x®°f^°^sTO ^ Btuo^^d 0113. ra$ tj$tt&§ ot|$ ^ pianac «soj uvtootioo 
t^iiowoo jo «ot:Q.Bui?.*p0 o^o^ottoo 3 rao«xj tso^tum ®T -£«xog.S|;t| ^ txBotj|« 
-SH© $13% «T &EOQ.epi jo S a w w W oi TOAOt T*^W*BUP-eTO 
0XflL«O|T«I*9 ooii* ®% %% *etioT8TTWt .XQI&O tqptti£0Q 0$ $t*©q.3ro ©taoo 
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BuTp3©A©«* ©m[ ^.H S(t)T®nPWPit TO t # \ o ^ dtioaB ^  
iSXt^ttOtl *dtl0*tlB t3 ^ O 'ttinpTAI^ni'QD ©d©BsES tXOT^ I^OA^ H 
fb® f a c t i o n a l description of tho pa#i of receiving i n d i * 
vi&uaka and $3?oup@ i n the i»0imlatox>y pjpocosf a'iao has a second 
is$oi?tantapplication to* oa? p a r a l l e l w i t h r the writing of h i s ~ 
tory*;- -JghlSjlim i n th® fact that the ai?s*iva.l;at h i s t o r i c a l unAeiN 
,|tanding -aotBee about through the necessary interdependence of 
outstanding isailvldmi© and the? gtfoup associated with the©* Foi? 
» - • «osciio$>Xe». Giooon, i3p©aglOis? and Chai?2.©a Seavd* and thai? intevp*eta# 
tiona of history* as?o inconceivable apaj?t fj?om the societi e s 
which gavo jeis© to thdnu- Shoy are ohvieuely d©p©ndont upon th©ir 
reiW**^;'^^V^8"*0*,'*^^p approach to history* At the sasn© 
time they w©3?$ («faa$$$9P t h e i r fattlte) outataadiiig individuaX©" 
with; unusual i n s i s t into various h i s t o r i c a l situations^ and i n • 
Varying dogreoa and ©ays thoy gave to--their soci0ti©0 a n©w 
understanding of t h e i r Situation* 
Shis i s not to ofcaour© th© differeaooa oetv;©on theology and 
history* the tiaaio character of which wo have described i n a 
previous section** ' But i t i s to assert that on a functional > 
3#y0^ receiving individuals -and groups play tho aaia© rol© ;i&C:"'• .• 
history and i n the w a i v i n g • of revelation* 
Ot Eov$lationand 'ecstasy. ; .:*..» > 
l i l l i o h i s f u l l y avare of the danger of laiaund^tanding 
i n th© use of the word Meoataay M# tout i t s ua© i s nooeasary a© 
there i s none other to describe the r e a l i t y to which i t points* 
(1) see STrgra,pp.334ff. 
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of the, abyss to which .#e&soa l& a l l i t r f ttsotioha 
i s driven with tho expepleioee of the ground l a 
tifoieh j?0aeos i s grasped % the myeioipy of i t s otm 
dipfo.fimA of tho depth of being gaaeffl&lfy* (X) 
OxicQ mox'O i t i3 v/ell to warn that this doe a not mean that reason 
i© te®imv®&$; aoa? does i t moan that ?©aso» i s iav&ded by a $t)?aB$e 
lK^\^'lB9OfAod0» vdth which i t oaimot \mito, fh© patetfalehoe of 1 
this' distortion of.ooatasy seve&atieii shoved a^t blind us to 
it.® oliaj?e©t0r| mm©l5T|, 021© of damoni© and destsmctiv© euperaatw* 
align*. . . < . . ' 
It jasy b© helpful to apply this description of ooataoy to. 
a famixias? 5?©0os?d .0f an ooatatio ©xpepiencei m«i03Ly that of Paul 
o& th© J p n ^ s j?oad*, .'Pip»* of %1X: itv'wouli ©xoiude any: single 
identification of what 'happened with o&eiteiaent* enthuaiasai or 
a&miia^psychological statoa* secondly, i t wmld exolude any 
iatos?pi?0tati0si of the .<$acfeevi»X Qia?oui88tan00a* auoh *a th® X$$ht. 
and th# heavenly voi0©j as having hax^ penod i n aajr l i t e r a l 0 ^ 
8tt'b.3©et~0l?30ot Q0n0©~*if. you w i l i j , £n any w whioh would hav^ • 
been .^hotog-mpifeb^* • fhia?dly| it would assuia© the necessity on .. . 
th© pa*»t of Paul of having a ^a^unde?atanding" a* to the 
necessity of a Christ* of hating wceivod previous swolation 
(f!P0j3 tho Jewish 0hto?oii)| and of having undergone a••process of 
©lostioyiing a» to whether OJ? not Jesus i s the Chtfist* Fourthly* 
i t would int®s?pa?0t the o^o^ience ao having both the iaa^ Ka of 
nonheingj (the guilty the t?^iMwsa) and of nonbaing ov©3?00*&e 
(1) ' Wlioh* &aui» SyatQiaatio; .!gheQlo^y.A X, p*. 1X8* 
' 386 ' • 
(the odnves*sl<m i t s e l f ) * F i f t h l y f according to Million*s dee* 
eription of ecstasy, we cannot aay that Paul received any &no&* 
ledge ^hat waa antir or non*»rationalj nor anything that invaded 
hie wind ae a "strange body'1!! nor anything which he could not , 
he united t i t h hiB reason* Si&thly* that which Paul received . 
wuld have to he of ultimate concern to fein* namely that «Xesus 
the Christ was hie (Paul1©) Christ* 
•Ehere i s s t i l l a seventh* f i n a l and crucial characteristic 
Of Paul'e .eagperlenee* I t i s not only that Paul 1 a experience had 
the element of fate and freedom i n i t * i»e** the fa t e f u l involve* 
raent of Paul v/ith Jesus as the Christ* and the using of the fre.f*» 
dora to decide i n order to decide that Jesus is- the Christ*;. I'his 
occurs i n any, genuine act of historical decision^interpretati^n* 
But jaore i s involved here i n Paul's experience Because* i n con* 
trust to a stx'aightf orward historical decision* Paul*© deci^L on 
thali Jesus i s the Christ does not proceed directly from the for*?.-; 
nal evidence* The decision does not contradict the formal evidence 
(e*g*\fevidence pertaining to Jesus1 l i f e ) * hut i t does not pro-» 
ceed directly from i t * This i s fceeauee* as i s never the case i n 
ordinary history* ther formal evidence has a transcendent refers?.**' 
ense* a transcendent reference shorn to us through the operation 
of the Holy s p i r i t * She Spirit directed decision that Jesus i s 
the Christ i s made through or on the "basis of the fonaal h i a t o r i ~ 
eal evidence* hut i t does not proceed ©iiaply or stra i # i t f o r m r d l y 
from that evidence* 
, , . . . > • ' ' 
a* Revelation and miracle. 
I f tiie auto dative of revelation Is ee8tasyp th© objjec* 
tive aid© i® Jai3?aoloe I n the teria "miracle w w© have an even 
more thoroughly debased v/ord than "ecstasy"* I t has taken on 
the anti~rational definition of tta happening which contradicts 
[interfera withj the laws of nature"* and a typical r a t i o n l i s t 
theory of miracle has been elaborated to the effectt "the more 
impossible \ the more revel&toryi" This ia a demonic theory of 
miracles, because i t reveal® a "structure of destruction" » ^ 
I n an ef f o r t to correct this situation T i l l i o h suggests 
the use of th© Hew Testament word seiaelon* rendering i t &,$ "sign* 
event"* to ©spree© the giving ("objective") side of the revela* 
tory event * Further^ ^uot as- ^the eostaay i n which the mystery 
i s received doe® not destroy the rational structure of the mind 
"by tshieh i t ia received"* so "the sign-event which gives the 
Kivatery of revelation does not destroy the rational atruOture 
of the r e a l i t y i n which i t appears", 
Shore ia an additional parallel between ecstasy and tairaelO* 
A& we have discussed* ecstasy presupposes th© ©hook of nonbeing 
i n the miia&f so Maign#evente presuppose vh© atigraa of nonbeing 
i n the r e a l i t y * " U?his stigtaa i s the negative aide of the 
taystery tshieh appears* I n the aign-*event- the stigma of finitude 
(1) Of,* T i l l i c h * Paul* 3yatoraatlo ffheolo/sy* l9 pp*ll*3ff. 
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'*0tiotAcio puis p0*pT0tE0pst • 0©tao00q, e'oraf^  TT* $«-*StaTO ti t 
...4ttWtt^at •* tt0tti^ (az|9^ »oit 0t<S^ d^ 'dltt/'pit» . ^ t t & b t ;j» **0'*T) 
.. . a' i l i i e h * ^ treatment of airaeie i s a superb piece of thso'gy* 
\ogi$al .analysief the moat satisfactory to be found i n eonte^prarjr 
theo/lgibal • literature*..' - On the. one hand • i t avoids destructive 
aupernatur&lissij oxi the other It^ ie f roe ef u rationalietio 
evaporation of the accounts,'.of »&iraeiesf; AH revelation* i t 
maintains* ta&ee place fa history (i:*e.*jr in. the' sense that i t 
taises place i n space and time)? but also* and this i s ©ore iiaper** 
tant* revelation ta&es place throng history ,.i*©«* as an i n t e ^ : 
gral or non~al£en part of the ongoing course of history* But i t 
does not talcs place through any aM a i l history* Only those 
events of history la/hieh are part of a revelatory constellation'' 
(ecstasy and miracle) are the bearers of revelation* 
e* original and dependent, revelationf. 
S i l i i c h maises a distinction betvaeen the original revelatory 
events*, and- subsequent revelation thioh i s dependent upon th® j 
original, events* , His development of this distinction i s par* u *! 
t i c u i a r l y interesting i n view ©f ow investigations i n Part XX* 1 
An..original revelation i s a .r©velation.^ .\^ 'ieb.-occurs . -j 
v iar'ft constellation . ^ i i % ' & i d .not.-,:e3£ist. befere*. . t h i s . , i 
. lairacle and this Mstasy .are joined fOJ? the f i r s t ' 
. t i n a t .• Both, sides'are o>i$inal#**.[as f^ r-.-easanmle. whenl 
^eter encountered the sian^sus ttea hi'"'called the • j 
(1) flillicdu f a u l * .^ste^atiQ. ffheoloffv* lt -nit-: 
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This original miracle with i t a original reception i s a per* 
manent point of reference for the Church* But i n addition to 
t h i s there i s a continuing revelation i n the Church* This l a 
dependent revelation* i#e*, i t a "Spiritual reception by following 
generations **» 
This process i s more eomplicated that i t f i r s t appears* Zn 
the original revelation Peter* for e25araplet receives Jesus as 
the Christ* following generations receive as the Christ he who 
had been received as the Christ by Peter and the other apostles* 
Both sides of this correlation have now been changed* In the 
original revelation i t i s the man Jesus who i s received* In the 
dependent revelation i t i s the man Jesus^aa*received~hy~the~ 
apostles who i s received as the Christ* Once again* i n the 
original revelation i t was Peter and the apostles who received 
Jesus as the Christ* I n the dependent revelation i t i s I as a 
contemporary believer who receives the Christ* Shis change i s . j 
not «}uat a simple change of one man (| jyself) for another (Peter| 
I t i s leather a significant change due to the fact that I am a 
member of a different generation "with new potentialities of 
reception"* Thus when I tatee my place i n the revelatory eonstel-*! 
l a t i o n f i t i s a different constellation* In terms of our fore* 
going discussion* 1 enter the revelatory constellation with a 
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to forsake a st r i c t . sub;Ject*ob3©ct approach and to outer into 
unien or relationship with the event itself v 
But what does i t Bean to enter into union with the event 
i t s e l f ? I t -does m% -mm-primarily to enter into union with the 
Mographiealy; politiealtf psyohologioal etc* aspects of the l i f e 
of Jesus the Christ* as one might with the l i f e of Caesar or 
Luther * fe cannot do thi s because we have very l i t t l e inform** 
t i o n about these Hjatters^ and i f we did* i t would do l i t t l e i f 
anything to help us to recognise Jesus as the bearer of the Hew 
Beingf What we do knot of Jesus i s the Kew Being which appeared 
and appears i n hia* t h i s i s ..<nSrp^55raspect of Christ which i s 
described i n the Sew testament* and this i s so because i t wks' 
i n t h i s that the authors were primarily interested* 
Now we, are enabled to enter the' ^ revelatory constellation M 
with Jesus as the Christ when the divine Spirit or Holy Spirit 
"grasps* sha&es and moves the human spirit''* The description 
of the way i n which the Holy Spirit does this i s frequently 
handled i n an intolerable wayf usually being a conspiracy of 
silence* with the i n d i c a t i o n that the Holy Spirit worlss as a 
**strange body" moving into the situation* But certainly i f reve-
l a t i o n ta&es place .fltoMfoffi history and i n no other way* then the 
Holy S p i r i t wor&s ffiroufifo history and i n no other way*, I n nei* 
ther case i s there any 'asceticism to the Kairoe* This means, 
specifically* that the Holy Sp i r i t ia at work i n the ttpre*under«-
standing1* and questioning wnieh we bring into the revelatory 
mo 
vOonatellation*. 09. w e l l aa i n the ra t ional : a t rnt tufo- I t s e l f (the , 
jjiflfljaaj QW ^ #ind*r*. $he S p i r i t alao uaee the action© of om 
fellonwaen vMoh d#ive us to ae© man's need* as •vyell as the aeta 
soft JWW&B.- o f the 0hui?ch which witnesa to God* a mwmv to man* a 
need*. I t l a i n apon*. sp to 0X3^ als*.'. "^mieia»©- wave" aa these that 
the Holv S p i r i t operates*,. But the jpeault of the operation of 
the BQIV S p i r i t i s not mundano but ecstat ic* Thx*ou$i i t we • ••• 
ante** i n t o .an ecstatic, afevelatos'y oo»@t?llatio3i v/ltSi Jesus the 
Chiplatj and out o f t h i s the Nov Being .appear* the matfSes of ^ti ieh 
aspe s?©oonoiliati0iiii, reunion and i?esuj?roction# 
I f we wej?e t o afrstgaefc fgom the yevelatotfy process sueh 
f a c t o r s as ttptfe*un&e3eeta^ingM*; •«& would then oe able to say 
that there i s a complete s i m i l a r i t y between the process of his~ 
t o x i c a l understanding and the process whereby we a r r ive a t .liehbw* 
ledge o f revelat ion* However r i f we look at the two processes 
as a whole w© 000 that there i s both, a s i m i l a r i t y anfl a d i f f © r * 
©nee between them f. I n both eases i t i s through ^pre^underata:^;; 
i n g % gueatioaingj involvement i n a receiving community and 10 
on tha t m are embled to n r^o? iao t w and thus meaningfully ap-
prehend spec i f i c concrete, events which have taken place i n space' 
and time* r £his i s the s i m i l a r i t y * Wb© .difference.Otieai t f tha t 
while the Sp i r i t ^ - ^ th© s p i r i t o f ts?uthr-«*ia a t wor& i n his tor i*-
oal inquiry*; He i s not a t wor& i n such a *aay that i t leads to, 
•the ac tua l i za t ion of the new Being*,.• in..the apprehension o f '• 
revela t ion* on the other hand* these same fac tors of " p l u n d e r -
standing", queationingj, involvement i n a receiving community 
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| %V %QM$1B B%tl% Vfopk . A*p®0*tt0 ®&$®t *t*0f $0t0A0*S JO 
-if 'qpfqft et $ f W *p08B©«3t#3c© p©«.t0AOO 
• .^$p. oct At&Atse©^^^ ,.. 
•&m&<m %0u fit.:fi|tia '*Sftfiftt$©m pxjra #$&o<3: t i t ©era Sfwoos 
^«txt3«i tiOTtja iwn. g©^pn^^@ ©eotjq. t*$ &&&&&& vfppm... 
d A l q . 0 0 p q . o w q ; t i t uoetsoH H | t ^ o ^ q ^ ^©^t i^ra 
*tcoo s r a t t ^ S @,ti0tttTai Jo ©txo s©5f|tf4ti tso^tts i jep ©TO f » i ^ O J 
©ttocpueg t i | ttee*$A j o t&£®p $txe8©$&$%, w IBN^I 
w ,ppo | f^©pm oq. 0$ at QXQVXW {myk m.v®%%Q$& 
0$ p0#«*$je# e t 0 ^ pais *^t|Bno^ .G A t$tttV& ^ tfQWSQte 
<m>m Mvfrxwtm @ T O t t t p©seti©^|p act e o u i ^ o p j $ dmo^B otfy-'v$ 
j£tt^<tci4Qtt' SStJ0t§<l 9 t#^T® j o $tiO!a$B©«x^  %m%%®m9 0 | t f0? t t i& 
*p#eetio©fp 
"4«ftp © A m i ; t | o w tioft*t0A&tg pots' eoftn&ietiis&g '••'jfiio^eifti j® 
wfcm^e^fon @t$. j e $cw> mox$ e. | t j&itt$& 
m o i t o j 0 t p ix | 4tt9ptA© ©<i ptnott^ %t *e>tt eoAfideNSwteo ® | W t t ^ a 
: *w&t&Wi^i^®W$ '*l&m. * w t t i l ' ( f ) • ; .' -i'.-iV-.v. ,. • 
"• .'• • ; ' • * • 
*i»twje«e* t ^ ^ W i ' w nXios^Sii $0 ©t» j o 
-uoo ^tioittoo V2tw t^£0 ©4 $©t* 4©sce tjBsiott^ tj^a© %g:^Bti 
pre A\*oa©Wt$i3© xt^oq 0 | t |0f t i^ tie lt$J9sa $©'etatf tww: W 
oq. 8p©@oo«x& t$6ifttt£ *Tetaftt ' ^ t n o f j ^ t ? W ©Af$t3©S8n@ ©fii<}, no 
TO t^Ottq^ 9 t i | ^ 8 | 0 l j o ©t& o o m t f &'t&<Ut&'9t(% tat«©«3t 
t^ tttiraGioo ©tiq. ts$ ptt$ f M. j t®W*^W®<!« 0* flK8Ow«0*8 d i j f o e ® ©t& 
t|Suo4t|^ S u i i s f o l $© iS^n^S eatj tto©#&s #0 tftSop iat®©«* 
©^©t&smra ©t& u% i!li$tm%$*^qx&%,% 0% ®v$m% m^tttm m% x0tiom% 
S«|(j.ti|0d j o ^ t t m ' f e ^ ^mj ' t tooM 30 t&<£©p t a t ^ ,«fc|%,pBSoo 
w[% « i »p©STTi%fc©fc e | uosijej vfcyvfc u% ©^©s$u& ©i& t i f 
j o ^$t8ri& t W f r w s 'tm &% t&<i©i6 w& qj&rwww. mm *mmm 'go 
x&d©$ ©i& j6;©tctfei86a ©&s€Jt*o£$%a$®©p /t^fAOtifStiB^^ ^ m n ' ^ i ^ 
t>©%0ttmpEO ©q ^otni©^ tjofpi^ .yesA'q^ © ^ [jeo] **co^©*io 
t^aow^t ' i?iE©A© t i t s&TV&owfc ®i ti©its^ tt^m©aS,i mz% 
pt#] * i * i i ^ « v * 9 . t .'^eoo^iMc ©tj$_ t t f ^©tfd to ti©|M 
' ^  jit 1 • . 
M*tUKi4&t o% yix®% tjO|i|ia o% puts* * nsaoq, 9 w raetj^ 
I t^oq. tyzpm #0 $no @t& *4Soxo i j ^ t tf paBSoato JEftni «ff 
i ©mowtma: .«^«it9!S0o pern w $ p t 8 o o < t q t y t i o t « f t mj£M#tj0t$ 
! * | np t t t«ot^oto^ti0 ym vw*&V*pt mtt ®U0t%W®$ &t po$o®t$ 
$0 -pmtM&wp ^tioi^tma; MWt iBoo . 
*>mtt%® £0 %m | l | 0 © ^ $ 3 , p©TO<s$ttO# t|OTO I© i*o®& 
t w o t ^ f ^ A K t ©tot# ©|t$. t$$rw>£t& B«|titm^ etKtei^oo . 
wt% #0 t$4©a#s ttodrt $t&Ati©&8Biu3 i &t{ono4 qppffi t*oo& 
«tt1$Q0t#te BtrpiOTOJ t|0|tt1»£ 5^£© t^«00 Aft&QTCft t ! | ( $ J 
t j o | t p 0$ $ « e w e # & AAK vt% 4aMtwu %$ao£ o$tocj,ra£@ 
« t moo***. $0 t$d&p ©t$. 0%«e00«ido t^t y&Sst %tm®% x®&mx®$ n$ 
(a) ( t ) 
0t©etow -pm vmt&%®<i %Sp#t^^«^ p«e v®£m 
xmm%®<i e w t J « o o o« po©^e<350ptin e t ma*** j o ti$<£@p 
&u$ pus po^toois i t tsos^ o*? $0 $<!@0W00 W|^ofo%tto m$, 
xM&mWi ^KgqgfMaoa fii'nowsa* j o 'itsoi^awy: a e t a d 
i $ t & t a t i t t f f t j i ^ t i $ .^ tc 0 j# tp tiopiJttwfp s tsf # | f 
*mo$ ••©ttoqjiajS© t i | .txoisfcj j o i^&^p ©t$ j o ttW^toMMt 
! *$s03,t«a» tga?ttt& ***t* 5:0 wtod mo flfn 0^ t t | W - tist3i©©d« H U H 
M*t2oi^ j o ®^n%otwE^ ott^ txTOf& *9&%%imLl&89 ptxe ©no^ono^e^©^ 
^ o w t p o w t ^ <*& iSq pssaottm^ tst t[0|tp 
I t i t teofcuoa ^o t^ati9©«s ami%® tt©0/A^©<| ^ o t t ^ o o ©t^titoettt 
' po^ Bw|ptJ0 «M@tst « * | @iit% W W W ottq. est $% *i«Bt«e* 
£^®ti^ o j o © p t ^ o t t ? ttos 1©^ j o ut«Mc •ter.WKt1 ©t q.t «xo 9 «nft»^ 
*$0; uQ^mmflk® m% «t ^0 s^txtos #H * 6 t s © t ^ w i 
-*poia ©not^A « t w t ^ A ^ o t s t t^ottia 0 t? tW*s^ptm ^oti^otie tj^pv f t 
©^ . s^^oo ptie tj^ie® j o $«tPttW3@ptm txotii. t |o t t t t i& 
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•' *fltow'iijj f&JOTP^. t m i ^ p t i o JQ-. j p j f ^ ^ t o & : ..• ' : 
'9B*.it$&a uotik m$p %&tm 0SJHR30|j|tiS|si y&MtoA&Xb van %U®A® 
^ ensoj? jo $U©A$ mti ©ta$$ mm ®t{% %n ' ^ ^ - v k a ^ M 
: % O W A ti»w«A8 otii *t#MBtaojfo ^INMM&O Ato^ &tdteoo «i tio|t^: 
tjt| w ^y*'i0WO' ^ «* <ro6«[p.. *wan ©fjfoaak #fto jo SO^BOIB' 
p@0n.0it© t^^s pt^ 'ti^H ti$ eo&timo ym !o$j$o©<28 Mtdotei' 
a vo&iol©. of jsoligiorag expression and tho suo* 
s t i t n t i o n of mi®m® and serais* l a t h i s ©©as© 
Xt would deprive r e l i g i o n of ' I t s^Xfnem^i* .^) , 
f h l 8 gives an inf&oat ion of S i l l ieh .** approaon to wbli* Xt 
i s o f a pioe© vvith Jiis t o t a l h e r c ^ o u t i c a l p o s i t i o n jm disotiaaod 
In . the praooding amotions of. t i i i s ;oikptoj?# i&e iHipiioationa and\ 
fxnj&tfuXnoaa of thi© to4©^ataii4i^ oaft 1>© 4i0®ovoj?©d, only t>y 
f o l l o w i n g a dotaiXoa.ap^lioaliioft .of I t to a apec i f io 8»srt&* 00 
fo r -e /^ap io tli© long • d i sc i s s ion o f ^ t n o ^ a f c M TOIIMJK* XX ;of -t&e. 
g ^ ^ H ^ - ^ ^ F B ' - , < P P * 8fr«4aj« ',"• • .' 
#0 should not0 Sili l jf lfc ' ia »©siai?l?;0. ai?ottt l a y t & i a r e l W 
t i o n to th© w i t i n g o f n is tory* >; 
% t M o a l . saeans ayitfbolioaX of the, o ' ternal* To view . 
an h i s t o r i c a l f i g u r e ii^fcaio&Xly moan© to regard :i . t 
as the agress ion; of a meaning vihieh i s rootod i n 
! . ' • to depth of t l ^ eternals i t moans i n ih© ia&t anal-
y s i s to regard i t religio%9lyf.#*toeatco3?0ativ^. * . 
S i t i n g of h i s to ry , w i l l aliray© 00 starkod fcy raytho* 
l o g i & i i j g . toftdonoiee* A o t h o r or not i t desires: theia*.($) 
B3,.00«5Sios?0, ha. whites i n tho; mm®., vein? „ 
• j 
(3.) f i l l i o h * , Brol , . $$BMm$iQ.. XbAp?pfQi;-*%Xs y* idf l* ..Whethor or 
not $»ltfflanft hi&sOXf i s g u i l t y ' o f 'this- doublet© doiaytnolo* 
g i ^ t i p f t i s tf0ry saioh aft open ^uoation* ^ i l i i o h d^ooo not 
itenturb "an opinion in . the. flatter* Tno R a t i o n cannot to© 
deoideA on th© "baoi© of aftort tnotations* tout i n fal2»no0s 
t o Btdtmanii the f o l l o w i n g ©tatomeat o£ hi© ohould bo given 
> .here*, JGh&0 method' o f ' int03Pp3P0tat#oft -dif tho I'oataweftt 
""' whieh tiE'ios to ^©GOVOJ? tiio doepoj? Waning-toohind my* 
• •ii-thologioal, oon'00ption0; I . e a l l cie^iaytiioloRigino: .* an ungate* 
"faoto^,^o3?df to b@;:iSW0* I ts ' aim' isV'ftot' to '-eliminate th© 
sjythologioai statesa&to tout to in te rp re t t&oia*r t JOGUO 
• Oftgiat and ^ t h o ^ o ^ * SOM . Press* L6ndon t 1960» p*W*^Lv«.s/ x 
^($) T i l l i o f c , PanlVvtenfe ^ l l ^ i o ^ s ' ^ t ^ t i o 1 n f : taidian ' B i o ^ a ^ T ^ 
IJ©W ¥ 0 i % 1986* p*68.* . . . 
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• i f ftteq p©«nse©©.i« ©ti^  poo *©0qtgS©£ ©# tjon© ©t*o©rao© £q 
p0OT9.o©*S ©is tifi&Q%&%ii j o J&$0©©t$t?<?,, ti0©^?}.0q tsof%m%w&-$ eq$ 
(g)***jt©©$i: ^©©jftimii xmo 
tj$.a:©p © ^ t{©|t{/A t t | p tq &%q$%<i®$$®$• qp f tp ^otaou 
-^feicfi OT$••vgtf& op o$ .©mi A\*6$©|rq j o txb?$£Ad8©<|6 
%mx ©i^*l**s^j©d0(3E xs*>$i*0$©$t{ $o. qmgxtm ©t|^  * o^ . -
$t$noaq ©q ^omt©© %% *aotq.^u©©©«3td j o © t ^ t ^ t ^ t 
13 ©uiooeq $oram© «n St&&©P &%% vc% m%% '©sanoo j© 
«[A3£©3.©Pi ^©©fie® x^TOi&a ©i& j©3 &©^©tf£t3*!& ©Itjs 
s©0^ t«5H& ©t| ©t#a^35© aos '*©0"jft©tf&tf %tm j© ta&oj ©t^qti© 
©q o©t« Pt^ot^ * , i to^0$t i j© A\$©©GTO<£« m% $*> Mmo£®%m 
Q&Wpmq,1®®® m% j o mvitm ©f qorrctai (<*©W ©TO j o ©0xs©p 
*$A© 0Af9. t t t » ©q pt^OTp $tt"C-0# ©TO *<3©A0&©H 
>©oBoi ptx© ' S O ^ I ^ J J © 8 tti©itT1& ajoot ©A xiotm 
u%''VLo%%om %%m mi% u% m%%®Qttf> © w t *I©PTS«©O I T T * ^ *%T 
©stTt ©3|0ot ^fttt|«^t.oo $x ^«toq.©tt[ J © i^3osotP$ t t ®X 
*©TO JO tosp^i ©sooaq trao %m&& vaQT$o%®%ii &XQ$® 
j o ©©tsepG©©©^^ etn j o ttowotpxrj:: HIS ttiespxo© jEt^T* 
*iatoip4«4l »X|©x|^  j© t t * « l t p t ip . ©to^^© « | ,^iaq * ^ 0 ^ &q% j o ©toqia/E© 
t©$tS©t©^8* ©111. tr£ q.Otl ©Ol1t<X &8t3M ©^ ©TO ©©§^0|At£© t j o i t t f i t 
( t)*©s©tj©^|a | j j o ©©Be^s ©A|©0©o©n© j o m%%&%<zm®V ®$wi % 
; ' ©Aoqe poe$$* •t|©ft^. j o ©&©©$ £q itioraot© Ti30TO$ii 
@ W $ f « | ©A©S[ %mw j£t©n©t*X©9 tz©3t©4 ©q otj. ©| tjQ$T$fc 
Btit^l^a xt3©^oq.s|i| t w Jt^oTO^aiim ©t|^  
«©A© ^ ^ s ^ t . ^ f©0t^o^©|Q t^ i©- ^EOJ *a©A©ao^ '*ptit®A ©t 
©t^T^t<*^ ©tt?a '*©«tf% u | &m&G® o^ ppeoddii© ©^ ©^ttto© 
«*q^  '©t& tf©m/A x i | «^©A© i^ XKt^  A*q j£t«© p©Taf«t© ©q trao 
&WG%$oti®i ©itMi;q.t^ ©©KTO©^ 0tlt?IttT^ WTOA*i 
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• »%t*<2 Itio^mi^e ' 9 ' u 6 W ^ l l l ^ ' ^ t t u s i Itjptttta' ( t ) 
•rod I f v^otowosjE %,B03ft§3£ gift. 03. fesfo^ra^ - tjtp .epWBdtd.^on 
000P 3.1 iapnq^titj pro ©tnT$ j o ept«$.uO 0$ n'otqa orxttait ^ . t8M& JS^ a. 
H)fdt^8 pou^eouoo $.0$ at ^ Q W i a i J ^oip ot j j a s * * j f 00 j o ©pun-t^ 
©TO 0$ ^OtO^OB® J0 K0$$Te0d&O JO e^drtSf 
H*iS$fW<*0$0 P«0 0TOt*00M$0Ct dttl8W0TW0« 'T8fVI$Bfl©: 
wnji *i2xQ®®w f0©|ti©p iCT8«0|0^t00«ti *t*0$jo, 0<M **o jSfsnofQe 
*«OQ opn^pitJ $tx©fo$jjn0*jt00 j o t20|000^f(lX0 tie &% «pf0« 0*IS 
' • (X) * J T 0 W 
-&0<3,00 t®®»* 0i|$ Streem pti© ©t|!?. eotstp *ta«©Ji. ©t& jo 
©StIOS 0<*TOj0p 0t|$ VL% ptt© 110 99 B&TO U01XS 0tl .0$ 
©,£©11$ opn^ tu t j -%m%ts%jjri8~jT00 j o <j.-^l$0 0t& £0,2 
^jtQ'Pft^t^l^ ^0t01>«3:^®*i,^:t00n JO ©pttSJ.^^^ 0^ 0? 
q.1 • t00fSoxot}.Btio^9 jo. ©fsoti^t^uB mi% t iot t tTS 
*©ti0e?q;©tM j© $01$. **s*0 .*e$a0ta9AQBi tw^oTo^t iOGe u u t ^ t ^ o ^ o t i 
4t0&*0t puis to^ote^tjoo j o ti0$08ti©stp Tist j o osatnoo 003'ttx 
' * £30x03.0*100® »o 
«<I0?|,d0t|0 
©TO £0 trot$0@0 nvm %xm ox® u% &TW eaom m%%m exotic ©TO 
•00tio0t!p-'ttT* ' *000fc«-<£0a'i ©stOT^t^o t^0f) fl«w 0tste|^ 0Wtr q,0tnj. 
* i l ft^a: « t AW?S 0/a 00 *0t£& « t 3tup«t <xej et• * ) ( « o t w 
*t*0ao3g j o a%g$0tttg«V'« 0fe£0000. BOT^oot^ ©tp.' 'l8$o$ j , t^O-T^O^®^ 
< ^ ^ E i o ^T$f$^ e#f <t0©t& ettt 0A|^op 03. 0q.d3ts0^  m%u£o& letiotActo 
• **ttfca;t the wltimat© 4© ©> ©tat© of ,©:Kist©n©©; which 
htfings tii© ©ad of t imet # 0Q3a<s©pt ©f &B ©nd. ©f 
. tira©*, a .temporal, •©©h©©* cannot h© iaa i i i ta tod* i t W0nl& not ©e to end* hut a digoontinnan©©* £h© 
thought o f a diseontinuan©© of t ine* -ftovKMeg.* i s ., 
i t S Q i f a t i i ^ ^ 
- ©onipaiQiiota It0©i^# fi?h© end o f h i s t o r i c a l time i© 
(jeatheiO i t© r e l a t i o n to th© tiltira&t©, ( l ) 
In oth©2? wos?&0 a l l eseli&toXogioal concept© must have a donfcl© 
3p©f©3p©B©©} on th© one hand a pe j fwace to h i s to ry and tim©|. and* 
©a th© ©thea? hand*, to th© ititimat© o# th© ©t©?nal* I f @s©hato* 
l o g i c a l ©onoept© sir© d©pj?iv©& of thaij? ^©iationiship to fcigiosy, 
and tiia©> then th©2r ©oa© to #©p3?©a©nt an independent ©ph©^ o f 
o^oo t s and event©* fh©n t h i s happen© m hay© th© same ii^QSBifou 
s i t u a t i o n which m deaoyifeed i n &©aiing w i t h th© aisp^anatwai** 
i s t i © th©oi*y ©f iai3?a©i©0t i*©** th© ftf^etntfing o f Jenowlodg© i n t o . 
#©psi?ate and £©#©ign raalins, th© ^ l e g a t i o n of ®©©hat©Xo©r hy : 
f©a©on i n t o an ©motive 3?©aX% and th© h©t©p©n©aoii0 i apoa i t ion 
of ©schatologie&l eonoept© upon reason i n th© nam© of s^ l ig ion* 
^hus esohottologsr, t r u l y nnd©3?8toodf i© n©ith©j? ©©If* | 
9Uffi©i©nt f i n i t n d © nor ©uptfanateal ism* K®th©*»> i t i© an ©ac-
pa?©0sion o f th© i?©lation b©tw©©n th© f t n i t © and the. ©t©3£»nalj o f 
"the ttfansoon&ent &©anin^ implied i n hi©toj?y*M^ s^ 
<2h®m axfe two eoncfcpt©* T i l l i o h eoatinaea* which dofin© 
mom ©xactiy f h a t w© moan hy th© %ltisiat© w <| Xt wil3, 0© s©©n, 
' . ' '• • . i 
(1) $ i l l i © h f Th© Xn%3?^@tation/.of Ij istos^* p.#.88Q.# 
( s ) of*, p*s?p» 
th&t those two coneoptB ©K> not £03?oign t o h iBtoxy* hut th&t 
they aye o^piseesiond o f tho %mm&m&$n* moaning . i n his tory* ; 
f i # s t o f thoe© ooooepte i o " f u l f i l l i a o n t " , . 
W.f i l i m s n t h©s?o moans tha t tfc© moaning of h i s t e y 
hit® o w o o a o anMgui ty and i^aning&eoonossu.- $h# 
u l t i m a t e tlfegrefore* i s tho t3?asM30©nd©n$ f u l f i l l m e n t ^ ; 
th© uncondi t ional ly ' f W i l l o d * Conditioned f u l f i l l * 
meat i s stenaood hy the t h i r o t o f i soaninglossi iosaj fey ! 
th© threat tha t h i s to ry « i l l and n©gativoly#*fi38# 1 • i 
©hatology i s tho thoofcotioal ossproasion o f th© ChHs-* 1 
t i a n p o l i e f that i n ovoffy h i s t e i c & l ©Tent i n paat 
and f u t u r e thes?© i o a 3*eJ.ationship to ©n ulti iaat© 
f u l f i l l f f i o n t * which lend© moaning t o .vedAtive and 
oonditioji@d fu^ ' i lXiaeat* 
I t &B i n th© l i g h t o f t h i s "that tho osohatolo^lo^i ooac^pt. 
o f the Kingdom of God i s to bo understood* wi?h© Kingdom/of ©od 
i s tho f u l f i l l m e n t intondod i n h i s to ry and implied i n th© u l * | 
timate* Uhe .Kingdom of Sod i s the tffanooondent f u l f i l l m e n t * 
the aatae f o r the u l t imate f^om the point o f v iew o f f u l f i l l m e n t * * 
j^nd] emhracaa ©vos^thing i n tho sous4©© o f h i s to ry m i t s tipane-
seondemt j ra tmingte 9 ^ 
The oeoond eonoopt i e tha t of "dooisioa*^ j 
His tory ainoo i t depends upon f^eodora* itaplioa i 
decision* But eve^y h i s tox i ca l deoi^ion peaiain© 
ambiguous* I t i© alww® decision f 02? and against <•  "• 
meaning a t the'same time* Therefore the u l t imate* 
. ^wltm - tn^M%%vmtkt9 isiigt bo d e o i ^ b n a t theV same ; • • i 
; t i iao 9 doxihit© # / : , 4TOi^bi^ttouS| unoondition©$ decision*. 
fJJh© ul t imate* f3?oia t h i s point of view* M thatt % i o h 
, i s d@oidod| and eon;$o<|uently i f nOt ^ b ^ o o t to a now • 
decision i s eves^ th ing i n h i s to ry* So m wufct " •<. • 
o©y that the ul t ima to i s tho unconditioned decision j 
(X) T i i l i c h , -Paul | .H^,.Jntei'D^otation of Hi9to*>y f 'p*S98* 
a n 
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&%%mt} .*ti0i^t00d f ^ f t T O a0A0MOH ' ^ o | 0 | p | © . S t t | | ^ @ i 
i ^ l l t t W i ^ ^ ' ^ . $ o H f ^ f t i f d 00t| • •4 t^ |A^\ - 1 W*. i69d ,01&& 
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' Pt0pi«000tl0«(i , 0 | S$tJ0^0$$0t&* 0^1 t l | l i&X0(j.0p:^ • 
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conception of S£airo©, a demand fox* a ©©nsciouanoaa of the 'pre* 
sent and f o r ac t ion i n the preaent***"^ Sa r l i e r i n thi© chap-. 
t e r i t was necessary to touch upon t h i s conception of th© Kairo© 
and i t© r e l a t i o n to th© Logo©i now we mu©t develop and explore 
the©© concept© and t h e i r relat ionship* In t h i s explorat ion us 
ar©, tmfortunately* handicapped due to th© f a c t tha t th© x:>art 
of th© ffvfftematie gheolo&v dealing w i t h these concepts i n t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n to h i s t o r y ha© not yet appeared*^ 
Kairos i o not to be confused w i t h i t s ant i thesis* ©hronoa* 
Chronoa i s "formal t ime", and appropriate to @b © t r a c t , obiect iv© 
thinlcing, ' © • , chronicle and natura l aoienc©* I t i© also ap-
propr ia te t© the mystical unamreneas of h ia tory # Her© igya** 
t i c i am and na tura l science are united5 
Kairo© i t © e l f i© "the r i g h t tim©" or " f u l f i l l e d t i a e f f i j ^ 
For A r i s t o t l e Iffi&ro,© had a more l i m i t e d meaning, h©ing "the good 
i n the category o f t ime", OJhat i s to say* according to Ar ia to t l© 
" i f a special moment o f time i© good f o r th© f u l f i l l m e n t of aom©* 
t h i n g , t h i s moment i s i t s , lmiro8«»*But time a© ouch lias no 
(1) T i l l i c h , Paul , gh© Protestant, Bray iTisbet and G© # > London. 
i95if:-pp,*/3?*.aa>. 
(2) i t i© outside the ©cope of thi© explorat ion to enter i n t o 
T i l l i c h 1 © exc i t i ng and important appl ica t ion o f the©© ©on** 
cepts to contemporary soc ia l and p o l i t i c a l movements* For 
thi© app l ica t ion see th© essay "Kairos" i n She Proteatant 
l i r a , and She Reliaipua s i t u a t i o n . • " 
(3) "Th© poin t of a l l t h i s i s , Joey, that i t was you who taught 
m© how to t © l l tea time from h i s t o r i c a l time and sidereal 
time and apaco-tiia© a© mil as a l l o f the other no account 
tim©@f« M i l l e r , Henry, Wrm Intimate Henry WLLim* The Hew 
. America^ Libra ry , new York, M>9 , p t i i & J ' 
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l i n o oxplalnod i n our M s t o y i c a l consideration* I s 
.opposed t© the ^ n f c $ . n $ ; i n tii© to©5.©#3 
'tfe&tagft to th© sti©tiio&iGa3. main lin©.t»*th© eonsideapa*-
t i o n o f vmi&$$ i n 4k& .g©n.©# .of. j b t a ^ j t a b m . Log©$i ,. 
i s a t "beat an iiam©ri©© abstraction v;hich cannot do 
• flixioh\eha^«it.0a?i2!0s th©$© two Mn©® of development i n 
a ijpajjr vfoi<$* m ©;$aiiiin©d fcefos?©* "bui' isihich i t wi&X'fc© w©13> 
'to S?©p©ai ©tf iof iy h©j?©» i n t h i s ©ha?a^©?iaa t ion a© u&©a th& 
%©e©ti©i©ja^ i n th© a©ns© of "©^taping1* OJP Md©nyin$*< 03? 
Woldan©©**! and 'th© w©#<$ *Sjpo»* i n t&© 8©n©@ of' ttfi3.l|n|j.'rt OJ? 
M a f f a c t i o n 1 ' # f i r s t i in© of vii©'©t©a?n ®h%%Q®<&Mmi &©v©l<* 
opment lie describes as "aQceticisms toward the i-Caiross Eros 
tdw&fcd tn© 'togm** f n i© i s th© a t t i t ude of ptap© t h © © ^ and o f 
. r©ga3?ding t&© inosCtd' a®. a ' ^ @ t © a o f ©t©ffnak f©3?8J% . ©©cond 
lin©' t t i» '^S$x$toB m: :%@mii^m 'i0mM t i i# ia&w :&nd to**' •  
A t n * :L©go © V ) : H0a?©- know£#dg0. i s ga imd i n t © : » of hi©lS£$*-
o a £ o ^ e a t l o n ^ o o i i f i i o t and 
$h© qp©©li©n ^ l i c h i s t&on ^ais©d# and i t t 0 l i m hemi 
discusQ^d'eayii©3?> ' f a th©#© any •poasibi©aao:@.ti©i©fii: toward 
,th© Kaiffoe? ds? isi' .©uoli aseetioiim a n a^st^aotioiiif Fo^.a Xong 
tiia© t h i s aju©0ti©n l a © not a©&ed* and on© aaw %t3K8anit5r a© a 
(2.) ^ i H i c l i , S>au3L, $h© lnt©gp3?©Mt^©n o f HsjLatp^, p^sfc, 
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,183 ©1 t^fpAQO^. ' s t^ E^O 00tX©pl$X©..J&E©A ©t[t£ *4f.. O ,^ a$afdd.. o©t^ $1 
, *p©uo$q.$ptio0wn. « w . 0% W t © , ^ 3 t 0^ - p©tio|ij.|pii00 mt% $o, ^&m% 
:. *ji&p f t io ^ B t o p f ;^©A©.©©©0a^0 tp^ pufc ©t$!0«f*K$ v f©tdt.©KT*ti 
;,*B.©4d*j ©Q © x d f o u t ^ %|p«isn0 © 1 ^ o!}, &m$m xjpflTsfin ©ootrt'dc 
basis f o r h i s Christology* .W© now turn e x p l i c i t l y to t h i s 
re la t ionsh ip betweenhistory and Ghristology, 
. I t i l l i c h poiat© out tha t th© consideration of Jesus a© the 
Chr is t leads to tli© ( p o s t i o a o f historyg and that th© question 
o f h i s t o ry leads to th© Chrietologieal question* The f i r s t 
h a l f o f t h i s ©tatoiaont i s obvious* Christology i d concerned 
w i t h th© j?©o0ptioa aad int©i?p^@tQtioa o f an h i s t o r i c a l ©vent) 
Jesus as the C h r i s t , to in t e rp re ta t ion of h i s to ry is# i f not 
coa00io1.10a.3r held* a t leas t presupposed i n t h i s e f f o r t . 
Th© QQcoad h a l f of th© siatement i s loss obvious* 
In t e rp re t a t ion of h i s t o r y necessarily leads to th© 
guostioa of Christology* Xt i s s©lf*»d@e©ptioa* 
when profane i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of history** .ooasidare 
i t s e l f capable of t r e a t i n g h is tory without rogafrd-* 
in$ th© Chris t ©logica l question* isvery h i s t o r i c a l 
r e a l i t y * from which th© meaning and rhythm of h i s* 
to ry are derived* l i s© w i t h i n th© scope of the Chriato*-
•• •••IQBboaX question* To develop ip i r i s to logy a©aas to 
describe th© concrete poin t |th© Kairos i n th© unions© 
sense} at which soiaathing absolute appears i n h i s to ry 
and provides i t w i t h moaning and purposes and t h i s 
indeed i s th© cent ra l problem of th© philosophy o f 
his tory* (1) 
T i l l i e h i s saying that the existence and in te rp re ta t ion o f 
th© Kairos i a th© unique sens© of Jesus as th© Chris t i s the 
fundamental basis f o r the many secondary &aa?M i n which the 
e ternal invades the temporal* This statement focuses the 
question as to whether or not t h i s i s "philosophy of h i s to ry" 
i n th© sens© we have used that term i n Part 21 o f t h i s thesis* 
( ! ) T i l l i o h , Paul* The, Snteraretation of l l je torv« gpt8afi*94Sji 
see; 
We w i l l examin© t h i s ohargo shortly* 'A t ' t a l e ' po in t* however* 
©US? ftinda should a t least be open to the p o s s i b i l i t y that 
M i l l i o n baa s o u t h i n g v a l i d to aay ha** against Oollingwood and 
©epocia i ly 'Groce* continuing tho above quotation flillich dos* 
erib©@ a procoaa $hieh.'ta&&® #lac@'. i n ' va ry ing '«ay a and' dogr®e@ 
i n ? i c o f Gi?ooe and Gollingwood* 
$hia problem ip f meaning and purpose I n h i s t o r y ] 
can be obscured by leaving that oon©s?et@ point i n 
h i s to ry unnanted ox* rendering i t i n v i s i b l e by ' 
general abstract formulations* But the problem 
oannot b© oacaped* f o r h i s to ry becomes h ia tory 
only through i t s ge la t ion to ©uoh a ooneroto 
po in t by # i i c h i t gains waning* ( l ) " 
!£hii$ leaning* ' taSiiob t i l l i c h i s speaking o f 10 not a f a c t 
which i s ob j ec t i ve ly ascortainablo* I t doojj not f l o w a i ^ o t i y 
from th© M i l ovidenco* $o#» can there be an abstract , non-
h i s t o r i c a l decision about th© iaeaxiing of bistojpy* I n t h i s l a d t 
stateaont !£ l l l i oh i© i n a^roojaeht w i t h the hiato^lana #iom m 
have oxaminod; Meaning cannot arise i n a non^hiatorioal realm 
and then be imposed upon the h i s t o r i c a l process$ rather i t must 
arias out o f concrete h i s t o r i c a l ©Vent i t e e l f * thla" iaeahlri©* 
g iv ing ©vent must bo one i n which "the con t rad l t lon® of raoanlng 
are regarded as dvereosa©* i n ttiioh the p o a a i b i l i t y of f i n a l 
BQna^loasnosa i s i<»em0vedffM srow i t i s here 9 ^ i l i i c b aaya, tha t 
a decis ion o f the Chriatologicalk <j.ueation haa become par t o f 
the decision about his tory* Shis I s so because Jeaua as tb© * 
Chris t o f f e r s himself as a concrete ©vent i n h i s to ry i n «ihieh 
(1) T l l l l c h i Paul; flhe In te rp re ta t ion o f History* p»S&3*' 
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96$ th© Miator&aa tUss -rewlatory iftt©3?p3?etatfon of 
history • |%lei«&s of <tttii«& m havo #U8t*soen in- owe 
• Maeussion1 of hiatory and 'Oh^isljo^cig^ .t^ iaiitli©^  
oonflrma1 nor negatofc any-of Met 'atatomant^ahont • 
• do'eWBtei traditions* and the ;4iit©^ a@p©iito<5®.^ f • 
hlstoriea! wonts,*: (1) 
f i i i s not only applies to I ^ M H history*imt ' i t also*applioa to 
Bihlio&l homenotttios* Swa J i ^ 'th^ ;--©^ . fc© no tail o r i n g of • 
evidence to-omit or support a irpF&latory- interrogation of .hio* 
tory$ theologicial p o $ t i ^ 
Gi»»i^ to3.ogical <|U08tio^ f mo^ot^^f l,a • 
entirely independent of 'the prohieas of hlstorieal 
i&auiry into til©-fttbta behind the rise of'th& Bib«*: I l e a l ^ 
• • tmi&!&m only lend pr o f a a f c i l i t y ^ ^ respeet , • • to the his t o r i c a l <&iug£, a'very" f a i n t probability*.-. 
v i f o • religious eea?taihtyir ao religious bolief cantoo • 
'." supported by Stteh researches* (5J •;. . 
&1 B h O r t r ^ 
of history cannot affeetf cannot impose theiaaelirea mpon histori** 
eal rese&reh*. Shis • i s the basis of 3?iUioh^@; o r i t S o t o of aXl 
Utopian interpretations of history* These interpretations take 
ooaoepts moh as a isyth of an original or f i n a l epoch* the 01ass«-
less, eooa©ty ©a? tho Eisigaow of ®o& £*o» the **beyondtt sphere they 
belongs and «re:.they have v a l i d i t y asv& basis f o r certain, to* 
al^t&/;int© eonerete historieal events* and then proceed to . 
< ni^ea, tjheology1 s dependenee upon history* at least to th i s 
extent * that the theologian l a not indifferent to the hie* 
!>."<• terieal'i R a t i o n of .tothes? ,&r netiTeeus of ^ rasareth did 
$»/faet> livo**^ssa0.;an. "ea&stettt,$a any ease * this i s 
anether ^nestlon* and one #ii©h does not alter the point 
he i s trying to ma&e here* 
(3) T i l l i c l i , Pa t i l , Zhi, . I ^ t i i ^ r f t t e t ^ on, .of „TTj, ffltory,, 
(1) y n i i e h r Paul* a^a^atjle. ..,l^oJ^w^ I , p*l£® 
$hia is.;, an overstatement*, probably; f or p o i e a t o i roaaons-
(Niher statements i n f i l l i p make i t clear that he reeoa 
'•^amism. 30. W ^ ' t t * «*o etico tto' { I t mm 
t|0$%o$ . gti^ og.^ eE ^ tvfoeq^ p i ^ a t f pt»o& t|®$tp, 
" • trig 'jpq^ tfg:*tte'ttt1^ i«*- ®y%®0oM ' a^Mta 
ti pioifea !pi|0^ 
' 13 WOX$ &0ity?$# 0%V$ 'Stttfjtqm $Q t*0t$0$?04# 0t$ '*ifa*<HH» f»% $$|3j 
t$0t«%0$8ttj 
the iawm time!f: an olomont i n mmon i t s e l f , 
•toemfyi- tho &ipth of *»oa6on***A hotos^oiaouB 
authority usually cttpveaM i t s o l f i n tossaa 
of isyth and oult feeoauae thoao am tho dis?oot • 
and %ntmtboml' Q^mm&<>m of tho &©pth of 
roason* I t i s also possitolo f o r noninythibal 
and nonritual torn® to gain pom* ovor. th© 
mind p o l i t i c k ideas)* liotorononiy i n 
. t h i s ®mm' i s usually a m o t i o n again&t an 
< autonomy v/liicli has lost I t s depth and has be>«-
ooiao ompty and powm&dati* But ad a reaction 
i t i s &@8tamotiV0, donying to ??oason tho right 
of autonoiay and destroying, i t s structural law© 
from outai&O* ( I ) 
Uhe oonooptof hoteronomyj whioh %®m®& ooimftdo frow out# 
aide on how reason should grasp ana shape re a l i t y % dosoi^ihea 
irory vshat i s ob^ootiojia^ i n tho philosophy of hiotory w# 
But then tfillioh goe$ on to m3m esjplioit a most iaaportant ©1@-
aont i n t h i s $atstorf om whioh hao'fceonf.-at Mat* only i i s p l i o i t 
i n our previously ©xaiainod statements afcout t h t philosophy of 
history*** Ho does thio by cautioning w afcout tho opatialfto&a* 
phor* which m h&m. fro&uontly u^od* namOly*. nou.t:Bido.^ #.- wOutw" 
oido t t can 3ust m mil "b© ''ihoide'*!, tho o a l l fo5? a philosophy 
of hiotory" ari©©.® "inoido1* :of mm,* I t i s tho aasiftr to a noed 
iaan foo&s win«diywjr ho i s oompollod to wit© i t | honoo tho 
poronnial popularity of tho "philosophy of history'** 
f i l l i o h dw&op© thio fcy saying that tho hotoronosjy of tho 
philosophy of history* 1 avisos out of tho ttdopth of roa&on***:' 
5?his l & t t o r oonoopt wo diuousaod eai?lioa?r _ and W *W« fcriofly 
dOfino i t m tho *lou'batanoott or "ground" or «ahyosw of roapon 
m/hioh prooolfc roaoon and i$ manifoat through i t ^ 
(1) . ^iiiiOhf. HvSLf Syatoiifit^o. $heo^o$y:* $ # pp,34*86* 
(2) J & l f e P*?9* 
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+%g&W* t(P%m «t 0$$!}$ ,J0.00tE08 *A,?^9»ap0#& @lf$ tlf petal $0ti 
fe^ * w < t «TO *^o«0|n^ fwpnotft /paa 0#$t SWTO.W. 
&a?& ym £m§ov®'M&. I t t o t i ^ M . ©&t$0tu$®#t> %• 
) 'f£im.o0<Kt vB&'goftM? t i o w ^ ^ t i m w t 
: $0 *$.00<3E0#. TO 44«tt3$ Q% §&Q$$e M¥$61M$ettV * « f J^Gm>tZ®%m 
: > ^ j * i t - ^ W ? I I £<> Aq$m$W$u WU W- $0 *S*o. ts^ 0ft£$ #Ete0 
t?.ft^^|ttoo -ww mm mi% *i &ft& $fet$ t?0t#®$!P*! 
^0 ^ I|f0©ffitf^ j,:. 0tl$^0pvs0tt$, ®fCim tJ0tt#) <,U00ti6A ^0 
Hiato3Pi0®3L3^ ft autonoaou© reason ha® liboratod and maintained 
i t s e l f i n a novor ©ndihg f i g h t with heteronoiny* Wo &m thio •• 
f i g h t taking placo i n las»ge sections .of "Part I I i n term© of Mm 
©oaflict betisiooa autonomous historical inquiry and th© various 
forms of non^htstory* i t i s a oonfliot within reason i t s e l f * 
(ihore olse could i t hoi) In this conflict Croc© and Collingwood 
choao to ignore f o r th©, moat part ttth© depth of roasonws although 
Orooo1© ttpMlO0opiiy of the S p i r i t * might bo fudged to os^ roo© i n 
part the "depth of roaeon^i Vio©t on tho othor hand* mad© th© 
ef f o r t to unite autonomous history with, tho "dopth of reason'* i n 
hi© **idoal and otornal history* 1* , £his of f o r t m® of very limited 
suoooo&i as m havo ,soo%. and Vieo% iiaportanoo does not root 
upon thio attoiupt* : 
!Piiiich O00S i n thio conflict betwoen.autonomy an4 hotor* 
onoiay.a o a l l for or a.nood for rosolution* This rosolution ho • 
o^llo ttthoonoiayHi a rooolution whioh i s only poosihle through 
rovoiation* 
Autonoiay and. hoteronosay ,are rootod i n thoono83y# v and #aeh gooo aotray mm their thoonoiaouo. unity 
.. i s .bro|ony:, mmm' tea .asft mmi -ssmfissm • 
, authority; Thoteronoiari s i t sioana autoaoiaouo roaoon 
uSilodWth i t s omi depth* In a thoonomoua 'Situa-
t i o n reason aotualiaoo i t e o l f i n ohodienoo %o i t o 
structural, lavs and i n tho power of i t s own ineae*» 
hauotitoio ground* sinco Ctod (|hM|) i s the law 
(M88i) JM* tho atruoture and ground of roason, 
thoy ar© united i n him* .and thoir unity i s manifest . 
i n a tlioonojaouo situation* Mt {jPiliich cautionfj 
thoro i o no couplet© thoonoiay undsr th© conditions 
of osiotonoo* ( l ) 
(3,) f i l l i o h f Paul* .tetomtio ^ o i o p y ^ ' i f p.85i, Xtalios mino* 
mi 
.What does this sjoan i n terms of our problem* the understand* 
ln$ ; of history? I t . means that the 1 heteronoaously expressed in** 
©l^ht of the philosophy of history** i s united ivith the insight 
into history, expressed by autonomous historical research* The 
fjirsft i n s i s t i s that everything relative can become a vehicle 
f o r the absolute* T i l l i e h refers to this fcind of history as \ 
"absolute interpretations .of history"* And this absolute intefe* 
pretation of history i s what has been caressed i n varying ways 
and with varying decrees of success by Augustine, Vice Hegel*'. 
Um-$. Toynbee, and.. other w l t e r s of the ^ philosophy of history 1** 
%tmm. men have seen that history i s not: eelf*ea$p!afflatoryi that., 
from the "ground of/reason" a ©all. i s raised for an e^planaiien'•; J 
o**- i^ dL-artrOsrsr . Mtid^ b.' jg^ f a^, tMi^ Q^ d. that, which can be provided by a' \; 
s t r i c t autonosjyi and that f i n i t e * h i s torical event can beeoiae a 
ttpnif©station of the unconditioned* 
- ^ j M f i S B f . I h s l ^ i t * that ihioh m e^iored at length i n Pav& 
$1 and « e h -is" to be united with the f i r s t * i s the insight that; 
nothing relative can ever become absolute i t s e l f * W This i s the 
position of autonomous historical inquiry* m have developed 
thi s insight sufficiently i n ths foregoing discussion that m 
need not say anything further' at this point* 
. . ' • • 
(.1) Cf« Tillicha Paul* Th^ e ProtestantJ3r4 f p«t55* 
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* t o^s^tt ©ci (M3ti£ pmoa ©^0tiai t*$ pe^ocxta 0$ ^s0q.s|tj j o 
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This theonomous situation la the solution to the problem 
posed i n the introduction to t h i s ©hapter* This= problem i s , on 
the one hand* that for the r e l ^ i o u ^ ffiejf there i s i n history a 
supratoaporal element rahleh Cannot he reduced to historical 
terms* nor can i t be set alongside of genes?©! history as some* 
thing : which has a" separate history» ife#j» aa-if there were a 
sort of miraculous* holy history vMch i n some strange and un~ I 
©2sj»iai»able way Is neither identical with nor parallel with I \ 
general history* On the other hand there i s the rational theory f 
that sacred history i s nothing but a part of general hietoryjj a 
theory vsihieh leaves the self*su^fieieht finitude of the historic 
eal untouched* This impossible situation i s redeemed by the 
understanding of history based upon the 'Kairos) and the attitude 
of theonomyj here the absolute' and the relative are united* To 
alter s l i g h t l y a characteristic idea of Tillloh*ss ttThe con-* 
fidence of history* i t s courage to be* i s rooted i n f a i t h i n 
Ood as i t s creative ggoutfU^'. 
6* T l i i i c h Corrective to the Christian Attitude to History? 
Belief * f u l Realism* 
At the end we turn to T i l i i c h ^ s concept of b e l i e f * f u l 
realismw*. I t could very well have stood- at ; the; beginning* for 
(1) Of* T i l l i e h . Paul* 'systematic,,. Theolo^y.r I * . piSW* 
401 ' 
i t i s tho prOEmppoaition of his thoology ao well, as tho coftolu* 
•sion»A^ ' That:- which follows.will • b© recojgnisod m."a ooniroaioat 
' poiatod auoiaary of. ^ a t m ha?o oaid bqforo'in ojhoff contexts* 
• .: (-.Faith' os? boiief i s a#- attitude which transcends, overy eta* 
pirloai- r@ality# lioalism id. on .attitude isiiioh rojocto tho tr a n i * : 
seoado&t and wry- traaooonding of r e a l i t y * t o t tho two arc eon* 
biaod. into one concepts belief«ful rei&ieau This concept i s a 
d@nia3. of. J?©alism* i*o** c&oHWsuffioi<#tt firiitudo, of s t r i c t 1 
&u"&^ eet*©h^ oot thixM&g and the. doiainanee of controlling Imotif* 
10dgO|f. of^O)apty autonomy and eo on* At tho same tiza© i t i o a* ' * 
doaial of belief insofar as that io a ©upranaturalisan without a . 
ooriouo regard f o r coaerot© historical otfoat and th© outo&ottious 
. aopoot of r©&g*oa*y 
Positively« bel i e f * 4 % i roalisav i s a t o t a l attitude to?Jard 
r e a l i t y i n ?&ich i t i® aooerted* on tho one Jiand^ that there l o 
& tr&nseendonoo ©aqpreossod i n and through tho historical form 
.fhioh yot doco not broals that f c m * Or i n other wordo* thoro i s 
•, a ufro© devotion of f i n i t e forms to tho eternal*'* On the othor 
• * 
hand i t i o aloo aooortod that thoro i s to be an "unconditioned 
aooop'tooo of tho ooriouo importance of ov.r oonoroto oituation i n 
t i r o ..and qf tho . situation of tirio i n goaoral i n tho prooonc© of 
e t e r n i t y ^ T h o syoten of f i n i t e forms i s to romin as i t i s 
(1) Tho torm ^ o i i o f ^ f u l r o a l t o " appoaro i n Tiliioh*© ©arly 
witing©r.aad i s tho oontrai concept Of Tho % l i M o u a •j&ttotfro^u However tho term dooe, not' appoarlft. tho •' 
By^ t ^ f f i o j •Thoolofarm although obviously tho ooneopt roiaains?* 
(0) T m i o h r Paul* Thq^^^iou^, a ^ f l f l f c - p.*116» 
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they as?© neither to "be ©scaped throiieh some sort • of transcended 
ialleia,, nor', are. they to'be, •broken, hetecmpj^^lyi Yet. at the > 
• aawe time|. they, must be broken through as a wholes a free 
..tion of the f i n i t e forme to ;,the e t e r n a l S h i a ia the theonomous' 
s i t u a t i o n ^ ; • ,'. . . • • •= . ..'•;'•.'"•; 
.. ; How-.else* ;9i^i^--a^ei^^-di60e theology proceed than by tioglo* 
lag. through reality? •, Must/not f a i t h loolrlnto: the depth, of - real, 
things?. • Is not man*s h ^ s t o r l e a l s i t u a t i ^ ^ facets 
of ;deat&*. gu i l t , and salvationt ®& esGen&iai part of theology?' 
Any other approach than t h i s coull be supported only by defence 
- tea,; supx^ana'turalistle ;authority»5 ! But- -that:. would mean that, re:** 
ality;has no ultimate^signif'ioance. at!'all*•'that there 'is a ;gulf-.' 
beti?een belief and r e a l i t y producing a belief that i s estranged 
from r e a l i t y on, the .one...hand*.' and on, the other hand a -reality/".. 
wh|tch i s . considered without belief .• .This i s nothing else than 
the denial of the doctrii^; of Creation* 
i n Opposition to th i s Tlllioh., maintains the attitude of ' 
belief * f n l r^allsmi: On the basis of this attitude theological-
or religious statements ar,e statements about yppli^y< but about 
a'. .reality 1 ^ transeea&ed* ..The: transcendent i s 
ismianentv, '• 
(1) Of» T l l l l c h . Baulv The Protestant 
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This can be explained most clearly by giving examples* 
Concerning history, what i s i t that we bring to the study of , 
say, Caesar*s invasion of Britain i n 5B B*C*? We bring a'pre** 
understanding"of the way i n which an historical event takes place 
and- hence an awareness of the sort of question we may legitima-fet-
"fesly ask of that event i n the hope of receiving an answer* 
This awareness arises out of previous historical experience 
(some of i t of a very informal or practical Kind), and including 
such factors as the recognition that there was a motivation for 
the invasion* that preparation tools place, that d i f f i c u l t i e s 
were encountered etc* Abstractly* this pre*understanding"is 
the awareness that a specific historical event grows out of a 
previous hi s t o r i c a l situation, i s motivated* proceeds rationally, 
conforms to geographical and economic conditions etc* This 
"pre«und©r standing "is not "written i n heaven" , although i t i s 
assumed to the extent that there is a temptation i m p l i c i t i y to 
give i t some such exalted (self-evident) status* Actually i t . 
arises out of the previous historical experience we have spoken 
of, and without i t historical inquiry i s impossible* 
Turning to theology, l e t us give another specific example 
of'pre-understanding" What i s . i t that St* Paul brought to hia 
encounter with Jesus Christ on the Damascus road? He brought 
a'pre^under standing "of the way i n which G-od works, e.g., that 
there i s one God, who has given a Law, that God uses men to do 
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Ills t h ai God has promised a Messiah etc* Here again 
'pre^understanding, i s not self^evident * hut i i has. grown out of 
the religious*hi$torical experience of the, Jewish people} a»& 
without i t Paul could not have received Josus as the Christ* 
These examples indicate the nature ofjpr$*understandings 
Just adf.it underlies the a b i l i t y of the historian to explore 
his problem by asking the proper questions concerning Caesar*© 
invasion of Britain* so i t also underlies the a b i l i t y of Paul 
to explore hia problem ( l * * * . * the relationship between Jesus 
Christ and himself) by asking the proper questions of the ©vent 
of Jesus as the Christ* We might express this more concisely 
by saying that'fere#understanding!,is an essential element i n 
being able to think his t o r i c a l l y and theologicallyj of being > 
able to ask the right questions and to receive the answers to 
those questions* The answers may disappoint the que&tlonerf 
or they may so far surpass his expectatiaia as to show him. 
that his former position was almost entirely erroneous* levesp* 
theless the fact remains that i t i s only; on the basis of pre** 
understanding'that men are enabled to ask questions of history 
and of God's action i n history which are productive of inoreasod 
hi s t o r i c a l and theological knowledge* 
The question which presents I t s e l f at this point is? What 
i s the origin of 'pre~understanding^ and when did i t start? The 
•pre^under standing "appropriate to history l s # as we have soon 
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i n part 21* the precondition of historyj and i n i t s e l f testis 
fies to tho e^erience of a previous encounter with history* 
I t follows from this that historical knowledge can only grow 
out of histopical knowledge* Historical th|nfeing i s "an o r i g i * 
nal and fundamental a c t i v i t y of the human mind" similarly 
the $re*understanding" appropriate to theology i s tho precon** 
dit i o n of th© reception of revelation! and i n i t s e l f t e s t i f i e s 
to th© reception of previous revelation* As long as man has 
"been man,* as long as he has boon i n the "imago of God"4 he has; 
"been man i n relationship with God, I t i s a fruitless and 
theoretical QLUQOtion to-aslE about the i rhoginning M of history 
and th© "beginning" of revelation, for i n this context tho con-
cept of "beginning" cannot ho given any content* 
The great similarity between tho nature and role of pre**/ 
understanding"in history and i t s nature and role i n theology 
should not surprise us3 for (among other things) both formo ofx 
'pro^understanding" contain within them the ontological question^ 
the question of being* I n Christianity at least -(ant i n a 
different way i n Judaism) tho question about being i s , O a ^ l i c i t j 
i t i s concerned with the creation (the Father) §: rodomption (tho 
Son) and the sustaining (the Holy Spirit) of man's being* Tho 
Creation s^ory particularly* and, tho Old Testament as a whol©,| 
speates to tho question of why there -is boing and not non<*being» 
(1) The Idea/ of History p.34»7» For our pre v i o u s l y s t a t e d 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n of t h i s statement» see pp* T-ITsSfr. swpA*v• 
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The New Testament t e l l s us of the "new "being" Which has appeared 
i n Jesus GM»ist|. ana of. the Holy S p i r i t whose power enables us 
to make t h i s "new being" a part of our own 'being*; Revelation 
i s not derived from the ontologioal question and 'pre^understand.* 
ingV but they are a part of the basis upon Which revelation i s 
.received*. i . 
In history too the question of being i s askedj and although 
i t i s asked i m p l i c i t l y h^ere^it i s no Jess essential* The onto* 
l o g i c a l question i s present i n the historian*a i m p l i c i t queaiiipns! 
Why i s there form and not chaos*.••o^usaiity/.^and.j-not; b l i n d .e&aAoe j 
rational order and not i r r a t i o n a l i t y etc? , ^ ollingwood^ also 
i m p l i c i t l y ^ , points i n the direotion of t h i s understanding of 
history i n his answer to the question; Wh^ jfc i s history for? 
"^-answer i s that h i s t o r y i ^ 
Knowing yourself mean! knowing, f i r s t j what i t i s to be. a mak} 
(s) 
I t i s the asking and answering of, the question of being i n . 
(1) The-^Xdem:.of...Ifest^rff 1Q* •• • 
(g) The following p^fsage from Collingwoodboth enlightens and 
i s e n l i ^ t e n ^ d by our diseUssife 
that r e l i g i o n l i v e s either' below or 'above the l i m i ^ ! 
r e f l e c t i v e thought i s f a t a l l y to miscoac:eive either the,v : • ! 
nature of r e l i g i o n or the nature pf ..reflective, thoughts 
I t w o u l d be nearer the t r u t h to aay <that i n r e l i g i o n the • 
l i f e of r# ^ l e c t i o n i s concentrated i n i t s iniengest form^. 
and that the special problems of theoretical ah4 l>ractic"al 
l i f e a l l take t h e i r s p e l i a l forma by ^  ^  of 
the body of the r e l i g i o u s $onsdlouBness^ and retain t h e i r 
v i t a l i t y only so f a r as they preserve t h e i r connection 
with i t and with each other i n i t " . The Idea of History. 
- p*515* 
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an i n v a l i d way which marks: "philosophy of history"* such 
"philosophies" say: Look, t h i s i s how history forms a r a t i o n * 
a l l y coherent whole., and i n i t we see man i n his development# 
his present nature and his future d$st|ny# For the h i s t o r i c a l 
reasons- which we have discussed at lengthy t h i s approach to , 
his t o r y i s i n v a l i d ! "out i t i s an i m p l i c i t attempt to answer: 
the ontoiogioal question* 
I n a less grandiose way the more cautious historians are 
also i m p l i c i t l y dealing with the ontological question, as the 
quotations which we have jjrurt made from Collingwood Indicate* 
Croce too can he seen to he moving i n the area of t h i s .question 
when he speaks* as he frequently does* of the ' • s p i r i t " of man 
"becoming aware of and developing i t s p o t e n t i a l i t i e s i n the 
course of h i s t o r y * What maii? Look at history* he repli e s * . 
I n short# the ontological question i s a part of the pre~under* 
s t a g i n g "which i s brought not oaly to theology * hut also to 
history* 
Conceaming the v a l i d i t y of the whole conception of"pre* 
understanding! i n i t s r e l a t i o n to history we have argued at 
length i n Part I I , and we w i l l l e t i t s defence rest there* 
However* concerning pre-»understanding" i n i t s a p p l i c a b i l i t y to 
theology, we would ask t h i s further question? What alternative 
can he offered? Are we to say that revelation i s not received 
on the basis of'pre^understanding, but on the basis of a t o t a l 
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passiveness "before the revelation of God? Such a position, i s 
usually associated with the idea that the Holy S p i r i t , i n 
i s o l a t i o n from a l l other mode© of preparation f or the reception 
of Jmov/ledg©! i n some mysterious way enables revelation to "be 
received* I f there l a some such mysterioua and separate imayt 
then we need to have a description of i t * The rejoinder at 
t h i s point wight be that, t h i s separate way i s so mysterious that 
i t defies any description* I f t h i s i s the ease* i f i t oannot "be 
deseribed t then on what basi& are we to say that i t exists or 
does not easistf Here the insight of l i n g u i s t i c philosophers, 
can he of r e a l service to us by mafcing us aware that we have 
made a "meaningless" statement* i#e*, since i t i s indescribable* 
there i s no basis upon which to #udge i t true or false* i t can 
neither be affirmed or denied* 
Quite apart from t h i s d i f f i c u l t y * there i s another un#ea«-
tioned assumption about t h i s "separate way" which we would l i k e 
to <ju©ation# The assumption is. that t h i s r a d i c a l l y separate 
way of receiving revelation^ t h i s passivene&a: hefore God, i n 
some way redounds to the honour of God* Why? I f God has chosen 
to reveal himself to man i n a way which includes suoh factors 
as. pre^understanding''which have d i s t i n c t p a r a l l e l s i n human 
knowledge as a whole* why should t h i s not equally redound to 
his. honour? Or* how does one argue t h i s i n any way dishonours 
aod? 
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F i n a l l y , i n regard to t h i s "separate way" "by which we are 
supposed to receive the revelation of God, i t must "be pointed 
out that i f we accept t h i s theology then we have established a 
dualism between sacred and secular which can never be overcome* 
Even i n the incarnation i t w i l l not be overcome*: f o r that 
revelation too w i l l have been received on the basis of t h i s 
dualism* and hence infected by i t * I n taking t h i s position 
there is. no confusion of the separateness of the Creator and 
the created* Hor i s i t our intention to deny the dualism wiioh 
runs throughout the Old and New Testaments$ namely $ that of 
the righteousness of God and the sinfulness of 1113%. together 
with the consequent alienation of man from God* Such a dualism 
i s very evident * However i t i s quite another imtter ;tb g<? on 
and say that when the Holy S p i r i t enables us to a f f i r m an - X 
h i s t o r i c a l event as sign-event that the res u l t i n g knowledge 
i s without any connection with human isnowledgej that our mode 
. of #gl?&hending the jlo&os and the Logos possess' no s i g n i f i c a n t 
S i m i l a r i t y ! that knowledge of revelation comes to us by the 
Holy S p i r i t ^ but j ; since i t does not come to us l i k e any other 
form of knowledge, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to say ju s t how i t doss oome 
t o us* This i s to make ou* knowledge of God strange and alien* 
and i n v i t e s the use of such concepts as that of Mself*authen* 
ti e a t i o n 1 ' * i n t h i s we do not see human reason judged and 
f u l f i l l e d — ^ - a n d human reason very much needs to be judged and 
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fulfilled«"^but only overcome* I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n what content 
are we to give to the concept of man "being i n the "image of 
God"? And what use can the human enterprise make of t h i s 
t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t knowledge? 
I n contrast to a l l t h i s we have shown that i n such factors 
as'pre^understanding^' concern and "re-enactment" there are 
genuine p a r a l l e l s between ordinary knowledge and knowledge of 
revelation* p a r a l l e l s which are illuminating when we turn our 
atte n t i o n to either form of knowledge, We have also expressed 
t h i s "by saying that one aspect, of being. human* of being i n the 
"image of God"i i s to "be i n relationship (however imperfect) 
with God* And t h i s relationship i s based upon the previous , 
revelation (however inadequate) of God to man* As long as man 
hasteen man, he has been man i n relationship with Godj he has 
been i n the "image of God". And an in t e g r a l part of t h i s 
relationship with God given by previous revelation i s that n&fr 
possesses the pre*under8tanding"(iholuding the asking of the 
ontological question) which enables further revelation to be 
received* 'Prerunderstanding" i s part of the structure of human . 
understanding, given by God, and used by God the Holy S p i r i t to 
enable man to receive Godrs f r e e l y given revelation of himself. 
I n t h i s way we have argued against any radical dualism 
between ordinary knowledge and knowledge of revelation? and we 
have done t h i s without confusing the distinctiveness of the two 
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forms of Jshowledge* and without emptying the ishowledges of 
revelation of' the mystery proper to i t * Moreover we have 
indicated (and we w i l l return to t h i s i n the l a t t e r part of 
t h i s chapterI and especially i n our f i n a l discussion of the 
"philosophy of h i s t o r y " and meaning i n history) that through 
revelation human reason f i n d s i t s e l f fudged and. f u l f i l l e d > * - a n d 
t h i s without the destruction of i t s own proper autonomy* 
The idea of the receiving of revelation w i l l play an 
important part throughout t h i s chapter* Therefore* i n spite 
of the f a c t that t h i s w i l l anticipate our subsequent discussion 
to some extent * i t w i l l be helpf u l to state concisely at t h i s 
point the concept of revelation which has arisen out of our 
t o t a l investigation and which i& operative here* Revelation 
consists of two parts which must be distinguished i n the i n t e r * 
ests of c l a r i t y of theoloi^^q.uiry|j hut which are never 
separate i n the actual receiving of revelation* The f i r s t 
part i s that of an h i s t o r i c a l act i n space and time, e*g«, the 
events of the Exodus* the words of Isaiah* Jesus of Najaare-th 
etc* These events are and must remain open to autonomous 
h i s t o r i c a l investigationj and t h i s without any reservation* 
The second part of revelation i s that i n which the event i n 
question i s seen and affirmed as having not only a space-time 
significance (which I t has and never ceases to have), hut also 
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as having a transcendent reference. I t i s seen and affirmed 
as sign-event, as miracle* The description of the manner i n \ 
which h i s t o r i c a l event i s affirmed as sign-event i s the burden 
. of much of the ensuing discussion, but . here i t nee* to be said 
concisely (and admittedly at t h i s point rather abstractly) that 
t h i s affirmation i s made i n the l a s t analysis solely through the j 
i 
power of God the Holy S p i r i t * Through the Holy S p i r i t h i s t o r i c a l J 
event i s seen as sign«eventj He i s the l i n k between the temporal i 
and the Eternal* And the Holy S p i r i t i s not, as P«W.. Camfield 
has h e l p f u l l y emphasised^* a "quality" or "power" which can 
ef f e c t a union between the temper a l and the Eternal because i t 
i s innate to both* Rather the Holy S p i r i t i s of God alone} a 
g i f t coming from God and received by man enabling him to see 
h i s t o r i c a l event as sign-event, as miracle« Obviously i t i s 
here that the h i s t o r i a n as his t o r i a n cannot and does not wish 
to apeak* 
As a fu r t h e r preparation f o r our use of the concept of 
revelation we need to distinguish (following T i l l i c h ) between 
o r i g i n a l revelation and dependent revelation* By o r i g i n a l 
revelation we mean the f i r s t or o r i g i n a l occasion upon which 
a man or men i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n are grasped by the Holy ! 
S p i r i t and thus enabled to see anChistorical event as sign»*event. 
The "occasion" upon which the apostles were f i r s t enabled to 
see Jesus of Nazareth as Jesus the Christ was Pentecost; and 
( l ) Of* Camfieldj F*W«, Revelation and the Holy Spirit« E l l i o t ! 
Stock, London, 1935» pp #120a50.141 Let passim* . j 
i 
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t h i s is. the primary instance of o r i g i n a l revelation* Concern* 
ing t h i s primary instance* an implication of our position as 
to the operation of the Holy S p i r i t i n revelation—-and not 
only as i t i s stated here, hut also as i t has been prepared 
f o r i n the preceding chapters---needs to be made e x p l i c i t * 
This implication i s that the Holy S p i r i t did not "descend" only 
Upon Pentecost* but was continually "descending" from Easter 
onwards as the process of "re-enactment" took place i n the 
live© of the a p o s t l e s — r a t h e r i n the manner of a fermentation* 
I n l i k e manner dependent revelation also takes place when 
the g i f t of the Holy S p i r i t enables the affirmation to be made 
that an h i s t o r i c a l event i s a sign-event} f o r example* when the 
contemporary "believer affirms Jesus of Nazareth as the Christ* 
I n t h i s fundamental way i t i s the same as o r i g i n a l revelation* 
However* dependent revelation i s d i f f e r e n t i n that i t i s depen-
dent upon* and cannot come i n t o being apart from, the o r i g i n a l 
revelation preserved f o r us i n the witness of the Church? and 
above a l l i n the witness of the Church which we f i n d recorded 
i n Holy Scripture* This witness i s not i n and of i t s e l f 
revelation} but i t "becomes revelation when the power of the 
Holy S p i r i t enahles us to a f f i r m (i*e«a to reaffirm) that the 
h i s t o r i c a l events recorded i n Scripture are just what Scripture 
proclaims them to he* namely* sign-events. This dependent 
aff i r m a t i o n or reaffirmation i s made not upon the authority of 
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the Scriptural authorities, (Peter* Pan:!* the Evangelists e t c . ) , 
hut upon the authority of the Holy s p i r i t whb*, through the • 
process of wr©*enac(tHient0 i n our own l i v e s , enables the past 
Scriptural witness to become a l i v i n g contemporary r e a l i t y * 
Our a f f i r m a t i o n i s Spirit»authenticated* Holy scripture as such 
i s not the Word of God, but i t i s the essential instrument used 
by the Holy s p i r i t to enable the Word of God to, appear i n our 
l i v e s * But t h i s Word of God which i s reaffirmed (and i n being 
reaffirmed* reappears) is. dependent upon and i d e n t i c a l with the 
af f i r m a t i o n of the witness of the Church* 
With t h i s somewhat abstract statement as preparationi l e t 
us go on to examine the 1 factors involved i n t h i s S p | t i ^ ^ i r e c t e d 
process by which h i s t o r i c a l event i s affirmed as sign*ev^nt^ 
He,o^iving group,s» $he h i s t o r i a n and theologian bring 
pr©underatanding*to t h e i r a l l i e d yet d i s t i n c t i v e tasks, but t h i s 
pre**understanding"i@ not f i r s t of a i l t h e i r own* Rather they 
eatress and sometimes develop the ^ ^understanding''which they 
have received from the group of which they are a part and w i t h i n 
which they work* I n the case of the historians i t i s t h i s group 
which receives and incorporates the work of a par t i c u l a r h i s t o * 
r i c a l investigation^ thereby changing, however infinitesimjUiyj 
the 'pre^understanding 'which i s brought to future h i s t o r i c a l 
investigation* I n the case of the theologians i t i s t h i s group; 
which receives and preserves the revelation of Godf thereby 
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©hanging the ;|>re«understanding1' which they bring to future revela* 
t i o n * Using T i i l i o h * s terminology here* we w i l l c a l l these groups 
"receiving groups'1* 
For the historians whom we have studied the operative 
receiving group may broa&ly but meaningfully be character! a# 
that of Western o i v i l i a a t l o n j t a group which i s Greeo^Roman i n 
o r i g i n and has been profoundly modified by Chr i s t i a n i t y * More 
s p e c i f i c a l l y t h i s receiving group i s made/ of those men (both lay 
and professional) w i t h i n the t r a d i t i o n of Western civilizati'on,; , 
who have been seriously engaged i n the problems of h i s t o r i c a l 
i n q u i r y * That t h i s group i s no abstraction should be- evident- •*'• 
from our study of Vicq, Croce and Collingwood* For one of the 
outstanding themes of a l l three of these, men has been the vehement 
protest against the w r i t e r s of false history (i«©*« "heretics f t) 
who through the production of chronicles^ philology, "philosophy 
of h i s t o r y " etc* lead men astray and corrupt the inquiry a f t e r 
h i s t o r i c a l t r u t h * I n t h i s matter* and i n much more, the h i s t o r -
ians whom we have studied speak out of an awareness of t h e i r 
membership i n the group whose task i s h i s t o r i c a l inquiry* 
For the Christian theologian the receiving group i s more 
cl e a r l y defined* I t i s that of the Hebrew^Christian people* 
Here the p r i n a i $ U external influence is. that of Greeo^Roman . 
thinking* For the theologian there i s an e x p l i c i t * s e l f ^ o n * 
Q<*iousawareness of standing w i t h i n a t r a d i t i o n f of opposing 
fa l s e theology}, and of being responsible f o r the continuation 
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of the task: of true theological inquiry w i t h i n the Church*--* 
Within the receiving .group, She receiving group of both the 
h i s t o r i a n and the theologian are* when fun c t i o n a l l y described, 
very similar* . • 
With respect to the past the function of both receiving 
groups i s the preservation of the record of h i s t o r i c a l events}: 
and including,, necessarily, the f r u i t of the inquiry i n t o these 
events* (For the h i s t o r i a n this'iecord includes * at least theo-
r e t i c a l l y * a l l h i s t o r i c a l events} f o r the theologian t h i s record 
i s p r i m a r i l y but hot exclusively that found i n the Old and Hew . 
Testaments*) With respect to the f u t u r e , and the continuation 
of the v i t a l l i f e of the receiving group,) the task of both 
receiving groups i s the continuing development and dissemination 
of the pre**understanding"which i s to he "brought to hearj respect 
; lively.0 upon history and revelation i n the future # 
This second function of the receiving group, that i n regard 
to the f u t u r e * can be expressed i n a variety of ways} and of 
these we w i l l mention only two* The most obvious way i n whieh 
the receiving group*s'pre-understanding i s developed i s through 
the change wrought by new developments i n the h i s t o r i c a l or 
theological heritage*;v A* these new developments come to be 
'.•V i r 
accepted'i a changed 'pre*under standing 1 emerges) and. i n turn t h i s 
changed '^re^under standing "results i n history and revelation 
"being apprehended i n a new way* For example, a f t e r Vioo*s 
methodology and understanding of history became known, 
h i s t o r i c a l events, could never be seen i n the same way again, 
419 
f *g»i they could neves? again he seen as composing a storehouse 
of wisdom which could he used as prescriptions f o r guiding 
public and private behaviour. This could not happen because 
there was a s i g n i f i c a n t l y new 'pl u n d e r standing "which v i r t u a l l y 
forces the receiving group (i»e., the historians) to apprehend 
hi s t o r y i n a d i f f e r e n t way* 
The theological 02? r e l i g i o u s heritage preserved by the 
receiving group brings about a similar change i n 'pre^understand* 
ing," and with i t a corresponding similar change i n the way i n 
which theology apprehends succeeding revelation* For e2sample 7 
our r e l i g i o u s heritage t e l l s us about the events of Moses* the 
prophets and Jesus C h r i s t j and aft e r each of these events th#|*$ 
was a new understanding of God, with a resulti n g new 'pre-wunder^ 
standing "which i s brought to a l l succeeding revelation* 
Another way of in d i c a t i n g the role of the receiving group*© 
fpre<tunderstanding', i n the continuing development of his t o r y and 
theology i s to point out that at d i f f e r e n t points i n history 
receiving grotips formulate the ontological question i n d i f f e r e n t 
ways1 For example* there i s one prewunderstanding" about t h i s 
question implied i n the areek historians* who thought i n terms 
of recurring cycles which were i n some way eaqpressive of a 
divine pattern^ and t h i s way i s obviously d i f f e r e n t from that 
of Croce* who thinks of the " s p i r i t " of man progressively 
changing and developing. I n theology there i s a similar change 
i n the way i n which the receiving group (the Church) formulates 
• 4>m ••<} 
the question of man's heingj ana these changes play a part i n j 
the changed way i n which revelation i s received* For example, ! 
the prophets brought. about one change i n the way i n which man j 
i s understood! the event of Jesus -Christ wrought another changes j 
and the entry of Greek philosophy, i n t o Christian theology s t i l l ' 
another change* I n modem times Luther's great emphasis on. j 
the threat of g u i l t i n man's. l i f e indicates a d i f f e r e n t approach ;  
to the question of man*a being from that of T i l l i c h whose: primary! 
emphasis i s upon the threat of meaninglessness i n man's l i f e * j 
(Gf course both Luther and T i l l i c h show a concern^or^oi^D 
g u i l t and meaninglessness j but i t i s the matter of emphasis 
which we are c a l l i n g a t tention to here*) And agaih f as i n the 
case of h i s tory | a change in'pre^under standing* and i n the a^»:, 
ing of the question of man's being results i n a change,in the; 
approach to the task of theology* T i l l i c h and Bultmann do and • 
must receive the revelation of God i n a d i f f e r e n t way from 
Luther* I t must b© d i f f e r e n t because the revelation i s to j 
be received, i t must be received as the l i v i n g ^ S p i r i t - f i l l e d I 
answer to contemporary man's problems and questions^ These 
problems and questions are always changing! which i s another 
way of saying the £re.-funderstanding" i s always changing* I t 
has always been the case that revelation has been received i n 
t h i s way* i*.e*> on the basis of a tprewunderstanding,'which i s 
always i n th© process of change* And because the pre-under* 
standing"which i s brought to revelation i s constantly changing#, 
so i t follows that the problems and questions which men bring 
to t h e i r encounter with revelation are always changing* This 
ever changing, every new way i n which revelation i s encountered" 
and received i s one aspect of i t being "the same yesterday* 
today and forever"* I f t h i s were not the case* i f we had i n 
some way to recapture and enter into the'pre^nnderstanding" 
possessed by the members of the e a r l i e s t Qhurehj then we would • 
have to say of revelation* of' the Qospel^ not that i t was always 
• i . 
"the same", but that i t was ever "more remote" from the situa* 
t i o n i n which we l i v e * 
The receiving group, then t i s concrete» dynamic and always 
i n the process of changes i t l i v e s i n awareness of the t r a d i t i o n 
of which i t i s a present-day expression? and i t seeks on the 
basis of i t s '^re-understanding" to f i n d the answers to the con* 
temporary problems which obscure h i s t o r i c a l and theological 
t r u t h * (This i s part of what i s meant by the i n i t i a l l y d i f f i * 
c u l t phrase " a l l h i s t o r y i s contemporary history"* A f u l l 
discussion of t h i s w i l l be found i n the following pages*) 
Receiving groups have t h i s nature and s p i r i t which we have 
describedi and because t h i s i s so t h e i r member© always work 
with an a t t i t u d e of concern about concrete problems,* I n Vicb* 
Groce and Collingwood we have seen the i n t e n s i t y of t h i s concern,! 
i 
and the concrete way i n which t h i s concern manifests i t s e l f * 
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I t i s not a generalised enthusiasm f or history? %ru$ the concern 
that specific h i s t o r i c a l evidence should not he handled 
f a l s e l y (e*gag as "philosophy of history") hut t r u l y (as "re-
enaotment w)i.i I f possible* t h i s characteristic of receiving 
groups i s demonstrated even more Clearly i n theology%. etg** . 
•.V/ 
Origgn and h i a attack en B i b l i c a l literalism,, Sohieiermaohej? 
with h i s ''cultural theology w* Bultmann and h i s programme o f 
demythologigationt T i l i i c h i n his attack on the various forms 
of heteronomy etc* History and theology always begin w i i h a 
specific problem (or problems) i n which the h i s t o r i a n or 
theologian focuses the concrete concern of the ongoing l i f e o f 
the receiving group* 
Rifl.tp.ry and theology d i s t i n ^ i s h e d . Haviftg said so much 
about the s i m i l a r i t y between history and theology* w# must 
immediately go on to point out the difference between them* 
This difference i s simply and concisely expressed i n Bultmann*^. 
wordaj "But t h i s i s 3ust the paradox of f a i t h s I t understa#a. 
an ascertainable ey^nt, |%' j t a context i n natoe h i s t o r ^ 
the act of God*.-*^ ifllhen the event i s considered aaan % v e n t 
i n i t s context i n nature and history"* then i t i s , and must 
be| considered aa on© which 4a of the same order as those events 
atu&ied by the h i s t o r i a n * But when such an event i s seen as an 
(1) Keryffma and Myth^ p;*199* I t a l i c s mine. 
"act of God", as an event which points to God} then i t i s not 
only the proper subject of study f o r the h i s t o r i a n | hut also 
f o r the theologiani whose task i t , i s as a member of the Church 
and on the basis of/"re-enactment" to state i n just ^hat way 
t h i s act addresses u& as .an "act of God11* The. h i s t o r i c a l events 
studied by the: theologian are considered to have a transcendental 
reference} but t h i s i s never the s i t u a t i o n f o r the h i s t o r i a n * 
When through the operation of the Holy S p i r i t an 
"ascertainable event i n i t s context i n nature and hist o r y " is. 
understood and received as an act of God, then that "ascerta^n*«0 
able event" i s received as revelation* This event-as*»revelation 
has an objective side indicating what was received* and which 
i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y termed "miracle"} and i t has a subjective side 
indicating the way i n which i t was received^ and this i s t r a d * 
i t i o n a l l y termed "ecstasy". 
•in our examination of T i l l i c h we called attention to the 
f a c t that the objective side, "miracle% could p r o f i t a b l y be ' 
referred to as "sign-event". This term helps to indicate, as 
"miracle" does not,, both of the primary characteristics of 
the revelatory event*/ The f i r s t primary characteristic i s 
that i t i s "an ascertainable event i n i t s context i n nature 
and history",;, and as such a perfectly legitimate subject of 
study f o r natural science and history* ^  This f i r s t charac* 
( l ) I t i s t h i s which renders so theoloAldallv questionably the 
attempt by the theologian; to off e r a description of the 
"event i n i t s context i n nature and hi s t o r y " which i s 
both at variance with and exclusive of the explanation 
which would be offered by the s c i e n t i s t of h i s t o r i a n , 
e.gt| the attempt to i n s i s t that the V i r g i n B i r t h i s a 
statraent of b i o l o g i c a l f a c t * 
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t e r i s t i e i s preserved i n the second h a l f of the term *Vign* 
©vent"* rpjjg, second primary characteristic, of the revelatory 
event i s that i t points to Godf £«e-»# that i t has a transcendent 
reference* $his understanding i s presented i n the f i r s t half 
of the term "sign*event t t* History ha© no categories to deai 
with t h i s aspect of the revelatory event* 
Ecstasy is; the situation, i n which "an ascertainable event 
i n i t s content i n nature and history *' (the objective side of 
revelation) i s recognised as having a transcendent reference! 
m "being a "sign^evenV' pointing to God* lostasy has no 
necessary co r r e l a t i o n w ith emotional disturbance (although the 
account of Pentecost indicates that such a correlation i $ not 
to be excluded)t and even leas does i t have a necessary cor.re.la* 
t i o n w i th a r t i f i c i a l l y induced emotional excitment*: Eathejf 
ecstasy i s * following the under standing of revelation stated 
near the beginning of t h i s chapter # the s i t u a t i o n i n which' the 
Holy S p i r i t acts i n and through the h i s t o r i c a l event* and thfts/ 
emblem the believes? to see that event as sign*event* We may 
say that, i n ecstasy the event i s not only understood or grasped 
as an object of tewwledge (an aspect which never disappears)j 
but that also the believer i a ^ raa-oed by the event . More 
precisely|»; the believer i s grasped by the power of the Holy 
Spirit#. the power of God, as that power operates i n and through 
the ascertainable h i s t o r i c a l event, And t h i s power operating i n 
and through the ;eveht i s the transcendent reference of that 
eventjr-it I s &0d Mm$eill?> the God to whom the event points 6$ 
a sign* Now^ we • not only &now the eventy Taut also, "because the 
©vent i s t i ^ e d with a persos^l.powej? superior and transcendent 
to ourselves|, i t ©an "be said (re^ogniaing fully the d i f f i c u l t y 
o f ; t h i s 1 " l o g i c a l l y s^i?angert egression) that we are ^ wh/by,' 
that which wo^ks i n and through the event* The easp^ession 
%nown b y % as we have used i t here* i s a d i f f i c u l t - <$gppea9$<to 
because we oannot assume the. position of Go% and consequently 
cannot say just what i s constituted i n toeing Known "by God* 
Nevertheless t h i s " l o g i c a l l y strange" affirmation i s made because 
t h i s p o w e r f u l ! event i s not made manifest through the operation 
of some impersonal life.*foroej tout rather through the power of 
God who i s Father f Son and Holy S p i r i t coming %a, us i n address 
and e l i c i t i n g our obedient response* I t i s i n t h i s sense that 
we are "Jmown toy" God* Since t h i s i s the si t u a t i o n we say that 
i n ©cstasy that which concerns us unconditionally manifests 
i t s e l f ? f o r the h i s t o r i c a l event i t s e l f (Jesus of Nawe^h) f # 
only a preliminary concern! "but the transcendent reference of 
that event (Jeau& a* the C h r i s % a© the son of God) disclosed to 
me by the Holy i p i r i t concerns me unconditionally* I n him j 
f i n d the health* wholeness and purpose of my l i f e * 
But l e t ua emphasis© again that t h i s being grasped "by 
the Holy S p i r i t tafees place only i n and through the %e*enact* 
menttt of an ascertainable h i s t o r i c a l event* e*.gtf. Paul*s being 
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grasped on the Damascus road took place i n and through Josua 
Of Naaareth, the preaching about him and Paul 1 8 reception of 
that preaching* I t takes place through, the Holy S p i r i t 
operates through* the r a t i o n a l process of concern, 'pre*under-> 
standing, questioning etc* which we have described. This 
r a t i o n a l process i s not superaee'ded or destroyed i n ecstasy$ 
but i t i s transcended when through the operation of the Holy 
S p i r i t ; t h e ascertainable event i s seen as an event which points 
beyond i t s e l f to God* 
i t i s evident that here there i s no genuine p a r a l l e l to 
his t o r y * I n h i s t o r y there i s i n t u i t i o n and imagination* but 
not ecstasy; not the operation of the Holy S p i r i t * at least not 
openly and i n i t s most characteristic mode of operation. $he 
Significance of an h i s t o r i c a l event proceeds d i r e c t l y out of 
the "re-enactment" of'that event " i n i t s content i n nature and 
history"} but the significance of an event which i s perceived 
i n ecstasy (e*g*» Jesus of Nazareth i s the Christ) i s not arrived 
at simply through t h i s process of "re-enactment^* Hather there 
i s an additional, S p i r i t - d i r e c t e d step i n which one makes a 
free decision to understand t h i s event also, as a "sign-event",' 
and obediently to respond to i t as such* 
i t i s t h i s understanding of revelation which shows us the 
significance of myth as i t i s used i n Chr i s t i a n i t y * Myth too 
i s a sign pointing to the eternal * but i n a d i f f e r e n t manner* 
i n Christian myth, as i n the more dir e c t revelation which we have 
been discussiwg, (e*g*, Jesus as the C h r i s t ) , the f i n i t e points 
to the i n f i n i t e j but unli&e direct revelation the finite"events" 
of myth are not ascertainable events which, can "be located i n 
the context of nature and history. For example* the events of 
the Creation story or the b i r t h narratives cannot be located i n 
the context of nature and h i s t o r y * ^ And yet the motivation 
and development of Christian myth springs from and must be 
consistent with some event which can be so located* This can be 
i l l u s t r a t e d by the Creation story which* i n i t s Old Testament 
form, i s an i n d i r e c t product of the Exodus* The understanding 
of G-od arrived at through the events of the Exodus provides both 
the motivation f o r the re ^ w r i t i n g of t h i s myth, and the concept 
of God which i s developed there* I n l i k e manner the.b i r t h 
narratives I n the New Testament are an in d i r e c t product of the 
revelation of Jesus as the Christ* I n t h i s case the picture of 
Christ presented i n the b i r t h narratives i s consistent (as f a r 
as Christ*s nature i s concerned) with the picture which we f i n d 
• . \. * 
i n the parts of the Gospels based upon ascertainable h i s t o r i c a l 
event* 
This undex'standing of miracle and myth (which i s heavily : 
indebted to T i l l i c h , although he might not agree with the way 
( l ) Because the Creation and b i r t h stories (and other similar 
material i n Scripture): have t h i s nature* i t i s c l early 
inappropriate and misleading to t r e a t them as i f they could. 
be located i n a natural and h i s t o r i c a l context* I.e.* > to 
deal with them s c i e n t i f i c a l l y and h i s t o r i c a l l y * When these 
and similar accounts are reduoed to l i t e r a l records of 
actual events* then they become proper subjects f o r scien-
t i f i c and h i s t o r i c a l investigation. The only possible 
r e s u l t i s absurdity* 
I n whleh i t has been, developed ham)' .&mm to be more satis** 
£aotory than that which w© found i n BuXtnamu In our lindorstand* 
l a g miraoi® and sigrtb<a*a preserved* and a basin i s given which 
pefottlta th#$» to b© deeply approbated as an important part of 
Scripture* indood* t h i s understanding enables th$m to b© 
®pp#&oi&t$d wwh IQM deeply than that £$rango,|. poat^aoismtific 
p o i n t of -v{Uwr whioh insist® that they b# aocopted l i t e r a l l y or 
not a t a l l f At th© saw© tira© the unnecessary stumbling bloo&j 
whioh &a .pw$#&iffl(L by miraol© and isjyth when i t i s treated as a 
Mt©s*al and aupermturaXly loosed eiront* I s don© mm with* 
I n Bultmas% on th& other tend, ?/e a#e w sure whethor h@ 
wlsh&t to fcoep tho r0intorprote& airacl© and myth ^ 03? whothor 
$i|^ : i n ^ n t l o n la . to dispos© of thera a f t e r t h e i r Js^rnoi.Of^ianing 
has been' abstr^eted*: I n a rooont statement Bnitmann -mio^^-. 
t h a t i t £& hi© i n t e n t i o n that isiraelo and myth ^ - - ^ t a l n ^ ^ ^ -
But* I n any oaae» w© do not f i n d i n Bultfaana (and t h i s As I n groat 
eontrapt to f l l l i o a ) any atatomont aboiit the riohnoaa of lairaojt.©' 
and myth .m a spooiiO, mode of theological otatanftnt.! nor do we 
f i n d an iiqpwaalv* treatraont of any of tho m$o* Christian mjptfea 
aucfe tug the Oroatlon story or b i r t h narratives * . ; 
p_an,,.Msto.^ ri,a^ d; .tteoOonff.be, f i n a l l y , d i r t l a ^ p ^ a ^ l t We hair© 
ghown thfc way© i n which h i s t o i d and theology aro similar # and 
thm the way I n whioh tao two ar© d i s t i n c t i v e * f i n a l l y m want 
to poeo the causation am to whether or not ©van th© dlstinotion&. 
«b|e2t w$ have dram between hi s t o r y and theology ar© radical 
(at) Bnltnaannt. Eudolfg ffoans/.. .Qto^lst and Elvtholoi^ y» SOM Pr@s% 
London* 1960* p*X8*:' 
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one©* TSis question i s to be regarded not as a gb$t0Pl06l 
question* but as a genuine one* ' 
hair© fcpo&en of how the hi s t o r i a n i m p l i e i t l y and i n h i s 
own way ask® the ontologioal auestion^ i * e * * why i s there foam 
and not chaos* reason and not, i r r a t i o n a l i t y r o&use and not b l i n d 
oMnc© ete* Moreover! he not only i m p l i c i t l y * aaica these ojues-* 
tions of ooaoi?et0 ©vents ji but lie also proceeds on the basis: of 
Ma b e l i e f that there i s form, eause* reason etc. Above a l l he 
a&sumeia th&t there i s meaning i n historyy that concrete etents 
•are' worthy of olose study? and that these events as?0 i n some way 
capable of showing man the meaning whioh'the h i s t o r i a n assumes . 
i s t o be found i n h i s t o r y * -fchla i s true even though the 
various historians ooeupy very d i f f e r e n t positions as to how ^  
t h i s meaning i s to be discerned. A l l of t h i s i s so thorougMgr 
aooepted as to appeal? self-evident* Yet* i s i t ? The t r a d i t i o n 
out of whioh a l l of t h i s derives i s that of Western c i v i l i i s a i i o n j 
a t r a d i t i o n profoundly influenced by Ch r i s t i a n i t y • And t h i s 
t r a d i t i o n of h i s t o r i e s ! study whioh we Jmow i n the West i s not 
prac t i s e d (excep t derivat i v e l y ) anywhere elsei although i f i t a 
assumptions and proee^dures ©re t r u l y self*.@vident we would 
est^eot i t to be practised i n a l l high c i v i l i s a t i o n s . 
How are we to «aqp%a£tt' t h i s situation? I t i a to be hoped 
that no one wishes to o f f e r the explanation that men i n the t e s t 
are, i n some way more i n t e l l i g e n t . A more reasonable and obvious 
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explanation would seem to li© i n saying that the a ssumptions 
peculiar to h i s t o r i c a l thinking i n the West were taken over 
from the assumptions prevalent i n Western c l v i l i g t a t i o n * These 
assumptions would be both Greco-Roman and Hebrew-Christian i n 
o r i g i n , and ;just as the respective contributions of these two 
t r a d i t i o n s have become subtly intejfcwined i n Western c i v i l i z a -
t i o n as a whole, so the respective contributions of these two 
t r a d i t i o n s to h i s t o r i c a l study have become intertwined to the 
point where they defy an$r clean-out separation* However,many 
of the assumptions of h i s t o r i c a l sMdy can be i d e n t i f i e d as 
being p r i m a r i l y Greco*Roman or primarily Hebrew-Christian i n 
o r i g i n * Thus the categories of form, cause and r a t i o n a l i t y can 
be steen to be pri m a r i l y Greco-Roman i n o r i g i n , regardless of 
how divergent their, contemporary use i s from t h e i r o r i g i n a l 
use* Similarly, the assumption that concrete h i s t o r i c a l events 
are worthy of study and are a source of value i n and of them* 
selves, and not simply as a r e f l e c t i o n of a divine pattern (the 
Greek idea), t h i s assumption i s primarily Hebtew-Ohristian i n 
o r i g i n * ^ ^  And, as we have mentioned before, the idea that 
h i s t o r y has a positive meaning which i s to be located within 
h i s t o r y i s peculiarly Hebrew-Christian* The o r i g i n of t h i s 
idea i s the a f f i r m a t i o n that history i s "salvation hi s t o r y " ! 
( l ) I t i s the Christian r e l i g i o n with i t s great stress upon the 
doctrines of Creation, the Incarnation and the Resurrection 
of the Body which enabled man to see the dig n i t y and value 
of the created and h i s t o r i c a l orders and t h i s not because 
i t r eflected " s p i r i t u a l values", but as a quality proper 
to i t s e l f * 
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that salvation has come to us not through the mystical a b i l i t y 
to escape from h i s t o r y i "but through events which have taken 
place i n space and time, v i z * * through the Law and the prophets, 
through £ls^  Jesus the Christ* This meaning i s and must remain 
ah a f f i r m a t i o n , f o r i t i s impossible to maintain successfully 
that meaning i n history can be discerned through the st r a i g h t -
forward observation of h i s t o r i c a l "objective facts"•^ i—a si t u a -
t i o n which has been conveniently overlooked by those who have, 
decided that the "salvation occurence" i s reason^ a pa r t i c u l a r 
race* the classless society etc* 
So the s i t u a t i o n wwld seem to be as -.follows;,*..: There are 
cert a i n concepts at work i n .Western h i s t o r i c a l -thought such 
as the idea that h i s t o r i c a l event i s worthy of serious st$iy»v 
h i s t o r y proceeds r a t i o n a l l y f meaning i s to be discerned i n 
hist o r y etc* These concepts are assumptions, f o r history, pro* 
cee$s on the basis of such concepts, but does not and canhot ^  
prove that they are true * Moreover* these assumptions are not 
found i n other c i v i l i z a t i o n ^ but they are found i n a l l areas 
of thought i n Western c i v i l i 2 a t i o n j and hence we assume that 
the source of these basic concepts, these assumptions i n 
h i s t o r i c a l study,, i s the same as i t i s , f o r Western c i v i l i z a t i o n 
as a whole* Nov/ some of these concepts can be i d e n t i f i e d as 
pr i m a r i l y G-reco-wRoman i n o r i g i n * and some as prima r i l y Hebrew* 
Christian i n o r i g i n * Of the former we w i l l ; not speak* but of , 
(1) For a recent and authoritativ© discussion of the non^hla* 
t o r i c a l character of Eastern thought see Man and Time., 
edited by Joseph Campbell.* Houtledge and icegaa f a t a * London, 
19S8, pp*110~8QO* J&2~m* 
the l a t t e r at least i t i s true that they are "based on revelation* 
The net r e s u l t of th i s , argument i s that the fundamental assump-
tions of h i s t o r i c a l study in. the West are not self-evident* 
hut are i n d i r e c t l y "based upon Hebrew-Christian revelation* And 
so once again we are presented with a s i t u a t i o n which makes us 
ask whether i t i s possible to make a radical d i s t i n c t i o n between 
history and theology* 
We can describe t h i s s i t u a t i o n by saying that there i s at 
work i n the w r i t i n g of history a "mythical element by means of 
which i t i s raised above a mere .description of successive 
stages of f i n i t e n e s s * " ^ This "mythical element" i s not 
expressed i n terms of any t r a d i t i o n a l mythj but i n concepts 
which are f u l l y rational,: and yet contain an indication of the 
transcendence of h i s t o r y * These f u l l y r a t i o n a l yet "mythical" 
concepts are, 3ust such concepts as those which w# have been 
discussion, e#gy, r a t i o n a l order, meaning^ the di g n i t y and 
value of concrete h i s t o r i c a l event etc* 
To what extent do we f i n d an indication of t h i s trans-
cendence of history i n the three men whom we have studied? We 
have found i t of course i n Vico's "rational c i v i l theology of 
divine providence"* However we have noted the serious d i f f i -
c u l t i e s which Vice encountered i n applying t h i s to actual 
history* 
(1) The Sagfe/of History. n*9fe* 
4,08 ' 
Croce would have vehemently objected to the idea that there 
was anything at work i n hi s t o r y whioh pointed to the transoen* 
dent* to God. But what do we actually f i n d i n Crocs? We f i n d 
such central ideas as that of % i r i ^ Jbeing the source of value 
i n h i s t o r y ! and of history as "being the story of l i b e r t y * Such 
ideas are not self-evidentj they do not proceed d i r e c t l y from 
the evidence. History could be and has been w r i t t e n i n which 
the primary source of value i n history i s seen i n terms of 
economic development % or h i s t o r y could be w r i t t e n as the story 
of bondage* I t i s of course true that Croce i s always at 
pains to speak of S p i r i t and l i b e r t y i n terms of concrete 
h i s t o r i c a l events? but what he makes of these events'.is not 
the only p o s s i b i l i t y . There i s i n Croce an element of what we 
have termed here the "mythical",, and by whioh history M i s raised 
above a mere description of suocessive stages of finiteness'% 
Croce himself wished to do t h i s by having h i s t o r i c a l events 
point to Spirit? but by his use of the basie presuppositions 
which we have discussed he pointed beyond the "suocessive stages 
of f i n i t e n e s s " i n a way he d i d not consciously intend. 
Turning to Collingwood we have a smaller* less ambitious 
and less systematic body of work upon which to form an 
opinion. However» i n Collingwood there i s the "mythical" 
element. the element which points beyond the events 
themselvesj and t h i s takes place not only i n the basio 
presuppositions common to a l l h i s t o r i c a l w r i t i n g i n the 
West, but also i n such statements as " h i s t o r i c a l 
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thinking i a an o r i g i n a l and fundamental a c t i v i t y of the human 
m i n d " ^ # "history does not presuppose mind* i t i s the l i f e of 
mind i t s e l f and *fThe Vaui&e of h i s t o r y * , * i s that i t teaches 
us what man has done and thus what man i s * " ^ tn addition 
there i s the fascinating hut undeveloped statement by Gollingwood 
which we have already q u o t e d ^ * and the meaning of which i s 
(Q) 
i n l i n e with what we are saying i n t h i s section* v ' 
|n summary then* w& have pointed out the ways i n which 
hi s t o r y and theology are aimilar* and the ways i n which they 
d i f f e r * This, difference l i e s primarily i n the transcendent 
reference revealed to us by the Holy S p i r i t i n the h i s t o r i c a l 
events studied by theology % a reference which i s focused above 
a l l i n miracle and myth* We then went on to qualify even t h i s 
difference by suggesting that history too has i t s own peculiar 
"mythology" which points beyond i t s e l f to the transcendent.... 
However, i n conclusion* we may establish one l i m i t e d but 
complete difference between history and theologyj: namely* that 
the main concerns of history are e x p l i c i t l y preliminary concerns,. 
(1) The Idea of History* p. 847 
(2) i b i d . * p*SS7* 
( s ) i h i d * . p*10. 
(4) se^ p* %o+ s^gA*v. 
(5) i n r e l a t i o n to our whole discussion here concerning the 
relationship between the theologian and the h i s t o r i a n * 
i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to compare T l l i i e h remarks about the 
relationship between the thologian and the philosopher 
found i n systematic Theology^i* p.g5< 
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while those of theology are e x p l i c i t l y of ultimate concern to 
us* The preliminary character of h i s t o r i c a l concern i s seen 
c l e a r l y i n the p h i l o l o g i c a l aspect of history,* e«g*# i s t h i s an 
accurate text?, has t h i s journal been f a l s i f i e d ? „ how shall we 
cl a s s i f y these potsherds? etc* Wo one would maintain that the 
asking and answering of these questions, however important they 
are i n t h e i r own way*, contributes to the wholeness*: dir e c t i o n 
and meaning whioh we seek to f i n d i n human l i f e * I n the more 
fundamental questions of h i s t o r i c a l inquiry, such as the reeon~ 
st r u c t i o n and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of h i s t o r i c a l epochs* the concerns 
of h i s t o r y are s t i l l preliminary?;.although here t h e i r preliminary; 
nature i s not as evident* I t i s not as evident because the 
subject matter consists of the hopes and struggles which involved : 
m i l l i o n s of people* Nevertheless even here the concerns are 
preliminary* For example, the h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which 
I place upon even so important an event as the French Revolution i 
i s not of ultimate importance i n my determining the meaning of 
my l i f e and of l i f e i n general! nor i s i t of any decisive import ; 
tainee i n helping me to answer such questions as "Who am I? "# 
This i s not the task of history* For the Christian at least, 
the preliminary character of h i s t o r i c a l concern i s made clear 
by drawing attention to the generally . accepted view that the 
histories,-.! reconstruction of the l i f e of Jesus of Haaareth can 
neve?? be more than a preliminary concern f o r either the Christian 
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os? the non<-Chrietian* I t i s true that t h i s preliminary concern, 
and many other preliminary concerns f o r that matter, can become 
the vehicle of ultimate concernj but they are not .themselves 
of ultimate concern* 
I t may be objected here that we have previously said that 
history asks the ontological question, the question of being*, 
and c e r t a i n l y t h i s would go f a r toward qualifying history as 
being of more than preliminary concern* We did say t h i s * but 
we also said that t h i s asking of the ontological question i s an 
i m p l i c i t one j and not e x p l i c i t as i n theology* Moreover we have 
stated our reasons f o r maintaining that the form i n which the 
ontological question i s .asked and the answer which i t receive©, 
does not proceed solely and atraighlborwardly out of the h i s t o r i c ^ 
evidence* but that i t stands i n a f i n a l dependence upon revela* 
tion*. (This i s seen most clearly i n "philosophy of history", 
but i t i s also a t work i n genuine history*) Therefore even when: 
history deals i m p l i c i t l y with matters of ultimate concern* i t 
can do so only by standing i n ultimate dependence upon revelation 
I n contrast theology deals e x p l i c i t l y with the ontological 
questlonj with the question of "Who am I?"* I t speaks e x p l i c i t l y 
of the creation of being* of man* through the Father; of h i s 
redemption through the Sons and of his being sustained by the 
Holy S p i r i t * I n theology we are concerned with the incorporation 
of man i n t o God, in t o the ground of his being* This e x p l i c i t 
task of theology i s of ultimate concern to us* and here, and only 
here theology stands:: i n complete d i s t i n c t i o n from h i s t o r i c a l 
inquiry* 
3* History and Theology as "Re*enaetment,,• 
a* The problem of f i n d i n g a basis f o r history and;theology* 
We now come to that which unites a l l f i v e of the men whom 
we have examined i n t h i s thesist the struggle against a s t r i c t 
subject-object epistemology* Vico, Croce and Collingwood strove 
to demonstrate that history cannot be w r i t t e n on t h i s basisj 
and Bultmann and T i l l i e h , whose c r i t i c s often f a i l to understand 
what they are attempting to do* str i v e to demonstrate that 
theology cannot be pursued on the basis of such an epistemology* 
As we discussed i n our chapter on Vico, the classical 
formulation of the subject-object epistemology given by Descartes 
establishes a problem which does not arise i n genuine history* 
Descartes distinguishes between the subject with his ideas, and 
the object with i t s nature, i*e», he i s concerned with the 
relationship between ideas and things——the problem of sfcepti«!<* 
cism* But i t i s just t h i s problem which does not arise i n 
h i s t o r y , f o r h i s t o r i c a l study has no existence apart from the 
events of which i t i s the explanation* History i s not something 
which exists abstractly i n the mind of the h i s t o r i a n (the sub-
ject)» and which then may or may not be attached to an event or 
events (the object)* History i s nothing but the r a t i o n a l account 
of specifici. concrete events i n t h e i r interrelatednessj i t i s 
the synthesis of h i s t o r i c a l event and the historians thought 
about that event, and when the synthesis i s broken hi s t o r y 
disappears* A second f a i l u r e of Descartes i n regard to 
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h i s t o r i c a l thinking i s his c r i t e r i o n of admissable evidence} 
namely^ that i t be a d e a r and d i s t i n c t idea* This c r i t e r i o n 
i s as useless as is. his epistemologyi f o r , as the examination 
of any book of history beyond the text book l e v e l w i l l make 
clear, h i s t o r i c a l evidence i s never clear and d i s t i n c t * Vico 
recognized and pointed out both of these Cartesian f a i l u r e s i n 
respect to history* 
Croce and Collingwood take up t h i s argument and*, i n a 
clearer and more systematic way than Vioog demonstrate, the 
falseness of history w r i t t e n on the basis of the Cartesian 
separation of subject and object, of inte r p r e t a t i o n and event* 
This false approach consists, as.we need only to recapitulate 
here, i n c o l l e c t i n g numbers of objective facts ("brute" or 
"unthought" facts) and then either r e f i n i n g them (philology) *> 
l i s t i n g them chronologically (chronology»r "scissors and $>ast@"), 
grouping them ("pigeon h o l i n g " ) , turning them to some p r a c t i c a l 
use ("rhetorical" or "poetical" h i s t o r y ) , or imposing some 
external meaning upon them ("philosophy of h i s t o r y " ) * A l l of 
t h i s i s an attempt to write history on the basis of a s t r i c t 
subject»*object epistemologyj i n the realm of " I and I t " * And., 
as we have discussed before* i n spite of i t s long domination ot. 
the waiting of h i s t o r y , the results are a patent f a i l u r e * 
Having seen the many s i m i l a r i t i e s between history and 
theology, i t should not surprise us when we come to Bultmanh 
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and T i l l i e h that the strong protest against the s t r i c t subject-
object epistemology forms an .important theme i n t h e i r work too* 
The fo c a l point f o r Bultraann*/ especially as he i s a New 
Testament theologian, i s the problem of the r i g h t interpretation 
of documents* Therefore a major part of our examination of 
t h i s theologian was formulated i n terms of the problem of 
hermeneutics* What i s the correct epistemology i n approaching 
documents, and especially the New featament documents? The 
c r u c i a l factor i s just that which we have encountered i n the 
historians* I n Bultmann's,own wordss "For f a i t h needs to be 
emancipated from i t s association with a world view expressed i n 
objective terms* whether i t be a mythical or a s c i e n t i f i c one."^ 
The demythoiojjigation controversy*- whatever i t s own peculiar 
merits j, i s only an aspect of t h i s larger struggle to free f a i t h 
from an excessive subjeet^dbject epistemology* I n spite of the 
f a c t that Bultmann*s programme of demythoioliaation has been/V 
under discussion f o r some years now* i t does not seem to have < : 
made much progress toward a resolution of the problem^ And; i t : 
w i l l not make much progress so long as the more fundamental 
problem of the s u i t a b i l i t y f o r theology of a "world view 
expressed i n objective terms" i s not discussed more f u l l y and 
widely that i t has been up to now, 
The reason that t h i s matter i s so persistently avoided* as 
( l ) KeyvA-ma and Myth, p*210* 
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well as the reason that Bultmann's c r i t i c s so often miss the 
point of what he i s saying* i s thatBultmann (andTillloh too) 
Is attaching a very alluring ana comforting misconception with 
which Christians do not wish to part. This misconception i s * 
the "belief that there are historically ascertainable events 
(e*g* i miracles) which exist amvt from f a i t h * and yet which 
can "be used to support f a i t h * This misconception could also be 
expressed i n terms of our earlier discussion by saying that there: 
exist certain events; i n their context i n nature and history (e*g«; 
^resus* miracles of healing) which w# are able to see a'par^ t from .'j 
f a i t h aa^  having a transcendent reference! as being events which ! 
point to God. This i s the objective basis of f a i t h l j 
Those who attack Bultmann on this point say that he i s 
dissolving the objective oasis of f a i t h * i*e** the mighty acts 
of God# I f Bultmann i s really doing this* i f he i s trying to 
create a theology which i s not founded upon concrete historical ! 
©vents* then he i s seriously i n error* However* when one reads 
the actual words of Bultmann* i n contrast to the words of his 
c r i t i c s and paraphrases* i t I s hy no means evident that he i a ; 
dissolving the genuine objective basis of f a i t h * This i s the 
crucial qjuestion, i n regard to Bultmann* and everything depends 
upon what $® meant by "objective"* I f hy this term i s meant 
that there are objective ("brute"* ,,unthought,r) facts (e*g#* the 
Holy Sp i r i t descended upon Jesus at his baptism) which we may 
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thenproceed to interpret and use aa a support for f a i t h j i f 
t h i s i s mat i s meant* then Bultmann. |& diisaolving the objective 
^asis^Ci) of f a i t h * I f , on the other hahd* by "objective" is 
meant th$ concrete historical events i n their context i n nature 
and history which the New Testament sees; as events which point 
to Q-oi| ant upon the basis of which i t forms i t s statements 
about the person and work of the Christ> i f this i s what i * 
meant* then Bultmann i s not dissolving the oh Motive basis of 
faith*. Rather $ he treats i t i n a much more convincing way than 
do those who are s t i l l held captive by the sub^eot^objeot 
"mythology11* 
As we have seen i n our chapter on T i i l i c h f and again at the 
beginning of t h i s Chapter where we discussed miracle^ ecstasy 
and mythology* T i l l i o h i s i n substantia! agreement with Bu!tma^ 
aa regards the matter of subject and object i n theology* The 
p$int at which this agreement becomes most essplieit i s where: | 
T i l l i e h speaks, of the Biblical picture of Ohrist a i being j 
i 
independent of the problems of historical inquiry into the facta j 
which lay behind this picture * ^ Aa we aaid before i n our I 
discussion of t h i s appfcently polemical and hence ea&ggerated 
statements i t s intention i s not to deny that there i s an hiatoh- i 
f i c a l correlative to that Biblical picture j but i t does deny 
that there are a body of facts Known apart from f a i t h (i*e*# 
(!) gf> The Interpretation of History* p*S66. supra p» 3^ 3. 
M>2 . . 
apart from the Biblical picture) ?/hich point to God and hence 
can be used to support our f a i t h * 
So i t i s that the positions of T i l l i c h and Bultmahn are 
substantially the same. However, characteristically, T i l l i o h 
goes oh to qualify his. position i n this matters and as usual 
this qualification embodies a useftil distinction* He agrees of 
course that i n the act of receiving Knowledge the subject does 
not stand apart from i t s object, hut enters into union with i t j 
yet, he goes on to point out, the element of detachment of the 
subject (the laiower) from the object (the Jsnown) is. never com* 
pletely destroyed* * In the act' of Itnowing union and detachment 
are i n s t r i c t interdependence? and i t i s impossible to destroy 
the one or the other t Moreover« i n those acts of knowing where 
we are striving to establish a technique or to control some 
thing* the element of detachment is necessarily the predominant 
one* $ho:iB)st obvious example of this i s the whole f i e l d of 
technologyj and i n a technological c i v i l i z a t i o n thei>e i s the 
constant movement to transform the whole of re a l i t y into a 
thing which can be controlled* Whenever we see a s t r i c t or 
predominatingly subject-object epistemology at worlt* then we 
know that the intention i s to control the objectj and i n the 
case of theology this means that the intention i s to control 
God* There may be the intention* i n a second step, to be con-
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t r o l l e d bj£ or to submit to God} but this God Is on© who has. 
already been brought under control i n the f i r s t step, The false 
theology which results from this approach i s the theological 
equivalent of the false history which we have discussed previous-
-sly* Let us l i s t some of these i<j.uivalents» 
In history the controlling, sub^ect^ob^ct epistemology i s 
used to produce a false history which we have- called chronology 
i*e», the l i s t i n g of "facts"* The theological equivalent of 
this i s manifested i n those theologies which are conceived pre* 
dominantly i n propositiohalj noh*exiatential terms* The com* 
raonest example of this i s to be found i n the text books and 
compendiums of theology* Here there i s s t a t i c t objective and 
propositlonal theology i n which the religious problemsboth of 
the contemporary world 'and the world out of which the proposi* 
tions took their r i s e 9 remain gt,t besjfe implicit* The same situa-
t i o n i s to be found i n the doctrinal formulations of varioua 
orthodoxies* As chronology has i t s place i n history* so such 
compendiums have their place i n theologyj but they are noV 
theology* Theology is. l i v i n g doctrine | propositionaliy stated 
doctrine i s dead theology* 
The theological equivalent of "philology 1 1 i s seen i n many 
Biblical word studies and i n much Old and !Tew Testament exejsis. 
Here the words which we have seen Orooe applying to history are 
equally applicable to theology} namely/ "documents that have 
been restored, reproduced, described, brought, into l i n e , remain 
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doeuments*-^h^t is- to say* silent t h i n g s * T h e document? i s 
never <iuesti0h^ 
v a l i d i t y of the document both i n the past and i n the present 
m % statement of man's relationship with O-odirand above a l l 
how t h i s document . affeels my own relationship to Gad* Botft 
''philology" and i t s theological equivalent have their respective 
places i n history and theoiogyf but m the one i s not l i v i n g 
history^, so the- other i s not i n Itself an expression of l i v i n g 
theology or f a i t h * 
The theological equivalent of "universal history" i s the 
histo3?y Of r e l i g i o n s * ^ The errors of both are the same* F i r s i j 
since, obviously everything cannot be included* there ia : neeea* 
sarily an i n i t i a l bias with its>easuing f a l s i f i c a t i o n i n the 
selection of the material which i s to be included* The f a l s i f l -
t c a t i o n o f t e n compounded with a second? nam^ly^ that i n the 
ef f o r t %o present a comprehensive survey of the history of 
religions various "dark periods" must be f i l l e d i n i n one way 
or another* To this i s frequently added a more serious d i f f i -
culty when the attempt $s made to develop some thesis about the 
development of religions* e*g*, that religion i.a the neurotic 
attempt to deal with feelings of inadequacy* How such neurotic 
attempts, play a part |n probably a l l religion*' and we are %im 
richer f o r having this brought forcefully to our attention^ but 
the h i s t o r i c a l l y and theologically objectionable aspeot of t h i s 
(I) Th^oiry and History of Historiography, 
(S) The type of history of religions which we; have i n mind hero 
t# eitner the sweeping survey of world. religions, or the 
relatively brief "e^lamtioiis 1 1 of a particular religion* 
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presentation i s the rather obvious selection and tailoring of 
evidence to suit the thesis, together with the implicit or even 
explici t claim that this i s the true interpretation of religion^ 1) 
However the f i n a l objection to the history of religions i s really 
the fundamental one* This objection i s that the writers of such 
histories assume that the religious facts and events of history 
(concerning Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism etc*) are objective 
things which can be had by reproducing certain words from a book 
or manuscript j and that these can then be moved about lik e 
checkers i n order to suit the author's thesis* In order to do 
this one must assume, since Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism etc* 
each represent a particular historical development and point of 
view, that he can enter equally into each at w i l l i n order to 
procure the insights of each* And i n the case of Christianity, 
Judaism and Mohammedism, each of which depend upon a specific 
event i n history which forms the center of history, the author 
of a history of religion assumes that he can simultaneously 
occupy several centers of history* Now this i s impossible, and 
i f such persons ever t r i e d to do this they would find out that 
i t was impossible* since they do not seem to be aware of t h i s , 
the obvious conclusion i s that they have never tr i e d j and they 
have never t r i e d because they do not believe i t i s necessary to 
approach this matter historically* The concepts of receiving 
(1) Here we see the close a f f i n i t y of the history of religions 
with the "philosophy of h i story " j and this again i s a 
characteristic which i t shares with "universal history"* 
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groupp. problem, "re-enactment" etc* are foreign to tlie history 
of religions, Just as they are to "universal history"., Rather 
we have i n both a s t r i c t subject^object epistemology whose 
scarcely disguised, purpose i s to control the material i n order 
that i t may serve the purpose of demonstrating the thesis of 
the particular history of religions* The value of the history 
of religions i s the same, as that of ''universal history"; namely 
the collection of a large body of facts together with a com** 
mentary upon the facts which i s often suggestive for genuine 
hist o r i c a l or theological work as the case may be* But i n con-
clusion i t must be eaiphasiaed that the assumptions and method 
of the history of religions are inappropriate to either history 
or theology* for the "category of 'beside one another' i s a 
spatial not a temporal category",*^ (3) 
Another approach to religion or theology which^ i n the j 
form i n which i t has frequently been practiced i n the past, must • 
be judged largely a failure i s the "philosophy of religion". / 
The inadequacies of this discipline are very similar to those 
of the history of religions which we have Just discussed* And 
indeed the history of religions i s often treated within the 
context of the philosophy of religion* 
I t i s notdriously d i f f i c u l t to define philosophy of religion,, 
but a relatively recent definition of Austin Farrer's describes | 
(1) The Interpretation of History, p*851* 
(S) .g£* Buber, Martin, Eclipse of God* Harper Torchbook Edition, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1967, pp«&33~137* 
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„,.the typo, of philosophy o J \ r e ^ •'• 
iiccordlng to Farrer (who* I t ihould b© noted* Is very c r i t i c a l 
of t h i s oonooptioft of the philosophy of religion) the philosophy 
of religion takea the position timt "certain type® of hmm. exper* 
itiaoda and human a c t i v i t y ar© accepted as occurWi- ®®& the philo* 
soph@r*&. Voatam i s to extract f rom these, the j> ftflfyMffc prin©i*» 
pies or v&WK&X forms presumed to be embedded i n them* 
tt(l) I t 
• |a assumed as i n the hiatery of religions* that religious 
• Werienoe from diverse traditions can be -oove^jfe&eaci- Entered 
into and TOropri&tM* although the philosopher stands ?&thiu 
only one ot mm mm of them*r We have already stated the oi)#C* 
tionfc to th i s non*hi©toricai procedure* The philosopher ®t 
gion then.goe^' on-to the. even more ojaeBtionmhl© pspoo^ s/ir ^ . e x -
tracting th& kernel of meaning froia the; objects of his stu%t--/®ad 
thereby fcuil&s up a body of universal*. .^^0^-principles which-
can be applied to religion i n general* The asauj^ption that t h i s 
i s possible i s basically* ttM» same assumption m that held b|r 
thos# engaged i n of history Mj. namelyi. the m^mi&m 
from, selected hiiatelcatl evidence of universal principles, or • 
"laws" which os?0 then applied to a l l of history* The fallacy of 
thifc approach has b@en 00 amply demonstrated i n the preceding 
pages that we need not repeat, i t . hers* 
This lead® m to diseuas,* f i n a l l y * the more atraight£orw©s?& 
• (1) flattwafefc,A»M»» yinita-aad. .^nfin^te^ kondoa* 1&&3* p»vii* 
Quoted by 0und&v*" ' i&' theScottish Journal' of 
Theology., Vol*. 10* Ho* a* :p*US* 
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th®0;i©si$ai. <$^ifmm$ m: tm .^phiios^phy^ o £ M ^ w % ^ ^ t 
tjm:.m%igi<m^ or theological, "philosophy' of hi©t©f#%^) mm$ •• 
$m% m I n iarx or $ oynbe@| an ideal pattern i a developed on • 
th# b&aia of a apeMal' interpretation of a a t t a i n limited 
rmZ&®$ipn:Q£ hlatj&rieal «yidB&aef' and the^ this pattern i® . 
imposed upon a :wide sweep of empirical Metorieai -mnstimi 
&u;®U0tine*0 iheav^nlsr and earthly oiM@ai Joa$him. of; Piori®* 
three ages; of thfc y&VSmfr, the Son and. the Holy Spirit} the eon* 
temporary theory ( i f I t "be given t h i dignity . of a "theo^'*) 
that.Sod i s on th® #id© of f#$tern#/democratic, capitalism etc* . . 
A ©ont^ mporary-3^ XigiouQ ^tenom©hon :«rhioh patfta&ea both of - -
thi©\*©Mgi©us "philosophy of hiitory 1* and also the philosophy 
of religion,*, assd whieh oall© f o r more than passing notion* is.-
that of mm^mmn%&.%tBm^ tuntaentaliem #etabl|ah©0 a numbed 
®£ & flfffoflfo, P*iJM»ip3ts»(| prisiary &m being that B$b;lioai 
statements .are to be accepted as l i t e r a l 'atat@menta of oh^e^iive . 
fac t * ;(Xbie me&na that th® Biba.0 ia loosed upon and dealt with 
( l ) the pnvpom® of 'our discussion w©, have made a e^paratto 
her©, betw&en ^philo^ophy of history^ and' religious: "phla?* 
Ioaophy of history** However; imm I.© m genuinely non* 
religious, "philosophy of history"* $hia i s ao beoaua© the 
motivation of the "philosophy of history", •namely to ©a^ plain 
. the 'meaning of hiatory* i r a r@iigioua •'motivation*. Th@ 
tr u l y no»>r0lig.ioua p t w n i s not .interested i n the meaning 
of history *. and hence would have no causa' to produce: a 
"philosophy of history"*.' 
($) mm typo of Fundamentalism which m have i n mind hei?e i s 
the poat^ aoie&tifio» obsoura^tiat variety. which'ha® g#ow» .. 
up i n the last hundred $$NMH or. leas*. I t s name and much 
of it s . character i s derived from &-att*&&s of traeta ': 
published i n th# ttaitod States early i n the gOth Century 
and entitled "fhe Fundamentals"* 
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. a&V chronicle -Wait a. orioffi -principle• 4s not derived from - • 
•Scripturej rather* ironically enough* i t pw^es i t s origin to 
the -scientific point of vi e * against which the BHindamentaliSts 
are rebelling^ namely$ that genuine r e a l i t y consists of objective, 
obseryable facts* This point of view [totm'(or at least i t did 
so i n the period out of which Fundamentalism arose) an adequitt ; 
basis for scientific experiment^ but of course when . i t - i s tranit" 
formed into ah\]a.:-oriior:i principle of Biblical interpretation a 
oohfusion resuilst which continues to burden the Church* A l l 
Bibli c a l events must conform§ however outrageous the results^ to 
this principlej i * e * * to this special way i n which historical 
©Vidence. must be read* i n Addition this-a. p r i o r i principle 
enables Bib l i c a l statements to be used i n the most arbitrary, 
way to explain| j u s t i f y and - predict contemporary events, e.g«, 
th$ use made of Scripture; by white supremciats/ I n south Af rica 
and theSouthern United states* 
In discussing the theological equivalents of' the "philosophy | 
bf history" we need to form an estimate of the extent to which 
the bid Testament i& gui l t y of this practice* There are i n the 
Old Testament many elements" of ; the "philosophy of history"* To; j 
begin with there is- the determinative concept that Israel i s 
God' s eove,n^ teed people % % concept which i s based upon % special 
interpretation of a limited selection of historical events; 
(primarily the Exodus)» Moreover this concept of a covenanted 
people affected not only the Jews and their history, for i t 
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Was through this special people that the gentilos wore to 
f i n d their f u l f i l l i a e n t * A l l of history was seen i n theso 
teriasf; and the creation stories were rewritten i n order that 
no part of h i s t o r y * would he t o t a l l y outside of this undor* 
standing* 
This understanding was not invalidated by such empirical 
evidenoo as the failure of either party to this covenant to 
perform their covenanted responsibilities* God1® failure to v , 
help them was regarded as chastisement* On man's side, howevofr* 
tho f a i l u r e to ©hoy the Law did lead to a modification of the 
covenant concept* The people of God ceased to be the whole 
Jewish nation* an& became Instead a "righteous remnant"} and 
|n addition# the need fo# a Messiah came to be recognised by 
many* • /' 
The further point remains* and this i s a cardinal er^or of 
any "philosophy of history'*$ Did the Jew© impose their un4or<* 
standing m the exclusive. .Interpretation of history i n i t s 
entirely? Th^y would undoubt©di4r have saidi Yesi this i s the 
interpretation of history*. However*here an anachronistic note 
becomes, evident i n our reasoning} for I n contrast to a l l modern 
"philosophies, of history 0 there was no genuine: history' against 
which the Hebrew ^philosophy of history" could arrogantly set 
i t s e l f i n opposition# There was only chronicle and other 
"philosophies of history 1'* such as that of the Greens* 
So we may say* and t h i s applies equally to the lew 
Testament* that |n the Old Testament w# have many of the 
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elements of the "philosophy of history"! but the historical 
content i n which i t w;a^  held ma&es i t significantly different 
from the modem "philosophies of history" which we have discussed 
previously1 i n this thesis* Nonetheless*, at one p^oint at least * 
we see the Jewish, philosophy of history" performing a disservice 
Characteristic of a l l such schemes! for one of the important 
factors i n the Jews rejection of Jesus, as th# Christ was the 
fact that there was no place i n their "philosophy of history" 
for a crucified Messiah* 
b* •Ee^na,otment..iis a basis; for history and theology*. 
In the preceding section we have shown why neither history 
nor., theology #a.n proceed on the basis of a. s t r i c t su^4e#|iiile.oi. 
epistemologyii; and we have discussed the types of false h i s i i r y ' 
and theology which arise when such a basis i s used* I t i s now 
our tasJs to describe the basis upon which genuine history and 
theology can be wrltt@n t and to characterise the results which 
can be expected, from this approach* This positive statement 
w i l l serve a secondary purpose i n strengthening our argument 
as. to the inadequacy of the s t r i c t subjeot^objeot approach to 
history and theology-*. 
Each of the men whom we have studied has eicamined ani 
described, the process by which a genuine isnewledge of historical 
events can be achieved> Although the terminology has. varied* 
this process has- been essentially the same i n each casej and. 
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this i s true i n spite of the fact that some of the men have 
spoken as historians and others as theologians* We w i l l c a l l 
t h i s process "re*enaotment"* I t i s only through a process of 
wre*@naotmentw that i t i s possible to arrive at a genuine 
knowledge of historical events* The definition of "re-enactment 
i n i t s simplest and least qualified form iss the process i n 
which the contemporary historian or theologian on the basis of 
"pre^understahiing" enters into the situation described i n 
the pertinent documents? insofar as possible identifies himasif 
with that situation* including i t s point of view and presupposi* 
tions; and under the .strict, control of the documents c r i t i c a l l y 
,fce«enacts''and questions the events i n order to find the answer 
to one or more questions about them* Now l e t us review the 
various waye i n which this abstract and composite definition 
of'Jpe-tenactment "has %o expressed* 
I t was Vico who f i r s t gave coherent and selS-conscious 
expression to the process of "re-enactment"^ and saw i t s 
Importance for history* Two of his most fundamental "axioms" 
state his position concisely i n this matter* "The nature of 
things i s nothing but their coming into being (nascimento) at 
certain times and i n certain fashions*"^ This i s again 
expressed from a slig h t l y different angle i n the words? "Doo* 
trlnes must take their beginnings from (the beginnings) of the 
matter which they t r e a t * " N f c V That is to sayf i f we are to 
(1) The New 3cienoefPar» 147, 
(S) The New Science*-par* 314* 
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Imow the nature of a document 03? an event we are not merely 
$0 accept i t s content as a building ©tone which can he stacked 
up with other such stones to form history; rather we must study 
specifically and concretely the way i n which that document? or 
event came into being* i fe## i ^ must be "re-enacted"t The 
second "axiom" which we have quoted says this also* but rejects 
hy implication the idea that this process of "re-enactment" of 
the original event can be short-circuited "by appealing to the 
"authorities" on the subject we are studyingt Vice goes on to 
elaborate this position by firmly maintaining (however deficient 
his practice) that this process of "re-enactment" of historical 
events (which he refers to as the factum) must at a l l time© he 
guided by philosophy (the varum) * By philosophy Vioo meant* as 
did Croce and Collingwood after 1 him* not a metaphysio but 
systematic and rational thought about historical event* This 
process of "re-enactment" i s not emotional or mystical* bu| 
consistently'rational* However uneven the results* this was 
the foundation of Vieo's etymoiogiiaingj his reconstruction of 
the three ages of the G-ods of the heroes and of menj his. recon-
struction of the "true Homer" etc* In the development of these 
two "axioms" we have a statement i n i t s essential form of the 
process of "re-enactment" upon which genuine history and theology 
are cased* 
This same essential position i s stated by Crooe and 
Goliingwoodj the former* as we have seen* i n rather elegant 
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terms,,, and the. l a t t e r more mattei?*of^ fa©tly« Groee t e l l s us-
that Mstory i s not; the .juggling of historical events which 
have been accepted from ^ l^ he "authorities" and affirmed as 
objectsj rather i t , i s the thoughtful "re^enaotaent'' of specific, 
concrete events t (This; "re*enaetment" involves "prerunderstand-* 
ing" and. the other factors discussed i n the preceding section*) 
For e^mple* i t i s only .through,th$ historical study or "re* 
enactment" of the process of thought i n a specif ic documents ; 
e«g»:f Desostrteja*' .A. ftiBeourae on Method^ that X come to know 
anything of: the "universai" which Oroce calls " t r u t h " * ^ ) Xn 
other Instances it,might be a painting, a treaty or an invasion^ 
which, i s "re*enacted" or recreated i n the mind of the histor (ian| 
and i t i s i n this way that one comes to know something of "truth 
••beauty"* "goodness" or "utility"---r<}roee*s four "universals"?*-
as the case may be. We are not interested i n Crooe's sy sterna* 
tidi n g of the end product of this process into "universals"*; 
but we are interested i n the process i t s e l f * This process is. 
i n every case an historical process i n which the historian*; on 
the basis of %re*uM@rstanding" and membership i n a receiving 
group* "re«enaets" or recreates a specific historical event i h 
order to f i n d the answer to certain questions which he has 
about that event* The genuinely real i s that which i s known 
i n this way* 
(1) Oroce would not deny that this philosophical treatise 
exists as an object or thingj but as such i t i s valueless 
as a source of understanding or truth* 
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The implication of this.. w i d e r B t i ^ l s ^ ' l w ; t ^ t . a l l hlatospy-
i s contemporary history* The documentsf painting@* archaelogloal 
remains, etc* with which the historian i s concerned are a record 
of former l i f e # The " s p i r i t " of the historian t as Oroce terms 
i t | works upon the / l i f e 0€/these various records of past l l f e i 
records which are past manifestations of " s p i r i t " * i n part 
the historian works i n terms of logic and deductive thought$ 
and i n part i n terms of i n t u i t i o n and imagination which he brings 
to hear upon the documents* Through this process the record of 
past l i f e i s "re**enacted"j i t comes to l i f e again i n the l i f e 
and mind of the historian? i t becomes contemporary! History i s 
this unity of the record of .past l i f e together with the c r i t i c a l 
thought of the historian i n which the past comes alive and con** 
tinues to l i v e i n the present* With the hope that we w i l l be 
interpreted neither with undue literalism nor mystically^ we 
would joi n Oroce i n saying that history i s "knowledge of 
eternal -present"«^) 
Collingwood puts this same point of view i n a more straight*: 
forward way* In an h i s t o r i c a l study of* again l e t us say 
Descartes1 fa Discourse on Method» the historian f i r s t of a l l 
identifies the problems which Descartes i s trying to answer? 
he must think the problems out for himself, including the 
various possible solutions; and he must -understand why the 
author chose the particular solution which i s found i n the 
( l ) Theory and Historv of HIatoriOKraphv. t>»61. i t a l i c s Croce's, 
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document* This, means rethinking, recreating or "re*emcting:tt 
the thought of the author after him* By this we do not mean that 
the emotions and related ideas which may have oome to Descartes 
• •X 
during the writing of A Piscourse on Method can "be recaptured* 
fh i s i s clearly impossible* But the thought insofar as i t i s 
recorded i n the document can and must he rethought or "r©*enao* 
ted". I f for any reason We cannot "re-enact" an event or 
document from the pastj then that event remains lodged i n the 
pastj non^contempo^ary and inaccessible* I t i s thus a "dark" 
event, and possibly part of a "dark age"f i*e,> an age so alien 
to our way of thinking that everything i n i t remains ft to one 
degree or another* "dark"* Here we see (as i s ooiwaonly reeog* 
nized) that not only i s the l i f e of a particular age conditioned 
hy the limited or historically conditioned point of view of that? 
age> but that also our own knowledge of that age (and hence i t s 
re a l i t y for us) i s conditioned and limited by the point of view 
of our own timet . 
An integral part of this whole understanding of history 
originated by Vico and developed by Croce and Collingwood i s 
that event ahd interpretation arise together* This statement 
i s not to he perversely understood to mean that events exist 
solely i n cur minds* For exaraple, Caesar's invasion of Britain 
could "exist" apart from any "re-enactment% interpretation 
and understanding of that event} say as an entry i n the mstnu-
script of an ancient chronicler* But that "existence" i s use* 
lessi i t telUs us nothing about Caesar* Romet Britain,* military 
history or anything else. We could not even defend the "exls* 
tenoe" of this event against a sceptic except to say that aome 
chronicler said i t took place* I t would he an utterly "dark" 
event* 
The genuine, useful existence of an event arises with the 
"re-enactment% understanding and interpretation of that eventj 
and i n this "re«enactm@nt" i t takes i t s proper placeiin the 
coherent historical record* How i t s escistenc^ can he a source 
of enlightenmentj we can defend i t s exiitence^ discuss i t s 
relevance to other events etc* "The nature of things j[their 
"existence"'] i s nothing but their coming into being (nascimento^ 
at certain times and i n certain fashions*" And implied i n this 
statement i s the necessity of Knowing (understanding, interpret* 
ing) the time and fashion i n which the "things" came into being* 
Apart from this knowing we do hot Know their nature ?. and con* 
sequentiy we cannot say anything useful about them* I t i s i n 
this sense that we say event and the interpretation of that 
event arise together* 
I n the f i r s t part of this chapter we have shown the simi** 
l a r i t y between history and theology i n regard to certain impor*. 
tant but preliminary matters, e,g#jp "pre«#understanding"* receiv-
ing groups, the importance of the attitude of concern etc* 
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Then*, i n the immediately preceding paragraphs* we went on to 
desorib© the nature &nd rol© of %©^naetm©nftM i n hiatorioai 
investigation* ShJU ©oncis© descriptionhas arisen out o£ 
extensive; examination of Vico* Croc© and Collingwood i n Part I l | 
and the defense and elaboration of this description given i n 
Part I I need not "be repeated her®* Now we move on to th© aom* 
parison of the nature and role of ''re^emotment1' i n * respootively 
history and theology* This i s not* as "before $. a preliminary 
matterj "but on© whieh i s absoluMy fundamental to both* Regard* 
ing t h i s , what* do we find, i n th©ologyi and especially i n the 
theology of Bultmann and Tillioh? 
Bultmanii .as&s:m rhetorical;^! " i s not f a i t h simply tft© 
hearing of Scripture as th© Word of Godl* 1^ But hoy does th© 
. b©i'i©ter "h©'aff $hi£ |& not a rhetorical ^©stion* fo£ there ar©^  
a variety of possible answers constantly I n use*. Theise : a^swerf 
are of two ma^or types, (Of course^ a particular individual ; 
w i l l not necessarily cbnf in© himself conslsten'l&y to on© typ© 
or th© other)* On© type of answer grows out of th© aeqeptane© 
of th© s t r i c t s^3©ot~ob4©c^ and. i t resultB- in, 
"diot&tioh" theories of Scripture* Fundamentalizm (both S# ss 
and Merioan vari©ti©#) * proof tenets*, th© acceptance of Sorip^ur^ 
as containing propositionai truth which tan "be applied directly 
to ooutemporary situations etc;* Hone of the factory such as 
'*pr©*u«4©rBtandingw i n of any use to th© parson who accept0 this 
(1) Kerymaa.: and Evthy -p^gQl* 
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type, of answer to the question of how • Scripture i s heard as 
the Woxd of God* 
The other, type of answer i s that,,; on the basis of "pre* 
understanding" 'and membership I n a receiving group (in this case 
the Church), the hearer enters into a direct relationship with 
the events described i n Scripture* He hears them as personal• 
proclamation directed to him and calling for his obedient 
response, A specific problem of Scripture (e*g#, Paul*s "Who 
w i l l save me**.*") which i s described as Paul's problem i s * 
through the process of "r@~enactment", seen to be an "eternally 
present" problem? and more particularly* a problem for the 
hearer*© own l i f e * Through this process the hearer becomes 
identified with the author* and as a result Paul *s answer (Jesus 
aa- the Christ) i s no longer a formal^ conceptual possibility 
but a l i v i n g possibility* The hearer i s brought within the 
power of the answer* And when his response to this powerful 
answer i s one of f a i t h f u l obedience, then the word of Scripture 
has brought forthcthe Word of G-od i n that person*s l i f e , 
Z% i s now entirely i n order i f at this point the believer 
wishes to proceed to describe propositionally the answer which 
he has received* Indeed;, i f he is a theologian* he i s bound to 
proceed to some extent i n this ways as, for example* when we 
conceptualise the process of "re-enactment"* There i s xw 
necessary antithesis between l i v i n g ("re-enacted", existential) 
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and propoaitional knowledge of God* but there Is a very serious 
question of p r i o r i t y between the two* 
"Re-enactment" i s not a guasi-hiologicaX process i n which 
there i s a development or unfolding of one's own inherent 
pos s i b i l i t i e s * I n both history ahd theology "re-enactment" i s 
always a response to and interaction with an event which i s 
external to the historian or theologian* Further* this approach 
to Knowledge i s the Very opposite of any subjectivism; for i t 
t e l l s us to loofc f i r s t of a l l outward to historical event* and 
not inwardly into our own minds* Of course the c r i t i c a l thought 
of the inquirer then enters into union with the event* but even 
here this "inward" element of the historian's or theologian' @• v 
thought remains under the s t r i c t control of the event* 
There i s another sense* ahd one which i s quite compatible 
with what we have just said,* i n which i n "re-enactment" we do 
see an unfolding of innate human possibilities* For the histo* 
rian these are the innate possibilities which belong to man as 
a rational being* For the theologian these are the innate 
possib i l i t i e s which belong to man as being i n the "image of 
God"| a concept which includes the idea of man being a rational 
being* However the decisive factor which enables the possibili* 
t|:es of being i n the "image of God" to come to expression* which 
enables the lord of God to appear i n our lives,* i s . not innate 
but comes from God who has spoken to us i n Jesus Christ. I t 
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i s thla Generate mot .apprehended through %©wenaetmentM and •. .'. 
responded to in • f a i t h f u l obedience which exurfblaa ua. t© re&liae 
the hmsm u$QmiMltty*«*»*if we May .no^  w w w i t .a©***-** 
esdapi&g froia our a®lf*oenteredn@Ba and pride and being eon-
formed to Ohrlet* 
• l a our diaeuaaien of Tlixicoi WJawa aaea this' aana under* 
standing-of faith 'deaeribed i n t e w of "fete and frea&osfi'V By ' ' 
*'fate" i s meant that i n the process of wre*emctia@»t° t under* 
stand my hlatorioal fate to be connected with the historical, 
fai'e « f tfe&ua Oteiit|,' that ay hifctojioaX fate of being the person 
X aa .4* related, to: finds i t a Meaning i n the historical "fate '•' 
wfeieh l a dajgoribed i n to Hew Tastam@»t*-^he kerygma. By 
:- "freedom** le mmt. that though the process of M3?e*«enaetia©at" 
X decide freely to faapo&d isi ebediene© to the fate of Jeana-, 
•••Christ as described i n the Mew Testament* The recognition of 
the event of *feaua ©ntfiat m the siga*evenV the aavlisg event 
f or &y l i f e esmnot take place apart, from my free decision to 
respond to that 'att%: tfaattft/aa the Christ , ia not an "object"} 
he doea net as lat jaa. J S f f i f i E j t a g ( a s miracle) apart from ay 
free paqpogtae to him* sign-event and f a i t h i n that sign~ev@n* 
apiae together* And on the lavax of fimoti^nal deaeription thia'" 
pvoaaaa corresponds osaetly to the fact- that for the historian 
event and interpretation arise together*. i»e#* u n t i l the hia* 
torian haa "re^naeted" an event-« and out of hie freedom made 
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a decision about the meaning of that event,.until this has. 
happened that event does not exist as a meaningful* valuable, 
enlightening historical fact* Event and interpretation arise 
together* 
This understanding of "re-enactment% f a i t h and sign-©vent 
(miracle) applies not only to Jesus Christ,* but also to sign* 
events as a whol$* Our whole position commits us to the view 
that i n every case sign-event and f a i t h arise together* I t i s 
true that i n the New Testament the sign-events performed by j 
Jesus were, i n accordance with the general belief of the time* '• 
sometimes accepted apart from f a i t h i n Jesus as the nets of a 
"wonder worker"* (Even here there was a distorted kind of f a i t h ' 
at work) the event i s seen or interpreted as "wonder?1*) However 
the sign~events were never accepted as Jesus wished them to be 
accepted (i*e# j,; as signs pointing to the Father) apart from 
f a i t h i n Jesus* Once again this i s to say* i n opposition io 
much talk about miracles* that miracle or sign*event cannot, be 
known and used objectively as props for our faithf but can only 
be known as one responds i n f a i t h f u l obedience to "the proclaim* 
ing| accosting* demanding^; and promising word of preaching' 1*^ 
What i s the part of the Holy Spirit i n this? I t i s from 
beginning to end the work of the Holy Spirit • The Holy Spirit 
i s He who leads us to Christj and what we have done here i s to 
describe concretely the way i n which He leads men to Christ* 
(1) As always we are interpreting Bultmann-'s characteristic 
v/ord "preaching" as including Scripture* preaching, 
sacraments etc* 
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The--Holy Spirit, i s not more real, as some people astouMingly 
when the work of the Holy Spirit i s abstracted from the historical 
means such as 'pre*understanding? and "re-enactmenttt which He uses | 
to effect His purposes i n human l i f e * Nor are these abstract | 
t$ons any less abstract when they are couched i n pious language* 
The Holy S p i r i t i s at work i n the Church} and more specifically 
and concretely t h i s means He i s at work i n the proclamation* i n 
the whole process of 'pre*understanding and "re-enactment"! and i n 
the response of f a i t h f u l obedience i n which historical event i s | 
affirmed as sign*event* In this s p i r i W i r e c t e d process, the l i f e * : 
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ are seen to be ever present1 
r e a l i t i e s | r e a l i t i e s which are and must be created, anew again and 
again |n the l i f e of the contemporary believer? This; i s aa4 ha,© , 
always, been % charaoteristic of f a i t h i n the: Christ, Ani beeauss 
this.; i s so w# cansay that t h i s "always new'** this "always #on*. 
temporary" quality of f a i t h i n Christ i s one important sspest of 
I t s being always the same "yesterday* today and f o r e v e r I f 
t h i s were not the case* i f the Christ <$id not again and again j 
become a l i v i n g r e a l i t y within our livea* then we would have to i 
say that Jesus Christ i s "ever more remote" from the contemporary! 
i 
©asperienee of the Christian people* i 
I t must be this spirit*dirseted process of "re-enactmenty* j 
i n which Scripture becomes the Word of God for us* that Calvin j 
and others refer to when they speak of Scripture as being "self** : 
authenticating"*^ asroxv there i s obviously no such thing as 
(!) gg* Calvin* John* Institutes* 1*7* par* 6« 
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a 8©lfauthenticating statement j but^ a statement can he theo* 
logically authenticated when the Holy Spirit works i n con-Junc-
tio n with Scripture In the process of "re-enactment "* I f this 
i s what i s meant i n such statements, then "8pirit*authenticafing !5 
would he a "better phrase than the very misleading one which i& 
process of 3pirit*»authentieation which does take place when the 
words of Scripture are received as the Word of God* On the 
his t o r i c a l side the analogue of this i s the "interior verifioa* 
the document which takes place when the historian c r i t i c a l l y 
"re-enacts" the thought of that document, and finds i t to he 
• true;*: >.:i,.. 
I f this i s the work of the Holy Spirit i n "re^enaetment" 
and i n the receiving of Jesus the Christ* then when i s this 
work of the Holy sp i r i t stifled? I t is s t i f l e d whenever we do 
not l i s t e n attentively to the problem posed i n the proolamatidni 
and this includes most especially a translation of that problem 
into i t s contemporary terms* I t is s t i f l e d whenever our think-
ing i s not controlled by the documents (Holy Scripture)? and 
this includes l e t t i n g them control the use we make of customs 
and traditions ancient and modem» I t i s s t i f l e d whenever we 
uncr i t i c a l l y l e t some "orthodoscy" become an authority f or usj 
5 
more commonly used* But be this as i t may* i t i s 3ust this 
t i o n " which Croce speaks of This i s the verification of 
(1) Cf* Croce, p* 
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and whenever we follow a s t r i o i ©ub^ ee1^ ob|e0t ©pistemolegy 
and thereby come to regard the documents as a ttsoure#tt of 
doctrines and miracles which ©an be used objectively as supports 
fo r our f a i t h and as weapons- against the unfaith of others* tn 
a l l of these lll^fotinded attempts we see the notes of detachment 
and analysis* charaoteristic of what T i l l i e h has called "con-
t r o l l i n g fcnowledg©,lf and this points to the unconscious inten* 
tion of th i s S p i r i t ^ s t i f l i n g attitude which isr--Niibeit i n the 
name of $0&****t0 control, God* We have opposed to this an 
attitude i n which the notes of detachment and, analysis are 
present but not dominant! an attitude which sees the process 
of Mre*enactmentw as the means of approach to Scripture * and 
which contains as the predominant notes those of participation* 
tinder standing and the expectation of receiving* 
We have spoken of the process of 0re*en&ctmentw as the means 
whereby Holy Scripture i # received as the Word' of God* This i s 
dependent revelation* As we stated In the f i r s t part of this 
chapter I dependent revelation i s dependent upon the original 
revelation received by the prophets or apostles and recorded 
i n scripture.*, Dependent revelation is. different f#oa original 
. revelation i n that the contemporary believer i n contrast 
to the prophets or apostles brings a d i f f ©rent world^iiew 
and hence a modified "pjpewunderstanding** to the revelation* 
I t i s also different i n that* f o r example* he receive^ 
not simply ifesus the Christ* but Jesus the Christ* 
as«received«by*the*apostle^ ^ This fact introduces a whole 
series of factors into the receiving of the revelation which were 
not originally present* 
On the other hand there are many similarities i n the way i n 
which dependent and original revelation i s received! and these 
similarities far overshadow the differences* We could state 
this similarity i n summary form by saying that the process of 
"re-enactment" i s essentially the same for the apostles and '•• 
for the contemporary believer* This means., more particularly^, 
that i n both i t i s directed by the Spirit and i t s locus i s the 
Churohi and that i n both the factors of wpre**understanding,?f 
hearing and the decision to obedience play their essential part* 
I t i s the same i n both because the apostles also brought a 
,^pre<-underBtanding1, to the encounter with the Christ! "Wwy $ 0 0 
lived i n a community of"'concern (the Jewish people) which had 
i t s particularprcblemsj and they too (and above a l l Peter) 
could no more than ourselves accept the words and acta of 
Jesus as self-evident blocks of divine truth out of which a 
f a i t h could be b u i l t * I n short, they too participated i n the' 
same essential process of "re-enactment" i n order that Jesus 
of Nazareth might become for them the Christ* For the apostles | 
the three year ministry must have been just this process, and ' 
including many failures (e«g*,: requests for precedence i n the 
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that Jesus* relationship to the father was one which bear a 
some positive a f f i n i t y to the relationship which exists between 
man and G-od| a relationship which we have described here i n 
terms of Spirit^directe^ "re-enactment11 • 
Histoid and the^ .Hjoly: B!p^ r^ .*.. fe have insisted upon the .. 
many parallels both as to method and content between historical 
and theological "re**enactment"f and upon the essential part 
played by the Holy Spiri t i n the la t t e r * , This raises the 
question* Pan we say that the working of the Holy Spirit 4a 
theological "re-enactment1' i s paralleled by a similar working of 
the Holy Spirit i n his t o r i c a l " r e - e n a c t m e n t I f we deny t h l ^ 
Similarity then we are saying that insofar as truth i s achieved, 
by the h i s t o r i c a l process* i t i s achieved without the Holy Spi r i t * 
I t would follow from this that the " s p i r i t of truth' 1 i s only the 
s p i r i t of certain kinds of truth * and thi# would be presumably 
the "reiigious" truth which i s to be found i n a "holy history" ; 
which easiets without an organic- connection with a l l otiies? t r u t h 
and history. In fact the ejeistenee of a separate "religious^ 
truth i» the necessary ba.s>i'& for a distinct "holy history*? whiofc 
i s conceive^ of as being separate from a l l other history, altho* 
ugh the two ar e a^aeent in t ime and space * We have previously 
stated our reasons for re Meeting any such radical separation of 
general and religious, knowledge* ^ 
{X) see supra pp. 410ff. 
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. Tii©,. Holy Spiri t £ g at work i n both historical and theolo^-
gieal. "re*©naetment% We Will return'.to this |n the concluding 
eeetien of thie chapter * At this point we only wish to e stablish 
that the Holy Sp i r i t has a different task i n history and i n 
theology* A suggestive way of expressing this difference i s 
to say that i t i s not the task of the Holy Spirit i n historical, 
"re-enactment" to lead us to Christ (the Lojggs.) t; hut only to 
the . truth (the ayaffPffV* similarly* i n theological, Mre*enactmentM 
we are led. to Ohrist (the M0>&)* but not the truth (the logos) 
about Oaesar*'s invasion of Britain or the cause of the French 
Revolution* Theological "re-enactment " leads to the £ojgoj and 
not the logos because i t brings to i t s task the particuiai? 
"pre*understanding° which has arisen out of man's age-long 
relationship with Godj and* second3*yt because i t directs i t s 
attention primarily to those documents (Holy Scripture) ifoieh 
describe the particular events i n and through which God. has • 
chosen to reveal himself to man f u l l y and conx&etely* . In. t h ^ • 
Spirit*directed Inquiry the loffoa i s the Lo&osj.th© t3?Uth f s 
the -;Ghrist'#. • 
Ther© i s % second difference which we can point to when 
we are comparing the role of the Holy Sp i r i t i n historical and 
theelogieal -%©*©na©ijment,f*^  i n the. fact : 
tha^' i n theological ^ ,rre^enactment,, (and i n contrast to histo?i* 
eal "re-enactmentM) when we wish to decide whether or not the 
470 
Holy Sp i r i t i s at worlt i n some particular event or events* we 
have a specific and concrete criterion to appeal to* This 
crit e r i o n is. Jesus the Christ* This criterion Is not, i n 
practice, sufficient to resolve a l l problems as to the presence 
of the Spirit'^-^s the existence of the divisions of the Church 
bear® v i v i d testimony* However* i n historical "re*enaetmentrt 
there i s no one concrete criterion to which one can appeal3 
the jlogoft does not have one but many embodiments* Thus i n the 
case of two quite opposed interpretations of the French 
Revolution there i s no independent criterion to which one ean 
turn for heipj rather, i f one interpretation i s to be fudged 
to be a better expression of the truth of the situation,; then 
this judgment must be based solely upon the historical integrity 
of the preferred account*. 
The Holy S p i r i t | then, i s operative i n both historical 
and theological ',re*enaotmen1>,,j but i t i s operative i n the 
distinctive ways we have described* 
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3. Historical Knowledge as the Only Approach to God* 
The "basis of historical and theological knowledge i s "re* 
enactment"* I f we accept t h i s , then the question presents i t * 
-
self: Just what i s i t which permits i t s e l f to he the subject 
of "re-enactment"? Vice has given us a concise answer to this 
question i n the formula? yerum et factum convertuntur. l»e»» the 
condition of knowing truth (verum) i s that the knower should 
have created i t (factum)* This, of course, does not mean that j 
I can only know those things which are my own personal and 
original creations* Rather i t i s meant that the condition of 
knowing anything i s that mankind has created i t (e,g., as Euclid 
has created Euclidean geometry), and that I persDnally am able 
to recreate or !'-re~enact" that creation* Since i t has been 
created by man once, so i t can subsequently be recreated by man, : 
Therefore, that which lends i t s e l f to're-enactment1' i s the 
entire cultural residuum} a l l that man has madej a l l of history* • 
And i t i s through the "re-enactment" of specific examples of 
what man has made that we come to know i t s nature j that we 
come to know the truth expressed i n that specific creation, as 
well as the truth about man who has created i t . 
I n Croce this same basic idea i s greatly elaborated* He 
speaks of the human " s p i r i t " which comes to know and develop 
i t s e l f as i t investigates specific, concrete acts of thought. 
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e*g#, a painting! treaty* philosophical treatise etc* This 
process "by which "acts of thought" are investigated and the • 
"spirit 1?- comes to know i t s e l f : i s the process of "re-enactment"« 
For Croee this process i s the historical process« and as . such i t 
i s identified with philosophy,. (By "philosophy" Croce does not 
mean a metaphysic but a methodologyj namely, 3ust this historical 
process of "re-enactment")* 
The implication of.this position i s that reali t y cannot be 
i 
i 
known i n i t s essence alone»• hut only i n i t s embodiment i n "the ' 
entire wealth of the developed form" § ^ The study of "the 
entire wealth of the developed form" (the factum) i s history$ 
i t i s the study of " s p i r i t " i n I t s particular* concrete mani* 
festations* For Croce this process of thought thinking histo%;. 
i s the only conceivable source of value (meaningfulness> use* 
fulness, truth about re a l i t y ) for the human enterprise* ^ 
...  Man only knows that which he has made* This i s the position; 
which our historians have established for us i n the realm of 
history,. Is i t possible to maintain the same position i n theologj 
and say: Man*s only knowledge of God i s discovered i n that which 
man has made? Th0 answer which .we give to this question w i l l 
depend upon our view of man* history and the created order i n 
general*. (For, as we said i n the Introduction, the understanding! 
which we have of history has implications which reach out into 
(1) see p.... 15.8, supra. 
(2) CSfeg pp. 159£tzOgupsa. nd"'.. 
(3) Collingwood i s not included i n thiB review as, on this pointj he does not contribute anything beyond that which i s stated by Vico and Croce «> 
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the t o t a l i t y of Christian doctrine)* Obviously, i f ow view 
of man, history and the. created order is one which assumes that 
i t i s more or less alien to ©odj or, to put i t the other way 
around* i f our doctrine of God i s such that i t assumes that man, \ 
history and the created order i s alien to Himj i f this i s so, 
then i t would be necessary to reject the position which we w i l l 
maintain her®* Ehis position i s j Our only knowledge of God i s 
discovered i n that which man has made* We w i l l develop this 
position! and then proceed to state the understanding of the 
created order upon which this position rests* 
Our only knowledge of God i s discovered i n that which man 
has made* Shis i s a less ambiguous statement of what is meant 
When i t i s said that Judaism and Christianity are historical 
religions| or that our knowledge of God (the content of revela-
tion) i s hi s t o r i c a l l y given* Our knowledge of God arises out . 
of our "re-enactment" of the human acts and words| primarily 
those recorded i n the Old and New Testaments* ahd espeoially xout : 
of the acts and words of the prophets and Jesus Christ. What- v; 
ever else we may want to say about these acts and words* they 
are the actions and words of men taking place i n time and space# 
S'hey are not, i n any ordinary sfcnse * causally related to God or 
any other transcendent source3 anymore than the world as a whole ; 
Is causally related to-God, (the cosraological argument)* In 
saying this we are accepting unconditionally the seriousness of 
our concrete situation i n time, 
4?4 
As a part of this saiae unconditional acceptance w© agree 
with Bultnenn when he s&yss "X am interpreting theological' 
affiratations as assertions about human l i f e * ' - 3 ^ By this i t 
i s apt meant that we are to rest content i n a aelf'-suff ieient 
finitud© oa? "naturalism'* which i s satisfied to m&tee assertions 
only about human liffa* Bather those a f f i x a t i o n s ar© theolftfl- ' 
Meal affirmationsj (led |g to be discovered i n human l i f e * 
•Tlirough the process of Mre*en^etiaentM which w© have described 
wo respond i n f a i t h f u l obedience and affirm that i n these .asser* 
tions about human l i f e (Sod i s reveale&j and supremely this i s 1 
00 i n our assertions about the human l i f e of «feau& of laaareth* 
I t needs to be iaad© very clear at this point that we are 
nat saying that 0o& i s related to these hunjanj historical ©vents 
which form th$ basis of theological aff istaation as cause i s 
related to ef£oet* fhe eternal is not the cans© of f i n i t e acta 
and words,* Bather w© are saying that i t i s i n * and only i n * 
these acts and words that Sod i s diseovere&j these acts and wQud& 
are sign-wonts which point to God* Tim transcendent i s isaraanent 
i n hwaan. history* Ihe eupx:>ort for this position is$ and can 
only be, the conviction' which X share v/ith the Church that i n 
the nr#-»enaotsaent,, of the historical events recorded i n Qeripture 
we are pointed toward and put i n relationship with God? that 
his Holy S p i r i t coiaes to dwell within us* and we are led to do 
his w i l l * Xt i s i n this sense that i t can be said that God i s 
(&) Keryama,.and Mythy p»10?» Gf • r f i l l i e h * i^anl, .$ys,t_enartlfe. %edlo&y« x , n»§66* 
«at work i n historyV .Sh this •sense too we iaay say that (jod i s 
a causal factor In history? "but never i n any ^supernatural1' .sense 
Which would oircunivent the .historical process and human ,re>*©nact*' 
jaent*f never i n the sens© of divine f l a t interfering with this 
natural and historical process. In a l l this .«© see that the tra*»-
dl t i o n a l l y understood concept© of "natural *t and "supernatural% 
In their application to the problems of religious fenowlodge at 
least, are aisleading* 
• in his recent -Pyo^ emB off-Helicons .ffljip^eflpas. Peter Uwxz 
egresses* although i n a- very different terminology from our own* 
a point of View $hieh ha© iflany points of similarity with that 
which vm have "been advocating i n the preceding pages* Freely 
toorrov/ing'froia Mun0*.«i tdx^&o&o&rt i t might "be helpful, to.ro* 
etat© hrief l y our cm position i n the following \ ? a y i ^ $he sub* 
;}ect matter of Christian theology Is and can only he certain 
•specif ie • events, i n space and tliae which have been received and 
continue to he received t h t * o i ^ the process of theological tt*** 
enactment*** fhese • events (e.*.g!t j Jesus.of Nasareth as the Christ) 
are not "supernatural11« i f hy that i s meant that they are "eau* 
sed" hy aed*s nor are they "natural", i f "by that i s meant 
tiiat they are looted upon s t r i c t l y as empirical events i n space 
and time* Bather* they are empirical ©vents .perceived i n a 
(1) Buns* Peter # Prohlffas. of Heliploua Knowledge« SOLI Press* London* 1989* Qh»XXX Qt^&^m, Char statexaeht here does 
not pretend to describe mml@ point of view} i t i s simply 
a oorrowing of some of hie terminology i n order to c l a r i f y 
our own position* 
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v & & m M X way*. i * e«*: by a receiving grotip ( t o CMroh) which,:. . 
under the guidance, of the Holy s p i r i t | /brings i t r Mpre*u»derstand* 
ia$ r t to bear ;-1jp©» the empirical event© i n Queatioa* In Kims^ sv 
terms* an event so perceived i s a "symboltt$ and the syiabol* i n 
contrast to the empirical historical r e a l i t y whioh gave rise to 
the symbol* i s made by man, such a symbol neither '"stands f w " 
Cod* noi? i s i t a prepositional statement ab^ui God* Eather* the 
ifrmboi points us toward Hi©* The content of revelation i s human* i 
^ c r i t i c a l * h i s t o t f i e a l * * ^ ^ simply, theolqgioai^^hQught about . 
• these emboli* . 
>f$B»8 are in agreement with the historians to the extent, 
that w© believ® that knowledge* includi&g our knowledge of 
God* .depends upon historical experience* Aad i f we; agree- with 
them i n t h i s t then we are further bound to agree with them that • 
a l l of our knowledge i s historically Conditioned* Historical 
knowledge i s the daughter of a specific historical timej i t 
shows the limitations of i t s time* And i f a new t i ^ %ringg ' •. :i 
f o r t h new knowledge $ then with i t come new limitations*^ :.Hiitp«* • 
r i e a l knowledge never gives us absolute knowledge* ^hiei i s tsftie''.;: 
of a l l of ota? toowledgeof God* both as that i s e3Cperieneed by ; 
the Church and by tlm individual Christian, In the Chur^i the 
revelation to Moses was succeeded by the revelation to the 
prophets t and th i s ixi turn was followed by the revelation i n 
Christ* * i o h w i l l i n turn be succeeded when we "meet God faeey 
to fao®"* She Church i s ''•being on the way11* as i s also the 
individual Christian who i s constantly presented with the possi«* 
b i l i i y i n his own hist o r i c a l experience of the Holy Spiri t open-
ing to Mm further "dependent" revelations of God« "The past 
from wMch every -pTOent springs i s not a determining pastf 1 
but a past • of faring to the pi#s©afc:cth© problems which demand - • 
solution or development*1*^ 
This reminds us of the idea o^resaed througliout the three 
historians whom w© have studied* and which found i t most devd* ' 
toped egression i n Crooes namely» that hlatozy i s the process' 
111 i t i i c h the human , ,spi3pit w moves toward an ever f u l l e r realisa* 
tie.a of . i t s nature* Concerning this* and froma theological 
point of viewy we may say that history i s the x^reeeas i n whion 
GfQ&*s Holy Sp i r i t has moved toward an ever f u l l e r manifestation 
of i t s iiaturet The Hoiy -Spirit which "spolse "by the prophets1' 
I s the same Spi r i t t&tich Jesus reveals to us as ^osforte* 1** 
Yet what a different Spi r i t the one i s from the, otheri The 
HoSLy^Spirifi too has progressively manifested i t s e l f i n history* 
Bom© w i l l wiah to ©mphasiao at tMs point that the imperfect; 
S p i r i t manifested i n the prophets i s the same Spirit revealed to 
us thpotigh <3esu# Christ$ and that our conception of the^dnead 
4s; ©noh that w* arebound to •believe that ttoo Holy Spirit as v ; 
auoh was always the saaet eternally perfect* we would 
t©2^ 1$lv©ly agree with t h i s statement, but at the same time we 
would wish to emphaeijse in, turn that her© we need to "be reminded 
of two things* F i r s t * and more obviously* this statement about 
the nature of the Holy Sp i r i t i s an historieally based 
and conditioned statement # secondly> and lees obviously| 
statements about the Holy Spirit being - "always the 
same" are not -the, straightforward assertions which 
(3-) M^om..Mt4.,3^h^jo^pm P.133* 
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they are usually ta&en .to la©,;., ..cannot, ^ peefe. objectively .and 
.• . straightsorwardly of the nature of the, Holy 3pirit# as we can 
of the nature of the oart»on atom* as having been "always the • 
sai»eH* As applied to the Holy Spirit ''always the same° i s used 
to .suggest ©uoh notions as "perfeetness"* And while i t i s . 
beyond th® rscope of this thesis to enter; into a description of, 
the 0odhe^d* we would suggest the development of the idea of 
^always the same" i n terms of a static perfect ion i s open to 
question* ^  , 
Xn our eisamination of Oroee we found him saying* i n oon*, 
neotion with the development of " s p i r i t " i n history* that reyela** 
t i o n " i s that which thought gives to thought by weans of ' 
c r i t i c i s m * * * ^ Or to esspress i t more strai^tforwardlys "$h® 
only revelation i s that Which arisen i n th© mind of -the h i s t o r -
ian i n the process of c r i t i c a l thought*'*! and for Crocs c r i t i c a l 
thought has a© i t s basis the "^emetment" of concrete events* 
m conceived of this statement as. a radical • secularisation •<#. 
(1) -ftp*: B©s?&yaev*- lioolas* ffhe ^ anjng. .off...History. Geoffrey Blee 
Londonf 1986* 8..al:,a&s;a3j^"But X am deeply convinced ! that the Christian 4oetrin©; of the immobility and inertia 
of God and the Absolute* and of the offeotiveness of the 
histos»ieai principle dniy i n the created and relative world 
tha # d i f f e r s Essentially from the Ahsplute, i s a purely 
.• ,| exoteric .and superficial doctrine*** (p*4?) "She usual ' 
• • v #;piii^oaop3aieal objections to the po s s i b i l i t y of movement I n th<s in t e r i o r depths of the Absolut© Is a formalist and 
• -ratAgnailsti© one* I t reduced i t s e l f to the argument that 
s^u^aa^assuB^tionsis irreconcilable with divine perfection*, 
since* a l l movement * dastiasf and history postula te an i n * 
sufficiency and,- hence, m imperfection*" (p*60)v '"Of* also •• 
. VMtenduse-j. W.*A*> Qrder^, goodness.. .Olorv^ - 035ford. Uniy©rsity 
Press* London*. 1960* pp*©$*B3'»: 
(2) History as the Story of Liberty* T>aff?i . 
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the* concept of revocation* NeyWiese.it i s a satisfactory 
statement' of what goes on i n the process of,Christian revelation* 
For revelation• i s apprehended,^ received or arises i n the mind of 
the believer through the process of Mre*enact^ttent,, (which | % 
eludes c r i t i c a l thought) of concrete events *. e*g.f # the JSasodusi 
the words of Isaiah*; the person of Jesus the Christ etc* ($he 
use of the phrase %3?ises i n the mind" no wore denies an ob;j@c* 
tiv e correlative to Christian revelation than i t denies a 
similar correlative when the revelation of beauty arises i n the 
mind of the historian studying a Rembrajit paintings) On a 
s t r i c t l y f unctiona^^ level, Oroce*s description here perfectly 
identical with the process of Christian revelation*, Wm distinct 
t i o n between croce and the Christian l i e s i n the content* f h i 
f i r s t difference i n content i s that for the Christian i t i s not 
only the human "spirit*' which is. manifested i n human thought 
about concrete eventsi but also the Holy Spirit* She second 
difference* l i e s i n the fact that for the Christian the process of 
Mre*enactmen|^, of hist o r i c a l events not only reveals their nature 
as beauty* truthij goodness or u t i l i t y (process position)! but 
$hat this process*,, when ttaed theologicaiXyf; also has the a b i l i t y 
to reveal the nature of certain events as si^*eyent# directing 
us. to G-od« I n this we are :im$tdenying or. saying anything less 
than. C'rce.e and the other historians, have said^ rather we. are say-
ing &omethihg more* $h|s "something morew i s the assertion tha"! 
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'eono?$te;events In •-their place : i n nature and history can have 
a transcendent reference} that they can point to God* 
The whole presupposition of this position on both i t s 
h i s t o r i c a l and theological sides i s that the nature or essence 
of anything on the one hand* and i t s historical manifestation 
on the other hand*, are not separate. The historical manifesta-
t i o n when i t i s hi s t o r i c a l l y apprehended has the power to reveal 
the nature of anything*^-*-insofar as that nature can be loaown* 
Beauty i n i t s e l f and the beauty of a Bembraj|i> self~portrait 
are,not separate! rather they are the same* Beauty i s not known 
save i n i t s jaanif ©station i n specific works of art* i n l i k e 
manners, the nature of the Son of God i s not different from the* 
histprioai manifestation of the Son i n Jesus of Xtosareth* 
Insofar as vm know the 3on£ we know Him i n this Jesust She 
process by which we know; anything begins with the apprehension^l; 
of i t i n i t s historical manifestation* 
Ti l l i e h ' s statement of this position* common to a i l five 
of the men whom m have studied* w i l l serve as an excellent 
summary; He easpspeases i t by saying that the joffoa (the idea) 
can only be; grasped i n terms of spefeifio historical eviantsj 
anil; the particular manifestation of a particular Idea he tersm 
th® Kairos of the idea t*W 4figo4» For exariple* Hegel's phi#* ;-; 
iosopiiy i s the BMros (and i n this ease*-|h& Kalros) of German 
Idealism* i t was the historical fate of German Idealism to be 
easpreeeed by Hegel| that fate; i s not alien to t i t , "butrather 
i t i s through the study of the fate* the Kairos of German Ideal* 
ism that we come to know what i t i s * Recognising r e a l i t y 1$ 
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recognising r e a l i t y as i t stand© i n **e historical fate, not 
beyond it**i$he participation of tae ihings £the Kairei] i n 
the idea fthe ^ g o j i j corresponds just as seriously to the part** 
ioipation of the idea i n the thin0aV'^ Tillieh's formula f o r 
thie position^ a position which oaeh of the five mm we have . 
studied has ©pressed i n his own words$ i s j "The Kairoa deter*, 
minesthe :L©go@B*^ ^ 
Moreover 9 the iofffeffi considered as something independent of 
any Kairost ^® loffee. above fate* i s not a possible subject of 
either h i s t o r i c a l or theological inquiry* My discussion of 
history must be* at least by implication* a discussion of par* 
tieu3.ar historieal events; and any discussion of <k>& mus^  be 
based upon partieular historical revelations of ©od*s .nature 
and w i l l * I t i s for t h i s reason that theological affirmations 
are f i r s t of a l l assertions about huma# l i f e , i*e»s assertions 
about specif i e * human* historically conditioned Kairoi; which are 
egressions of the Logos* Above a l l , theological a f f irmationi • 
i s an assertion about one particular human l i f e * one particular 
Kairoa* 3mm as the Christ 4 
At this point i t should beeome clear that the eentrai 
problem of history and the central, problem of theology are the 
(1) $he-.,ftn^^ P*164>* 
(8) Cf* Marsh*© expression "The Order of Knowing certainly 
i s from the historical to the eternal***" Marsh* on* 
XQjt». p*W* ... • **' 
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earn© problem*. The central problem of history centera ground/ 
the interpretation of historical event? i s i t opaque, or can i t 
be an egression, of meaning?$ i s i t Irretrievably i n the pasti -
er oan i t become a l i v i n g part of contemporary ©isperiene©?! 1© 
i t an expression of the reall y real (genuine historical t r u t h ) * 
or does r e a l i t y have a separate existence "above" the event?} 
i f r e a l i t y (the 1OROQ% h i s t o r i c a l truth) i s Reined with historic 
oal event* what i s the nature^f this union? etc* These problems 
have been dealt with at length* , W© have seen that they are also ? 
the central problems of theology* For the theologian the central 
problem i s the interpretation of historical events and especially 
the event of Jesus Christ t i s that event opaque, or can i t become 
the expression of m©aning-*-^ and i f so. what meaning?j i s i t 
lrret0#S.vably i n the past and capable of beiiig ©pressed only 
s t a t i c a l l y and propositlonally* or can i t become a l i v i n g pari 
of contemporary experience?3 Is this event an expression of the^ 
really real (the Logos) or does rea l i t y have a separate exia*' 
tence "above" the event?} i f r e a l i t y (the Logos) i s joined with 
historical event t what i s the nature of this union? etc* Thus 
the historian and the theologian epea& of the same problems, and 
they spoak of them i n much the same way*. The difference i s . not 
that the theologian says less or denies aisything that the 
historian saysj- rather? he i s saying more-* He is. saying that 
the seallfcy which finds expression I n hlstorlpal event 
includes the eternal li.gos» God* And he i s enabled to say t h i s 
because the Holy Spirit reveals an historical event to be a 
aigh*event*; 
This last matter certainly $. at least as far as. e ^ l i c i t 
intention i s concerned, forms a distinction between history 
and theology. Only theology i s e x p l i c i t l y concerned with the 
revelation of God within the historical order* However* we 
have seen that T i l l i c h maintains that the historical and theo* 
logical (and especially Christological) ques'iaons hav@| beyond 
the methodological similarity 3ust discussed* a further 
simii&Pity* And this second similarity raises the question m 
to whether or not the distinction Which we have jjittst made 
betw^en 0histoi*ioal and theological inquiries i s really a radical 
one* Tililoh'e statement of this second similarity can be 
es^ pre seed i n the following way* 
First of a l l * both history and christian (and Hebrew) 
theology have as an important part of their purpose th#:: discern* 
ing of meaning i n history* As we have said several timea^ th|& 
purpose i s a distinctively Hebrew<*Christian on©| and. no one 
would deny (however diverse his formulation of the answer) thai 
the discerning of meaning i n history i s one of the legitimate.' 
purposes of theology!* Nor would any of the historians whom we 
have studied deny that the discovery of meaning %n history 
(however different this meaning might be from that for which the 
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theologian searches) ia the purpose of historical inquiry* 
this raises the question, as to whether or not the distinctively 
HehrefeGfiristian concern for the, discovery of weaning i n history 
has not insinuated i t s e l f into the historical inquiry? (Here 
we need to remember that there i s no genuine inquiry into the 
meaning of history i n pre*Ghristian timea*) And indeed we hay©; 
already quoted Qollihgwoed to the effect that the specifie 
interests of history* and a l l other Inquiries too* have theia? 
origin An, and hay© been isolated from, the realm of theology*®^ 
Secondly* 8$ we have'seen,* E i l l i e h says that history and 
theology (and especially christolo®r) seek "to describe the eon* 
orete point at which something absolute appears In history and 
provides i t with meaning and purpose"* ^  2h|s i s obviously 
true of theology| and as far as the "philosophy of history" i s 
concerned i t |s also obviously true* Ehe "philosophy of history 
seeks to describe a concrete manifestation of meaning i n history 
which gives meaning and purpose to the whole of history* %g»* 
¥ioo*> "ideal and eternal history"* the Enlightenment* Hegelf# 
Prussian state* Harass classless society etc* The direct and 
heavy indebtedness of the "philosophy of history" upon orthodox 
Christian theology i s so obvious* and has been so widely dAs$u«-
esed i n recent lit e r a t u r e * that we need not enter upon i t here. 
However* as we have stressed* the "philosophy of history" pro* 
ceeds upon assumptions which always 3®ad to a distortion of 
histo r i c a l etidenoe* 
( l ) see p.409 supra. 
(3) yh^ Interpretation of Histoyy p.* 243. 
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ihe ^ question^ r e ^ ^ . $ ; thej%.-is the description o£ "the 
concrete point at which something absolute appears i n history 0•: 
also a concern of genuine history as i t i s of genuine theology? • 
Till i c h , : s answer to this question i s aff irmative # ; although he 
admits; that? "Shis problem can be obscured by leayinp; that cona-
cre te point i n history unnamed or rendering i t inyiea.ble by 
general abstract formulations* But the problem cannot be esoaped| 
for history becomes history only through i t s relation to such a ; 
concrete point by which i t • gains meaning*.^^ I 
i 
How does this statement apply to each of the three hist or*- J 
ians whom we have studied? A i l throe agree with T i l i i c h that 
the meaning must be concretes but at what point or i n what j 
specific form doea that meaning appear? Vioo developer a " e i y i i 
li^Ology of divine providence" which reveals an "ideal and;-; • ; \ 
ete'??|ai history"; and i t i s this "ideai and eternal history" '• "; 
whioft provides history with i t s meaning* 3?his is an explicit : 
' . ! • • • . 
attempt to describe a diffuse but nevertheless concrete absolute, 
which has appeared i n history and which. gives meaning to a l l of 
history* However we have seen that this attempt, for a l l of i t s 
greatness, was involved i n the serious shortcomings of the 
"philosophy of history"* 
Collingwoodj whose work i s the least pretentious of our 
three historians, leaves the meaning*giving event of history 
unnamed* He states emphatically that the source of meaning must 
(1) She Interpretation of History. p*S43* 
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not come from beyond history! but must be concretely historical; 
he sets fo r t h a method ("re~enaetraent") by which any such event 
would have to be approached} he says history i s "*for* human 
self-knowledge"* and that this arises out of the historical 
study of human acts* and he indicates (no more) that religion 
enters into this somehow. But he does not identify or explain 
how "human acts" correctly understood provide history with 
meaning and purpose* although his assumption i s that history 
does have meaning and purpose* I f he had been pressed upon 
this point he would probably have said that the most he could Y 
say as a historian i s that events provide their own meanin^^i^fl-^ 
purpose * But here we are back to the idea* which we found so 
unsatisfactory at an earlier point i n our discussion* of state* 
ments or events which authenticate or give value to themselves!u 
I n short,j for Collingwood history has meaning and purpose, but 
the source of that meaning (assuming that we cannot accept 
self^meaning^giving events) remains unnamed* 
The position taken by Croee is*, although expressed much 
more elabora^y^ essentially that of Coilingwood* For Crooe 
value i n history arises through the "re*ensctment,f of historical 
events* and by this process of "re<*enaotment" " s p i r i t " i s deveU 
^oped and comes to know i t s e l f as N " s p i r i t " * The value which 
arises out of this process can be categorized as beauty» truth 
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goodness and u t i l i t y * The value expressed i n these four cate-
gories i s i t s own meaning and purposes there i s no need for any | 
other* Thus| for example, the value of the beauty dlsoovered 
i n paintings by Rembrandt i s self*validating* This i s not 
f i n a l l y satisfactory, although i t i s adequate as a basis for 
a great deal of creative work In history and a l l of i t s ramifi* 
cations* Crooe would undoubtedly have replied to this criticism • 
that i t i s satisfactory for him, andiin any case there i s no 
other source of value* However we are l e f t with the strong 
suspicion that the historical source of meaning and purpose i n 
history has been rendered "invisible by general abstract for* 
mulations"* c, 
T i l l i c h , Croce and Collingwood are agreed^ as to the . . 
form which meaning and purpose i n history must takes a concrete ; ' 
event hi s t o r i c a l l y perceived* . However, they do not agree, and 
here the divergence i s sharpest between T i l l i e h and Croce, as to : 
jjust what that event i s * For Croce i t i s the whole gamut of tgaMj 
which have been his t o r i c a l l y perceived,i*e*,the events containing 
their own meaning and purpose* I t ic* d i f f i c u l t to see that t h i s 1 
gives meaning to history^ and the many philosophers and hlstor* 
ians who would disagree with Croce on this point does not render 
(1) Vice and Buitmann are agreed i n this matter too, but the 
matter i s posed more e x p i i c i t i y i n T i l l i o h , Croce and 
Gollingwoodj and hence we are discussing i t i n terms of 
these; l a t t e r three men* 
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o u r d i f f i e u l t y any :.easier^ Yet , G3?ooe does j>?ooeea wi*h the 
cJpnvicticijft that there'is meaning and purpose - i n history,|! that; 
in i t w© see the development of " s p i r i t t h a t i t i a the story 
of l i b e r t y etc* St i s t h i s which 3eaves us with the strong 
suspicion that f o r Croce there i s "something" i n history which 
enables i t to have the meaning Oroce declares i t to have* and , 
yet which remains unnamed* We are l e f t with the suspicion that 
Croce wishes to have the complete freedom of the autonomous 
hi s t o r i a n ^ and at the same time to a v a i l himself of a meaning 
and purpose i n history v/hich that autonomous history cannot 
provide? that he wishes to eat his oaKe and havei.it too, 
T i l l i c h j on the other hand* s # s thSt the meaning^gi*$S% 
center of history i s the event of Jesus the Christj and that 
t h i s event constitutes history* s meaning and purpose* This 
center i s absolute t; and through the process of "re-enactment'' 
i t i s affirmed as a l i v i n g r e a l i t y w i t h i n vthe context of con-
temporary l i f e , , Admittedly* t h i s affirmation i s a decision i n 
f a i t h about an event, Jesus the Christ, which i s h i s t o r i c a l and 
therefore ambig2ous| and because i t .,$.$ ,ambig£ous i t has received 
Other and non^Christian interpretations* But t h i s i s the nature 
of a l l h i s t o r i c a l knowledge that it-does not provide us wi$h 
absolute t self^authenticating Knowledge* Croce's affirmation 
that h i s t o r y i s history of the " s p i r i t " i s an affirmation about 
ambiguous h i s t o r i c a l evidence which has received many other 
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l&tisrpjTjsii&tlbn^^.Thus-, i n the end t wo 9©© that i t i s on the 
basis of f a i t h and decision that any affirmation i s made that:. 
h i s t o r y i s the history of-, the v i c t o r y of *meanin^ulness over 
meaninglessness $ that history i s affirmed as the history of 
salvation* Here again the problem of meaning i n history and 
the Ghristological problem are seen to' converge», 
Christology today canaot be conditeted exclusively or even 
pr i m a r i l y i n terms of the t r a d i t i o n a l discussion of the two 
natures. Rather, we must f i r s t of a i l approach the event of 
Jesus Christ i n f u l l seriousness as an h i s t o r i c a l event tafcing 
place i n time and space* Christians are quite w i l l i n g verbally 
to accept t h i s event i n t h i s way,, but s i g n i f i c a n t l y they are not 
Wi l l i n g to accept the consequences which come with t h i s accept 
tance* These consequences can be stated i n the following way* 
F i r s t i i t means to give up the notion of God i n t e r f e r i n g with 
the natural and h i s t o r i c a l processj 03? of God ''causing'* the 
Incarnation* where "cause" i s used i n any straightforward and 
ordinary sense» Secondly* i t /ipeans to recognige that the event 
of Jesus-,as the Christ i s * li&e a l l h i s t o r i c a l events^ aiabigleus) 
and that therefore ;j©sus Christ cannot be set up as an objective 
support'for'fa£th#: but can only be affirmed i n f a i t h and &eci** 
&ion« As i n history* .there are ho c ^ e e t i v ^ . •tta&atejypareted. 
fact s * Thirdly* and closely related to what we have ^ust said> 
the event of Jesus Christ must be approach'by the whole process 
of h i s t o r i c a l understanding which we have referred to as 'tee-
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enactment". -And f o u r t h l y , the Christology which i s b u i l t up 
I n t h i s way i s seen to "be not a special, esoteric toiowledge 
growing out of a special "holy history", "but that at many points 
i t i s seen to "be an i n t e g r a l part of human knowledge as a whole* 
As- Jesus Christ points m uniquely to the divine Lpjgp&i so human 
knowledge as a whole can be affirmed i n f a i t h (as. i n the h i s t o r * 
ians whom we have studied) as pointing to the loffos,. And t h i s 
IOKOB• be i t beauty* t r u t h , goodness or u t i l i t y (to use Croee*a 
terminology) i s not foreign to the Lpjga&* I t follows from 
t h i s that the knowledge given to us i n the event of Jesus Christ 
speaks, to us not only about God,but also of history as a whole 
of which t h i s event i s i t s e l f a part* Jesus the Christ, the 
&s 'the center of history i n which a l l p a r t i a l meanings 
( a l l i n d i v i d u a l revelations of beauty* goodness, t r u t h and 
u t i l i t y ) f i n d t h e i r basis and perfection* I f * f o r example., 
his t o r y i s affirmed i n f a i t h to be the story of l i b e r t y (Imag&te' 
any h i s t o r i a n outside of the Hebrew*Christian t r a d i t i o n making 
t h i s statement I ) , then t h i s i s possible f i n a l l y because of the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of l i b e r t y which i s revealed and given to Us again 
and again i n the S p i r i t * d i r e c t e d "re*enaotment" of the event of 
Jesus Christ* 
This p o s i t i o n raises one fundamental problem) namely,* i t 
looks disquietingly l i k e "philosophy of hist o r y " . True, i t 
does not f i n d a p r i n c i p l e of interpretation outside of hi s t o r y , 
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and then impose i t upon hi s t o r y * t n i s center of history 
arises w i t h i n history i t s e l f * Nevertheless, • t h i s center of 
hi s t o r y does have a transcendent reference which l i e s outside 
of h i s t o r y ; and i n any ease one par t i c u l a r event i n history 
•becomes i n some sense determinative f o r the whole of history* 
But i n what sense i s i t determinative? This"is the cr u c i a l 
question. As we have demonstrated, the fundamental error of 
the. "philosophy of h i s t o r y " i s that i t t a i l o r s h i s t o r i c a l evidence 
i n order that i t may conform to the selected center or principle 
of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I f , f o r example * following Toyribee, we say 
that c i v i l i s a t i o n follows a characteristic cycle of emergence, 
growth, l e v e l l i n g Off and declinej then necessarily we have a 
scheme in t o which, with more or less violence, h i s t o r i c a l 
evidence must Toe made to f i t . However* the affirmation that 
Jesus, the Christ i s the event which gives meaning and purpose 
to h i s t o r y does not provide a basis f o r selecting or prejudging 
h i s t o r i c a l evidence* Ohureh'tcentered events are not necessarily 
more r e l i g i o u s l y s i g n i f i c a n t than p o l i t i c a l or economic events* 
and may indeed be much less so. Moreover, there i s no one 
in t e r p r e t a t i o n of any p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l event(s) which can 
be called " r e l i g i o u s t t or "Christian", i . e . , there i s no Christ* 
i a n economics, p o l i t i c s , aesthetics etc. Hor does the position, 
which we are maintaining here even prejudge what,, the h i s t o r i a n 
as h i s t o r i a n s h a l l say about the meaning-giving event of Jesus 
i ' I 
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.Christ$ i*e», i f the h i s t o r i a n can astablish any new f a c t , 
how©v©r embarassing f o r Christian beliefs that f a c t must be 
accepted a M dealt/* w i t i u ^ The Christian i s not a f r a i d that the 
logoff of t r u t h which the historian e x p l i c i t l y seefca i s at 
variance w i t h the Logos who i s the t r u t h * The autonomy of 
h i s t o r y i s not threatened by the position we are maintaining* ' 
I n the realm of time and space^Hln the realm of histor3T w , , w 
there i s no unconditional r e a l i t y which can be heteronomously^ 
imposed upon the autonomy of reason* neither a' "philosophy of 
history*'* no*? & philosophical method* nor a theology can be 
idolatrously i d e n t i f i e d with d e f i n i t i v e or f i n a l t r u t h * And 
i t i s <just t h i s idolatrous claim which has evoked a vehement 
protest from the historians whom we have atudie&j a struggle 
which ? i n fillich*® terms* i s an egression of the age-long 
struggle between autonomy and heteronomyi 
y&faf one more t i l i n g must be said about "philosophy of 
h i s t o r y " * ^ I t ©asplicitly recogniaea, as autonomous history does 
not* that i n d i v i d u a l h i s t o r i c a l meanings are not enough* xt i a 
not enough to be concerned jj j j s j , with the beauty of a pa r t i c u l a r 
p a i n t i n g j the t r u t h of a part&ouXas? treatise , the u t i l i t y of a 
p a r t i c u l a r social systom etc* BJven when th©s© individual mean* 
ings are organised* m i n &roc@* i n t o an intereonneotad aggregate 
i t i s s t i l l . i n s u f f i c i e n t ! $ne "pMlosophy of h i s t o r y " wishes* 
to f i n d a moaning f o r h i s t o r y which w i l l ' provide an illu m i n a t i n g 
•(1) Cf# koberts* 'J?'*A*, History and Chrisftfem iwolgmtyQ* a*P«C«E 
London,. 1960 a m*im*3A9 et pas@i|osB ' 
(&) heteros (strange) + ripinpg- (law)* Sed^mr discussion of t h i o 
term, pp.394^f« supra. 
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content ,£03?. .a^l of the individual meanings i n history* After 
a l l * we would f i n d i t incredible that Mar;$ ^ e n g l e r * Toynbee 
and a l l of the other distinguished men who have w r i t t e n "philo-
sophy of h i s t o r y " were engaged i n an enterprise whieh .was 
without ftnVi v a l i d motivation* The d i f f i c u l t y , as we have con* 
elusively shownj i s that t h e i r attempt to supply meaning f o r 
h i s t o r y %q one which leads, inevitably to the f a l s i f i c a t i o n of 
h i s t o r i c a l evidence and an heteronomous incursion upon the 
autonomy of h i s t o r i c a l study* 
At t h i s point that which i s needed becomes obvious, The 
insight of the "philosophy of history" that there be a deter-
minative meaning f o r history needs to be united with the insight 
of autonomous his t o r y that i t must follow i t s own di s c i p l i n e 
without external interference# This need i s met i n the event 
(the\lialPo;s) of Jesus the Christ which gives history meaning 
and purpose j t h i s event determines the truths the logos of 
history*. He. i s the center of history* and i n t h i s center the 
transcendent meaning of history becomes immanent wi t h i n history$ 
but He claims nothing f o r Himseif} He does not heteronomou&ly 
impose Himself upon hi s t o r y * i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n there i s no 
special, r e l i g i o u s way of "doing" history* There i s not even 
a radi c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between general and B i b l i c a l hermeneutics, 
although each retains the distinctiveness necessary f o r i t s 
respective inquiry (the f i r s t searches f o r the logos, the l a t t e r 
T i l l i o h Qjiaraoteriaes t h i s general type of s i t u a t i o n as 
one of ''theonomy'V Theonomy means* i n the p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n 
joined with the..meaning of history which i s received i n Jesus 
Christ and.through the process, of revelation* She autonomy of 
reason (the Iq&oaQ retains i t s i n t e g r i t y * and the event of 
Jesus Christ (the Logos ) retains i t s o e n t r a l i t y * Neither i s 
imposed upon the other # Eh© ftoffoa and the Logo®;, are d i f f e r e n t ^ 
hut they are tooth grounded i n Godj and because both are groun* 
ded i n God* ttwy s^e not i n c o n f l i c t , I n the theonomous 
s i t u a t i o n both point to God* 
Here l i e s the answer to the problem which we posed iti the 
Introduction to thisthesis»and to which we have returned at . 
several points* This problem i s , on the one hand, that f o r 
the Christian view there i s . i n history a supra*temporal element 
which cannot be reduced to h i s t o r i c a l terms} but which at the: 
same time must not be set alongside of secular history as 
something which i s strange and unrelated* On the other hand 
there i s the r a t i o n a l theory that sacred history i s nothing .. 
( l ) We are using certain concepts of T i l l i e h ' s * but i t cannot 
be assumed that he would agree with the use which i s made 
of them* 
(.a) D i a l e o t i c a l l y i t needs to be said that at a l l times i n 
hi s t o r y sihful, ;man i s tempted to d i s t o r t t h i s difference 
so-that the logos becomes a self^auff i c i e n t rationalism , 
on the one hand, and on the other hand the Logos, becomes 
a heteronomously imposed supernaturalism* 'i'aere i s never 
a complete theonomy* 
( I which we are discuw&i&g that the autonomy of reason i s 
495 
"but a part of general history} a theory which leaves the 
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t f i n i t u d e of secular history untouched* This 
impossible s i t u a t i o n i s resolved by the understanding of his t o r y 
based upon the event of Jesus Christ and the at t i t u d e of 
theonomy* 
The divine* f o r such a state of mind, i s not 
a problem but a presupposition*, i t s Mgiimnne#i»r 
i s more certain than that of anything else* 
This s i t u a t i o n finds egression* f i r s t of a l l * 
i n the dominating power of the religious sphere* 
' "but J& ffliqfo a '*&-y fftcnaftft r e l i g i o n a 
special form of l i f e r u l i n g oer the ather forms* 
Rather r r e l i g i o n !s> the l i f e - b l o o d * the Inixer 
power* the ultimate meaning of a l l . life*» There 
i s no profane nature or his t o r y , no profane ego* 
and no profane world. A i l history i s sacred 
h i s t o r y * 4*{%). 
The confidence of history, i t s courage to be, i s rooted i n 
f a i t h i n G-od as i t s creative ground* V f t , / 
(l.) The Protestant Bra* p*4$* 
( 2 ) PJ1* Systematic Theology, I * p.* 870* 
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